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This study on competitiveness, FDI and technological activity in East Asia 
is the outcome of a research project organized by the World Bank Institute 
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the Japanese and East Asian development management experience and to 
disseminate the lessons of this experience to developing and transition 
countries. The current study is one of a series of such projects undertaken 
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The objective of this study is to examine the degree to which foreign 
direct investment (FDr) and technological activity have contributed to 
export competitiveness and economic growth in East Asia. The links 
between export competitiveness and its main contributory factors, namely 
FDI and domestic technological effort which include R&D, learning-by­
doing, adaptation and copying have not yet been fully explored. The 
ways in which these links are forged differ among countries. Some coun­
tries have placed less emphasis on FDI and the presence of transnational 
companies (TNCs), relying instead on building domestic technological 
capacity through R&D efforts, adaptation and so on. Some others have 
depended largely on TNC presence for their technology development and 
upgrading. 
These differences in the strategies adopted by countries in their technol­
ogy development pose two important questions. They are: (i) what are the 
most effective ways in which technology transfer could take place through 
FDI? and (ii) how to adopt alternative ways of technology development in 
lieu of FDI? 
The first alternative - where technology transfer and market informa­
tion are imported through FDI has several forms. These forms include 
inward FDI, or externalized methods such as licensing, subcontracting, 
original equipment manufacturing (OEM) arrangements and so on. 
Inward FDI transfers take place between TNCs and their overseas 
affiliates and are called intra-jirm technology transfers. The externalized 
methods come under technology spillover where technology transfer takes 
place between TNCs' overseas affiliates and local firms. In the case of 
Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs), intra-firm technology 
xvii 
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transfer was quite common, while in the case of countries like Indonesia 
and Malaysia, spillover was the predominant form of technology trans­
fer from TNCs. 
The second alternative is to place more emphasis on domestic technolog­
ical effort. This involves building R&D capabilities, adaptation of new tech­
nology, copying and so on. Korea, for instance, took the path of building 
domestic R&D capabilities instead of relying on FDI for its technological 
growth. Its total R&D budget as a percentage of GOP has been quite high. 
Some other countries have taken an informal approach to technology trans­
fer by relying mostly on incremental improvements, learning-by-doing, 
adaptation and copying. There is, however, little correlation between suc­
cessful technology development and the existence of a strong domestic tech­
nological base. A number of countries have been able to undertake highly 
sophisticated export activity - such as exporting electronic equipment - by 
specializing in the final assembly of products by foreign affiliates even when 
they lacked a strong domestic technological base. Some others have encour­
aged affiliates to undertake advanced processes and design the products 
locally and even launch advanced R&D. A third category of countries has 
embarked on the path of developing local capabilities and networks which 
allow them to keep up with fast-moving technologies without having to rely 
on FDI. 
The alternatives chosen by each country depend on a number of factors. 
These include, inter alia, the prevailing policy environment, domestic tech­
nological capacity, development objectives and the institutional frame­
work. While these factors are unique to each country, it is possible to distill 
some general lessons and policy guidelines by looking at some of the 
country experiences in East Asia. For this reason, a number of countries 
have been identified for case studies. They include Japan, Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and China. 
Technological progress is achieved through a continuous upgrading of 
technology, information and skills. The process becomes more complex in 
an environment where both export competition and technical change take 
place simultaneously and at very high levels. Depending on how this 
process of technological progress is managed, each economy develops a 
distinctive pattern of exports over time. These export patterns differ in 
terms of the product, market and technological specialization. The 
significant differences in the levels of technology transferred, upgrading of 
local content over time, and R&D undertaken by affiliates are influenced 
by the prevailing export patterns and vice versa. Similarly, the main agents 
responsible for technology transfer are also, to a large extent, influenced 
by these patterns. For instance, in Singapore, China, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Indonesia, TNCs have been the main agents of technology transfer 
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1. Introduction and overview 

Sanjaya Lall and Shujiro Urata 

East Asia is by practically any measure the most competitive and dynamic 
industrial region in the developing world. This is universally acknowledged 
but it is not fully understood, despite the industry that has grown up around 
the analysis of East Asian competitiveness. It is widely known that the suc­
cessful countries used very different strategies to build their industrial 
competitiveness, but the ingredients of these strategies still need further 
analysis. In particular, the means that the 'Tiger' economies used to access 
and absorb new foreign technologies over time - this process is the very life­
blood of industrial success - have useful lessons for other countries. As the 
intensity of international competition mounts and as developing countries 
open their economies more widely to global market forces, all policymak­
ers and analysts need to know how the most dynamic countries 'did it'. 
This book deals with one aspect of competitiveness strategies in East 
Asia: the interaction between foreign direct investment (FDI) and local 
technological activity in building export competitiveness. It highlights 
different strategic approaches at the national level and looks at capability 
development within industrial enterprises. 
ISSUES 
These differences in the strategies adopted by countries to promote tech­
nology development pose important questions. How, for instance, are 
foreign technologies most efficiently transferred from industrial to develop­
ing countries? Does the mode of technology transfer matter for subsequent 
technology development? What is the need for local technological effort in 
developing countries that are 'latecomers' to the industrial scene and can 
draw upon the vast cornucopia of technological knowledge in the devel­
oped world? Are TNCs essential for export competitiveness in technology­
intensive industries today? And so on. Not all these questions can be 
addressed in this book but many are. 
Some of the points that emerge in the analysis of country experiences are 
as follows. 
1 
2 Competitiveness. FDI and technological activity in East Asia 
• 	 The transfer of technology and market information from foreign 
companies can take several forms. These include 'internalized' modes 
like inward FOI (where transfers take place within the company), or 
'externalized' modes like licensing, subcontracting, original equip­
ment manufacturing arrangements (where transfers take place across 
companies). While all countries use both methods to access foreign 
technologies, the balance between them varies greatly. 
• 	 Having accessed foreign technology, the developing country has to 
learn to use it effectively, adapt it to local conditions and improve it 
over time to keep up with competition and the international technol­
ogy frontier. Simply importing new technology does not mean that it 
can be used competitively: there is always a need for local effort to 
create the capabilities to use new knowledge. 
• 	 The mode of technology transfer affects the need for, and the extent 
of, domestic effort. 
• 	 Reliance on internalized technology transfer reduces the need for 
independent local effort (though some learning is always involved). It 
also often provides access to state-of-the-art technologies along with 
established brand names and entry into global markets. FOI is thus 
a very effective way to transfer and operationalize new technologies 
for export competitiveness. 
• 	 Externalized technology transfer entails greater effort and risk on the 
part of the recipient country, and may not allow access to the most val­
uable new technologies (which are closely held by the innovators). 
Exploiting externalized technologies in world markets is also more 
difficult because of the need to build export marketing capabilities and 
channels. Where externalized transfers are not managed effectively, 
with the considerable local investment in capability development, they 
can result in technological inefficiencies, lags and subsequent uncom­
petitiveness. 
• 	 Yet there may be sound reasons for encouraging the development of 
local technological capabilities. In most medium to large sized econ­
omies, local enterprises account for the bulk of industrial activity, 
and their competitiveness depends on externalized technology trans­
fers. Externalized transfers involve greater effort - and yield greater 
learning benefits. With industrial diversification and deepening, 
countries have to undertake more advanced technological functions, 
such as design, development and research. Internalized modes of 
technology transfer may not lead to the same pace of upgrading as 
externalized modes: there are good economic reasons for multina­
tional companies to keep advanced technological effort centralized in 
a few industrialized countries. 
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• 	 Technology development strategies have a large element of cumula­
tiveness and path-dependence: once launched, they tend to persist 
along particular trajectories for long periods. At the same time, there 
are forces making for greater convergence. The international 'rules of 
the game' are changing, constraining the use of certain government 
interventions (such as protection, subsidies, local content rules and 
exclusion of FDI) in promoting technology development. The exter­
nal environment is also changing, making externalized modes more 
costly and risky. At the same time, countries relying heavily on inter­
nalized modes are seeing the need for greater domestic capability 
development to sustain export competitiveness. 
The East Asian countries have chosen different combinations of internal­
ized and externalized modes of technology transfer, and are converging 
towards a more uniform set of policies at different rates. Korea, for 
instance, has taken the path of building domestic R&D capabilities instead 
of relying on FDI for its technological growth. Taiwan is rather similar, but 
has been slightly more open to FDI and less interventionist in building 
domestic industrial champions. Both are now more open to inward FDI 
while becoming major direct investors on their own. 
The Philippines and Thailand have chosen to rely heavily on the import 
of internalized technology and have invested relatively little in domestic 
R&D effort. This has not prevented them from entering highly sophisti­
cated and dynamic areas of export activity, but it is seen as a constraint on 
sustaining competitiveness in the longer term. Singapore has relied on FDI 
but has made strong efforts to induce foreign investors to deepen into local 
design and development. China combines the Korean and Singaporean 
strategies. Its total R&D budget as a percentage of GDP has been quite 
high. And so on. 
The choice of strategy has, of course, depended on many country-specific 
factors. These include, inter alia, the prevailing policy environment (in turn 
reflecting history, culture and political economy), domestic technological 
and human capital, development objectives and the institutional frame­
work. As noted, however, there is considerable policy convergence between 
Asian economies. Countries that have built competitiveness by specializing 
in labour-intensive segment of MNC activities are finding that they can 
sustain export growth only by deepening local content, skills and technolog­
ical activity. Those with strong indigenous technological bases are realizing 
that innovation is becoming expensive and specialized, and that production 
is being increasingly organized in internalized MNC systems spanning 
several countries. It thus becomes necessary to form alliances with technol­
ogy leaders and participate more fully in global production systems. 
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This is a highly simplified picture of a complex and dynamic scene, with 
many variations within and across East Asian countries. The chapters that 
follow adopt different approaches to the analysis of technology strategy 
and competitiveness. We have not sought to impose a uniform format or 
approach on the studies, encouraging authors to explore aspects of tech­
nology development and FDI from their own perspectives. 
CHAPTERS IN THIS BOOK 
Lall (Chapter 2) sets the scene for the country studies by analysing the 
general relations between technology transfer, FDI and local technology 
development. He describes the nature of technological learning and effort 
in developing countries, and the possibility of a divergence between the 
private interests of the multinational company and the social interests of 
the host economy in terms of long-term technology development. He goes 
on to trace recent patterns of export growth and competitiveness in manu­
factured products, noting the rising share of technology-intensive products 
and the growing competitiveness of East Asia. The advantage of East Asia 
over other developing regions is greatest in technology-intensive products, 
and the most dynamic exporters (including China) have rapidly moved up 
the technology ladder as they have expanded exports. 
The burgeoning competitiveness of East Asian economies draws upon 
quite distinct strategies. Lall distinguishes between four broad approaches. 
The first is 'autonomous' (the building of domestic technological capabil­
ities, restricting FDI entry and investing heavily in domestic skills and capa­
bilities), as in Korea and Taiwan. The second is 'strategic FDI dependent' 
(relying heavily on FDI but using industrial policy extensively to induce it 
to deepen into advanced activities and functions), as in Singapore. The 
third is 'passive FDI dependent' (also heavily FDI reliant but without the 
use of industrial policy to deepcn thc technological structure). The fourth 
is 'lSI restructuring' (inducing domestic market-oriented activities to 
restructure for export markets), as in China. 
Each of these policies has been successful in its own way in boosting 
export competitiveness, though each faces different strategic challenges. 
Lall shows with some comparative data the varying implications or conse­
quences of the strategies in terms of skills, R&D and FDI. Cluster analy­
sis is used to supplement the descriptive statistics and illustrate graphically 
the differences in FDI dependent and autonomous strategies. 
Kawai and Urata (Chapter 3) examine the performance of East Asian 
economies in terms of per capita GDP and total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth for 1970~97. They also investigate statistically the determinants of 
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per capita GDP and TFP growth for 137 countries with a focus on domes­
tic technological capability and inflows of foreign technologies. 
They find that East Asian economies as a group perform better than 
other developing countries (despite some variations among the individual 
Asian economies). Improvements in domestic technological capability and 
greater inflows of foreign technology both contribute to increases in per 
capita GDP and TFP in East Asia. High educational attainment plays an 
important role in improving domestic technological capability while capital 
goods imports and FDI inflows are the main sources of foreign technolo­
gies. In some cases, foreign technologies are used most effectively when 
combined with high domestic technological capability. 
Though East Asian economies in general perform better than do other 
developing economies, there are wide variations among them. Many are 
facing difficult challenges in upgrading technological levels because of 
increased competition and rapid technological progress. Kawai and Urata 
argue for a business-friendly environment for foreign and domestic firms by 
pursuing open policies, improving hard and soft infrastructure, and main­
taining stable macroeconomic performance. 
Goto and Odagiri (Chapter 4) analyse how Japan acquired foreign tech­
nologies in the manufacturing sector during the period from 1945 to the 
early 1970s. The most striking feature of Japan's strategy was the limited 
use of FDI and the reliance on technology licensing and purchase of 
capital goods for the acquisition of foreign technologies. The reasons for its 
competitive success lie in accumulated technological capability, a rapidly 
growing market, intense competition from domestic rivals and potential 
foreign entrants and government policies. There was a 'virtuous circle' 
between the import of foreign technology and domestic R&D, reSUlting in 
the development of technological capability. The measures used by the 
Japanese government included the protection of domestic industries and 
promotion of R&D. 
Goto and Odagiri draw two policy implications from Japan's experience. 
The first is that the acquisition of foreign technology requires strong tech­
nological capabilities and enormous efforts on the part of the acquiring 
country. The government played two important roles in technology acqui­
sition. First, it nurtured technological absorptive capabilities by promoting 
general education and R&D spending. Second, it opened the economy to 
trade and FDI gradually and with careful preparation. It announced liber­
alization in advance and in a policy environment in which Japanese firms 
could raise technological levels in order to compete effectively with antici­
pated competition from foreign countries. 
The second implication concerns FDI policy. While accepting the poten­
tial benefits of FDI for technology transfer, they identify some potential 
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drawbacks. such as the domination of domestic industries by foreign firms. 
Goto and Odagiri argue that restrictive FDI policy contributed to the 
development of local firms by providing high profits and so allowing them 
to invest in capacity and capabilities. However, they warn that such restric­
tions have to be short term: domestic firms must face a potential entry 
threat. In the globalized economic environment and taking account of the 
wide technological gap between developed and developing economies, 
Goto and Odagiri question the advisability of restrictive FDI policy for 
developing economies today. 
Urata and Kawai (Chapter 5) deal with overseas R&D and intra-firm 
technology transfer by Japanese MNCs. They distinguish between two 
types of MNC technology transfers: intra-firm (from the parent to overseas 
affiliates) and spillovers (from affiliates to local firms). Both can contribute 
to upgrading technological capability in host economies. Urata and Kawai 
find that Japanese affiliates transfer technology to affiliates and also under­
take R&D in host developing economies (mainly to support production). 
The determinants of affiliate R&D include strong dependence on local 
sources for intermediate inputs and long operational history in a given 
location. The determinants of successful intra-firm technology transfer are 
the availability of educated personnel and R&D resources, the size and 
development of the local manufacturing sector and accumulated Japanese 
FDI. 
Urata and Kawai draw the implications of their analysis for developing 
host economies. First, it is important to build strong supplier industries to 
promote R&D by foreign firms. Second, developing economies should 
improve the quality of human capital, on the shop-floor, in engineering and 
in research activity, in order successfully to assimilate technology from 
foreign firms. Finally, developing economies should provide the economic 
environment, legal system. infrastructure and so on that attracts FDI. 
Kim (Chapter 6) argues that rapid technological learning by Korean 
firms was the most important factor in its phenomenal industrial and 
export growth. Korea relied heavily on the inflow of new technology via 
licences, capital goods and original equipment manufacture (OEM) con­
tracts rather than FDL Domestic efforts and capabilities were essential in 
assimilating foreign technology in these externalized forms, since foreign 
firms were reluctant to transfer key technologies and capabilities. Kim 
warns that FDI reduces the efforts on the part of domestic firms and 
increases their dependence on foreign firms. In Korea domestic technolog­
ical capability was nurtured by both supply and demand factors. The main 
supply-side factors were the availability of strong human resources, active 
R&D by private firms and the creation of large firms, supplemented by 
credit provided on favourable terms. The main demand-side factor was the 
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very competitive environment facing Korean firms, engendered by the 
strong emphasis on exports which offset the protection offered on the 
domestic market in terms of providing incentives for capability building. 
Kim derives four policy implications for developing countries. The first 
is the importance of skill building. The second is the role of strong export 
orientation in creating an intensely competitive environment. The third is 
the use of the 'brain drain' as an input into domestic capability building: 
high calibre nationals abroad can be important sources of technical knowl­
edge and skills. The fourth is the role of government research institutes 
(GRIs) in providing a supply of capable researchers and engineers. 
The Korean experience is, however, difficult to emulate, in part because 
of the new international environment. For example, tightened intellectual 
property right protection has made it difficult for developing economies to 
'reverse engineer' foreign products, one of the main methods of acquiring 
foreign technologies by Korean firms. Restrictions on FDI are more diffi­
cult, and the protection of infant industries is now impossible. 
Bee-Van Aw (Chapter 7) analyses econometrically the effect of different 
modes of technology acquisition on total factor productivity growth in 
Taiwan, using firm-level data for the electronics industry in 1986 and 1991. 
She distinguishes between the following modes: exporting, FDI, R&D, 
employee training, subcontracting and technical cooperation. The results 
suggest that exporting, R&D and FDI had positive effects on TFP. In terms 
of technology spillovers (the acquisition of technology through informal 
interaction between firms) FDI and exports have a significant impact in the 
same geographical region and in the same industry. This points to the 
importance of contacts with foreign firms through exports and FDI, par­
ticularly in the electronics industry, where the technology frontier shifts 
rapidly. 
Aw also finds that R&D and training improve technological ability, 
allowing local firms to assimilate technology more effectively. In Taiwan, 
the role of the government and industry associations in linking foreign 
investors with local firms, and in establishing an efficient system of sub­
contracting, was vital to technology transfer and absorption. All this 
required human capital, and policies to improve education and R&D man­
power were also critical. The impact of technological activity and spillovers 
greatly contributed to the competitiveness of the small and medium-sized 
enterprises which formed the bedrock of Taiwan's economic development. 
Wong (Chapter 8) traces Singapore's rapid economic growth and struc­
tural transformation since independence in 1965. This remarkable eco­
nomic performance was, according to him, made possible only by the 
upgrading of technological capability. Singapore underwent four distinc­
tive phases in technology development. The first was the industrial take-off 
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phase, with high dependence on technology transfer by foreign firms. The 
second phase involved deepening local process technological capabilities, 
both within MNC affiliates and in supporting local firms. In the third phase 
foreign and local enterprises and research institutions expanded applied 
R&D activity. The fourth phase is that of high-tech entrepreneurship and 
basic R&D. This evolution has moved Singapore from being a technology 
user to becoming a technology creator. 
The technology development of Singapore is to a large extent attributable 
to effective government policies. These include sound macroeconomic man­
agement, open trade and FDI policies (including effective promotion and 
targeting of MNCs), active science and technology policy and strong 
emphasis on education and training. One noteworthy feature of technology 
development in Singapore has been the willingness of MNCs to invest in 
R&D, partly in response to the strong incentives and enabling conditions 
offered by the government. Wong also notes the effectiveness of government 
measures in creating technological linkages between MNCs and local firms. 
Wong draws several implications from this experience for other economies. 
First, it is important to combine a long-term commitment to upgrade tech­
nological capability with the institutional capability for flexible and rapid 
policy change in response to changes in the global environment and the 
changing needs of the national innovation system. Second. a proper sequenc­
ing should be followed in building and deepening technological capabilities: 
operational and adaptive capabilities should be built before investing in basic 
research. Third, success in technology development depends not only on 
effective science and technology policies but also on a variety of other factors, 
including an open trade and investment environment, sound macroeconomic 
performance, political and social stability, a corruption-free public service 
sector and good infrastructure. Fourth, there is no universal set of technol­
ogy development policies that can be applied to all the countries. One country 
cannot copy the system that worked in another without modifying it to suit 
its own conditions. This modification itself needs significant government 
capabilities. 
Yao (Chapter 9) describes China's remarkable industrial growth since the 
start of liberalization in the late 1970s. He attributes it partly to improve­
ments in technological levels, revealed by rapid increase in total factor pro­
ductivity and by a shift in the export structure from resource-based 
products to labour-intensive and simpler technology-intensive products. 
He describes several characteristics of the technology system in China, 
such as the dominance of central and local government and public research 
institutes in R&D activity and the important (even excessive) role of basic 
research. The acquisition of foreign technologies has shifted from licensing 
to FDI, particularly in the 1990s. 
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Yao assesses the effectiveness of the government, private firms and 
foreign firms in Chinese technology by descriptive and econometric analy­
sis. He finds several interesting patterns. First, collective, private and 
foreign firms (excluding those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) are 
more efficient than state-owned enterprises. Second, foreign firms seem to 
be reluctant to transfer state-of-the-art technology, but they have beneficial 
spillovers by training personnel and stimulating competition. Third, R&D 
by public research institutes has no significant impact on firms' technolog­
icallevels. 
Yao draws policy implications for China and other developing econo­
mies. First, he argues for a shift in emphasis in technology development 
from the public to the private sector and for close ties between basic 
research in public laboratories and the private sector. Second, he notes the 
importance of technology development in labour-intensive industries, in 
which countries like China have a strong comparative advantage. This 
entails a shift away from the current emphasis on high-tech. Third, he 
remarks on the importance of integrating foreign firms into the domestic 
economy. 
Abrenica and Tecson (Chapter 10) provide a provocative analysis of 
technology development in the Philippines. They contrast its very high-tech 
export specialization (the Philippines has one of the most technology­
intensive export structures in the world) with its weak technology base. 
They describe the various channels of technology transfer FDI was the 
most important and go on to explain the sharp divergence between the 
export structure and the technology base. They note that the high-tech 
export structure is due solely to the predominance of the electronics indus­
try, and within it to semiconductors. In this activity, the Philippines is con­
fined to the labour-intensive end of assembly and testing, with very low 
local content and little upgrading over time. The apparently high endow­
ment of human capital is also slightly misleading once the quality of edu­
cation is taken into account. 
While MNCs have transferred considerable production technology to 
the Philippines, they have not invested much in local R&D. Neither have 
local industrial firms. The bulk of R&D takes place within government 
laboratories, most of it de-linked from the productive sector. Technology 
strategy has not been coherent, and its implementation has been weak. The 
main science and technology body has a low status in the government. 
Trade liberalization has not stimulated a change in the technology culture 
in industry, and without this the country is exposed to considerable risk by 
its narrow specialization and low local content in export activity. 
Rasiah (Chapter 11) deals with technology development in Malaysia, 
which was, to an even greater extent than Thailand, dependent on foreign 
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investors to drive industrial and export growth. As with Thailand, local tech­
nology development lagged; Rasiah notes the contrast between Malaysia's 
experience and those of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, where technology devel­
opment and industrial competitiveness were largely driven by domestic 
effort. However, the government did play an important role in attracting FDI 
and providing good infrastructure and a conducive business environment for 
export-oriented industrialization. 
FDI has provided considerable benefit to the Malaysian economy, going 
beyond its direct contribution to exports, employment and manufacturing 
production. It has raised local content over time, and so helped the growth 
of supplier industries. However, rising costs and the emergence of cheaper 
sites in China and Indonesia place Malaysia under increasing pressure to 
upgrade its production structure and capabilities to higher value activities. 
Rasiah finds that Malaysia has not been very successful in meeting this 
challenge, largely because of its failure to make the requisite institutional 
changes in such areas as tertiary education and technological activity. 
While the public sector has actively supported R&D activities, the private 
sector has not responded adequately. In addition, there is insufficient co­
ordination between such technology support activities as finance, training, 
technical extension and R&D. Rasiah emphasizes the need for a compre­
hensive policy addressing all these issues. 
Brimble, in his analysis of Thailand in Chapter 12, draws a rather differ­
ent picture of technology development in another dynamic and competi­
tive economy. Thailand's rapid economic growth was based on the growth 
of labour-intensive, low-tech industries, with foreign investors playing a 
very important role. However, the development and deepening of local 
technological capabilities lagged. Indeed, Thailand lags behind many other 
Asian economies in terms of technological development; this is borne out 
by interuational comparison of such things as the quality of technology, 
management and labour. It is also shown by low R&D spending, the small 
number of scientists and engineers and the small number of students spe­
cializing in science and technology. 
Brimble attributes weak technology development in Thailand to a lack 
of awareness in the public and private sectors of the economic importance 
of science and technology. This is attributable to a tradition of passive reli­
ance on off-the-shelf technology import, with little subsequent effort to 
absorb and improve upon it. Thai entrepreneurs tend to display a short-run 
commercial orientation, which deters them from investing in the long-term 
development of technological capability. Yet the phase based on low wages 
and skills is coming to an end, and Thailand's future growth and competi­
tiveness depend on its ability to develop significant new technological capa­
bilities. This calls for substantial changes in its science and technology 
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policies. Such changes extend well beyond the narrow scope of S&T, and 
cover manpower development, technological upgrading of small and 
medium-sized enterprises and the development of support industries. 
Brimble stresses the need to allocate more resources to training, R&D 
and other innovation activities with a particular emphasis on applied tech­
nology. He also points to the importance of the creation and use of link­
ages - between the government and the private sector, between foreign firms 
and public intervention and between foreign and local firms - to improve 
technological capabilities. All this also needs greater awareness on the part 
of the Thai government, business and the population at large of the impor­
tance of technology development and the role of FDI in development. 
Okamoto and Sjoholm (Chapter 13) treat the case of Indonesia, which 
made enormous economic strides betore it was struck by the financial crisis 
in 1997. Despite rapid industrialization, however, Indonesia still lags 
behind other East Asian countries in technological development. 
Analysing the results of other studies of Indonesia's experience, Okamoto 
and Sjoholm draw four lessons for technology development. First, in the 
early stage of industrial development agents like foreign buyers, trading 
companies and experts are important sources of technology; thus, it is 
important to have an open trade and FDI regime. Second, FDI can con­
tribute to development not only by introducing new technology but also by 
generating employment, expanding production and exports. However, the 
host economy has to build local skills and R&D capabilities if it is to benefit 
fully from MNC presence. Third, the government can play an effective role 
in acquiring, upgrading and disseminating technology, especially in an 
environment where private industrial linkages are deficient. Specifically, 
government can provide better education and training, and improve the 
technology infrastructure (standards, quality and testing). Fourth, technol­
ogy policies targeting high-technology industries (like aircraft in Indonesia) 
can be wasteful, unless backed by the prior development of skills and a 
technological, managerial and institutional infrastructure. 
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Figure 2.1 	 Total and high-technology manufacturing: annual growth 
rates, 1985-97 
faster than those that do not. Figure 2.1 shows the growing significance of 
high-tech activities in production and trade (based on NSF, 2000). The 68 
countries in the total sample apparently account for 95 per cent of global 
productive activity. Note two features of the table: exports in general grow 
faster than production, and high-tech production and exports grow much 
faster than overall production and exports. 
The speed, spread and nature of technical change pose difficult chal­
lenges for achieving competitiveness. Unlike a few decades ago, policy lib­
eralization makes it difficult to insulate tradable industrial activities from 
global technical pressures. In addition, the traditional buffers provided by 
high transport and information costs are diminishing in significance as new 
information technologies force all countries into the same competitive 
arena. Some analysts note that the nature of competition itself is changing 
in response to new technologies. What Best (1990) calls the 'new competi­
tion' entails flexible response, networking, customization and new forms of 
inter-firm organization (in clusters) rather than c1assie eost/price competi­
tion dominated by hierarehicallyorganized firms. Small enterprises and net­
works are establishing competitive niches in many aetivities, including 
those with high rates of innovation. At the same time, however, with 
growing trade and investment flows, the role of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) is rising in importance. 
2. 	 TECHNOLOGY AND CAPABILITY BUILDING 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Technological effort is vital to developing countries, even though they do 
not innovate. They import new technology, equipment, patents and so on 
from more advanced countries, but they have to learn to use these inputs 
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effectively. Using new technologies is not an automatic or simple process. 
I t entails the conscious building of 'technological capabilities', a mixture of 
information, skills, interactions and routines that firms need to handle the 
tacit elements of technology. Received theory assumes that technology 
mastery and diffusion in developing countries are relatively easy, knowl­
edge is not tacit, and the markets involved relatively efficient. Thus, devel­
oping countries simply import and apply existing technologies, picking 
them in line with their factor prices. Once selected, technologies can be used 
effectively from the start (apart from minor learning-by-doing). In this 
setting, free international trade and investment flows maximize the inflow 
of beneficial new technology,3 
This approach is over-simplified. The international technology market is 
far from perfect.4 Once imported, using technology efficiently is not easy, 
costless or automatic. Micro-level research on developing countries, based 
on the evolutionary theories of Nelson and Winter (1982), shows how 
complex and demanding the task can be. Technology is not sold in 'embod­
ied' forms. Its tacit elements need effort and time to master. Its efficient use 
cannot therefore be assumed for poor countries that expose themselves to 
more world markets and technologies. Technological mastery entails build­
ing costly new capabilities; it takes time and investment and is uncertain 
(LaB, 1992, 1993; Westphal, 2002), 
Some important features of the capability building process are described 
in Box 2.1. The learning curve is not known in advance. Learning is tech­
nology and firm specific, and often occurs in an uncertain environment 
where the skills, information, networks and credit needed are not available. 
Many enterprises do not even know how to go about learning, and have to 
'learn to learn'. They interact intensively with other agents, with extensive 
spillovers. Once launched, the process is difficult to change. The learning 
process is, in other words, rife with externalities, agglomeration, path­
dependence and cumulative effects. 5 Technology development can thus face 
market failures (Stiglitz, 1996). 
In sum, learning to use new technologies (new, that is, to a particular user 
or location) needs investment and conscious effort. Much of the effort lies 
within the firm, but a significant part lies outside, in other firms, factor 
markets and support institutions. While the capability building process is 
essential in both developed and developing countries, it tends to be more 
difficult in the latter, with weak enterprises, networks, markets and institu­
tions. Furthermore, mastering new technology is not a once-for-all task. 
Most developing countries start with comparatively simple, labour-inten­
sive technologies where skill needs are low, learning is short and relatively 
less risky and there is little need for inter-firm or inter-industry coordina­
tion. Once mastery is achieved, continued development (with rising wages) 
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BOX 2.1 	 TEN FEATURES OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
LEARNING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
1. 	 Technological learning is a real and significant process. It is 
conscious and purposive rather than automatic or passive. 
Firms using a given technology for similar periods need not 
be equally proficient: each would travel on a different learn­
ing curve according to the intensity and efficacy of its capa­
bility building efforts. 
2. 	 Firms do not have full information on technical alternatives. 
They function with imperfect, variable and rather hazy 
knowledge of technologies they are using. 
3. 	 Firms may not know how to build up the necessary capabil­
ities - learning itself often has to be learned. The learning 
process faces risk, uncertainty and cost. For a technological 
latecomer, the fact that others have already undergone the 
learning process is both a benefit and a cost. It is a benefit 
in that they can borrow from the others' experience (to the 
extent that this is accessible). It is a cost in that they are rel­
atively inefficient during the process (and so have to bear a 
loss if they compete on open markets). 
4. 	 Firms cope with uncertainty not by maximizing a well-defined 
function but by developing organizational and managerial satis­
ficing routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). These are adapted 
as firms collect new information, learn from experience and 
imitate other firms. Learning is path-dependent and cumulative. 
5. 	 The learning process is highly technology specific, since 
technologies differ in their learning requirements. Some 
technologies are more embodied in eqUipment while others 
have greater tacit elements. Process technologies (like 
chemicals) are more embodied than engineering technolo­
gies (machinery or automobiles), and demand different 
(often less) effort. Capabilities built up in one activity are not 
easily transferable to another. 
6. 	 Different technologies have different spillover effects and 
potential for further technological advance. Specialization in 
technologies with more technological potential and spill­
overs has greater dynamic benefits than specialization in 
technologies with limited potential. 
7. 	 Capability building occurs at all levels - shop-floor, process 
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or product engineering, quality management, maintenance, 
procurement, inventory control, outbound logistics and rela­
tions with other firms and institutions. Innovation in the 
sense of formal R&D is at one end of the spectrum of tech­
nological activity; it does not exhaust it. However, R&D 
becomes important as more complex technologies are 
used; some R&D is needed just for efficient absorption. 
8. 	 Technological development can take place to different 
depths. The attainment of a minimum level of operational 
capability (know-how) is essential to all activity. This may not 
lead to deeper capabilities, an understanding of the princi­
ples of the technology (know-why): this requires a discrete 
strategy to invest in deepening. The deeper the levels of 
technological capabilities aimed at, the higher the cost, risk 
and duration involved. The development of know-why allows 
firms to select better the technologies they need, lower the 
costs of buying those technologies, realize more value by 
adding their own knowledge, and to develop autonomous 
innovative capabilities. 
9. 	 Technological learning is rife with externalities and interlink­
ages. It is driven by links with suppliers of inputs or capital 
goods, competitors, customers, consultants, and technology 
suppliers. There are also important interactions with firms in 
unrelated industries, technology institutes, extension ser­
vices, universities, associations and training institutions. 
Where information flows are particularly dense, clusters 
emerge with collective learning for the group as a whole. 
10. 	 Technological interactions occur within a country and with 
other countries. Imported technology is generally the most 
important initial input into learning in developing countries. 
Since technologies change constantly, moreover, access to 
foreign sources of innovation is vital to continued technolog­
ical progress. Technology import is not, however, a substi­
tute for indigenous capability development - the efficacy 
with which imported technologies are used depends on local 
efforts to deepen the absorptive base. Similarly, not all 
modes of technology import are equally conducive to indig­
enous learning. Some come highly packaged with comple­
mentary factors, and so stimulate less learning. 
Source: Lall (2000b). 
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involves the upgrading and deepening of technologies. Otherwise, countries 
that establish a competitive niche in a low-teehnology activity may stagnate 
at the bottom of the technology ladder. To sustain competitive growth, they 
must move into more advanced technologies and technological functions 
within activities. At each stage, learning needs new knowledge, skills, insti­
tutions and policies. This has always been true, but the new technological 
paradigm means that the challenges are greater. 
Continuous access to new technologies is essential to sustaining compet­
itiveness. While internalized modes necessarily involve MNCs, external­
ized ones may also involve MNCs selling technologies on contract (MNCs 
are the largest sellers of licensed teehnology). However, there are also other 
sources of technology: national enterprises without overseas investments, 
consultants, capital goods producers, research institutions or govern­
ments. The sale can take a variety of forms: minority joint ventures, fran­
chising, turnkey projects, sale of equipment, licences, technical assistance, 
subcontracting or original equipment manufacturing arrangements. 
Internalized transfers bring a package of supporting inputs to ensure their 
efficient deployment. Externalized transfers may involve additional inputs 
by the technology seller, but generally tend to call for greater learning 
effort by the recipient. 
3. 	 ROLE OF FDI IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
AND LEARNING 
The MNCs that dominate global FDI flows are also the main source of 
innovation: innovation is often the main competitive factor that allows 
them to become (and remain) multinational. Despite the recent growth of 
small technology start-ups, concentration in R&D remains high. For 
instance, in 19972 per cent (representing the largest employers) of manu­
facturing companies undertaking R&D in the USA accounted for nearly 
80 per cent of industrial R&D spending (calculated from table 2-8, NSF, 
2000). Such concentration is even higher in small OECD industrial coun­
tries (UNCTAD, 1999). It does not seem to have declined over time. 
As the major innovators, MNCs are the main sources of international 
technology transfer. Their role is naturally larger in high-technology activ­
ities where they possess the strongest advantages. Before considering trans­
fers to developing countries, let us highlight features of recent FDI (Box 
2.2). 
In general, internalized technology flows are a very efficient means of 
transferring a package of capital, skills, information and brand names to 
developing countries. For many new technologies, internalized transfers are 
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BOX 2.2 SALIENT FEATURES OF RECENT FDI 
• 	 FDI flows are growing faster than other economic aggregates 
like national gross fixed capital formation, world trade and GDP. 
International production (by MNCs and affiliates) is steadily 
increasing its share in global production. 
• 	 MNCs increasingly dominate world trade: around two-thirds of 
visible trade is handled by MNCs, and the share is growing par­
ticularly in activities with significant scale economies in produc­
tion, marketing or innovation. 
• 	 Of the visible trade handled by MNCs, between 30 and 40 
per cent is within MNC systems, between affiliates and 
parents or among affiliates. Such internalized trade contains 
the most dynamic exports today, moving within integrated 
international production systems, where MNCs locate differ­
ent functions or stages of production to different countries. 
Affiliates participating in such systems produce at massive 
scales and use the latest technologies, skills and manage­
rial techniques. Examples of complex integrated systems in 
which developing countries are important are automobiles 
(mainly in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina) and electronics 
(Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Mexico). The glo­
balization of the value chain is likely to spread across many 
other industries, and linking local production chains to global 
chains will become a major source of growth, technology 
transfer and skill development. 
• 	 Some MNCs are locating non-production functions like 
accounting, engineering, R&D or marketing to affiliates - these 
are high value activities that feed into manufacturing competi­
tiveness and local capabilities. This is what UNCTAD has 
termed 'deep integration' in international production, in contrast 
to earlier 'shallow integration' where stand-alone affiliates repli­
cated many functions and related to other affiliates or parents 
via trade. However, the transfer of functions such as R&D lags 
that of production, particularly in developing countries. Over 90 
per cent of overseas R&D by US MNCs is in other industrial 
countries. MNCs from smaller countries are more international 
in terms of relocating R&D overseas, but MNCs from econo­
mies like the UK are also conducting very substantial amounts 
of R&D overseas. However, much of such R&D remains 
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confined to other industrial countries. For deep integration to 
occur, host countries have to be able to provide not just cheap 
labour but the whole array of modern skills, infrastructure, insti­
tutions, efficient business practices and supplier networks that 
MNCs need to be fully competitive in world markets. Very few 
developing countries are able to meet these needs. 
• 	 Large companies with transnational operations increasingly 
dominate the process of innovation: the creation of new tech­
nologies and organizational methods that lies at the core of 
competitiveness in all but the Simplest activities. Most such 
companies originate in mature industrial countries. About 90 
per cent of world R&D expenditure is in the OECD. Within this 
group, seven countries (led by the USA) account for 90 per 
cent, the USA alone for 40 per cent. Access to new technolo­
gies thus involves getting knowledge from technological 
leaders in these countries. Many are increasingly unwilling to 
part with their most valuable technologies without a substantial 
equity stake. Thus, FDI becomes the most important often the 
only - way of obtaining leading edge technologies. 
• 	 Mf\JCs are often central to exports by local firms of technology­
intensive products. Many such products are difficult to export 
independently because of the need for expensive branding, 
distribution and after-sales servicing. Thus, 60-70 per cent of 
consumer electronics made by Korea and Taiwan is sold to 
MNCs on an OEM (original equipment manufacture) basis. The 
significance of OEM for Korea is shown by the following statis­
tics. In 1985, over 40 per cent of Korean exports were in the 
form of OEM. In 1989, around 50-60 per cent of VCR and TV 
exports and about 80 per cent of PC exports by Korea were 
under OEM. In 1990, 70-80 per cent of total Korean electron­
ics exports were under OEM. MNCs are also active in exports 
of low-technology products where factors like scale econo­
mies, branding, distribution and design are important. 
• 	 Mf\JCs can help restructure and upgrade competitive capabil­
ities in import-substituting activities. Where the facilities are 
already foreign owned, MNCs are often better able to respond 
to liberalization than local firms by investing in new technolo­
gies and skills. They can also help local suppliers to upgrade, 
or attract investment by their suppliers overseas. This has been 
commonly found in Latin America. Where local firms own the 
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facilities, MNCs help them to upgrade through mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). While cross-border M&As are often 
regarded with suspicion or resentment, they can salvage exist­
ing facilities that would not survive in a liberalized environment. 
In fact, with globalization and liberalization, international M&As 
now constitutes the bulk of FDI flows, accounting for over 80 
per cent of FDI in developed countries and around one-third in 
developing ones (UNCTAD, 2000). 
• 	 FDI in services is rising rapidly as formerly homebound provid­
ers (as in utilities) globalize activities and take advantage of lib­
eralization and privatization in their industries. The entry of 
service MNCs can provide rapid improvements in the produc­
tivity and efficiency to host economies, not only in their indus­
tries but also to their customers (many of which are important 
exporters). 
the only possible mode of transfer, since innovators are unwilling to part 
with them to unrelated parties. Even where technologies are available at 
arm's length, internalization may be the most efficient way of transferring 
the tacit knowledge involved because of the commitment of the transferrer 
and its capability to support learning. If the technology is changing rapidly, 
internalization provides the most direct access to improvements. If the 
activity is export oriented, internalized transfers offer the additional advan­
tages of international marketing skills and networks, established brand 
names or, of increasing relevance, access to integrated production struc­
tures spanning several countries. 
However, internalized technology transfer may also have costs (Pack and 
Saggi, 1997). Profits are realized by the MNC on the package as a whole 
rather thanjust the innovation component. If the host country already pos­
sesses other elements of the package, it is cheaper to buy the technology 
separately (countries like Korea and Taiwan did this because their enter­
prises had the necessary capabilities to master the technology). In general, 
the more standardized and diffused the technology, and the more capable 
the buyer, the more economical will externalized modes be. However, there 
is a more subtle reason: the existence of learning benefits, deepening and 
externalities may tilt the choice in favour of externalization even for rela­
tively complex and difficult technologies. In such activities, reliance on 
foreign investment can shorten the learning period but reduce the other 
benefits of technology transfer and capability building. 
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A useful way to analyse this is to divide technological capabilities into 
four levels, At the bottom are the simplest (operational) ones, needed for 
running a technology efficiently: these involve basic manufacturing skills as 
well as some more demanding troubleshooting, quality control, mainte­
nance and procurement skills, At the intermediate level are duplicative 
skills, which include the investment capabilities needed to expand capacity 
and to purchase and integrate foreign technologies. Next come adaptive 
skills, where imported technologies are adapted and improved, and design 
skills for more complex engineering learned. Finally come innovative skills, 
based on formal R&D, that are needed to keep pace with technological 
frontiers or to generate new technologies. 
The advantage of internalized forms lies in the long-term commitment 
of the foreign partner to the project and its ability to provide the elements 
needed to operationalize new technologies. At the lowest level, therefore, 
foreign investment is a very efficient way of transferring technology. Since 
all technologies need adaptation and improvement, foreign affiliates, with 
their base of high-level management and technical skills, tend to be in the 
forefront of such activity in developing countries. In addition, MNCs have 
the experience of other affiliates in the developing world to draw on, and 
can shift knowledge and personnel across countries to help with the 
upgrading of local capabilities. 
As capability development progresses to the top level, where local inno­
vative efforts become viable, there can be a conflict of interest between the 
host country and the foreign investor. Internalized technology transfer and 
local capability development can, in other words, become competitive 
rather than complementary. There are good reasons for international inves­
tors to keep innovative work centralized at home or in a few developed 
countries: thesc include ease of coordination, skill availability, proximity to 
main markets, and more advanced science and technology infrastructures. 
At the same time, it is important for countries at a certain stage of indus­
trial development to deepen their capabilities and move into innovation. 
MNCs tend to transfer the results of R&D rather than the process itself, 
whereas the sustained technological growth of developing countries calls 
for increasing local innovation. There is clear scope for a clash between the 
social interests of the host economy and the private interests of MNCs. At 
this stage, there is a case for restricting reliance on internalized forms to 
promote local R&D capabilities based on externalized forms, or for inter­
vening in the FDr process to induce MNCs to transfer more advanced tech­
nological functions. 
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4. 	 PATTERNS OF EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS IN 
EAST ASIA 
The pattern of manufactured exports reflects the underlying structure of 
and competitive advantages in manufacturing. A sophisticated export 
structure, with growing world market shares, generally suggests that the 
exporting economy has built the production and innovative capabilities to 
use advanced technologies and, over time, keeps abreast of new technolo­
gies. This is not, however, always the case. The rise of integrated produc­
tion systems means that developing countries can enter sophisticated 
export activities at the simple labour-intensive end: FDI can introduce a 
wedge between indigenous capabilities and export structures. East Asia has 
examples of both kinds of competitive bases. Some countries have built 
strong domestic capabilities in technology-intensive activities, generally by 
restricting or manipulating FDI to boost local innovation. Others have 
enjoyed rapid export growth and technological upgrading by plugging into 
high-tech TNC production systems. This section shows how both strategies 
have led to dynamic competitiveness in East Asia. 
Both strategies have advantages and drawbacks. The domestic capability 
building strategy has many long-term advantages, but it is costly, risky and 
prolonged. And over time, as innovation accelerates and the structure of 
international production changes, it has to move towards greater reliance 
on MNCs. The FDI dependent strategy allows countries to raise exports 
and technological structures rapidly, but it faces the problem of sustainabil­
ity. MNCs can dynamize competitiveness in countries in which they locate 
integrated systems, but such activity may not allow the exporting country 
to maintain a competitive edge as wages rise, technologies grow more 
demanding or there is greater need for local suppliers. Thus, domestic capa­
bility building becomes necessary to retain the base set up by export­
oriented MNCs. 
While the two strategies move towards some convergence, however, there 
is considerable path-dependence once countries get launched along partic­
ular trajectories. This is clearly the case in East Asia, as the country studies 
in this book show. But let us paint a broad comparative picture here by ana­
lysing the export data. 
Technological Classification 
The analysis separates primary from manufactured exports and groups 
manufactures into four technology levels: resource-based (RB), low­
technology (LT), medium-technology (MT) and high-technology (HT) 
(Lall, 2000a). All such classifications suffer from data and definition 
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Table 2. 1 Technological classification of exports 
Primary products 
Manufactured products 
Resource-based manufactures 
Agro/forest-based products 
Other resource-based products 
Low-techn%gy manufactures 
Textile/fashion cluster 
Other low-technology 
Medium-technology manufactures 
Automotive products 
Medium-technology process 
Medium-technology engineering 
High-technology manufactures 
Electronics and electrical 
Other high-technology 
Other transactions 
Fresh fruit, meat, rice, cocoa, tea, coffee, 

wood, coal, crude petroleum, gas 

Prepared meats/fruits, beverages, wood 

products, vegetable oils 

Ore concentrates, petroleum/rubber 

products, cement, cut gems, glass 

Textile fabrics, clothing, headgear, footwear, 

leather manufactures, travel goods 

Pottery, simple metal parts/structures, 

furniture, jewellery, toys, plastic products 

Passenger vehicles and parts, commercial 

vehicles, motorcycles and parts 

Synthetic fibres. chemicals and paints, 

fertilizers, plastics, iron, pipes/tubes 

Engines, motors, industrial machinery, 

pumps, switchgear, ships. watches 

Office/data processing/telecommunications 

equipment, transistors. turbines. generating 

equipment 

Pharmaceuticals, aerospace, opticall 

measuring instruments, cameras 

Electricity, cinema film, printed matter, 

'special' transactions. gold, art, coins, pets 

problems. It is not possible to capture an important aspect of technical 
change: upgrading within given product categories.6 The categories are 
highly aggregated and can conceal differences within each category.? They 
do not show the processes involved in making a given product: the spread 
of integrated production systems mean that these differ substantially 
between countries.8 Nor do they show local physical and technological 
content in exports: one country may be assembling imported components 
and another manufacturing the product from scratch. Nevertheless, some 
disadvantages can be overcome indirectly. For instance, we can use qualita­
tive information on local content and processes to allow for differences in 
technology content in export activity in different locations. 
25 lssues and evidence 

Table 2.2 Growth rates and market shares of exports (% per annum) 

All products Primary All mfg. RB LT MT HT 
Growth 198598 
World 8.6 3.4 9.7 7.0 9.7 9.3 13.1 
Developed 8.4 4.4 8.8 7.0 8.5 8.5 11.3 
Developing 8.7 1.3 12.5 6.0 11.7 14.3 21.4 
Growth \985-90 
World 13.1 5.6 \4.9 \1.4 16.3 \5.1 17.4 
Developed 14.0 7.9 14.7 12.7 15.4 14.7 16.2 
Developing 9.1 1.3 15.4 4.9 18.4 19.3 26.7 
Growth 1990-95 
World 8.2 4.4 8.9 7.4 8.3 7.8 13.2 
Developed 7.0 4.9 7.2 6.2 6.2 6.6 10.1 
Developing 12.0 2.7 15.3 10.3 11.3 16.6 25.4 
Growth 1995-98 
World 2.1 -1.9 2.7 -0.4 1.8 2.5 6.1 
Developed 1.7 -2.3 2.2 -0.9 1.4 2.0 5.6 
Developing 2.8 -1.1 3.5 0.9 2.2 3.1 7.0 
Shares of products in world exports, 1985 and 1998 
1985 100 21.7 73.8 21.1 13.7 30.2 12.4 
1998 100 11.5 84.2 14.5 15.8 32.8 21.1 
Shares of developing countries in world exports, 1985 and 1998 
1985 24.3 52.1 16.4 26.3 26.7 8.3 10.7 
1998 25.0 39.7 23.3 23.7 34.5 15.3 27.0 
Global and Regional Patterns 
We start with the major categories for four sub-periods between 1985 and 
1998.9 Table 2.2 gives growth rates and market shares for exports by the 
world, developed and developing countries. 10 
Table 2.3 shows manufactured exports by main developing regions. I1 
SSA and LAC are shown with and without their major exporters South 
Africa and Mexico, the 'outliers' in their regions. 12 The figures show large, 
and generally increasing, disparities in export performance across the 
developing world, with enormous concentration of competitive capabilities 
in East Asia. 
Table 2.3 shows that with nearly 70 per cent of total manufactured 
exports by developing countries, East Asia is not just the dominant player, 
its share is rising over time. The largest loss of share is by LAC2 (excluding 
Table 2.3 Regional shares of developing countries' manufactured exports of developing world total) 
Year East Asia South Asia MENA LACI (incl. LAC2 (exc. Mexico SSAI (inc!. SSA2 (exc. 
Mexico) Mexico) S Africa) S Africa) 
All 1985 56.9 4.5 12.9 23.1 16.9 6.2 n/a 2.6 
manufactures 1998 69.0 3.8 6.0 19.3 8.9 lOA 1.8 0.8 
RB 	 1985 34.6 3.8 23.8 32.9 30.7 2.2 n/a 4.9 
1998 47.5 4.7 15.0 28.0 24.0 4.0 4.8 104 
~ 
0- Agro-based 1985 55.1 2.2 4.5 32.0 3004 1.6 n1a 6.2 
1998 55.1 1.7 4.9 33.1 28.3 4.6 5.3 204 
Other RB 1985 25.6 4.5 32.3 33.3 30.8 2.5 n/a 4.3 
1998 41.4 7.2 23.1 23.1 20.6 2.5 404 0.6 
LT 1985 71.7 8.3 7.3 11.9 10.2 1.7 n/a 1.8 
1998 70.2 8.5 7.2 12.6 5A 7.2 L5 0.2 
Textile cluster 1985 69.9 11.6 8.1 9.5 8.5 1.0 n/a 0.9 
1998 67.3 12.1 9.1 lOA 4.9 5.5 l.l 0.8 
Other LT 1985 75.2 1.7 5.7 16.6 13.5 3.1 n1a 0.8 
1998 74.9 2.9 4.2 16.0 6.3 9.7 2.0 0.3 
MT 1985 63.4 2.0 7.1 25.8 17.5 8.3 nla 1.8 
1998 63.8 1.8 4.4 28.1 10.2 17.9 1.9 0.2 
Auto 1985 40.6 2.7 5.9 50.3 32.9 17.4 nla 0.4 
1998 39.8 1.4 2.9 54.2 16.9 37.3 1.7 0.1 
Process 1985 53.4 2.3 13.8 28.2 25.2 3.0 nla 2.3 
1998 65.6 3.3 8.4 19.9 13.0 6.9 2.8 0.5 
Engineering 1985 73.0 1.7 3.5 20.1 10.4 9.7 nla 1.7 
1998 72.5 1.1 2.6 22.4 5.8 16.6 1.3 0.1 
N 
"l HT 1985 81.0 1.1 1.8 14.8 6.6 8.2 nla 1.3 
1998 85.5 0.6 0.7 12.9 2.1 10.8 0.4 0.0 
Electronic 1985 84.7 0.5 0.7 14.0 5.1 8.9 nla 0.1 
1998 87.2 0.3 0.6 11.8 1.2 10.6 0.2 0.1 
Other HT 1985 60.3 4.5 8.2 19.2 15.2 4.0 n/a 7.8 
1998 66.9 4.2 1.9 25.0 12.2 12.8 0.0 0.3 
Source: Lall (2000a). 
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Mexico, which shows a healthy increase), It is followed by MENA, which 
retains second position but after a hefty fall; its performance is strongly 
influenced by Turkey. South Asia, despite its substantial industrial sector, 
suffers a diminution of its small share, the continuing legacy of decades of 
import-substitution, Sub-Saharan Africa starts from a marginal position 
and deteriorates further. The share of SSA2 falls to below 1 per cent (only 
0,2 per cent of the world total); even including South Africa only brings the 
figure to below 2 per cent (0.4 per cent of the world total), 
Table 2.4 shows the technology composition of manufactured exports by 
region. The world and the developed countries shift from RB to HT prod­
ucts. In the developing world, there is a more marked shift away for 'simple' 
(RB and LT) to 'complex' (MT and FIT) products, but with a massive 
increase in HT. East Asia has the most high-tech export structure (more 
than developed countries) and the largest upgrading; its reliance on LT 
products falls over time, particularly in the textile group. LAC has a 
complex export structure but mainly because of MT products (particularly 
autos). The Mexican presence is very significant, driven in turn by its 
maquiladora export activities. Both MENA and SSA2 reduce their heavy 
dependence on RB, but remain specialized in simple manufactured prod­
ucts, especially in the fashion cluster (led by Turkey and Morocco in 
MENA and Mauritius in SSA2). While MENA raises its share of HT and 
MT. SSA2 does the reverse. South Asia shows a similar trend to MENA, 
but with a much heavier reliance on LT products. Thus, East Asia emerges 
as the most competitive, dynamic and technologically advanced region in 
the developing world. 
Country-level Performance in East Asia 
Manufactured exports by developing countries are concentrated not just at 
the regional but also at the country level. In 1998, for instance, the leading 
five exporters accounted for 60 per cent, and the leading ten for over 80 per 
ccnt, of the developing world total. Interestingly, concentration tends to be 
greater the higher the level of technology, ranging from about 60 per cent 
for RB to 96 per cent for the top ten HT exporters in 1998. This suggests, 
as expected, that capability needs (and entry barriers) rise with technolog­
ical sophistication. Concentration levels also tend to rise over time, indicat­
ing growing capability needs. Annex Tables 2A.l and 2A.2 show values and 
breakdowns of manufactured exports by technological category for 13 
main developing country exporters. All the countries in this study are in this 
group. Shares of MT and HT products in their 1998 manufactured exports 
are shown in Figure 2.2. 
In MT. the highest share is in Mexico, a result of its MNC dominated 
Table 2.4 Distribution of manufactured exports over technological catef.wries. 1985 and 1998 
1985 RB RBI RB2 LT LTl LT2 MT MTl MT2 MT3 HT HTl HT2 
World 23.7 9.8 13.8 18.6 8.3 10.3 40.9 12.2 9.7 19.0 16.8 10.9 5.9 
Developed 21.0 9.6 11.5 16.1 5.8 10.3 44.7 14.3 10.3 20.1 18.2 11.4 6.8 
Developing 38.0 11.6 26.5 30.4 20.1 10.3 20.6 2.1 6.7 11.9 11.0 9.3 1.7 
East Asia 23.1 11.2 11.9 38.3 24.7 13.6 23.0 1.5 6.3 15.2 15.6 13.8 1.8 
South Asia 32.3 5.6 26.7 55.8 51.8 4.0 9.2 1.3 3.4 4.5 2.8 1.1 1.7 
MENA 70.1 4.0 66.1 17.1 12.6 4.5 11.3 1.0 7.1 3.2 1.6 0.5 1.1 
LAC 1 54.2 16.1 38.2 15.7 8.3 7.4 23.1 4.5 8.2 10.4 7.0 5.6 1.4 
LAC2 61.1 18.4 42.7 16.2 8.9 7.3 18.9 3.6 8.8 6.5 3.8 2.5 1.3 
'" 
SSA2 70.7 27.3 43.3 10.1 7.0 3.0 13.8 0.3 5.9 7.6 5.5 0.5 5.0 
'0 
1998 RB RBI RB2 LT LTI LT2 MT MTl MT2 MT3 HT HTl HT2 
World 17.3 8.9 8.4 18.8 8.2 10.6 38.9 11.5 8.8 18.6 25.1 18.2 6.9 
Developed 16.8 9.1 7.7 15.5 5.2 10.2 43.2 13.6 9.1 20.5 24.5 16.0 8.5 
Developing 17.6 7.8 9.8 27.8 17.1 10.8 25.5 5.2 7.6 12.8 29.1 26.6 2.5 
East Asia 12.1 6.2 5.9 28.3 16.6 11.7 23.6 3.0 7.2 13.4 36.0 33.6 2.4 
South Asia 21.7 3.4 18.3 61.6 53.6 8.0 12.1 1.9 6.5 3.7 4.6 1.9 2.8 
MENA 44.3 6.4 37.9 33.7 26.1 7.6 18.8 2.5 10.6 5.7 3.3 2.5 0.8 
LAC I 25.4 13.3 12.1 18.1 9.1 8.9 37.1 14.5 7.8 14.8 19.4 16.2 3.2 
LAC2 47.2 24.5 22.6 16.8 9.3 7.5 29.1 9.8 11.0 8.3 6.9 3.5 3.4 
SSAI 46.0 22.4 23.6 22.6 10.5 12.0 25.8 4.9 11.6 9.3 5.7 3.0 2.7 
SSA2 51.3 38.6 12.7 35.0 27.4 7.6 11.5 0.6 7.7 3.2 2.2 0.7 1.5 
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Figure 2.2 	 Shares of MT and HT products in manufactured exports 
( 1998) fiir 13 largest exporters 
automotive and engineering exports, followed by Korea (dominated by the 
chaebol) and Brazil (mainly MNCs). The highest shares of HT are in the 
Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia, all dominated by MNC export­
oriented operations. Of these countries, local content is highest in Singapore, 
followed by Malaysia. The Philippines remains at the stage of final assembly 
and testing operations. 
However, Korea and Taiwan have the greatest technological inputs and 
competence among the large HT exporters. Their domestic firms undertake 
much of the manufacturing and also provide high levels of physical, design, 
R&D and engineering inputs (see Hobday, 1995 and Lall, 1996). Because of 
product differentiation and branding, a large proportion of sophisticated 
exports have to be sold by MNCs under their own brands (called OEM, or 
original equipment manufacture). Hong Kong has a weak technology struc­
ture, and is the only Asian Tiger to suffer massive de-industrialization in 
recent years. This may in part be traced to its lack of targeted industrial and 
technological policies: Singapore, with higher wages and a strong service 
sector, has a growing industrial sector because it has been able to target and 
promotc higher value-added activities. 
Let us now consider revealed comparative advantage (RCA) by teelmol­
ogy categories for the leading exporters in 198598 (Table 2.5).13 There are 
several points of note. 
China. In 1985 no manufactured export category for China had an 
RCA of over I (at the more disaggregated level, its fashion cluster products 
had an advantage). Its main advantage lay in primary products (with an 
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RCA of 1.7, not shown here). In 1998, China showed a revealed compara­
tive advantage only in LT products. Its RCA for HT products also increased 
strongly over the period, but not sufficiently to give an RCA of over unity. 
Its weakest RCA was in medium-technology products, while the lowest 
increase was in RB. 
M~ature Tigers. Korea started the period with a strong revealed com­
parative advantage in LT and a slight one in MT. By 1998, while it retained 
RCAs of over unity in these two groups, it had also developed a strong com­
parative advantage in HT products offset by a declining RCA in LT (and 
primary products). Taiwan started in 1985 with a stronger RCA in LT and 
had a slight advantage in HT. In 1998, it retained this pattern, but like 
Korea had suffered a large erosion of LT advantages while enjoying an 
increase in HT. Singapore had a strong comparative advantage in RB 
(petroleum refining and petrochemicals) and a somewhat lower one in HT 
products. By 1998, its only area of comparative advantage was HT, the only 
country in the group to show an increasing RCA in this set of products and 
declining ones in all others. Hong Kong remained overwhelmingly special­
ized in LT over the period, far more so than much lower-wage economies 
in the region. However, it also showed a slight positive comparative advan­
tage in HT products (mainly electronics-based light consumer goods like 
watches and toys) in both periods. In general, it showed the weakest and 
least dynamic of industrial structures among the Tigers, accompanying an 
anaemic export performance. 
'New Tigers'. The Philippines started in 1985 with an RB-dominated 
export structure (with a slight comparative advantage in textile products). 
It then underwent a dramatic transformation, losing in RB and gaining in 
HT. However, this was driven almost entirely by semiconductor assembly 
and belies an otherwise weak competitive performance. 14 Malaysia also 
started with a strong advantage in RB but it already had an advantage in 
HT. Over the period, its RB suffered a decline but retained a (slight) advan­
tage, while its HT greatly increased its RCA. Thailand had advantages in 
RB and LT in 1985, and by 1998 had greatly increased its competitive edge 
in HT while losing it slightly in RB and LT. Indonesia started, like China, 
with no RCAs of over unity in any manufactured category (that is, its 
advantages lay in primary products). Over time, Indonesia acquired advan­
tages in RB and LT products. Its pattern of resource-based and low­
technology competitiveness development contrasts with that of most other 
countries in the region. 
Table 2.5 RCAs for leading 13 developing country exporters by technological category, 1985 and 1998 
1985 RB RBI Ril2 LT LTI LT2 MT MTI MT2 MT3 HT HTI HT2 
Total Total Total Total 
China 0.525 0.364 0.639 0.751 1.417 0.219 0.096 0.012 0.322 0.034 0.099 0.019 0.248 
Korea 0.471 0.462 0.477 2.890 4.270 1.786 1.183 0.249 1.398 1.673 0.986 1.347 0.318 
Taiwan 0.539 0.760 0.381 3.657 4.599 2.904 0.663 0.314 0.764 0.836 1.237 1.794 0.205 
Mexico 0,462 0.253 0.610 0.366 0.322 0.401 0.547 0.390 0.267 0.790 0.693 0.987 0.148 
Singapore 2.070 0.921 2.888 0.523 0.548 0.502 0.645 0.071 0.654 1.009 1.644 2.127 0.750 
"" 
Malaysia 1.695 3.521 0.396 0.322 0.489 0.189 0.208 0.015 0.236 0.319 1.195 1.719 0.224 
'" Thailand 1.124 2.009 0.495 1.336 2.279 0.582 0.378 0.022 0.574 0.506 0.197 0.260 0.080 
Brazil 1.728 1.914 1.597 1.067 1.305 0.877 0.679 0.558 1.137 0.523 0.272 0.280 0.257 
Philippines 1.695 3.142 0.666 0.930 1.258 0.667 0.157 0.051 0.499 0.052 0.467 0.693 0.048 
Indonesia 0.893 1.252 0.637 0.234 0.445 0.064 0.044 0.001 0.168 0.009 0.050 0.054 0.042 
India 1.610 0.392 2.476 2.289 4.653 0.397 0.231 0.148 0.269 0.266 0.227 0.135 0.398 
Hong Kong 0.174 0.231 0.133 4.415 6.953 2.383 0.609 0.001 0.166 1.225 1.146 1.616 0.275 
Turkey 0.908 1.021 0.828 2.814 4.402 1.543 0.567 0.144 1.325 0.452 0.093 0.101 0.079 
All developing 1.0812 0.791 1.288 1.0982 1.633 0.670 0.3398 0.115 0.465 0.420 0.4387 0.571 0.193 
countries 
1998 RB RBI RB2 LT LTI LT2 MT MTi MT2 MT3 HT HTI HT2 
Total Total Total Total 
China 0.619 0.520 0.723 2.883 4.151 1.896 0.563 0.105 0.773 0.745 0.862 1.016 0.455 
Korea 0.671 0.479 0.874 1.210 1.493 0.991 1.073 0.889 1.525 0.971 1.288 1.619 0.418 
Taiwan 0.362 0.334 0.391 1.839 1.870 1.814 0.804 00400 1.175 0.877 1.654 2.203 0.208 
Mexico 0.409 0.426 0.390 1.070 1.152 1.006 1.187 1.696 0.604 1.151 1.260 1.561 0.469 
Singapore 0.912 0.422 1.431 0.417 0.293 0.514 0.537 0.081 0.623 0.778 2.683 3.545 0.414 
1.032 1.741 0.282 0.625 0.651 0.606 0.557 0.064 0.571 0.855 2.217 2.876 0.482 
.... 
Thailand 1.080 1.342 0.803 1.302 1.782 0.928 0.508 0.191 0.596 0.663 1.339 1.729 0.311 
.... Brazil 2.074 2.436 1.690 0.730 0.893 0.603 0.858 0.967 1.201 0.629 0.295 0.189 0.577 
Philippines 0.471 0.702 0.227 0.873 1.463 0.414 0.317 0.134 0.158 0.505 3.042 4.133 0.169 
Indonesia 1.470 1.957 0.954 1.148 1.630 0.773 0.311 0.066 0.729 0.264 0.252 0.318 0.079 
India 1.623 0.343 2.979 2.409 4.363 0.887 0.348 0.231 0.741 0.234 0.244 0.140 0.519 
Hong Kong 0.291 0.360 0.219 3.352 6.491 0.908 0.378 0.000 0.393 0.605· 1.158 1.306 0.766 
Turkey 0.854 1.096 0.598 3.114 5.522 1.239 0.554 0.293 0.997 0.503 0.253 0.281 0.180 
All developing 0.949 0.816 1.091 1.384 1.937 0.953 0.613 00421 0.801 0.641 1.083 1.365 0.339 
countries 
Note: Calculated for all exports, including primary products (not shown here). 
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5. MAIN DETERMINANTS OF COMPETITIVENESS 
Strategic Issues 
What were the strategies pursued by these countries to build industrial 
competitiveness? While a part of export growth was certainly based on the 
better exploitation of natural resources and unskilled or semi-skilled 
labour, the most dynamic performers have relied on the creation of new 
advantages in complex products. This has been based, in turn, on new 
domestic skills and technologies and/or on the attraction of MNC produc­
tion chains. The exact combination of the two has differed by country: 
some have relied on attracting FDI, others have built stronger domestic 
capabilities by intervening in factor and product markets. 
To reiterate the strategic issues: the development of competitiveness in all 
activities at all technological levels requires building capabilities in manage­
ment, production, engineering, design, distribution, marketing and so on. 
The realization of existing advantages (say, in resource-based or unskilled 
labour-intensive activities) tends to involve less effort, risk and externalities 
than the development of advantages in complex activities. Sustained export 
growth needs moving from easy to complex products and processes within 
activities, and across activities from easy to complex technologies. The 
choice between modes of technology transfer depends on the existing base 
of skills and the scale, marketing and technological demands of exporting. 
It also depends upon the ability of governments and institutions to help 
local enterprises build capabilities and tap externalities. MNCs and local 
firms face different factor markets and have to overcome different market 
failures in learning. 
MNCs have advantages over local firms in using new technologies. They 
have mastered and used the technologies elsewhere; they may have created 
the technology in the first place. They have large reserves of skill, technical 
support, experience and finance to design and implement learning. They 
have access to major export markets, established marketing channels and 
well-known brand names. They can transfer particular components or pro­
cesses from a production chain to a developing country and integrate it into 
an international system. This is much more difficult for local firms, not just 
because they may not have the experience or technological competence ­
they inevitably face higher transaction and coordination costs in integrat­
ing into MNC corporate systems. 
While MNCs can be a highly effective means of transferring technolo­
gies and building production capabilities, they may be less effective in deep­
ening and broadening them. MNCs initially transfer equipment and 
technologies suited to existing skills and capabilities. They do invest in 
35 Issues and evidence 
upgrading local skills, technological capabilities and supply chains but only 
to the extent that it is profitable in eommercial terms (to implement produc­
tion technologies). They will go beyond this, but only if the skill base is 
growing, local suppliers improving their capabilities, technology institu­
tions can provide more advanced services, and so on. This needs aetive 
government policies. Moreover, a policy to induce MNCs to enter more 
advanced activities by offering such inducements as specialized infrastruc­
ture and skills can accelerate the upgrading process. With a completely 
passive policy, MNC exports can remain at low, technologically stagnant, 
levels. Thus, an MNC-dependent export strategy needs a proactive element 
for dynamic competitiveness. 
More important, depending on FDI is not a substitute for strengthening 
domestic capabilities. There are many activities that MNCs do not enter, 
including many localized ones that tend to be populated by SMEs. They 
also need efficient local suppliers if they are to go beyond the assembly of 
imported components. Capturing the spillover benefits of foreign presence 
needs capable local firms. More important, a strong base of national enter­
prises can lead to broader, deeper and more flexible capabilities, since the 
technology development process within foreign affiliates may be curtailed 
as compared to local firms. The very fact that an affiliate can draw upon its 
parent company for technical information, skills, teehnological advances 
and so on means that it needs to invest less in its own capabilities. This 
applies particularly to functions like advanced engineering, design or R&D, 
which MNCs tend to centralize in industrial countries. As they mature 
industrially, it is imperative for developing countries to undertake these 
functions locally to support their future comparative advantage. This is 
why some countries choose to promote technology development in indige­
nous firms. 
Different countries make different strategic choices in these respects. 
Taking our sample of leading developing country exporters, we may distin­
guish between four: 
1. 	 Autonomous, based on the development of capabilities in domestic 
firms, starting in simple activities and deepening over time. This strat­
egy used extensive industrial poliey, reaching into trade, finance, edu­
cation, training, technology and industrial structure. It involved 
selective restrietions on FDI, and actively encouraged teehnology 
imports in other forms. All these interventions were carried out in a 
strongly export-oriented setting, with favours granted in return for 
good export performance. The prime examples are Korea and Taiwan. 
2. 	 Strategic FDI-dependent, driven by FDI and exports within inte­
grated production networks. There was a strong effort to upgrade 
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MNC activity according to strategic priorities, directing investments 
into higher value-added activities and inducing existing affiliates to 
upgrade their technologies and functions. This strategy involved 
extensive interventions in factor markets (skill creation, institution 
building, infrastructure development and supplier support), encour­
aging R&D and technology institutions, and in attracting, targeting 
and guiding investments. The best example is Singapore. 
3. 	 Passive FDI-dependent, also driven by FDI but relying largely on 
market forces to upgrade the structure. The main tools were a welcom­
ing FDI regime, strong incentives for exports, good export infrastruc­
ture and cheap, trainable labour. Skill upgrading and domestic 
technological activity were relatively neglected (though some countries 
had a relatively good base), and the domestic industrial sector tended 
to develop in isolation from the export sector. Malaysia, Thailand and 
the Philippines are good examples, along with the Special Economic 
Zones of China (and the maquilas of Mexico). 
4. 	 lSI restructuring, with exports growing from established import­
substituting industries where competitive (or nearly competitive) capa­
bilities had developed. The main policy tool was trade liberalization or 
strong export incentives (some, as in Latin America, within regional 
trade agreements). This led to considerable upgrading, restructuring and 
expansion of these industries along with their supplier networks. In 
some countries the main agents were domestic enterprises and in others 
they were MNCs. The main difference from the 'autonomous' strategy 
was the lack of clear and coordinated industrial policy to develop export 
competitiveness, with haphazard (and often weak) support for skills, 
technology, institutions and infrastructure. China and India are exam­
ples within Asia, the large Latin American economies elsewhere; ele­
ments of this strategy are also present in many other economies. 
These strategies are not exclusive. Countries often combine them and 
vary the combinations over time. Nevertheless, this typology is useful as an 
analytical tool. Let us now consider the main supply-side determinants of 
capability building (skills, technological activity and FDI attraction). 
Skills 
In the traditional setting, industrial development required improving the 
quantity and quality of primary schooling and basic technical education, 
and encouraging all forms of in-firm training. The data do not permit a rig­
orous comparison of skill formation across countries, particularly for 
enterprise training. What is possible is to compare educational enrolments. 
37 Issues and evidence 
The most common comparisons are for the three general levels: primary, 
secondary and tertiary. Given the focus in technology, however, we concen­
trate on tertiary enrolments in technical subjects: science, mathematics and 
computing and engineering. Note, however, that national rankings are 
fairly similar even if other measures of skill creation are used (Lall, 1999), 
so the exact definition of the measure is not that important. Table 2.6 shows 
enrolments for the mid-1990s for East Asia and its comparator regions and 
countries, with some advanced industrial countries shown for reference. 
Enrolment data are not, as noted, the ideal measure of skills. They ignore 
on-the-job learning, other forms of training and quality differences in the 
education provided. Nevertheless, they are the only comparable data avail­
able and they do show the national base for skill acquisition. In percentage 
terms the Asian NIEs enrol over 33 times as many of their population in 
technical subjects than does SSA (including South Africa). The ratio is 
twice that of industrial countries, nearly five times that of Latin America 
and the new NIEs, and over ten times that of South Asia and China. The 
leading three countries in terms of total numbers of technical enrolments 
- China (18 per cent), India (16 per cent) and Korea (11 per cent) account 
for 44 per cent of the developing world's technical enrolments, the top ten 
for 76 per cent and the top 20 for 93 per cent. 
In terms of the intensity of technical skill creation (enrolments as a per­
centage of the population), however, the picture is quite interesting, partic­
ularly at the country level (Table 2.7). The world leader is Korea (1.65 per 
cent), followed by Finland (1.33 per cent). Taiwan, the next developing 
country, ranks fifth 0.07 per cent). Singapore comes in much later, in 
thirty-eighth position, below the Philippines and Hong Kong; however, this 
is misleading in that the polytechnics provide a great deal of technical edu­
cation in Singapore and students also study abroad, which is not captured 
in the UNESCO data. The new NIEs, apart from the Philippines, are well 
behind: Indonesia (54), Thailand (70) and Malaysia (75). China and India 
are even further (82 and 78 respectively). 
These figures have to be treated with care. The connection between techni­
cal enrolments and technological competence is not direct. The quality of the 
training and the ability of industry to exploit available skills in R&D or other 
technical effort matter a great deal. The accumulated stock of trained man­
power and, more importantly. its base of experience are extremely important. 
Technological Activity 
Technological activity in developing countries consists less of 'innovation' 
than of engineering and technical work for learning, adaptation and 
improvement. Given its diffuse nature, however, it is difficult to measure. 
Table 2.6 Tertiary level enrolments and enrolments in technical subiect,\~ 1995 
Tertiary level 
enrolment Technical enrolments: numbers and 'Yr, of population 
Total no. 'X, pop. Natural science Maths, Engineering All technical 
students computing subjects 
numbers (,X,) numbers numbers ('X,) numbers 
countries 35345800 0.82 2046566 0.05 780930 0.02 4194433 0.\0 7021929 0.16 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1542700 0.28 111500 0.02 39330 0.01 69830 0.01 220660 0.04 
MENA 4571900 1.26 209065 0.06 114200 0.03 489302 0.14 812567 0.22 
Latin America 7677800 1.64 212901 0.05 188800 0.04 1002701 0.21 1404402 0.30 
'-N 
'::c 
Asia 21553400 0.72 1513100 0.05 438600 0.01 2632600 0.09 4584300 0.15 
4 mature Tigers 3031400 4.00 195200 0.26 34200 0.05 786100 1.04 1015500 1.34 
4 new Tigers 5547900 1.61 83600 0.02 280700 0.08 591000 0.17 955300 0.28 
S. Asia 6545800 0.54 996200 0.08 7800 0.00 272600 0.02 1276600 0.10 
China 5826600 0.60 167700 0.02 99400 0.01 971000 0.10 1238100 0.13 
Others 601700 0.46 70400 0.05 16500 0.01 11900 0.01 98800 0.08 
Transition economies 2025800 1.95 55500 0.05 30600 0.03 354700 0.34 440800 0.42 
Developed economies 33774800 4.06 1509334 0.18 1053913 0.13 3191172 0.38 5754419 0.69 
12297400 3.17 876734 0.23 448113 0.12 1363772 0.35 2688619 0.69 
N America 16430800 5.54 543600 0.18 577900 0.19 904600 0.31 2026100 0.68 
3917700 0.49 805800 0.10 805800 0.10 
Australia. Ne\1' Zealand 1128900 5.27 89000 0.42 27900 0.13 117000 0.55 233900 1.09 
-
Source: Calculated from UNESCO (1997) and national sources. Blank spaces indicate data was not available. 
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Table 2.7 Technical tertiary enrolments by country (% population), 1995 

\ Korea 1.65 38 Bolivia 0.34 
2 Finland 1.33 39 Costa Rica 0.34 
3 Australia 1.17 40 Turkey 0.33 
4 Taiwan 1.06 41 Ecuador 0.29 
Spain 0.97 42 Vruguay 0.29 
6 Ireland 0.90 43 Venezuela 0.29 
7 Austria 0.78 44 El Salvador 0.26 
8 Germany 0.77 45 Morocco 0.25 
9 UK 0.75 46 Tunisia 0.24 
Chile 0.73 47 Indonesia 0.23 
11 Portugal 0.73 48 Nicaragua 0.22 
12 Sweden 0.73 49 Honduras 0.20 
13 Greece 0.72 50 Thailand 0.19 
14 Canada 0.69 51 Brazil 0.18 
Israel 0.68 52 S. Africa 0.17 
16 N. Zealand 0.68 53 Hungary 0.16 
17 USA 0.68 54 Malaysia 0.13 
18 Norway 0.67 55 Egypt 0.12 
19 Italy 0.64 56 India 0.12 
Japan 0.64 57 Jamaica 0.11 
21 France 0.61 58 Paraguay 0.11 
22 Denmark 0.60 59 China 0.10 
23 Panama 0.59 60 Zimbabwe 0.09 
24 Netherlands 0.56 61 Bangladesh 0.08 
Philippines 0.55 62 Nepal 0.08 
26 Colombia 0.5\ 63 Sri Lanka 0.08 
27 Switzerland 0.5\ 64 Cameroon 0.06 
28 H. Kong 0.49 65 Madagascar 0.06 
29 Romania 0.49 66 Pakistan 0.05 
Argentina 0.47 67 Senegal 0.05 
31 Singapore 0.47 68 Mauritius 0.04 
32 Peru 0.46 69 Congo 0.03 
33 Mexico 0.44 70 Kenya 0.02 
34 Belgium 0.43 71 CAR 0.01 
Jordan 0.42 72 Ethiopia 0.01 
36 Algeria 0.41 73 Malawi 0.01 
37 Poland 0.39 
Source: Calculated from UNESCO (1997). 
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What we can measure is formal R&D. This is still useful, since R&D 
becomes an important input into competitiveness in countries at interme­
diate levels of industrialization. It is necessary to monitor technological 
developments overseas and select those relevant to local needs. This lowers 
the cost of technology transfer and captures more spillovers from the oper­
ation of TNCs. A growing R&D base permits better and faster technology 
diffusion within the economy and facilitates greater use of local resources. 
It makes it feasible and attractive for TNCs to locate their own design and 
development work there. Most importantly, it permits the industrial sector 
greater flexibility and diversification, and allows it greater autonomy. 
Table 2.8 shows R&D scientists and engineers and expenditures in the 
developing world. The patterns again reflect the technological depth of 
exports analysed earlier. Productive enterprise-financed R&D as a share of 
GNP ..... perhaps the best indicator of technologically useful R&D in the 
mature NIEs is nearly 400 times higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
around 10 times higher than in the new NIEs and Latin America. Asia as 
a whole accounts for 86 per cent of R&D scientists and engineers in the 
developing world, Sub-Saharan Africa for 0.3 per cent, and Latin America 
for 10 per cent. The proportion of enterprise-financed R&D in total R&D 
spending is highest in the mature NIEs, followed by the new NIEs, and 
lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Latin America and South Asia are similar, 
with below 10 per cent of national R&D financed by productive enterprises. 
The regional averages conceal variations at the national level. Figure 
2.3 shows productive enterprise-financed R&D as a percentage of GNP for 
selected countries. Korea is again one of the leaders; its figure is the highest, 
not only in the developing world, but also, apart from Japan, in the world 
as a whole. 15 Taiwan comes next in the developing world, with a lower ratio 
than the UK but more than the Netherlands or Italy. Singapore comes next, 
though much lower in the world scale. While its high dependence on FDI 
has not held back the growth of private sector R&D (much of it in foreign 
affiliates), this has needed a strong government push, and the innovation 
base remains narrow. Hong Kong does not publish R&D data, but reports 
suggest that total R&D is only 0.1 per cent of GNP (NSF. 2000, table 2-14) 
and enterprise-financed R&D is a very small proportion of this. The other 
three Tigers are clearly a class apart in the developing world. 
Of the new Tigers, Malaysia leads while Thailand comes in last, surpris­
ingly lower even than Indonesia. 16 This reveals an important weakness in 
Thai competitiveness, the shallowness of its high-technology export activ­
ity (Lall, 2001). Malaysia has succeeded in raising R&D in MNCs (espe­
cially in electronics), adopting some of the same strategies as Singapore, 
but it has a long way to go before it can match the latter in technological 
competence. 
(a) Only including countries with data, and with over 1 million inhabitants in 1995. 
(b) 
(c) Including Middle East oil states, 
(d) Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan 
(e) Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines. 
(I) India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal. 
(g) Including Russian federation. 
USA, Canada. West Europe, Japan. Australia and New Zealand. 
Table 2.8 R&D propensities and manpower in major country groups (latest year available) 
Countries and regions (a) Scientistslengineers 
in R&D 
Total 
R&D 
Seetor of 
performance 
Source of 
financing ('Yo 
distribution) 
R&D by 
('%of 
GNP) 
Per mill. 
pop. 
Numbers CX,of 
GNP) 
Productive 
sector education 
Prod. 
enterprise 
Govt. Prod. Prod. 
sector 
Industrialized economies (b) 1102 2704205 1.94 53.7 22.9 53.5 38.0 1.037 1.043 
Developing economies (c) 514 1034333 0.39 13.7 22.2 10.5 55.0 0.041 0.054 
Sub-Saharan Africa (exc. S. Africa) 83 3193 0.28 0.0 38.7 0.6 60.9 0.002 0.000 
North Africa 423 29675 0.40 nla nla nla nla nla nla 
Latin America & Caribbean 339 107508 0.45 18.2 23.4 9.0 78.0 0.041 0.082 
Asia (excluding Japan) 783 893957 0.72 32.1 25.8 33.9 57.9 0.244 0.231 
.... Mature NIEs (d) 2121 189212 1.50 50.1 36.6 51.2 45.8 0.768 0.751"" 
New NIEs (e) 121 18492 0.20 27.7 15.0 38.7 46.5 0.077 0.055 
S. Asia (f) 125 145919 0.85 13.3 10.5 7.7 91.8 0.065 0.113 
Middle East 296 50528 0.47 9.7 45.9 11.0 51.0 0.051 0.045 
China 350 422700 0.50 31.9 13.7 nla nla nla 0.160 
transition economies (g) 1857 946162 0.77 35.7 21.4 37.3 47.8 0.288 0.275 
(79-84 countries) 1304 4684700 0.92 36.6 24.7 34.5 53.2 0.318 0.337 
Notes: 
Source: Calculated from UNESCO (1997). Regional propensities for R&D spending arc simple averages. 
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Figure 2.3 R&D financed by productive enterprises, 1995 (% GNP) 
MNCs account for substantial portions of technological effort in 
Singapore, Malaysia, Brazil and Mexico. Interestingly, the latter two coun­
tries attract the most US MNC R&D in the developing world (UNCTAD, 
1999), but are poor performers in overall terms. In Korea and Taiwan, 
R&D by local firms takes precedence, driven by strategies to restrict FDI 
inflows and reverse the passive reliance on foreign technologies that marks 
most developing countries. 
FDI 
As noted, trade and competitiveness are increasingly related to MNC activ­
ity. MNCs now account for large shares of world trade and their shares are 
higher in technologically advanced and differentiated products. A very 
large part of MNC trade is now intra~firm. In the USA, for instance, 
exports by MNCs to their majority-owned affiliates in 1996 comprised 48 
per cent of parent company exports, up from 41 per cent in ] 977. Half of 
exports by foreign MNCs in the USA (accounting for 20 per cent of total 
US exports) were also intra-firm; similar trends are likely in other capital 
exporting countries. The propensity to engage in intra- as compared to 
inter-firm trade is higher in technologically complex and novel products. 
Within the web of intra-firm trade relationships is the emerging network of 
international production systems, with different stages of production and 
services located in different countries in accordance with relative costs and 
strategic considerations. 
Entry by developing countries into a large (and dynamic) segment of 
industrial activity and trade thus increasingly requires direct MNC (that is, 
equity-based) participation. Arm's length and joint venture relations with 
MNCs help, but they only provide partial entry into this segment, and only 
for countries that have strong local technological and innovative capabil­
43 Issues and evidence 

Table 2.9 FD! as percentage of gross domestic investment (averages) 

1980-85 1994-97 
Singapore 18.72 27.81 
China 0.87 13.24 
Malaysia 1l.18 12.47 
Hong Kong 6.90 9.93 
Philippines 0.37 8.20 
Indonesia 1.00 6.60 
Thailand 2.41 4.18 
Taiwan 1.50 3.05 
Korea, Rep. 0.40 l.ll 
Cambodia 0.00 27.41 
Laos 0.00 23.14 
Vietnam 0.00 22.88 
Pakistan 1.39 6.27 
Sri Lanka 3.02 5.54 
India 0.14 2.46 
Bangladesh 0.00 0.49 
Chile 6.23 23.14 
Mexico 2.41 12.50 
Argentina 2.98 11.39 
Brazil 4.19 5.97 
Ireland 4.14 15.05 
UK 6.53 12.34 
France 2.02 8.32 
USA 2.74 5.81 
Germany 0.60 1.53 
Japan 0.09 0.09 
Sources: World Bank, (2000), UNCTAD (2002). 
ities. Even for such countries, the needs of scale, specialization, and access 
to new technologies and international marketing makes it imperative to 
belong to MNC systems rather than stay outside them. This is why world 
technological leaders encourage interpenetration by each other's MNCs, 
strategic alliances and cross-border M&As. 
However, few developing countries participate in these emerging MNC 
systems. While FDI in developing countries is rising rapidly (from an average 
of US$29 billion in 1986-91 to US$208 billion in 1999), flows are highly con­
centrated. The top 10 developing countries account for nearly 80 per cent, 
and the top 25 for 95 per cent, of the total. Table 2.9 shows FDI inflows as a 
percentage of gross domestic investment in East Asia (including some 
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formerly socialist economies) and comparators in Latin America, South 
Asia and the OECD, averaged for 1980-85 and 1994-97, 
Singapore has been, and remains, the country most reliant on internal­
ized technology transfers by MNCs in the region. Malaysia has tradition­
ally been the second, but in recent years has been overtaken by China 
(which in absolute terms is the largest recipient of FDI in the developing 
world). The Philippines has greatly raised its attractiveness to foreign inves­
tors, as has Indonesia. Thailand remains a relatively modest player by 
regional standards. Taiwan, and to a greater extent Korea, have been rela­
tively restrictive on FDI inflows (and have been net exporters of FDI for 
some time). However, Korea has become far more receptive to inward 
investments after the financial crisis. In fact, it saw a dramatic upsurge of 
inward FDI in 1998-99, accounted for by a burst of cross-border M&A 
activity: inflows thus rose from US$3.1 billion in 1997 to US$10.3 billion 
in 1999 (UNCTAD, 2000). Thailand has seen a similar spurt, largely into 
the financial sector but also into manufacturing industries. Indonesia, by 
contrast, has suffered negative inflows as a result of the political instability 
following the crisis. 
The relationship between reliance on FDI (internalized technology 
inflows) and domestic R&D effort varies greatly within East Asia. The 
'autonomous' countries, Korea and Taiwan, built up strong innovative 
capabilities by restricting internalized technology inflows and using a 
battery of promotional measures to encourage technological development 
and R&D by local enterprises (Lall, 1996). Of the FDI-dependent coun­
tries, only Singapore had a coherent and consistent policy for encouraging 
local R&D, encompassing both foreign and local firms and using tools and 
incentives to get MNCs to upgrade affiliate technological capabilities. The 
other economies (China apart) did not have technology promotion policies 
for MNCs (though Malaysia had a mild and largely ineffective approach 
along Singaporean lines); for domestic firms they had some general policies 
but without much 'bite'. As a result, their capabilities were largely confined 
to production technologies. 
This pattern suggests that countries with ambitious technological objec­
tives need to mount coherent and targeted strategies to induce firms to 
move up the skill and innovation ladder. Building a strong and diverse inno­
vation base in domestic enterprises seems to need selective policies to 
restrict FDI. Raising R&D in foreign affiliates needs a different set of pol­
icies, but it is clearly feasible if the host country is able to provide world­
class skills, infrastructure and business environment. 
45 Issues and evidence 
2.5 Capability building Bubble size indicates average value of 
strategy RCA in higlHech exports 
2 
Korea1.5 l~ (UlW<1n a FDI-dependencea,0 RCA 147 
<:>(l 
 \ strategy ~ "GECD Chma ~RCA 086 Hong Kong ~_ Malay,..0.5 Devclopmg countncs 	 MexIco 
RCA: 0.12 ('0\ I PhliJppmes 
+---r-----~-- ~ Smgapore 
\....~d ThaJland 0 ~ RCA 161 
I
-0.5 
-2 	 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 
FDI 
Figure 2.4 	 RCA in high-technology exports and main industrial strategies. 
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6. 	 CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVENESS 
STRATEGIES 
We can illustrate the different strategies for Asian and other countries (73 
in total) for 1995. The dependent variable is competitiveness, measured by 
RCAs in different technological categories. The independent variables are 
FDI (as a percentage of gross domestic investment) and technological effort 
(R&D by productive enterprises as a percentage of GOP). 
The technique used is K-means cluster analysis. l ? Cluster analysis groups' 
observations on the basis of selected characteristics, help in this case to 
identify groups of countries with similar export patterns and strategies. 
Strategies in turn are indicated by different degrees of reliance on FDI and 
domestic R&D. Figure 2.4 is a three-dimensional representation of RCAs 
and these two determinants of competitive performance. It shows clearly 
how Korea and Taiwan stand out from the other high performing Asian 
economies in terms of their higher reliance on domestic R&D rather than 
R&D. It also shows that FDI-dependent countries in the region have higher 
RCAs, being able to enter MNC international production systems. 
Clearly the growth of these production systems has transformed compet­
itive patterns in some countries very quickly, allowing them to bypass the 
slow and arduous process of building domestic capabilities. It does not, 
however, ensure a sustainable base of capabilities in the longer term, as 
their wages rise and technologies become more complex and skill intensive. 
In strategic terms, the data show clearly the differences between what we 
have termed 'autonomous' and 'FDI-dependent' approaches to building 
competitiveness. The implications are that countries that wish to pursue 
autonomous strategies need to mount enormous efforts to compensate for 
46 Competitiveness, FDf and technological activity in East Asia 
the lack of internalized technology transfers. Those that are unable to do 
this would be wise to depend on MNCs and direct their efforts towards inte­
gration into their international production systems. However, most coun­
tries have not been able to do either the aim of these countries should be 
to discover what they need to do to follow one pattern or the other. Note, 
however, that the strategic choices illustrated by these figures relate to the 
past. The options for the future are much narrower, as the 'rules of the 
game' change (towards a smaller role for government) and are more rigor­
ously enforced. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The figures on export competitiveness in East Asia are impressive. The 
region is the best placed in the developing world to sustain export compet­
itiveness. It is a dominant player in developing world trade. It is well posi­
tioned in fast growing products and shows great flexibility in adapting to 
changing patterns of technology and demand. Its specialization in high­
technology products points to considerable development of skill and tech­
nological capabilities. 
These generalizations conceal important national differences. Different 
Asian exporters base their competitiveness on different agents and factors. 
At one extreme, Korea and Taiwan have a strong domestic base of enter­
prises, skills, innovation and institutions. At the other, some very success­
ful exporters have weak domestic enterprises, a shallow technology base, an 
export sector isolated from local industry, and an inadequate skill creation 
system. 
This is not to say that the former set necessarily has better long-term 
competitive prospects than the latter. Each group faces its own risks and 
challenges. For instance, those with autonomous strategies expose them­
selves to greater risk the more they approach technological frontiers and 
the more rapid the pace of technical change. Those highly dependent on 
MNC networks to provide technology do not face the same technological 
risk. However, looking to the future, we can argue that the requirements of 
continued competitiveness are likely to be very different from the past. 
Passive FDI-dependent countries with low levels of skill and R&D may 
find themselves unable to attract the most advanced or dynamic technolo­
gies if their skill and supplier base does not rise to the level needed. 
Globalization does not, in other words, reduce the role of local capabil­
ities and innovative activity beyond the short term where an assembly base 
is established. On the contrary, it raises it because technical efficiency in 
each location becomes the final determinant of success. As rising wages and 
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technical change force countries into more complex activities, they have to 
furnish more advanced capabilities. Skill development, industrial special­
ization, enterprise learning and institutional change are needed to create 
cumulative and self-reinforcing processes to promote further learning, 
regardless of how much countries rely on MNCs. 
Autonomous strategies as demonstrated by Korea and Taiwan entail 
a great deal of industrial policy and accompanying interventions in factor 
markets and institutions. They lead to a massive development and deepen­
ing of indigenous skills and technological capabilities, with the national 
ability to keep abreast of new technologies and for domestic enterprises to 
become significant global players in their own right. However, such strate­
gies are increasingly difficult and risky on economic grounds - the sheer 
pace of technical change and the growth of international production 
systems raise the costs of being left on the outside. They are also increas­
ingly constricted by the new rules of the game being laid down by interna­
tional agencies and developed countries. 
FDI-dependent strategies comprise two sub-strategies, targeted and 
passive. Targeted strategies - as in Singapore - also entail considerable 
industrial policy, but the intensity of government interventions is lower 
than with autonomous strategies. The sources of technical change remain 
largely outside, in the hands of MNCs; there is less need to intervene to 
promote learning in infant industries for this reason. However, industrial 
policy is needed to ensure the development of the relevant skills, capabil­
ities and institutions required to ensure that TNCs keep transferring new 
technologies and higher value functions. Passive strategies involve less 
industrial policy in export-oriented activities to start with (though there 
may be intervention in domestic-oriented activity). However, they need to 
evolve into more targeted strategies if countries are not to lose their com­
petitive positions and momentum. 
National technology strategies are now starting to converge. Autonomous 
countries are becoming more integrated into MNC systems (and have many 
capable MNCs of their own). FDI-dependent countries are trying to 
strengthen capabilities in domestic firms and build up the institutional struc­
ture for innovation. Those using passive FDI strategies are moving towards 
more targeted strategies. These changes are driven both by new technologies 
and globalization as well as by new rules of the game, and are likely to persist 
into the foreseeable future. This does not, however, mean that countries will 
converge technologically. There will remain significant differences in techno­
logical and competitive performance, even among the successful exporters of 
East Asia, because of differences in endowments (size, location, resources 
and so on) and in inherited structures of technological learning. National 
systems of technology development have elements of path dependence and 
48 Competitiveness, FDI and technological activity in East Asia 
stability (Lall, 2000a) and can change only as the institutional, technological 
and human capital base evolves necessarily a slow process. Inherited struc­
tures also influence how flexibly and dynamically countries respond to new 
competitive challenges: this feedback process can let leaders maintain their 
advantage for very long periods. FDI can help change national technologi­
cal systems, but the real driver of change lies within each economy. 
Government policies and institutional structures playa vital role here, and 
this role remains even as its form and content evolves. 
NOTES 
I. 	 I am grateful to Manuel Albaladejo for doing the cluster analysis reported at the end of 
the paper, and to various members of the World Bank Institute study, in particular Bee­
Van Aw and Rajah Rasiah. for helpful comments. I would like to acknowledge my debt 
to UNCTAD for classifying the export data at my request. The usual disclaimers apply. 
2. 	 See UNIDO (2002) for data on the values and concentration of global and national 
R&D spending. 
3. 	 Despite their emphasis on human capital and technology, endogcnous growth models 
also assume that in developing countries openness to trade and investment (both condu­
cive to technology flows) is both necessary and sujficienl. 
4. 	 The international technology market is fragmented and ill defined, and searching for the 
optimal technology deal can be costly and difficult. It is not easy to define the technol­
ogy 'product' or its price. The transfer can take many different forms (that is, the product 
is not well specified). Much depends on how much technical and other information the 
seller includes (or the buyer asks for) and how it transmits this information and modifies 
it over time. The seller knows more about the 'product' than the buyer does (otherwise 
it would have nothing to sell): the buyer thus operates under an information asymmetry, 
largely absent in transactions in physical products. Even with full information, the two 
parties can have different valuations of the technology depending on their market posi­
tions, expectations and technological eapabilities. Since technological inlormation is 
constantly changing, the valuation also depends on which vintage is being transferred 
and how its future evolution is foreseen. For these reasons. the price and terms of tech­
nology transfer are subject to bargaining and the accompanying uncertainty and non­
transparency. 
5. 	 These are explored in 'new economic geography'; see, for instance, Krugman (1995) and 
Venables (1996). 
6. 	 One may compare unit values of exports over time or across countries to get a rough 
indication of technical change and quality, but this is only possible for a few (relatively 
homogeneous) products and countries. When the objective is to build up a broad picture 
of export patterns by technology levels, this procedure cannot be applied. 
7. 	 Ideally, the data should distinguish between levels of technology at a fairly disaggregated 
level. but this is not possible. We use the UN Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) data at the 3-digit level (Revision 2). This level can put together products of 
different levels of technological complexity in the same category. For instance, telecom­
munications apparatus includes advanced telephone technology as well as simple tele­
phone receivers. The export data do not distinguish quality differences within categories, 
such as fashion clothing from mass-produced items. 
8. 	 For instance, semiconductor exports can be based on high-tech processes in the USA and 
simple assembly and testing in the Philippines: both appear as 'high technology'. 
9. 	 The export data are all in terms of current US dollars and do not show volume changes. 
Since the main purpose of the exercise is to compare regions and countries across tech­
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nological categories, this does not matter very much, since a general price deflator would 
apply to all equally. However, it does mean that relative price changes between product 
categories cannot be taken into account. 
10. 	 Transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are excluded because of the 
very patchy nature of the data available over the period. Developed economies are 
defined to include [srael, South Europe but not Turkey (which is included in the Middle 
East group). Developing countries are defined to include the South Africa, the mature 
Asian Tigers, China and Asian transition economies (like Vietnam), and all Latin 
American countries (including Mexico). Data for 1998 have several missing values for 
developing countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and many African countries, none of 
which are major exporters in the developing world. Data for 1980 could not be used 
because they had missing values for major Latin American exporters. 
II. 	 'East Asia' includes all countries in Asia east of Myanmar, including Myanmar and 
Vietnam (but not Laos or Cambodia) and China, and excludes Japan and Central Asian 
transition countries. 'South Asia' comprises India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan. 'MENA' (Middle East and North Africa) includes 
Afghanistan and Turkey as well as all Arab countries (Sudan is counted under SSA). 
'SSA' (Sub-Saharan Africa) includes South Africa (SSA I) unless specified (SSA2). 
'LAC' (Latin America and the Caribbean) includes Mexico (LACl) and excludes it 
(LAC2) when specified. 
12. 	 Mexico is treated as an outlier because of its proximity to the USA and the unusual 
nature of its trading relations. Mexico has long been a base for export-oriented assem­
bly by US firms in its border maquiladoras, which were allowed to import duty-free 
inputs and sell the finished product to the USA with tariffs levied only on the value­
added. The formation of NAFTA in the mid-1990s gave offshore assembly a new fillip 
and brought Mexico into a position to challenge Asia. NAFTA allowed significant new 
privileges like allowing local inputs for duty exemption; this led to dramatic rises across 
all export categories and to a huge rise in FDI from Asia to use Mexico as an export base 
for the USA. Mexico now accounts for more manufactured exports than the rest of Latin 
America put together. South Africa is an outlier in SSA for more obvious reasons. It 
accounted for 55 per cent of manufacturing value-added in SSA in 1998, and for 45 per 
cent of its manufactured exports. 
13. 	 'Revealed comparative advantage' is defined as the share of a country's exports of a par­
ticular product, say clothing, divided by the share of its total exports in world exports. 
Thus, an RCA ratio of over I for clothing shows that the country has a revealed com­
parative advantage in clothing: its global share of clothing exports is higher than the 
share of all its exports. 
14. 	 Given its relatively low wages, for instance, the Philippines is performing poorly in tra­
ditionallabour-intensive exports (Lan, 2001). See Chapter lOon the Philippines for an 
analysis of the shallow base of its high-technology exports. 
15. 	 However, by 1997 Sweden had overtaken Korea and Japan. see UNIDO (2002). 
16. 	 However, this may be due to measurement errors and the real figure is likely to be some­
what higher, taking it ahead of Indonesia but still behind Malaysia. I am grateful to Peter 
Brimble for this comment. 
17. 	 K-means duster analysis is used to cluster large numbers. The number of groups has to 
be specified in advance: we specified five. Using the squared Euclidean distance (the sum 
of the squared differences over all of the variables), we identify 'five initial cluster 
centres' as a reference point for the other cases. Once the cases are classified. we obtain 
the final cluster centres, which are simply the average values of the variables lor cases in 
the clusters. 
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ANNEX 
Table 2A.1 	 Leading 13 exporters ojmanuJac tures in 1998, values oj 
exports in 1985 and 1998 (US$ million) 
Total RB RBI RB2 LT LTi LT2 
mfrs. total total 
China 6049.2 2349.7 677.7 1672.0 2645.2 2217.4 427.8 
Korea 29025.0 2493.6 1016.7 1477.0 12017.6 7892.5 4125.1 
Taiwan 29092.5 2883.2 1690.3 1192.9 15381.6 8597.1 6784.5 
Mexico 8336.3 1761.4 401.4 1360.0 1097.2 429.3 667.8 
Singapore 19014.0 8266.6 1527.8 6738.7 1640.2 764.7 875.5 
Malaysia 8626.5 4632.1 3998.9 633.3 692.4 466.6 225.8 
Thailand 3657.6 1386.5 1029.8 356.6 1295.1 981.8 313.3 
Brazil 17616.8 7744.6 3563.2 4181.4 3757.2 2042.9 1714.4 
Philippines 2428.7 1359.1 1047.0 312.0 585.7 352.3 233.4 
Indonesia 3856.4 2899.3 1690.4 1208.9 596.2 505.1 91.1 
India 6208.9 2518.8 255.] 2263.8 2813.2 2542.2 270.9 
Hong Kong 15979.5 504.2 278.1 226.1 10063.3 7045.7 3017.6 
Turkey 5790.4 1263.4 590.3 673.1 3075.5 2138.6 936.9 
Total above 13 155681.5 37568.9 17766.8 22295.8 43642.7 35976.2 19684.1 
Developing 210244.6 79986.4 24308.2 55678.2 63839.8 42194.1 21645.7 
world 
fy<) 74.0 47.0 73.1 40.0 68.4 85.3 90.9 
MT MTI MT2 MT3 HT HTI HT2 
total total 
China 738.9 28.6 589.5 120.8 315.4 38.6 276.8 
Korea \0807.1 678.6 3020.4 7108.1 3706.7 3287.7 419.0 
Taiwan 6124.1 865.3 1668.5 3590.4 4703.6 4430.0 273.6 
Mexico 3600.7 766.1 415.6 2419.0 1877.0 1736.4 140.5 
Singapore 4445.2 146.4 1066.3 3232.4 4662.1 3916.9 745.3 
Malaysia 982.1 20.5 262.9 698.7 2319.9 2167.4 152.5 
Thailand 803.8 13.9 289.0 501.0 172.2 147.7 24.5 
Brazil 5249.6 1287.2 2079.7 1882.7 865.4 578.4 287.1 
Philippines 217.8 21.1 163.5 33.3 266.1 256.5 9.6 
Indonesia 246.1 0.9 222.2 23.0 114.8 80.9 33.9 
India 624.7 118.9 171.5 334.3 252.1 97.4 154.8 
Hong Kong 3050.2 1.9 196.4 2851.8 2361.8 2163.1 198.7 
Turkey 1359.6 102.8 752.4 504.3 91.9 64.7 27.2 
Total above 13 27442.7 4052.2 10897.8 23299.8 18002.2 18965.5 2743.4 
Developing 43369.6 4380.5 14040.5 24948.6 23048.7 19490.7 3558.0 
world 
0/0 63.3 92.5 77.6 93.4 78.1 97.3 77.1 
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1998 Total RB RBI RB2 LT LTl LT2 
rufrs. total total 
China 167681.1 16551.3 7155.4 9395.8 83803.2 52814.7 30988.5 
Korea 120700.3 12914.5 4739.6 8175.0 25325.3 13673.1 11652.2 
Taiwan 105553.7 5811.3 2761.3 3050.1 32100.7 14291.0 17809.7 
Mexico 103681.3 6977.1 3743.6 3233.5 19848.6 9358.2 10490.4 
Singapore 103488.5 14588.6 3471.0 11117.6 7254.0 2226.8 5027.2 
Malaysia 65940.5 11004.8 9543.2 1461.7 7245.9 3301.7 3944.3 
Thailand 44759.5 8657.7 5532.4 3125.3 11345.3 6798.2 4547.1 
Brazil 38881.6 15424.7 9319.0 6105.7 5900.6 3158.6 2742.0 
Philippines 28118.8 2022.3 1548.6 473.7 4074.3 2988.2 1086.1 
Indonesia 26894.8 \0447.6 7154.9 3292.7 8868.8 5511.1 3357.7 
India 25855.1 7801.8 847.5 6954.3 12583.4 9977.4 2606.0 
Hong Kong 23136.7 1041.7 661.4 380.3 13034.7 11049.2 1985.5 
Turkey 22885.2 3339.9 2204.1 1135.8 13236.9 \0276.1 2960.8 
Total above 13 877577.3 116583.5 58681.9 57901.6 244621.8 145424.2 99197.6 
Developing 996967.5 175130.4 77385.7 97744.7 277435.3 169990.4 107444.9 
world 
0;;) 88.0 66.6 75.8 59.2 88.2 85.5 92.3 
MT MTl MT2 MT3 HT HTl HT2 
total total 
China 33853.9 1864.0 10556.4 21433.4 33472.8 28605.5 4867.3 
Korea 46443.7 11354.5 14998.0 20091.3 36016.7 32800.6 3216.2 
Taiwan 29044.5 4256.5 9644.3 15143.6 38597.2 37259.0 1338.2 
Mexico 45598.6 19200.6 5264.1 21133.9 31257.0 28055.0 3202.0 
Singapore 19326.2 861.8 5091.3 13373.0 62319.7 59674.4 2645.2 
Malaysia 13360.2 455.2 3107.9 9797.0 34329.6 32276.3 2053.3 
Thailand 9165.0 1014.8 2438.8 571!.5 15591.5 14593.9 997.5 
Brazil 14363.8 4770.0 4563.9 5029.9 3192.5 1476.4 1716.0 
Philippines 3058.9 382.2 346.8 2329.9 18963.3 18673.5 289.8 
Indonesia 4972.1 310.0 2647.5 2014.6 2606.3 2381.3 225.0 
India 3763.5 735.2 1820.4 1208.0 1706.3 708.5 997.8 
Hong Kong 3044.5 0.7 717.9 2325.9 6015.8 4920.1 J095.7 
Turkey 4870.8 761.5 J992.9 2116.4 1437.7 1156.3 281.3 
Total above 13 230865.8 45967.0 63190.3 121708.5 285506.2 262580.8 22925.4 
Developing 254289.1 51537.3 75515.3 127236.4 290112.8 265114.5 24998.3 
world 
% 90.8 89.2 83.7 95.7 98.4 99.0 91.7 
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Table 2A.2 Leading developing country exporters in 1998, distribution by 
technological category and growth rates, 1985-98 
Shares of LOtal manufactured exports by technological categories 1985 nq 
Total RB RBI RB2 LT LTI LT2 
mfrs. total total 
China 100 38.8 11.2 27.6 43.7 36.7 7.1 
Korea 100 8.6 3.5 5.1 41.4 27.2 14.2 
Taiwan 100 9.9 5.8 4.1 52.9 29.6 23.3 
Mexico 100 21.1 4.8 16.3 13.2 5.2 8.0 
Singapore 100 43.5 8.0 35.4 8.6 4.0 4.6 
Malaysia 100 53.7 46,4 7.3 8.0 5,4 2.6 
Thailand 100 37.9 28.2 9.8 35,4 26.8 8.6 
Brazil 100 44.0 20.2 23.7 21.3 11.6 9.7 
Philippines 100 56.0 43.1 12.8 24.1 14.5 9.6 
Indonesia 100 75.2 43.8 31.3 15.5 13.1 2,4 
India 100 40.6 4.1 36.5 45.3 40.9 4.4 
Hong Kong 100 3.2 1.7 1,4 63.0 44.1 18.9 
Turkey 100 21.8 10.2 11.6 53.1 36.9 16.2 
Shares of total manufactured exports by technological categories 1985 ('X) 
MT MTl MT2 MT3 HT HTI HT2 
total total 
China 12.2 0.5 9.7 2.0 5.2 0.6 4.6 
Korea 37.2 2.3 10,4 24.5 12.8 11.3 1.4 
Taiwan 21.1 3.0 5.7 12.3 16.2 15.2 0.9 
Mexico 43.2 9.2 5.0 29.0 22.5 20.8 1.7 
Singapore 23,4 0.8 5.6 17.0 24.5 20.6 3.9 
Malaysia 11.4 0.2 3.0 8.1 26.9 25.1 1.8 
Thailand 22.0 0,4 7.9 13.7 4.7 4.0 0.7 
Brazil 29.8 7.3 11.8 10.7 4.9 3.3 1.6 
Philippines 9.0 0.9 6.7 1.4 11.0 10.6 0,4 
Indonesia 6,4 0.0 5.8 0.6 3.0 2.1 0.9 
India 10.1 1.9 2.8 5,4 4.1 1.6 2.5 
Hong Kong 19.1 0.0 T.2 17.8 14.8 13.5 1.2 
Turkey 23.5 1.8 13.0 8.7 1.6 l.l 0.5 
Shares of total manufactured exports by technological categories 1998 (%) 
Total RB RBI RB2 LT LTI LT2 
mfrs. total total 
China 100 9.9 4.3 5.6 50.0 31.5 18.5 
Korea 100 10.7 3.9 6.8 21.0 11.3 9.7 
Taiwan 100 5.5 2.6 2.9 30.4 13.5 16.9 
Mexico 100 6.7 3.6 3.1 19.1 9.0 10.1 
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Singapore 100 14.1 3.4 10.7 7.0 2.2 4.9 
Malaysia 100 16.7 14.5 2.2 11.0 5.0 6.0 
Thailand 100 19.3 12.4 7.0 25.3 15.2 10.2 
Brazil 100 39.7 24.0 15.7 15.2 8.1 7.1 
Philippines 100 7.2 5.5 1.7 14.5 10.6 3.9 
Indonesia 100 38.8 26.6 12.2 33.0 20.5 12.5 
India 100 30.2 3.3 26.9 48.7 38.6 10.1 
Hong Kong 100 4.5 2.9 1.6 56.3 47.8 8.6 
Turkey 100 14.6 9.6 5.0 57.8 44.9 12.9 
Shares of total manufactured exports by technological categories 1998 (%) 
MT MTI MT2 MT3 HT HTI HT2 
total total 
China 20.2 l.l 6.3 12.8 20.0 17.1 2.9 
Korea 38.5 9.4 12.4 16.6 29.8 27.2 2.7 
Taiwan 27.5 4.0 9.1 14.3 36.6 35.3 1.3 
Mexico 44.0 18.5 5.1 20.4 30.1 27.1 3.1 
Singapore 18.7 0.8 4.9 12.9 60.2 57.7 2.6 
Malaysia 20.3 0.7 4.7 14.9 52.1 48.9 3.1 
Thailand 20.5 2.3 5.4 12.8 34.8 32.6 2.2 
Brazil 36.9 12.3 11.7 12.9 8.2 3.8 4.4 
Philippines 10.9 1.4 1.2 8.3 67.4 66.4 1.0 
Indonesia 18.5 1.2 9.8 7.5 9.7 8.9 0.8 
India 14.6 2.8 7.0 4.7 6.6 2.7 3.9 
Hong Kong 13.2 0.0 3.1 10.1 26.0 21.3 4.7 
Turkey 21.3 3.3 8.7 9.2 6.3 5.1 1.2 
Annual rates of export growth 1985-98 (%) 
Total RB RBJ RB2 LT LTi LT2 
mfrs. total total 
China 29.1 16.2 19.9 14.2 30.5 27.6 39.0 
Korea 11.6 13.5 12.6 14.1 5.9 4.3 8.3 
Taiwan 10.4 5.5 3.8 7.5 5.8 4.0 7.7 
Mexico 21.4 11.2 18.7 6.9 24.9 26.8 23.6 
Singapore 13.9 4.5 6.5 3.9 12.1 8.6 14.4 
Malaysia 16.9 6.9 6.9 6.6 19.8 16.2 24.6 
Thailand 21.2 15.1 13.8 18.2 18.2 16.0 22.8 
Brazil 6.3 5.4 7.7 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.7 
Philippines 20.7 3.1 3.1 3.3 16.1 17.9 12.6 
Indonesia 16.1 10.4 11.7 8.0 23.1 20.2 32.0 
India 11.6 9.1 9.7 9.0 12.2 11.I 19.0 
Hong Kong 2.9 5.7 6.9 4.1 2.0 3.5 -3.2 
Turkey 11.2 7.8 10.7 4.1 11.9 12.8 9.3 
Total above 13 14.2 9.1 9.6 7.6 14.2 11.3 \3.2 
All developing 12.7 6.2 9.3 4.4 12.0 11.3 13.1 
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Table 2A.2 (continued) 
Annual rates of export growth 1985--98 (%) 
MT MTI MT2 MT3 HT HTJ HT2 
total total 
China 34.2 37.9 24.8 48.9 43.2 66.2 24.7 
Korea 11.9 24.2 13.1 8.3 19.1 19.4 17.0 
Taiwan 12.7 13.0 14.4 IJ.7 17.6 17.8 13.0 
Mexico 21.6 28.1 21.6 18.1 24.2 23.9 27.2 
Singapore 12.0 14.6 12.8 11.5 22.1 23.3 10.2 
Malaysia 22.2 26.9 20.9 22.5 23.0 23.1 22.1 
Thailand 20.6 39.1 17.8 20.6 4 \.4 42.4 33.0 
Brazil 8.1 10.6 6.2 7.9 10.6 7.5 14.7 
Philippines 22.5 25.0 6.0 38.7 38.8 39.1 30.0 
Indonesia 26.0 56.7 21.0 41.1 27.2 29.7 15.7 
India 14.8 15.0 19.9 10.4 15.8 16.5 15.4 
Hong Kong 0.0 ··-7.5 10.5 - 1.6 7.5 6.5 14.0 
Turkey 10.3 16.6 7.8 11.7 23.6 24.8 19.7 
Total above 13 17.8 20.5 14.5 13.6 23.7 22.4 17.7 
All developing 14.6 20.9 13.8 13.4 21.5 22.2 16.2 
3. Competitiveness and technology: an 
international comparison 

Hiroki Kawai and Shujiro Urata1 

1. INTRODUCTION 
The economies of East Asia achieved remarkable economic growth in the 
post-World War II period. Indeed, the World Bank (1993) published a 
study entitled The East Asian Miracle to examine the factors that underlay 
this export-led growth. It analysed the 1960-89 period and attributed 
success to several factors including rapid accumulation of physical and 
human capital, export-oriented trade policy, sound macroeconomic envi­
ronment and well-functioning institutions. The report also emphasized 
rapid expansion in productivity as an important factor that contributed to 
remarkable economic growth. 
The World Bank study attracted a lot of attention. Economists and pol­
icymakers were particularly interested in the role of government in eco­
nomic development, because the study acknowledged successful cases of 
government intervention in the sectoral allocation of resources. This view 
was quite different from the minimalist view of the government that had 
been popular earlier. Some observers argued that the success of East Asia 
was largely due to active government intervention, while others argued that 
it was attributable to the market mechanism. Consensus has yet to be 
reached on the issue and the debate on the appropriate role of the govern­
ment in economic development goes on. 
The World Bank study instigated another interesting debate on the 
sources of economic growth in East Asia. Several researchers questioned 
the contribution of productivity increase to economic growth in East Asia. 
The World Bank calculated high total factor productivity (TFP) growth for 
East Asian economies. Krugman (1994) questioned the validity of these 
findings by referring to the low TFP growth estimates obtained by Young 
(1995). Krugman argued that the rapid growth achieved by East Asian 
economies was largely due to the accumulation of labour and capital 
inputs, and not to productivity increase. This debate reconfirmed the 
importance of productivity growth in achieving eeonomic growth; it also 
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brought out the sensitivity of TFP estimates, which depended on the 
assumptions and the method applied for the analysis. 
This chapter examines the factors underlying the growing competitive­
ness of East Asian economies in the pre-financial crisis period. Recognizing 
the importance of technology in economic grmvth, it focuses on technolog­
ical capabilities in East Asian economies and its relation to the use of foreign 
technology. Section 2 examines changes in East Asian competitiveness from 
1970-97. The analysis of competitiveness uses two indicators, per capita 
GOP and total factor productivity (TFP). The use of TFP as an indicator 
of competitiveness is based on the premise that productivity increase is a 
crucial factor in growth. Per capita GOP is used as a proxy for labour pro­
ductivity. It is a reasonable proxy because of limited availability of informa­
tion on labour inputs such as the number of workers or the number of hours 
worked. It may be added that per capita GOP indicates the stage of eco­
nomic development, a main concern for the countries striving to achieve 
economic development. Our analysis covers the period up to the financial 
crisis, and thus extends the period examined by The East Asian Miracle. 
Section 3 analyses technological factors in East Asia. The first part of the 
discussion deals with domestic technological capabilities and the second 
with inflows of foreign technology. These two aspects are, of course, closely 
related because assimilation of foreign technology, a major source of build­
ing competitiveness, depends crucially on domestic technological capabil­
ity. We attempt to identify by regression analysis the determinants of 
competitiveness as measured by the growth of per capita GOP and TFP. 
Section 4 concludes with policy recommendations. 
2. 	 COMPETITIVENESS OF EAST ASIAN 
ECONOMIES: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TFP 
GROWTH 
Table 3.1 shows the growth performance of East Asian economies between 
1970 and 1997. The average annual growth rate in per capita GOP exceeded 
5 per cent in this period.2 The growth rate accelerated over time, from 5.2 
per cent in the 1970s to 6.1 per cent in the 1980s and then to 6.4 per cent in 
1990-97. This performance was significantly and consistently better than 
in other regions. 
2.1 	 Economic Growth 
There are wide variations in growth rates within East Asia. The newly 
industrializing economies (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) 
Table 3.1 Level and growth ofpel' capita GDp, 1970-97 

Per capita GOP level (1992 US$,PPP) Annual growth rate (°lc,) 

1970 1980 1990 1997 197080 1980-90 1990-97 
Developed countries 13267 16679 20510 22988 2.39 2.12 1.62 
Developing countries 4201 5588 5804 7185 3.39 1.90 3.12 
1. East Asia & the Pacific 1998 3622 6611 9703 5.13 6.13 6.36 
NIEs 3071 5891 11126 16044 6.46 6.58 5.35 
Hong Kong 5438 10324 17205 21540 6.41 5.11 3.21 
Korea 2509 4367 9240 13831 5.54 7.49 5.76 
Singapore 4498 8722 14873 23296 6.62 5.34 6.41 
v. Taiwan 2724 5691 10668 15578 7.37 6.28 5.41 
\0 (2) ASEAN4 1547 2389 3378 4728 4.54 3.77 4.69 
Indonesia 764 1291 1993 2917 5.25 4.34 5.44 
Malaysia 2527 4235 5707 8486 5.16 2.98 5.67 
Philippines 2629 3629 3311 3493 3.22 -0.92 0.76 
Thailand 1545 2294 4104 5914 3.95 5.82 5.22 
(3) China 493 690 1437 2801 3.35 7.34 9.53 
2. South Asia 962 1030 1454 1845 0.65 3.43 3.37 
3. Latin America and the Caribbean 4626 6515 5966 6971 3.80 -0.73 2.05 
4. Europe and Central Asia 3664 4933 5844 6835 2.70 1.89 2.45 
5. Middle East and North Africa 11482 12804 7709 7496 2.09 -2.55 -0.37 
6. Sub-Saharan Africa 4258 4733 4307 4182 0.96 -0.74 -0.51 
Sources: World Bank, World Developmem indicators. 2()()O; Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book. 
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achieved high growth during the 1970s and 1980s, with annual average 
growth rates of per capita GDP of around 6,5 per cent Their growth rates 
declined in the I 990s to 5.3 per cent. Each of the four NlEs had similar 
growth performance, with the exception of Hong Kong, which recorded 
relatively low growth rates in 1990~97 (3.2 per cent). The ASEAN4 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) performed less well 
than the NIEs overall. However, their performance was substantially better 
than other developing countries over the 1970-97 period. Growth rates of 
per capita GDP for the ASEAN4 declined from 4.6 per cent in the 1970s to 
3.8 per cent in the 1980s, before rising to 4.7 per cent in 1990~97. Among 
the ASEAN4 the Philippines performed the worst, particularly in the 1980s 
and 1990s. China achieved a remarkable acceleration in growth from the 
1970s to the 1990s, with the annual growth rate in per capita GDP rising 
from 3.4 per cent in the 1970s to 7.3 per cent in 1980s and to 9.5 per cent in 
1990~97. 
In terms of PPP (purchasing power parity) in 1992 US dollars, average 
per capita GDP in East Asia increased almost five-fold over the 27 years, 
from $2000 in 1970 to $9700 in 1997. The comparable increase for develop­
ing countries as a whole and for developed countries was only about 70 per 
cent. Average per capita income in East Asia was only about a half of the 
average for developing countries in 1970 and was 35 per cent higher in 1997. 
In comparison with the developed world, per capita income in East Asia 
rose from 15 per cent of average incomes in 1970 to just over 40 per cent in 
1997. 
Per capita incomes vary greatly in the East Asian region. In 1997 the 
N IEs recorded the highest incomes ($16000), followed by ASEAN4 
($4700), and China bringing up the rear with $2800. Among the NlEs, 
Hong Kong and Singapore had very high per capita GDP at around 
$22000, while the corresponding values for Korea and Taiwan were 
approximately $14000. In the ASEAN4, the income ranks in 1997 were: 
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. Unlike the NlEs, the 
ranking changed over the 1970-97 period: the Philippines fell from leading 
place in 1970 to third place in 1997. 
2.2 TFP Growth 
The level and growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) are often used 
to measure the competitiveness of an economy. This is because, given factor 
inputs such as labour and capital, there is a positive relationship between 
TFP and output Table 3.2 presents the results of our estimation of TFP 
levels and TFP growth rates. 3 To begin with TFP growth, we find that the 
East Asian economies on average performed favourably compared to other 
Table 3.2 Level and growth oj total Jactor productivity, 197U97 
TFP level (USI980= 1.0) Annual growth rate 
1970 1980 1990 1997 1970-80 1980-90 1990-97 
Developed countries 0.83 0.87 0.97 1.02 0.56 0.98 0.81 
Developing countries 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.54 0.61 0.22 1.78 
I. East Asia & the Pacific 0.29 0.36 0.47 0.55 2.14 2.76 2.19 
(I) NIES 0.39 0.48 0.70 0.79 2.14 3.67 1.77 
Hong Kong 0.45 0.64 1.02 1.06 3.42 4.69 0.54 
Korea 0.43 0.47 0.70 0.75 0.84 3.98 1.11 
Singapore 0.48 0.64 0.79 1.00 2.88 2.10 3.44 
0-, 
-­
Taiwan 
ASEAN4 
0.32 
0.22 
0.43 
0.28 
0.59 
0.32 
0.71 
0.35 
3.02 
2.38 
3.14 
1.41 
2.75 
1.17 
Indonesia 0.15 0.23 0.27 0.34 4.07 1.72 3.10 
Malaysia 0.26 0.34 0.36 0.43 2.58 0.55 2.33 
Philippines 0.28 0.35 0.33 0.33 2.37 -0.74 -0.06 
Thailand 0.26 0.28 0.36 0.37 0.69 2.77 0.22 
(3) China 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.31 1.86 -0.01 5.35 
2. South Asia 0.24 0.22 0.28 0.32 -0.50 2.11 2.06 
3. Latin America and the Caribbean 0.61 0.62 0.53 0.58 0.08 1.48 1.26 
4. Europe and Central Asia 0.42 0.55 0.49 0.56 2.62 1.04 1.82 
5. Middle East and North Africa 0.49 0.65 0.66 0.76 2.78 0.16 1.93 
6. Sub-Saharan Africa 0.35 0.42 0.33 0.32 1.91 -2.48 -0.37 
Source: Authors' estimates. 
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regions, including the developed countries. East Asian TFP growth rates 
were around 2.1~2.8 per cent per annum from 1970 to 1997. By contrast, 
TFP growth rates for other regions were low and fluctuated substantially. 
For example, Latin American TFP growth rates fell from 0.1 per cent in the 
1970s to 1.5 per cent in the 1980s and then rose to 1.3 per cent in the 
1990~97 period. Similar fluctuations are found for other regions. 
Among the East Asian economies the NIEs had higher TFP growth than 
the ASEAN4: the range is 1.8 to 3.7 per cent per annum in the former and 
1.2 to 2.4 per cent in the latter. Although there are variations in TFP growth 
rates among the NIEs, they are not substantial. This is in contrast to the 
ASEAN4, among which TFP growth rates differ substantially. Indonesia 
records relatively high rates of around 1.8 and 4.1 per cent per annum, 
while the Philippines has negative TFP growth for the 1980~97 period. 
China shows a V-shaped pattern, with TFP growth rates declining from 1.9 
per cent in the 19708 to -0.01 per cent in the 1980s, and rising to 5.3 per 
cent in 1990-97. 
Rapid TFP growth led to rising levels of TFP in East Asia. TFP levels 
are estimated here by using the TFP level in the USA in 1980 as a base. The 
estimates indicate that in 1980 the TFP level in East Asia was 36 and 41 per 
cent of the levels in the USA and developed countries, respectively. Over 
time, this gap narrowed to 54 per cent of the level in developed countries in 
1997. 
Among the East Asian economies the NIEs had significantly higher 
levels of TFP than the ASEAN4 and China. The NIEs as a group had TFP 
levels of almost 80 per eent of the level for developed eountries in 1997; 
indeed, Hong Kong and Singapore had comparable levels of TFP to that 
for developed countries. TFP levels in Korea and Taiwan were lower at 
approximately 70 per cent of the level in developed countries. TFP levels 
for ASEAN4 and China were substantially lower, less than half of the level 
in the NIEs in 1997. Malaysia was the exception, with a somewhat higher 
TFP level than those in the rest of the ASEAN4. 
3. 	 FACTORS AFFECTING COMPETITIVENESS: 
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY AND 
IMPORTED TECHNOLOGY 
Many factors affect national competitiveness. One of the most important, 
some would say the most important, is technological capability. Even a 
country richly endowed with natural or labour resources cannot compete 
in international markets if it cannot use its resources efficiently in combi­
nation with appropriate technology. For developing countries the importa­
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tion of technology from developed countries is a vital source of technol­
ogy; however, access to foreign technology is not enough - the country 
needs the capability to absorb and adapt foreign technology. This section 
examines technological capability and the absorption of foreign technol­
ogy in East Asia, setting the stage for the statistical analysis of the determi­
nants of competitiveness later. 
3.1 Domestic Technological Capability 
Educated and well-trained workers are essential for using technologies effi­
ciently and improving them over time. Research and development also 
plays an important role by producing new technology, new production pro­
cesses and new products and helping in the absorption of very complex new 
technologies. We examine these two factors for East Asia. 
Education 
Although formal education may not constitute technological capability 
without technical training or experience, it provides the base on which tech­
nical skills are developed.4 Many studies have found a positive impact of 
education on economic growth, supporting thc argument that education 
plays a role in promoting economic growth. For example, the World Bank 
(1993) finds that education, particularly primary education, contributed 
significantly to the increase in per capita GDP in 113 countries in the 
1960-85 period. Specifically, it found that a 10 per cent increase in the 
enrolment ratio in primary and secondary education would lead to a 0.3 per 
cent increase in the growth rate of per capita GDP. 
Let us examine the educational levels of East Asian economies, using the 
indicator for educational attainment estimated by Barro and Lee (2000). 
The Barro and Lee data set has at least one observation on school attain­
ment, the highest educational level attained for the population aged 15 or 
over and for the population aged 25 or over, for 142 economies, of which 
107 have complete information at five-year intervals from 1960 to 2000. The 
data for the period up to 1995 are estimates and those for 2000 are projec­
tions. In our analysis we interpolate values for in-between years. 
Table 3.3 shows educational attainment and the average years of school­
ing for developed countries and developing countries. The figures indicate 
the proportion of population aged 25 or over that attained secondary and 
higher levels of education. East Asia has higher educational attainments 
than other developing regions, with the exception of those in Europe and 
Central Asia, which have longer average schooling and larger shares of the 
population with higher educational attainment. Educational attainments 
have improved significantly for all economies in East Asia from 1960 to 
Table 3.3 Educational attainment 
Average years of school Highest education attainment 
(secondary) 
Highest education 
1960 1970 1980 1990 1997 1960 1970 1980 1990 1997 1960 1970 1980 1990 1997 
Developed countries 7.24 7.82 9.00 9.53 9.97 34.0 36.1 45.2 42.1 41.7 8.4 10.9 17.3 24.9 28.7 
Developing countries 1.71 2.37 3.15 4.28 4.90 5.3 9.6 14.9 21.2 23.5 0.9 1.5 2.4 4.1 5.2 
I. East Asia & the Pacific 1.75 2.84 3.73 5.16 5.67 6.1 15.0 19.8 31.1 32.4 1.3 1.5 2.0 3.4 4.6 
(1) NIEs 3.37 4.64 6.56 8.52 9.55 11.9 20.8 31.7 47.6 47.5 3.1 5.2 8.7 12.5 20.5 
Hong Kong 4.74 5.11 6.73 8.37 9.40 17.4 22.3 30.5 43.3 47.3 4.7 3.1 7.1 10.6 14.9 
Korea 3.23 4.76 6.81 9.25 10.27 10.9 21.8 36.9 53.9 50.7 2.6 5.6 8.9 13.4 23.5 
Singapore 3.14 3.74 3.65 5.52 7.97 23.4 20.9 14.6 31.3 49.5 0.0 2.0 3.4 4.7 9. 
Taiwan 3.32 4.39 6.37 7.44 8.28 11.0 18.1 23.3 37.7 40.7 4.2 5.4 9.3 12.2 17.3 
'" 
(2) ASEAN4 2.12 3.05 3.88 4.54 5.46 4.5 7.0 11.6 17.9 21.7 1.5 2.5 4.1 6.6 8.9 
~ Indonesia 1.11 2.29 3.09 3.30 4.37 1.9 5.1 9.6 16.8 20.5 0.1 0.5 0.8 2.3 4.3 
Malaysia 2.35 3.05 4.49 5.54 7.76 7.2 9.4 19.9 27.1 42.9 1.5 1.5 1.4 2.8 7.2 
Philippines 3.77 4.81 6.06 7.07 7.48 10.6 14.2 18.9 27.2 30.2 6.2 9.6 15.2 18.7 21.3 
Thailand 3.45 3.54 3.77 5.35 5.91 4.9 4.4 6.8 8.0 9.1 0.6 1.1 2.9 7.8 10.4 
(3) China 1.58 2.75 3.61 5.23 5.61 6.2 17.2 21.7 34.4 35.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.5 
2. South Asia 1.31 1.77 2.52 3.37 4.03 3.2 4.6 13.3 14.3 16.1 0.1 1.3 2.3 3.7 4.2 
3. Latin America and the 2.95 3.32 3.97 4.93 5.53 9.4 10.4 12.7 16.5 19.1 1.9 2.5 5.4 8.9 11.1 
Caribbean 
4. Europe and Central 4.27 4.75 5.62 6.57 7.00 9.9 12.2 19.7 27.1 29.3 1.9 3.4 4.9 6.9 9.0 
Asia 
5. Middle East and 0.76 1.06 2.00 3.36 4.39 2.3 4.1 7.8 14.8 19.7 0.6 1.2 3.0 5.0 7.2 
North Africa 
6. Sub-Saharan Africa 1.18 1.32 1.90 2.78 3.50 3.9 4.4 6.1 10.3 15.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.8 2.5 
Note: Data for 1997 are interpolated from those on 1995 and 1999. 
Source: Barro and Lee (2000). 
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1997, the average years of schooling rising from 1.8 to 5.7 years. The shares 
of the population aged 25 and over with primary, secondary, and higher 
education increased from 25.3,6.1, 1.3 per cent in 1960 to 39.3,32.4. and 
4.6 per cent in 1997, respectively. 
There are wide variations in education among the East Asian economies. 
On average the NIEs have better performance than the ASEAN4, but there 
are substantial differences within these groups. Korea stands out among the 
NIEs with the longest years of schooling and the highest proportion of 
population with higher education, while Singapore appears to fare the 
worst. In the ASEAN4, the Philippines outperforms the others, particu­
larly in higher education; one out of every five persons aged 25 and over 
has higher education there. Indonesia has the lowest years of schooling and 
also the lowest proportion of population with higher education. Thailand 
has very low shares of the population with secondary education. Despite a 
substantial improvement over time, China still trails other East Asian econ­
omies in educational attainment, particularly in terms of higher education. 
Research and development 
The number of researchers in the popUlation can serve as a good indicator 
of technological capability. Table 3.4 shows the number of researchers per 
million population for East Asian economies. The average for developing 
countries was 334 in 1997, compared to 3161 for developed countries. 
Among the developing countries, the NIEs register much higher figures, 
comparable to those for developed countries; even more significant is the 
rapid increase in the number of researchers in the NIEs. In 1970 the number 
was 198, approximately 10 per cent of the corresponding value for the 
developed countries; by 1997 the number had increased to 2613, about 80 
per cent of the value for developed countries. Within the NIEs, Taiwan has 
thc highest number at 3530 in 1997, higher than the average for developed 
countries. The ASEAN4 are far behind the NIEs, and they lag even behind 
China. 
R&D is an input for building and improving technological capability. 
The ratios of R&D to GDP for East Asian and other developing countries 
are shown in Table 3.4. The picture is fairly similar to that for numbers of 
researchers per million population. The NIEs perform much better than 
ASEAN4 or China, spending 2.3 per cent of GDP on R&D compared to 
0.14 and 0.66 per cent for the ASEAN4 and China, respectively. Over time, 
moreover, R&D performance in the ASEAN4 is deteriorating. The NIEs 
have improved their capabilities greatly over time, and China has also 
achieved some success. However, ASEAN4 countries are lagging and the 
gap with the NIEs is likely to widen. 
Table 3.4 Researchers and R&D 
Reseachers per million population R&D/GDP ("!.,) 
970 1980 1990 1997 1970 1980 1990 1997 
Developed countries 1798 2201 3107 3161 1.99 2.01 2.43 2.39 
Developing countries 157 208 278 334 0.31 0.43 0.71 0.79 
1. East Asia & the Pacific 178 226 373 486 0.33 0.48 1.04 1.27 
NIEs 198 523 1826 2613 0.42 0.62 1.71 2.27 
Hong Kong nla nla nla n/a nla nla nla nla 
Korea 176 484 1645 2195 0.38 0.57 1.88 2.82 
Singapore 326 417 1426 2323 0.21 0.27 0.94 1.13 
0. 
0. 
Taiwan 
(2) ASEAN4 
226 
86 
620 
104 
2260 
164 
3530 
162 
0.50 
0.33 
0.72 
0.35 
1.66 
0.20 
1.88 
0.14 
Indonesia 85 102 189 191 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.07 
Malaysia 137 165 208 93 0.33 0.34 0.41 0.24 
Philippines 93 112 141 153 0.15 0.26 0.20 0.22 
Thailand 66 79 94 103 0.39 0.39 0.18 0.13 
China 203 243 348 454 0.19 0.37 0.68 0.66 
2. South Asia 71 85 132 132 0.32 0.53 0.74 0.69 
3. Latin America and the Caribbean 134 203 252 222 0.17 0.27 0.47 0.56 
4. Europe and Central Asia 968 1378 798 792 0.71 0.95 0.84 0.56 
5. Middle East and North Africa 154 212 296 377 0.24 0.19 0.28 0.32 
6. Sub-Saharan Africa 70 109 141 235 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.47 
Sources: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook; World Bank, World Development Indicator,; 2000; Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book. 
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3.2 Inflow of Foreign Technology 
We consider several channels for accessing foreign technology: foreign 
direct investment, foreign trade and technology imports. 
Foreign direct investment 
In recent years FDI has become an important means of importing technol­
ogy for developing countries. Intra-firm technology transfer has been ana­
lysed by several studies. Based on a survey of East Asian affiliates of 
Japanese firms, U rata (1999) finds that relatively simple technologies such 
as maintenance and repair of production lines were transferred from parent 
companies to affiliates. He also finds that relatively sophisticated technolo­
gies such as development of new technologies and new products were not 
transferred. Analysing the determinants of the extent of intra-firm technol­
ogy transfer by Japanese MNCs, Urata and Kawai (2000) find that the 
capability to absorb technologies reflected in educational level in host coun­
tries plays a key role in successful intra-firm technology transfer. Their 
study also points out that intra-firm technology transfer takes time and 
experience, suggesting the importance of maintaining a stable economic 
environment in the host country. 
The results of analyses of the presence of technology spillovers are 
mixed. Using industry-level data, Caves (1974) finds the presence of tech­
nology spillover in his study of the Australian manufacturing sector but not 
in his study of Canadian manufacturing. Using similar methodology, 
Globerman (1979) finds the presence of the spillover effect of FDI in the 
Canadian manufacturing sector. Blomstrom and Persson (1983) and 
Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) also detect beneficial technology spillover in 
their studies of the Mexican manufacturing sector. In contrast, Haddad 
and Harrison (1993) and Aitken and Harrison (1994) do not find spillover 
in their studies of Morocco and Venezuela. One possible reason for not 
detecting technology spillover in these studies may be the limited presence 
of foreign firms in these countries. 
Turning to the impact of FDI on economic growth, one finds that few 
studies on the subject have been conducted using macroeconomic indica­
tors. Borensztein et al. (1998) find that FDI has a marginally positive 
impact on economic growth; the impact is significantly positive when FDI 
is interacted with the educational levels of host countries.5 Their finding 
may be interpreted to mean that education becomes more effective when it 
is associated with foreign knowledge. Given that educational levels in East 
Asia are relatively high, it is reasonable to argue that FDI inflows have con­
tributed to economic growth in East Asia. 
FDI flows have been growing rapidly in recent years. World inward FDI 
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increased more than threefold in eight years from US$203 billion in 1990 
to US$680 billion in 1998.6 This rapid increase is attributable to several 
factors. Technological progress and deregulation in communication ser­
vices have reduced the cost of international communication, facilitating the 
management of far-flung operations by MNCs. Liberalization of FDI pol­
icies by many countries has also contributed. East Asia has experienced a 
remarkably rapid expansion of FDI inflows. It has undertaken consider­
able liberalization in FDI policies,7 with several economies offering incen­
tives to foreign investors, such as preferential tax treatment, especially to 
export-oriented investments. Another factor in East Asia has been favour­
able growth prospects, driven by past performance. 
One notable recent development in Asia has been the rapid increase in 
cross-border M&As (mergers and acquisitions). The share of M&As in 
FDI inflows in South, East and South-East Asia increased from around 3 
per cent in 1995 to 16 per cent in 1998.8 Korea and Thailand, hard hit by 
the financial crisis, liberalized their M&A policies and experienced a large 
wave of this kind of FDI. 
Table 3.5 shows the importance of FDI inflows for East Asian and other 
economies. The proportion of FDI inflows to GDP in East Asia increased 
from l.l per cent in 1970 to 2.8 per cent in 1997. In 1997 East Asia was 
behind Latin America in terms of the FDI inflows to GDP ratio, which reg­
istered 3.3 per cent. Within East Asia, Singapore had by far the greatest reli­
ance on foreign investors; its ratio of FDI inflows to GDP was 10 per cent 
in 1997, even after a notable decline from 14.4 per cent in 1990. Malaysia 
had the second highest ratio at 5.1 per cent, and China was the third at 4.9 
percent in 1997. The increase in the share of FDI inflows inGDP for China 
was spectacular, since the corresponding ratio for 1990 was only 0.98 per 
cent. Hong Kong also recorded a relatively high ratio of 3.5 per cent. In 
contrast to these countries, Korea and Taiwan had ratios of around 0.6-0.8 
per cent in 1997. The ratio for Taiwan declined over time, while that for 
Korea rose steadily. 
Imports of capital goods 
Foreign trade has been an important source of foreign technologies for 
developing countries via the importation of intermediate and investment 
goods that embody new technology. Reverse engineering is one way of 
assimilating technology from such imports, for countries that have the 
capability to carry out this complex task. Table 3.6 shows the share of 
machinery in total imports.9 East Asia exhibits a significant upward trend 
in comparison with other developing regions, the share of machinery in 
total imports rising from 0.30 in 1980 to 0041 in 1997 compared to 0.31 and 
0.35 for other regions. The ASEAN4 consistently have higher shares than 
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Table 3.5 FDI inflows (gross) (percentage of GDP) 
1970 1980 1990 1997 
Developed countries 0.46 0.52 1.06 1.27 
Developing countries 0.75 0.78 0.85 2.32 
1. East Asia & the Pacific 1.10 1.07 1.59 2.76 
(I) NIEs 1.72 1.59 1.59 1.60 
Hong Kong nla nla 2.31 3.46 
Korea nla 0.01 0.28 0.60 
Singapore 5.53 14.00 14.36 10.21 
Taiwan 2.45 1.13 0.83 0.79 
(2) ASEAN4 0.80 0.91 2.23 2.60 
Indonesia 0.86 0.23 0.96 2.17 
Malaysia 2.24 3.52 5.45 5.10 
Philippines 0.17 0.79 1.20 1.49 
Thailand 0.61 0.57 2.86 2.50 
(3) China nla nla 0.98 4.92 
2. South Asia 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.83 
3. Latin America and the Caribbean 0.82 0.78 0.68 3.25 
4. Europe and Central Asia 0.21 0.09 0.85 1.73 
5. Middle East and North Africa 0.64 1.15 0.55 1.00 
6. Sub-Saharan Africa 0.56 0.41 0.28 1.79 
Sources: IMF, Balance of Payment Statistics; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 
2000; Republic of China, Taiwan Statistical Data Book. 
the NIEs or China. For instance, in 1997 the share for the ASEAN4 was 
0.50, while that for the NIEs and China was 0.41 and 0.36, respectively. This 
may reflect the relatively high value of electronic component imports for 
export-oriented assembly in the ASEAN4. Singapore and Malaysia have 
particularly high shares (0.553 and 0.616, respectively) in 1997, again 
reflecting the strong presence of electronics MNCs in export-oriented 
activity. 
An expansion in imports may lead to improvements in technical effi­
ciency in domestic firms in different ways. One is increased competitive 
pressure, which to survive firms must introduce new technologies, products, 
management methods and so on. Several studies have found a positive 
impact of greater imports on productivity; Lawrence and Weinstein (2000), 
for instance, found that import expansion was associated with higher pro­
ductivity in Japan in the post-World War II period. Other studies have not, 
however, found a clear statistical relationship between import liberalization 
and productivity. 
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Table 3.6 Imports ojmachinery as a share oj total imports 
1980 1990 
Developed countries 0,256 0.355 0.378 
Developing countries 0.310 0.348 0.348 
l. East Asia & the Pacific 0.297 0.344 0.406 
(I) NIEs 0.254 0.383 0.438 
Hong Kong 0.237 0.308 0.371 
Korea 0.227 0.351 0.355 
Singapore 0.281 0.441 0.553 
Taiwan 0.273 0.434 0.474 
(2) ASEAN4 0.325 0.421 0.501 
Indonesia 0.376 0.411 0.425 
Malaysia 0.370 0.525 0.616 
Philippines 0.296 0.320 0.487 
Thailand 0.260 0.428 0.473 
(3) China 0.251 0,351 0.365 
2. South Asia 0.257 0.244 0.254 
3. Latin America and the Caribbean 0.295 0.339 0.373 
4. Europe and Central Asia 0,274 0.320 0.364 
5. Middle East and North Africa 0.323 0.341 0.335 
6. Sub-Saharan Africa 0.330 0.373 0.325 
SOUfees: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2000; Republic of China. Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book. 
An increase in exports may also have a positive impact on productivity. 
This may be so for several reasons: greater capacity utilization in industries 
in which the minimum efficient scale is large relative to the domestic 
market; increasing familiarity with and absorption of new technologies; 
greater learning-by-doing insofar as this is a function of cumulative output; 
and the stimulating effects of international competition and the feedback 
of technical and other information from export markets. 10 Several studies 
have shown that export expansion, particularly that of manufactured prod­
ucts, results in higher productivity. The World Bank (1993) finds that the 
high share of manufactured exports in total exports increased the growth 
rate of TFP in its study of 69 countries for the 1960-89 period. 1J A case 
study of Korean firms by Rhee et al. (1984) finds that exporting firms 
achieved higher productivity by obtaining technologies through contact 
with foreign firms. 
Table 3.7 shows the ratio of trade (exports plus imports) to GOP in 
developing countries. The ratio for East Asia rose sharply over 1970-97, 
from 47.6 per cent to 91.7 per cent. These values are significantly higher 
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Table 3. 7 Trade (exporls+ imports) (percentage of GDP) 

1970 1980 1990 1997 
Developed countries 28.8 39.2 38.3 42.5 
Developing countries 37.4 52.1 53.2 60.8 
I. East Asia & the Pacific 47.6 78.6 82.7 91.7 
(I) NIEs 76.0 122.0 115.7 118.9 
Hong Kong 181.5 180.6 260.1 264.2 
Korea 37.5 74.4 59.4 70.5 
Singapore 231.6 439.0 397.0 315.6 
Taiwan 60.7 106.3 88.5 95.7 
(2) ASEAN4 40.1 62.7 74.3 94.9 
Indonesia 28.4 54.4 49.9 56.0 
Malaysia 79.9 112.6 150.6 185.5 
Philippines 42.6 52.0 60.8 108.5 
Thailand 34.4 54.5 75.8 94.8 
(3) China 3.8 15.5 31.9 41.6 
2. South Asia 10.7 19.4 20.5 28.1 
3. Latin America and the Caribbean 20.5 26.7 28.9 36.3 
4. Europe and Central Asia 29.6 36.1 39.1 60.1 
5. Middle East and North Africa 71.9 72.7 68.0 64.8 
6. Sub-Saharan Africa 47.2 59.7 51.4 60.1 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 2000; Republic of China, Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book. 
than those for other developing regions or developed countries. Within 
East Asia, Singapore and Hong Kong had very high ratios, 250-300 per 
cent in 1997, reflecting their role as entrepot centres and their open trade 
regimes. Malaysia also had a high ratio, 190 per cent, resulting mainly from 
the large presence of export-oriented MNCs. By contrast, China, 
Indonesia and Korea had relatively low ratios, with China having a signifi­
cant increase and Korea and Indonesia showing fluctuations around the 
trend. The ratios for Taiwan also fluctuate, but the values are higher than 
for Korea. The trade-GDP ratios increase steadily for the Philippines and 
Thailand, but are significantly lower than for Malaysia. 
Technology imports 
Imports of technology in the form of licences and patents are an important 
way of obtaining foreign technology. In the past, technology trade was con­
ducted largely by independent firms through arm's length transactions, but 
in recent years intra-firm transactions (between MNCs and their affiliates) 
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Table 3.8 Royalty payments (percentage of GDP) 
1970 1980 1990 1997 
Developed countries 0.124 0.124 0.178 0.231 
Developing countries 0.112 0.086 0.137 0.172 
I. East Asia & the Pacific 0.075 0.128 0.259 0.292 
(I) NIEs n/a 0.195 0.472 0.467 
Hong Kong n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Korea n/a 0.195 0.540 0.507 
Singapore nla n/a nla n/a 
Taiwan n/a nla 0.363 0.405 
(2) ASEAN4 nla 0.098 0.162 0.357 
Indonesia nla nla n/a n/a 
Malaysia nla 0.152 n/a nla 
Philippines n/a 0.058 0.086 0.192 
Thailand n/a 0.092 0.200 0.539 
(3) China nla n/a n/a 0.060 
2. South Asia 0.016 0.008 0.021 0.034 
3. Latin America and the Caribbean 0.158 0.055 0.090 0.115 
4. Europe and Central Asia 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.227 
5. Middle East and North Africa 0.\86 0.177 0.\83 0.2\5 
6. Sub-Saharan Africa 0.\81 0.155 0.074 0.131 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2000; Republic of China, Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book. 
have grown rapidly. This reflects at least two related developments: rapid 
FOI expansion and the increased preference on the part of MNEs to use 
FOI as a means of deploying technology abroad, 
Table 3.8 shows patterns of technology trade as measured by royalties 
and licence fees paid abroad as a percentage of GOP in the East Asian 
economies. Note, however, that information for Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Indonesia and Malaysia is not available, and the total for East Asia is 
understated. The ratio for available countries in East Asia rose from 0.075 
per cent in 1970 to 0.292 per cent in 1997, much faster than for other 
regions, including the developed countries. The increase was particularly 
large for Thailand, from 0.092 per cent in 1980 to 0.539 per cent in 1997. 
The ratio for Korea also increased rapidly but not at the pace achieved by 
Thailand. By 1997 the ratios for Korea, Taiwan and Thailand were more or 
less comparable at around 0.4 to 0.5 per cent. The ratios for the Philippines 
and China were significantly lower at around 0.03-0.06 per cent. 
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4. THE DETERMINANTS OF COMPETITIVENESS 
This section presents the statistical analysis of the effect of technological 
factors on per capita GDP12 growth and TFP growth. We examined the two 
technological factors discussed above, domestic technological capability 
and inflows of foreign technology, using annual panel data for 137 countries 
over 1970-97. To deal with possible simultaneity problems in the regression 
analysis, we used instrumental variable estimation. Based on the Hauseman 
test results, we selected either the fixed effect model or the random effect 
model for the estimation of the panel data. The statistical analysis was con­
ducted for all the sample countries as well as for subsets of countries. The 
countries were divided into the following groups: developed countries, 
developing countries and East Asian developing economies. 
Table 3.9 shows the results for per capita GDP growth. Let us start with 
the whole sample. After controlling for initial per capita GDP (GDPO), 
domestic investment (INV) , openness (OPEN), government expenditure 
(GO V) and inflation (INF), we find that domestic technological capability 
as measured by educational attainment (HC) and R&D activities (RD), and 
inflows of foreign technology as measured by inward FDI (FDI) , capital 
good imports (CAP) and patent and licence payments (PA 1) have a posi­
tive and significant impact. These findings are consistent with expectations, 
indicating the importance of the technology factor in economic growth. 
Interaction terms for foreign technology inflows and domestic technologi­
cal capability suggest that imported patents contribute to growth when 
combined with a well-educated workforce. Unlike earlier studies, our 
results do not find a higher impact for FDI when it is combined with high 
domestic technological capability. 
The country groups show interesting differences. To begin with domestic 
technological capability, we find that both educational attainment and 
R&D have a positive impact on economic growth for all country groupings 
but the statistical significance differs: educational attainment has a signifi­
cantly positive impact for developed and East Asian economies, but not for 
developing countries. R&D has a significantly positive effect on growth for 
the developed and developing country groups but not for East Asian econ­
omies. In view of the importance of education in economic growth, our 
findings on the insignificant impact of educational attainment on growth 
for developing countries is puzzling and needs further investigation. 
Turning to the impact of imported technology, the importation of 
capital goods is found to contribute significantly to growth for all types of 
countries. FDI has a statistically significant and positive impact for devel­
oping countries and East Asian economies but not for the developed coun­
tries. However, FDI has a positive impact on growth in developed countries 
Table 3.9 The determinants of growth rates ofper capita GDP 
Total sample (137 countries, OBS =3836) Developing (113 countries, OBS 3164) 
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficien t t-value coefficient t-value 
LGDPO -6.475 13.780 -6.604 l3.978 -6.485 -12.380 -6.676 12.614 
INV 0.091 5.137 0.095 5.309 0.094 4.751 0.093 4.678 
OPEN 0.020 3.182 0.023 3.477 0.019 2.730 0.022 3.060 
GOV -0.191 -7.566 -0.190 -7.515 -0.186 -6.644 -0.184 -6.554 
INF -0.001 -3.331 -0.001 -3.338 -0.001 -3.041 -0.001 -3.082 
RD 1.679 3.350 0.465 1.443 2.061 3.004 1.735 1.083 
HC -0.017 1.028 0.018 0.876 0.019 1.012 0.045 1.193 ~ CAP 12.824 8.098 12.562 5.400 12.795 7.173 10.247 3.693 
FDI 0.443 1.956 0.987 1.625 0.449 1.963 0.974 1.937 
PAT 0.931 1.657 2.744 1.057 0.229 0.236 2.991 0.389 
CAP*HC 0.025 0.347 0.030 0.351 
FDI*HC 0.044 1.162 0.044 1.036 
PAT*HC 0.127 2.170 0.133 1.711 
CAP*RD 3.086 1.225 9.974 2.347 
FDI*RD 1.701 1.159 2.236 1.203 
PAT*RD -2.350 1.480 1.249 -0.435 
R2 0.188 0.190 0.182 0.185 
LMhet 26.180 [.000] 25.991 [.000] 19.210 [.000] 17.950 [.000] 
Hausman 207.870 LOOOO] 218.000 LOOOO1 161.490 [.0000] 166.910 [.0000] 
Developed (24 countries, OBS = 672) Developing (E. Asia, 9 countries, OBS=252) 
coefficient t-value coefficient t-va1ue coefficient t-value coefficient I-value 
LGDPO -8.832 -8.719 9.719 -9,475 -0.861 -1.830 -0.099 -1.686 
INV 0.064 1.715 0.064 1.738 0.117 2.160 0.068 2.063 
OPEN 0.072 5.829 0.077 6.298 0.023 1,486 0.027 1.588 
GOV -0.346 -5.946 -0,424 -6.973 -0.002 -0.023 -0.040 -0.345 
INF -0.012 ··2.581 -0.012 -2.542 -0.006 -0.184 -0.003 -0.103 
RD 0.506 ].890 3.173 3.218 0,441 0,485 5.359 1.168 
HC 0.039 1.861 0.058 1.639 0.081 2.105 0.091 1.720 
CAP 15.511 5.610 30.742 5.694 17.623 3.839 37.333 3.356 
FDI 0.197 0.090 16,401 1.758 19.015 4.218 11.025 2.020 
PAT 1.032 3.]66 0.156 1.032 -3.669 1.063 -20.325 1.959 
CAP*HC 0.094 0.859 -0.235 -0.802 
"l 
'-" 
FDI*HC 
PAT*HC 
0.501 
0.076 
2.781 
0.875 
OA57 
0.297 
].277 
0.972 
CAP*RD 5.728 1.865 14.272 -].323 
FDI*RD -6.824 -2.386 12.558 1.206 
PAT*RD -2.378 1.676 1.214 0.182 
R2 0.323 0.355 0.325 0.352 
LMhet 2.857 {.091] 2.296 [.130] OAIO [.522] 0.215 [.643] 
Hausman 64.177 {.OOOO] 76.257 [.0000] 21.064 [.0070] 25.721 [.0012] 
Notes: 
I. GDPO= In (initial per capita GDP); INV=investmen1iGDP; OPEN = (exporl+ imporl)/GDP; CAP=machinery import/import; FDJ=FDI 
inflow/investment; PAT Royalities and licence fees payment/GDP; RD= R&D expenditure/GDP; SC=education attainment rate (secondary [SC2) 
and higher [SC3)); GOV = government expenditure/GOP; J N F= inflation rate. 
2. Instrument variables are lagged independent variables and population. 
3. T-values are evaluated by Hey if heteroscedasticity does exist. 
Source: Authors' estimation. 
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when combined with educational attainment. Finally technology imports 
as measured by payments for patents and licensing have a significant and 
positive impact on growth for developed countries but not for developing 
countries or East Asian economies. Our findings suggest that capital goods 
import and FDI play important roles in acquiring foreign technology by 
developing countries. 
Our findings for the other variables are largely consistent with studies 
such as the World Bank (1993) and Borensztein et al. (1998). The initial 
level of per capita GDP (GAPO) is significantly negative in many cases, indi­
cating convergence of income levels across countries. The investment ratio 
(IN v) has positive and mostly significant effects. Openness (OPEl\T) has a 
positive impact on growth, supporting the argument that more open trade 
systems result in better resource allocation. Both high government expen­
diture (GOV) and high inflation (INF) reduce per capita GDP growth. The 
former, often associated with high inflation, tends to crowd out private 
sector activities and lead to inefficiency in the use of resources. Moreover, 
inflation discourages investment by increasing uncertainty about future 
economic prospects. 
So far, we have implicitly assumed that technological factors contribute 
to economic growth by improving productivity. We now investigate this 
hypothesis directly by looking at the impact of domestic technological 
capability and foreign technology on TFP growth. 
We apply the same methodology as for the analysis of GDP growth. The 
results for all sample countries suggest that inflows of foreign technology in 
the form of capital goods and FDI have a significantly positive impact on 
TFP growth (Table 3.10). The importation of foreign technology through 
patents and licensing contributes to TFP increase when combined with high 
educational levels. The estimated coefficients on dome tic technological 
capability are positive, as expected, but not statistically significant. There 
appears to be convergence of TFP levels among sample countries over time. 
The effects of investment and openness on TFP growth are positive, but only 
the effect of investment is statistically significant. Government expenditure 
and inflation have negative effects, with only the former being statistically 
significant. These results, very similar to those for growth, are consistent 
with our expectations. 
Turning to the results obtained from different sample groups, we find 
differences in the impact of domestic technological capability and inflow of 
foreign technology between developed countries on the one hand and 
developing and East Asian economies on the other. To begin with domes­
tic technological capability, educational attainment has a significantly pos­
itive impact on TFP growth for developing and East Asian economies, 
while R&D has a significantly positive impact for developed countries. 
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These findings suggest that innovative capability as reflected in R&D is 
important in raising TFP levels in developed countries, where TFP levels 
are already high, while in developing countries it is educational attainment, 
which improves the capability to absorb and assimilate imported technol­
ogy, that is the key to improving TFP. 
As to the impact of foreign technology, the import of capital goods is 
found to contribute to TFP growth for all the countries regardless of their 
levels of economic development. However, the impact of FDI and import 
of patents differs between developed countries and developing and East 
Asian economies. For developed countries, the purchase of patents and 
licences turns out to have a significant and positive impact, while for devel­
oping and East Asian economies FDI has a significantly positive impact. 
These findings suggest that developed countries, with high technological 
capability, can assimilate foreign technology in forms that do not generally 
come with much technical support from abroad. In contrast, for develop­
ing countries FDI, which brings not only technology but also management 
know-how, plays a larger role in improving TFP. The import of patents 
contributes to the improvement of TFP when combined with educational 
attainment. 
The findings for other variables are similar to those for the determinants 
of economic growth. The results for the TFP gap (GAPO) show the inter­
country convergence in TFP levels over time. Investment and openness have 
a positive impact on TFP growth though their statistical significance differs 
by group. Government expenditure and inflation both have negative 
impacts on TFP growth, with government expenditure showing statistical 
significance. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The remarkable growth and TFP performance of East Asian economies 
has been driven by several factors. Our study shows that important among 
these are strong domestic technological capabilities and the inflow of 
foreign technology, particularly in the form of capital goods and FDI. To 
sustain and promote these assets in the future, East Asian countries have to 
undertake various policies. To expand trade and FDI, they should further 
pursue liberalization and participate actively in multilateral and regional 
efforts to implement liberalization measures. They can also promote trade 
and FDI by adopting international standards and rationalizing customs 
procedures, disseminating information on overseas markets to domestic 
firms interested in exporting and on domestic markets to MNCs interested 
in undertaking FDI. 
Table 3.]0 The determinants of TFP 
Total sample (68 countries, OBS = 1904) Developing (44 countries, OBS 1232) 
coefficient t-value coefficient (-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value 
GAPO -0.039 -4.620 -0.039 -4.520 -0.040 -3.629 -0.041 -3.699 
INV 0.000 1.829 0.000 1.628 0.000 1.155 0.000 1.077 
OPEN 0.000 0.341 0.000 0.267 (l.000 1.801 0.000 0.905 
GOV -0.003 -7.330 -0.004 -7.439 -0.004 -5.809 -0.004 - 5.850 
INF 0.000 1.464 0.000 1.492 0.000 1.164 0.000 1.221 
RD 0.009 1.636 0.014 1.021 0.002 0.252 0.035 0.894 
~ HC 0.001 1.411 0.001 1.209 0.001 2.289 0.001 1.758 
CAP 0.106 4.517 0.124 3.551 0.125 3.929 0.105 2.174 
FDI 0.069 5.416 0.067 2.908 0.074 4.756 0.081 2.560 
PAT 0.005 0.874 0.064 1.024 0.002 0.179 0.087 1.641 
CAP*lIC -0.001 -0.650 -0.001 -0.386 
FDJ*lIC 0.000 0.466 0.000 0.247 
PAT*lIC 0.002 2.245 0.003 1.783 
CAP*RD 0.007 0.192 0.129 1.368 
FDI*RD -0.018 -0.617 -0.071 -1.l92 
PAT*RD -0.040 1.933 -0.073 -1.648 
R2 0.146 0.149 0.146 0.150 
LMhet 22.295 [.000] 21.600 [.000] 22.295 [.000] 9.846 [.002] 
Hausman 77.214 r.00001 79.907 [.0000] 51.060 [.0000] 57.922 [.0000] 
Developed (24 countries, OBS = 672) Developing (E Asia, 9 countries, OBS =252) 
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficien t t-value 
GAPO -0.022 -1.769 -0.017 1.328 -0.059 -3.828 -0.099 -3.871 
INV 0.000 1.144 0.000 1.309 0.001 1.671 0.002 1.118 
OPEN 0.001 4.970 0.001 5.076 0.000 1.964 0.001 1.854 
GOV -0.005 -6.916 -0.005 -7.376 -0.001 -1.199 -0.003 1.874 
INF 0.000 -2.148 0.000 -1.869 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.938 
RD 0.013 2.523 0.039 3.297 0.006 0.803 0.Q78 1.357 
He 0.001 1.402 0.001 1.249 0.001 2.190 0.003 2.000 
CAP 0.063 2.213 0.219 3.477 0.062 1.725 0.287 2.280 
FDI 0.003 0.135 0.175 0.577 0.237 4.574 0.168 1.275 
PAT 0.001 2.215 0.040 1.684 -0.Q38 -1.086 -0.264 1.161 
CAP*HC -0.001 -0.443 0.000 0.131 
'J 
'0 
FDI*HC 
PAT*HC 
0.004 
0.001 
1.724 
0.843 
0.005 
0.007 
1.171 
2.002 
CAP*RD -0.073 -2.011 -0.211 -1.590 
FDI*RD -0.022 -0.649 -0.147 -1.204 
PAT*RD -0.010 -0.587 -0.055 -0.713 
R2 0.208 0.225 0.132 0.253 
LMhet 0.244 [.622] 0.549 [.459] 3.182 [.074] 1.764 [.184] 
Hausman 55.103 [.0000] 59.917 [.0000] 11.551 [.1724] 16.465 [.0362] 
Notes: 
1. GAP=Gap in TFP level vis-ii-vis US TFP level; GDPO=ln (initial per capita GDP); INV=investment/GDP; OPEN = (export + import)/GDP; 
CA P= machinery importlimport; FDI = FDI inflow/investment; PAT= Royalities and licence fees payment/GDP; RD = R&D expenditure/GDP; SC 
= education attainment rate (secondary [SC2] and higher [SC3j); GOV= government expenditure/GDP; INF=inllation rate. 
2. Instrument variables are lagged independent variables and population. 
3. T-values are evaluated by Hev if heteroscedasticity does exist. 
Source: Authors' estimation. 
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The liberalization of FDI policies is a necessary condition for attracting 
FDI but it has to be supplemented by other measures. Among these are 
strengthening the infrastructure, both hard infrastructure such as transpor­
tation and communication facilities and soft infrastructure such as the 
governance and legal systems, education and training. 13 Furthermore, one 
cannot over-emphasize the importance of maintaining a stable macroeco­
nomic environment with low inflation, sound fiscal policy and stable, realis­
tic exchange rates. The reduction of business transaction costs and effective 
investment promotion are also important in competing for FDI. 
To improve technological capabilities. East Asian economies have to 
improve the quality of human resources and promote R&D. An up-to-date 
technology infrastructure. with strong institutions for quality, standards, 
testing and R&D support, as well as for SME extension services, is essen­
tial to support capability building. Universities and public R&D institu­
tions have to link up with industry, particularly in countries that are 
reaching the stage (as in the NIEs) of autonomous innovation. 
NOTES 
I. 	 The authors are at Keio University. Tokyo. and Waseda University and Japan Center for 
Economic Research. Tokyo. respectively. An earlier version of the paper was presented 
at the Workshop on Technology Development in East Asia, sponsored by the World 
Bank. Bali. Indonesia. December 14-15, 2000. 
2. 	 The figures are lor East Asia and the Pacific rather than lor East Asia alone. 
3. 	 TFP growth is estimated by applying the following formula: 
In (TFP(t)l1nTFP(t-I)} = In {YU)I Y(t-I)} - k,s,{t)ln {Xi(t)/ X,(t-I)} 
where Y is value-added. Xj is input and s;<tl is the factor share. which is computed as a 
arithmetic mean (Sj(t) + s,(t-I ))/2. 
TFP levels are estimated by the formula below with the TFP level in the US in 1980 
as the reference level. 
In {TFP(k)llnTFP(us») In {Y(k)/ Y(us)} 
where S;(k) = siCk) + SI' Sj is the arithmetic mean of factor share defined as k;S,(k)/ K and 
X~ is a geometric mean of factor input defined as X;= nX,(k),,(kl . 
4. 	 LaB (2000) provides a detailed discussion of human capital in East Asian economies. 
5. 	 United Nations (1999) presents similar findings. 
6. 	 United Nations (1996,2000). 
7. 	 Yamazawa and Urata (2000) discuss FDI and trade liberalization by APEC economies. 
8. 	 UN (1999, pp. 568). 
9. 	 Machinery imports are defined as items under SITC 7. These include components for 
assembly of electronics exports. 
10. 	 Pack (1988) presents a good survey of the impact of foreign trade on economic growth 
and development. 
11. 	 A number of studies have found a positive contribution of outward-oriented trade 
regime to improving productivity. See Pack (1988) for a survey of such studies. 
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12. Per capita GDP is expressed by 1992 PPP US$. 
13. For more detailed discussions of the determinants of FD1, see Urata and Kawai (2000). 
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4. Building technological capabilities 
with or without inward direct 
investment: the case of Japan 
Akira Goto and Hiroyuki Odagiril 
Learning is usually treated as a supply-side matter, thought to follow teaching, 
training, or information delivery. But learning is much more demand driven. 
People learn in response to need. When people cannot see the need for what's 
being taught, they ignore it, reject it or fail to assimilate it in any meaningful way. 
Conversely, when they have a need, then, if the resources for learning are avail­
able, people learn effectively and quickly. (Brown and Duguid, 2000, p. \36) 
INTRODUCTION 
Innovation and learning are, as Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue, the 'two 
faces of R&D'. Both indispensable to technological and economic devel­
opment. They were particularly important for a late-starter like Japan 
(after the Meiji Restoration of 1867 or after the defeat in World War II), 
because the acquisition of advanced technology from abroad was essential 
to help it build technological capabilities of its own. 
In this chapter, we examine the process of technology acquisition and the 
building of technological capability by Japanese manufacturing industries, 
focusing on the period from the end of World War II to the early I 970s. 
Post-war Japan imported many advanced technologies and used them to 
upgrade its level of industrial technology, which in turn contributed to the 
competitiveness of such industries as automobiles, steel, semiconductors 
and machine tools. Japan was able to become the world's largest producer 
in these industries by the 1980s. We concentrate on how Japan acquired 
foreign technologies; this is probably of most relevance to developing coun­
tries today. However, since technology acquisition and domestic innovation 
are closely linked we will also discuss domestic R&D in Japan (but not in 
great depth, since there are many other studies on this, including our own, 
Odagiri and Goto, 1996). 
Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a major source of tech­
nology transfer in most countries in addition to the import of technology 
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by licensing and the purchase of capital goods embodying new technolo­
gies. Inward FDI is considered important for economic growth not only 
because it brings scarce capital but also because it is a major conduit for 
flows of foreign technology. Technological spillovers are expected to take 
place from affiliates of multinational corporations (MNCs) to host coun­
tries, contributing to the upgrading of local technological capabilities. 
However, technology importation by Japan does not conform to this 
pattern: it is one of the few countries that progressed industrially with very 
limited inward FDL Korea and Taiwan are similar, and these are the three 
countries that experienced rapid growth and attained high levels of per 
capita GDP. This poses interesting questions on the importance of inward 
FDI for the accumulation of technological capabilities, and will be dis­
cussed in this chapter. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 summarizes the 
current status of R&D activity in Japan. Section 3 examines the process, 
trends and characteristics of technology importation by post-war Japan, 
and Section 4 discusses the determining factors, including market condi­
tions and government policies. Section 5 discusses inward FDI as a means 
of technology transfer, and Section 6 concludes by discussing the implica­
tions for developing countries and the challenges facing Japan today. 
2. R&D IN JAPAN 
Japan spent US$70541 million, nearly three per cent of GDP, on R&D in 
1995 (Table 4.1). Of the five leading industrial countries, Japan spent most 
on R&D relative to GDP, and came second to the USA in terms of abso­
lute amounts, About 80 per cent of Japan's R&D spending was funded and 
undertaken by the private sector. 
The results of R&D can be seen in several ways. First, the number of sci­
entific publications (in natural sciences and engineering) by Japanese scien­
tists is second in the world (Table 4.1), its share increasing from 6.8 per cent 
in 1981 to 10.3 per cent by 1998 (NISTEP, 2000). The share in citations, 
supposedly a measure of the quality of scientific papers, has also been 
increasing. Second, the number of patents taken out in the USA by 
Japanese citizens is also second only to the Americans (see Table 4.1); 21.5 
per cent in 1995, up from just 11.7 per cent in 1980, an impressive rise, 
Third, Japanese shares in high-technology exports are also high (Table 4.2). 
By industry, electric machinery accounts for almost 40 per cent of total 
manufacturing sector R&D, followed by transportation machinery and 
general machinery. These three industries together account for over 40 per 
cent of manufacturing sales and over 80 per cent of overseas sales. 
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Table 4.1 Indicators of R&D in selected countries, (1995) 
Japan USA Germany France UK 
R&D expenditure (million US$)a 70541 160358 31684 24253 19655 
R&D expenditure/GDP (%) 2.94 2.52 2.31 2.34 2.02 
Government funds (% of total 22.9 34.5 36.8 41.9 33.2 
R&D) 
Number of researchersh 658866 987700 231128 151249 146000 
Number of researchers/IOOO 5.25 3.75 2.83 2.60 2.49 
population 
Share of published scientific 9.6 35.1 8.4 6.6 9.0 
papers ('}t.y 
Share of US patents (%) 21.5 54.8 6.5 2.8 2.5 
Notes: 
a 1990 prices, converted to US dollars by OECD purchasing power parity. 
b 	On a full-time-equivalent basis except in Japan. 
Calculated from the data in 'National Science Indicators on Diskette' (Institute for 
Scientific Information). 
Source: NISTEP (2000). 
Table 4.2 Country share of world exports (by technology) 
Technology 	 United States Japan Germany 
---. 
All technologies 25.2 17.0 1I.7 
Biotechnologies 37.0 4.3 19.1 
Life science technologies 27.5 13.8 20.4 
Opto-electronics 13.7 22.8 24.0 
Information technologies 18.5 23.0 8.3 
Electronics 20.3 25.5 9.4 
Manufacturing technologies 16.2 21.5 21.9 
Advanced materials 28.6 9.3 15.1 
Aerospace 44.2 1.4 11.3 
Weapon technologies 34.3 4.6 12.1 
Nuclear technologies 20.8 0.2 9.6 
Source: DRIIMcGraw-Hill, Special Tabulations, April 1994, as cited in National Science 
Foundation. Science & Engineering Indicators 1996. 
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Chemicals and pharmaceuticals together account for more than 16 per cent 
of total manufacturing R&D, but only for 93 per cent of domestic sales 
and 6.6 per cent of overseas sales. The fact that Japan is competitive in the 
machinery-related industries but less so in chemical and pharmaceutical 
industries may be taken to reflect the strength and weakness of Japan's 
national innovation system (Goto, 2000). 
3. THE PROCESS OF LEARNING 
3.1 Initial Conditions after the War 
The end of World War II left Japan with a large technological gap and 
assets accumulated from the pre-war and wartime periods, two conditions 
that not only called for, but were also suited to, the active importation of 
technology. Since the late nineteenth century, the Japanese economy had 
grown steadily. Imported technology had played a major role in the process. 
Aided by indigenous technology and a well-developed education system, 
imported technology was used effectively to strengthen the domestic tech­
nology base and promote economic growth. A number of manufacturing 
firms, including those in shipbuilding, steel, aircraft and electrical machin­
ery, were near the global technological frontier and had started to produce 
world-class products. However, even these industries depended heavily on 
foreign technology and continued to import major technologies even after 
the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. 
World War II forced Japan into technological isolation. Though it tried 
to fiJI the resulting gaps with increased domestic R&D, it met with only 
limited success. When the war ended, Japan found itself lagging well behind 
technological levels in the West. Since there were also some industries (like 
petrochemicals and electric appliances) in which Japan was a complete 
newcomer, it had a huge 'backlog' of technologies to import. Japan also 
inherited several key 'heavy' industries, such as shipbuilding, steel, machin­
ery and chemicals, which had been strongly promoted by the wartime 
government. Consumer goods industries, notably textiles, had been con­
verted to the production of military-related goods. As a result, the share in 
manufacturing production of heavy industries (machinery, metal and 
chemicals) had risen from 33.9 per cent in 1931 to 79 per cent in 1944 
(Miyazaki and Ito, 1989), A large stock of plant and equipment in heavy 
industries survived the war (around 60-100 per cent, according to Miyazaki 
and Ito, 1989), along with large numbers of workers who had the experi­
ence, if not necessarily with high levels of skill, of working in these plants. 
As noted, R&D had increased during the war. According to one (rough) 
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estimate, the share of R&D in GNP went from 0.22 per cent in 1930 to l 
per cent by 1942. There were 1214 research organizations employing 49 560 
staff and spending 886 million yen (current price) in 1942 (Hiroshige, 1973). 
After the war, military spending was virtually eliminated, and the resources 
accumulated in the heavy industries were converted into the production of 
civilian goods. As a result, when the war ended, Japan found itself with a 
widened technology gap and, at the same time, the resource base to fill it: 
these provided it with the demand as well as the capabilities for active tech­
nology importation. 
3.2 The Process of Technology Transfer 
Technologies travel in many forms. They may be embodied in people ­
foreign engineers may bring in advanced technologies and Japanese may go 
abroad to learn them - or they may be embodied in new machinery and 
equipment, whose deployment can lead to lower costs and new products. 
In addition, the technological knowledge behind the new machinery can be 
learned: by taking machines apart, one may learn about new materials, 
components and designs. Such 'reverse engineering' has been widely used, 
not only in developing countries but also by firms in developed countries. 
Technologies can also be purchased through licensing agreements, the 
employment of consultants and the purchase of blueprints and other 
resources. Licensing is the sale of legal rights to the use of a technology. 
However, technology licensing does not necessarily mean technology trans­
fer if the contract does not provide the underlying engineering or scientific 
knowledge. FDI is another important channel of technology transfer. 
Foreign firms often bring not only new technologies but also new manage­
ment and marketing techniques and production and inventory control 
methods. Such practice can, in the right conditions, diffuse to local firms. 
FDI often takes the form of joint venture with local firms, some of which 
may be induced by conditions imposed by the host government. These con­
ditions are often designed to encourage transfer of technology to local 
partners and to avoid foreign control of domestic industries. Technology 
also diffuses when multinationals provide technological assistance to local 
suppliers. 
Other channels for technology transfer include academic and trade jour­
nals, exhibitions and trade shows. MNCs now operate research laborator­
ies worldwide, and intra-firm international technology transfer is growing. 
These overseas laboratories tend to carry out R&D to adapt products to 
local conditions and to monitor the R&D activities of local firms and 
research institutions. Gradually, MNCs have been developing global R&D 
networks, integrating the R&D resources of various countries. 
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Japan did not, as noted, use all these channels fully. It restricted FDI 
until the late 1960s and early 1970s, when gradual liberalization began. 
However, there were exceptions. There were foreign affiliates established 
before the war. In addition, during 1953-56, the so-called 'yen-based 
investment system' was adopted and several foreign firms established oper­
ations in the Japanese market (Komiya, 1972), including IBM, Esso 
(Exxon), Mobil, Nestle, Olivetti and NCR. They brought new technologies 
and new ways of doing business into Japan. These were, however, excep­
tions. Until liberalization, FDI into Japan was limited; in fact, it grew little 
even after liberalization. The implications of this process of technology 
transfer are discussed in the next section. 
Japan used other channels of technology transfer extensively. Imported 
machinery and equipment played a critical role in improving product 
quality and productivity. The automobile industry used imported machine 
tools and robots, the steel industry imported converters and rolling 
machines, electric utilities imported generators, and so on. Domestic 
machinery and equipment manufacturers used reverse engineering to learn 
from imported machinery and equipment in order to launch domestic man­
ufacture. 
Japanese firms also struck many technological agreements with 
American and European firms. Most automobile manufacturers, Toyota 
being the major exception, had technological agreements with Western 
manufacturers.2 Among electrical machinery manufacturers, Toshiba, 
Mitsubishi Electric and Fuji Electric had extensive agreements with GE, 
Westinghouse and Siemens, respectively. The steel industry introduced the 
revolutionary LD converter process pioneered by an Austrian firm. Textile 
manufacturers eagerly sought technological agreements with American 
and European firms for the production of new synthetic fibres. With these 
agreements, Japanese firms obtained patent licences and know-how. 
Foreign engineers from the licensing firms were often invited for advice and 
instruction. Many consultants were also hired, mostly from the USA, to 
help modernize the production process. For example, Nissan Motor hired 
US consultants to help with plans for their advanced Oppama plant, which 
was completed in 1961.3 
The purchase of blueprints was also common. In some cases, Japanese 
firms bought titles to inventions or ideas that had been developed only at 
the laboratory level. One well-known case is the purchase of a mid-to-Iow 
density polyethylene production process by Mitsui Petrochemical from a 
German scientist. The company is said to have paid US$1.2 million just for 
two notebooks of experiment data and, based on these data, it managed to 
build a plant. Japanese firms also sent their engineers abroad to seek prom­
ising technologies. Trade associations and institutions like the Japan 
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Productivity Centre often organized 'missions' to study technological 
trends and learn business practices. 
Thus, during the 1950s and 19605, Japan acquired advanced foreign tech­
nology through all channels except for inward FDI. It is important to note 
the diversity of channels. Discussions of technology transfer or importa­
tion tend to be based on technology balance of payments statistics, which 
covers payments and receipts of patent licences, know-how and associated 
expenses. However, this only captures a part of technological flows. 
Learning through reverse engineering, for instance, is not included. Nor is 
learning through journals, trips and 'missions'. Yet, these means played an 
important role in the learning of advanced technology by Japanese firms in 
the post-war years.4 
3.3 Trends in Technology Transfer 
With this important caveat in mind, let us examine post-war trends in 
technology importation using the technology balance of payment sta­
tistics. Figure 4.1 shows the numbers of new technical agreements 
between Japanese and foreign firms and payments for patent licences, 
know-how and associated expenses. Although the number of agree­
ments varied with economic conditions and with technology import lib­
eralization, the general trend is that, after remaining rather stable at 
about 20~300 per year, the number increased rapidly, more than 
tenfold, during 1958~73, until the first oil crisis hit the Japanese 
economy. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, Japanese technology imports were relatively 
stagnant until the mid-l 950s. During this period, increased demand was 
met largely through redeployment of unused plant and equipment rather 
than by new investment. Accordingly, the demand for new technologies 
remained weak even though the economy had entered the high-growth 
period. Technology imports accelerated thereafter and the composition of 
imports also changed gradually. Non-electrical machinery (engines, 
machine tools and other industrial machinery), electrical machinery and 
chemicals have been the three largest technology-importing industries 
throughout the post-war period. However, the shares of electrical machin­
ery and iron and steel dropped sharply from the 1945~65 period to the 
1965~72 period, possibly reflecting the rising technological level of these 
industries. 
At the same time, the proportion of technology imports for consumer 
goods increased. Imports of technology for such goods as air condition­
ers, colour-television sets, leisure products, cosmetics and clothing 
designs increased in the late 1 960s. This change partly reflects changes in 
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Source,' Science and Technology Agency, Gaikoku Gijutsu Donyu Nenji Hokoku (Annual 
Report on the Import of Foreign Technology), each year. 
Figure 4.1 	 Number of new technical agreements and payments for 
technology imports, 1952-84 
government policy. In the 1950s, the government encouraged the import 
of technologies that contributed to industrial reconstruction and discou­
raged those for 'luxuries', but these policies were gradually relaxed. 
However, we believe that the shift reflected not so much the change in 
government policy as the changes in demand structure with rising 
mcomes. 
4. 	 THE ROLE OF THE MARKET MECHANISM AND 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
Three factors explain the active and successful importation of advanced 
technology by Japanese firms incentives, capabilities and government 
policy. 
91 Building technological capabilities: the case (if Japan 
4.1 Incentives: Growing Markets and Intense Competition 
From the 1950s, the economy grew rapidly. While investment in plant and 
equipment by the private sector was only about 10 per cent of GNP during 
the first half of the decade, household demand, mostly for necessities, 
underwent rapid expansion. In the mid-1950s, investment in plants and 
equipment also began to increase, because what was inherited from the war, 
such as old steel mills, had become obsolete and insufficient to meet new 
needs. The changing demand structure also created the need to set up new 
industries, which required new investment. 
Entry to this rapidly expanding market was difficult for most foreign 
firms until at least the mid-1960s. In 1959, the ratio of trade liberalization 
was only 26 per cent, that is, only 26 per cent of the total value of imports 
was automatically allowed to enter the country. Trade liberalization pro­
ceeded swiftly and the ratio reached 70 per cent by the end of 1961. 
Subsequently, the import of steel was liberalized in 1961, automobiles in 
1965 and computers in 1971. Still, the share of imports grew only slowly, if 
at all, for many manufactured goods. The liberalization of FDI into Japan 
followed in the late I 960s and the I 970s. Again, the market share of foreign­
owned firms remained low. 
Thus, Japanese firms could serve the fast-growing domestic market 
without foreign competition (before trade and capital liberalization) and 
despite it (after liberalization). They also exported increasing amounts 
to world markets, which were growing, but at rates lower than in Japan. 
This growth created a strong demand for plant and equipment, which, 
in turn, boosted the demand for advanced technology. Existing firms 
expanded and new firms entered even existing industries like steel, all 
seeking plants with state-of-the-art teehnology. New industries emerged, 
such as petrochemicals and electrical appliances. The automobile indus­
try, which existed before the war but was limited mainly to producing 
taxicabs and military vehicles, was also in effect a new industry. These 
new industries required new investment and new technology on a 
massive scale. 
Under these conditions, the profits of Japanese firms grew and the profit­
ability of the non-financial private sector more than doubled from 1955 to 
1970 (Odaka, 1989). Many cases illustrate the high return on investment in 
imported technology and plant and equipment. Nissan, the second largest 
automobile manufacturer, made a technology agreement with the British 
carmaker, Austin, in 1952. At first, it was a knock-down operation where 
Nissan simply assembled parts provided by Austin, with the teehnological 
help provided by the British company. According to a Nissan executive at 
the time, the company could immediately sell all the cars they assembled at 
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the price of one million yen each, yielding a profit of 200 thousand yen per 
car (Ekonomisuto, 1984). 
These rapidly growing markets clearly provided Japanese firms with the 
incentive to invest in plant and equipment as well as in technology. 
However, the market handsomely rewarded firms that succeeded in upgrad­
ing their technology, and punished those that failed to do so. The 
'Economic Democratization Policy' administered by the Allied powers 
broke up the pre-war Zaibatsu (huge conglomerates). Several dominant 
firms, such as Japan Steel, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Oji Paper, were 
also split into two to four each. The Anti-Monopoly Law was enacted in 
1947. Modelled after the US Antitrust Law, it had several unique provi­
sions, such as the prohibition of holding companies, and was more strin­
gent in many ways than the original. These policy measures helped to create 
and maintain a competitive environment. 
Perhaps more importantly, rapidly growing markets attracted new 
entrants that further intensified competition. Sony and Honda are among 
the well-known examples. In steel, aluminium and petrochemicals the 
number of firms increased and in many cases surpassed the number of 
firms in the USA, where markets were much larger. In some cases, existing 
firms and the government tried to discourage further entry, citing the waste 
caused by 'duplicate investment' and 'excessive competition' and stressing 
the importance of economies of scale. These efforts, however, met with 
little success. Though the share of imports and foreign direct investment 
did not increase rapidly even after liberalization, liberalization pressured 
domestic firms to upgrade technologies to remain competitive with the 
much larger firms of the USA and Europe (discussed in more detail in 
Section 5). In addition, partly due to the Japanese government's concern 
over the balance of payments, Japanese firms intensified their efforts to 
export. 
Thus, even if direct foreign competition in the domestic market was not 
intense, domestic firms faced intense competition among themselves, from 
potential competition from foreign firms in the domestic market and from 
Japanese and foreign firms in world markets. They were under strong pres­
sure to upgrade their technology and the import of advanced technology 
was essential. 
4.2 Absorptive Capacity 
The profit and growth incentives were a necessary condition for active tech­
nology importation: domestic capability to select, import, adapt and imple­
ment new technology (absorptive capacity) was equally indispensable. 
Japan had inherited a strong technology base, and further investment in 
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R&D and education during the post-war period promoted not only indig­
enous innovation but also its capacity to use imported technology effi­
ciently. R&D data, available from 1953, indicate that R&D expenditures 
began to grow rapidly in the latter half of the 1950s.5 From 1955 to 1961 
they grew by more than 20 per cent annually. As a percentage of national 
income, they rose from 0.84 in 1955 to 1.73 in 1961. The increase in the 
latter half of the 1950s coincides with the increase in technology imports, 
which began in 1958. Over time, domestic R&D and technology importa­
tion grew together. Firms and industries that spent large amounts on R&D 
also tended actively to import technology. 
There are many possible explanations for this correlation. One is that 
rapid technological change will raise both domestic R&D and technology 
imports because of growing technological opportunity. Another is that 
sellers of technology often require remuneration not only in financial terms 
but also in new technology. Thus, in order to buy new technology, a firm 
must have its own technology to offer, forcing technology-importing firms 
to do their own R&D. However, these two factors do not fully explain the 
correlation. The positive relationship between domestic R&D and technol­
ogy imports is significant only for a few countries (Blumenthal, 1979). In 
Japan, the number of technology importation contracts involving cross­
licensing was small in the 1960s, though it rose over time. In 1965, there 
were only 3; in 1968, 37; and in 1982,98. 
A more relevant explanation may be the willingness of Japanese firms to 
invest in assimilating and applying imported technologies. Since FDI was 
not an important mode of technology import, firms had to carry out R&D 
to master and adapt the imported technologies. Japan also imported several 
technologies at a commercially untested stage (e.g. Mitsui Petrochemical's 
purchase of the mid-to-Iow density polyethylene process) or some intended 
for military or other non-commercial uses (e.g. transistors and VCRs). 
These had to be tested, upgraded and adapted for commercialization, 
requiring considerable R&D effort. Thus, only with the presence of a tech­
nological base inherited from the earlier periods and of entrepreneurship 
that fostered active R&D could technology import be successfully carried 
out without FDI. Imported technologies, in turn, helped to enhance and 
enlarge the technology base and induce further R&D. Domestic R&D and 
technology imports expanded together through this process. 
4.3 Government Policies to Promote R&D and Technology Importation 
Four sets of government policies helped Japanese technology imports.6 
First, the government controlled commercial technology imports with the 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of 1949 and the Foreign 
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Investment Law of ]950. Since technology imports required payments in 
foreign currency, the Foreign Investment Board reviewed each application, 
apart from technologies that cost little and could be imported with Bank of 
Japan approval. Screening by the Board was carried out in consultation with 
government ministries, particularly the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). These restrictions were gradually liberalized and the 
number of technologies to be reviewed decreased rapidly (Sekiguchi, 1986). 
Major liberalization measures were implemented in 1961, 1968 and 1972. 
Finally, in 1980, all technology importation was opened up except for twelve 
designated technologies; even among these, the import of technologies 
costing less than 100 million yen was liberalized. 
With this regulation, the government could influence the choice of the tech­
nology to be imported and the firm that imported it. Balance of payments 
consideration dominated the choices in the 1 950s, along with a preference for 
'important' industries and public utilities. The criteria changed over time and 
were sometimes rather vague. It was not clear that the government had the 
capacity to choose the best technologies and companies. While it may have 
had superior information-gathering and processing abilities, especially in the 
early post-war years, there were cases where it apparently made poor deci­
sions because of incompetence or for political considerations. 
Second, tax preferences were used to encourage technology import 
(Go to and Wakasugi, 1988). There were two such measures. The first was 
introduced to reduce tax withholdings on payments to foreign corporations 
in exchange for imported technology. The second was to grant tariff exemp­
tions on machines considered necessary for economic development and not 
produced domestically. Both measures were introduced in the early 1950s: 
tax savings due to these measures peaked in 1961 at 9.9 billion yen. These 
measures were abolished in the mid-1960s, as the emphasis of technology 
policy shifted from technology development through importation to that 
through domestic R&D. 
Third, international technology agreements were reviewed by the Fair 
Trade Commission (FTC). If foreign firms licensed technology to Japanese 
firms on conditions considered unreasonable, or involving restraints of 
trade or unfair trade practices, the FTC requested a revision to the contract 
or voided the agreement. Conditions which were considered as violations 
of the Anti-Monopoly Law included: restrictions by licensor on export 
price, quantity, geographical area or buyer of the product manufactured 
using the technology in question; grant back clause mandating the licensee 
to provide adapted, improved technology based on the originally licensed 
technology to licensor; and restrictions that dealt with competing technol­
ogies or products of the licensor. The FTC also strove to prevent 'excessive' 
royalties being demanded by licensors. There was no such review system for 
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agreements among Japanese firms. While FTC intervention on these 
grounds was intended to prevent unfair trade practices, it may have also 
enhanced the bargaining position of Japanese vis-a-vis foreign firms in 
negotiating licensing agreements. 
More indirectly, policies on trade and FDI had a profound impact on 
technology importation. Until trade and FDI liberalization, foreign firms 
had little choice in exploiting their technologies in Japan other than by 
selling them to Japanese firms. Needless to say, these policies must have had 
a welfare cost by limiting foreign competition and reducing the inflow of 
capital; however, the intense competition among domestic firms and in 
export markets, and Japan's high savings rate, meant that these costs did not 
become too large. At the same time, the policies encouraged the rapid 
broadening and deepening of the Japanese innovative base. 
Technology imports alone were insufficient to raise Japanese technology 
to levels needed for international competitiveness. The fourth set of poli­
cies were designed to encourage R&D activities by Japanese firms. 
Gradually, policy emphasis shifted from imports to innovation. One such 
policy was a tax credit for incremental R&D expenditures, started in 1966. 
This allowed firms to deduct a fixed proportion of their experimental 
research expenditures in the current year over and above the highest expen­
ditures incurred in previous years. The amount of tax foregone by this 
credit (and other less important R&D-related credits) reached 19 billion 
yen in 1970. This type of tax credit for R&D is now widely used through­
out the world. 
The government also started several subsidy programmes to encourage 
R&D. The value of subsidies reached 11 billion yen in 1970 and 61 billion 
yen in 1980 (Goto and Wakasugi, 1988). A large portion of these subsidies 
was given through research associations. The government, citing the fact 
that the R&D expenditures of the six largest Japanese computer makers 
combined was a mere fifth of that of IBM in 1970, encouraged collabora­
tive research and provided R&D subsidies through this channel. Research 
associations, a form of research consortium, also became an important 
technology policy tool in the 19708 and 19808. Some of these associations, 
the VLSI (very large-scale integrated circuits) Association in particular, are 
generally considered to have been successful. Others were not, and there 
were probably more cases of failure than success (Odagiri and Goto, 1996). 
5. DEVELOPMENT WITH OR WITHOUT FDI 
Japan is not unique among fast growing industrializing economies 
in restricting FDI inflows and relying on other means of technology 
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acquisition. Korea and Taiwan followed similar paths. There are, however, 
several countries in East Asia, such as Thailand and Malaysia, which have 
grown fast with a rapid increase in inward FDI. Would Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan have grown even faster if they had accepted more inward FDI? 
Past research on the effects of inward FDI on domestic industry gives 
mixed results. Tokui et at (1999) cite three studies that examine the impact 
of inward FDI on the productivity of domestic industries. In Canada, 
industries with a higher presence of foreign firms tended to have higher 
labour productivity (Globerman, 1979). In Morocco, on the contrary, FDI 
was not associated with any productivity increase in domestic firms 
(Haddad and Harrison, 1993). Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe (1996) 
show that, among developed countries, inward FDI has not contributed to 
productivity increase in host countries, while outward FDI has tended to 
contribute to the productivity of home countries. 
As for the impact of inward FDI on the R&D in host countries, 
Veugelers and Houte (1990) find that in Belgium the presence of foreign 
firms was negatively correlated with R&D by domestic firms. Bertschek 
(1995), by contrast, finds that in Germany inward FDI had a positive 
impact on innovation by domestic firms. Tokui et al. (1999) find that inward 
FDI in Japan tended to reduce both profits and R&D in Japanese firms in 
1987~94. It may also be the case that MNCs do not invest in innovative 
activity in their affiliates when they reap economies of scale and scope in 
R&D in their established bases at home or elsewhere. 
The impact of inward FDI on domestic technological activity or techno­
logical level is therefore complex. There mayor may not exist an associa­
tion between inward FDI and domestic R&D or productivity. Even if there 
is an association, it may be indirect, from spillovers of MNC activity or 
from the competition created by their entry. Tokui et al. (1999) argue that 
inward FDI intensifies competition and reduces the profitability of domes­
tic firms, which discourages their R&D investment. Obviously, foreign 
firms have an incentive to keep technology from leaking out to competitors 
to maximize the profits from their superior technological resources. 
This argument need not imply that the restriction on inward FDI will 
always encourage domestic R&D or raise the technological level of domes­
tic firms. Note that, even during the 1960s when FDI was restricted, 
Japanese firms were aware that capital liberalization was inevitable in the 
near future. Since many American and European firms, such as Du Pont, 
US Steel, General Motors and IBM, were huge and technologically 
advanced in comparison to major Japanese firms at the time, the latter felt 
a severe potential competitive threat. In many industries, they actually 
experienced the consequences of this threat in the pre-war period. For 
instance, Ford and GM had plants in Japan before the war and used to 
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dominate the Japanese automobile market. This dominance of Ford and 
GM, with their formidable financial and technological clout, remained in 
the minds of Japanese carmakers. After the war, this potential threat and 
the inevitability of trade liberalization, prompted Toyota, Nissan and other 
Japanese manufacturers to improve competitiveness. Fujimoto and Tidd 
(1993) compare this with the UK and argue that, perhaps ironically, the 
pre-war dominance of British producers like Morris and Austin in the UK 
market and Ford's failure to penetrate it may have delayed their introduc­
tion of a full-scale American mass-production system. Japanese producers, 
by contrast, retained a strong memory of Ford as a competitor of superior 
technology. Toyota tried desperately to learn from the mass-production 
system of Ford and other car producers, and even from those of other 
industries, most notably textiles, to come up with its own system, now called 
the 'Toyota production system'. 
Therefore, even if FDI did not playa major role in post-war technology 
transfer to Japan, it did play an indirect role by making the market more 
contestable and so stimulating local technology development. The role of 
inward FDI is indeed complex. The simplistic view that inward FDI con­
tributes to the development of host countries through spillovers may be 
naive, but so is the view that FDI played no role at all in post-war Japan. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Does the discussion of Japanese technology importation and development 
provide implications for developing countries today? We examine two such 
implications. 
Firstly, the acquisition of technology from abroad is not a simple matter. 
To be successful, it requires deliberate effort on the part of the buyer or 
receiver, obviously along with the right environmental conditions. In other 
words, 'technology transfer' can be a misleading term if it suggests that 
technology can be transferred automatically; 'technology acquisition' is a 
better expression, indicating the need for active involvement of the country 
that intends to acquire the technology. 
Imported technologies can only be used effectively if sufficient capabil­
ities exist for a country to master imported technologies fully and adapt 
them to its own environment. Managers, engineers and workers alike have 
to strive until the imported technologies bear fruit in the form of smooth 
production, market penetration and profits. They all have to work hard to 
understand the technology, learn from it through trial and error, and put it 
in actual use. Entrepreneurship, in its broadest sense, has to be present to 
facilitate this process. In post-war Japan, entrepreneurship was abundant, 
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from new start-ups like Sony and Honda to established firms like Nippon 
Steel and Nissan. What encouraged them was the incentive to invest in 
physical capacity, imported technologies and building their own technolog­
ical capabilities given by rapidly growing demand in intensely competitive 
markets. In essence, the Japanese experience suggests that countries have to 
build absorptive capabilities, learn from imported technologies and develop 
their capabilities further, utilizing them to promote local innovation. 
The Japanese government helped in various ways. From the beginning of 
industrialization after the Meiji Restoration of 1867, education, both at the 
elementary and higher levels, was given top priority in government policy. 
Before and during World War II, government procurement of military 
goods gave domestic heavy industries a large market and hence the incen­
tive to invest in R&D. After the war, the government encouraged investment 
through low-interest loans and various tax exemptions. The protection of 
domestic markets from imports and inward FDI provided Japanese firms 
with a large and growing market for their products. This restriction on 
inward FDI forced American and European firms with advanced tech­
nologies to sell their technologies instead of exploiting them via direct 
investment, thereby enabling Japanese firms to import these technologies 
separately. 
Yet, knowing that the restriction would be eliminated in the near future, 
Japanese firms were under intense threat of entry by advanced foreign 
rivals. Moreover, this threat was credible. In the automobile and electrical 
equipment industries, Japanese firms remembered the advanced technolog­
ical and managerial capabilities of American and European firms, as rivals 
(for example, GM and Ford) or as major shareholders (for example, GE 
was 51 per cent owner of Toshiba, Western Electric 54 per cent owner of 
NEC, and Siemens 30 per cent owner of Fuji Electric). They were keenly 
aware that, without catching up technologically, they would be wiped out 
by foreign entrants. 
This leads to the second implication for developing countries: the role of 
inward FDI. Theoretically, FDI is an important channel of technology 
transfer as MNCs are leading innovators and transfer the latest knowledge 
to their affiliates. Some of their knowledge and skills spills over to local 
firms by means of technological advice given to local suppliers, the move 
of management staff, researchers and workers from foreign to domestic 
firms, and the emulation by domestic firms of the practices of foreign firms. 
The presence of foreign firms also makes domestic markets more compet­
itive, giving an incentive for domestic firms to raise their productivity. 
However, FDI can also constrain local technology development. Once 
foreign firms dominate domestic markets, domestic firms may lose the 
opportunity to expand their operation to attain economies of scale and to 
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accumulate production volume needed to learn by doing. The expected 
profitability from R&D investment may become too low and the cash flow 
needed to finance R&D may be insufficient. These tendencies may yield a 
negative spiral, making domestic firms even less competitive and foreign 
firms more dominant. Thus, government restrictions on inward FDI, as 
well as on imports, in post-war Japan made sense. We emphasize again, 
however, that the restriction has to be short term, providing domestic firms 
with a potential entry threat. In addition, export by domestic firms should 
be encouraged not only to earn foreign exchange but also to make them 
face competition in export markets against foreign firms 
Does this suggest that developing countries today should restrict inward 
FDI? We doubt if there is a clear-cut answer to this question. The political 
feasibility of such a policy is questionable. Besides, the economic environ­
ment and the historical background differ significantly from those of post­
war Japan. Initial technological capabilities, management know-how, and 
worker skills were much higher in Japan than in most developing countries. 
Technologies at the time were less complex and less science based, and the 
technological gap between Japan and more advanced nations smaller. In 
these conditions, restricting FDI may only lead to the deterioration of tech­
nologicallevels rather than to faster development of local capabilities. In 
addition, infant industry protection may be more difficult. Ordinary citi­
zens can easily access information on other markets, and multinational 
companies can readily switch production bases across countries. 
Nevertheless, under the right conditions, such as an educated and entre­
preneurial population, protection of industries in which technological 
catch-up is possible within, say, a decade or two, may be effective, provided 
the government fixes (credibly) a time limit for the protection. The cost, if 
industries fail to catch up, may be high and there are clear risks of foster­
ing undesirable political connections between the government and pro­
tected industries. 
Let us conclude by noting two challenges that Japan now faces. One is 
the need for more basic research and its application to industrial purposes. 
The proportion of national R&D spent for basic research was slightly lower 
in Japan (14.4 per cent) than in the USA (16.6 per cent) in 1998 and the pro­
portion spent by universities was higher in Japan (20.0 per cent) than in the 
USA (14.4 per cent), suggesting that industries undertook relatively more 
basic research in the USA. R&D expenditure in the university sector was 
3223 billion yen in Japan and 5313 billion yen in the USA (converted with 
the OEeD purchasing power parity index). Japan's expenditure is smaller 
than that of the USA but the proportional difference is smaller than for 
total R&D expenditures. Yet, the number of papers in natural sciences and 
engineering was more than three times smaller in Japan than in the USA 
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(301394 versus 1048137) in 1994-98, although the language barrier is 
undoubtedly one reason for this difference. 7 
Japan also has fewer instances, in comparison to the USA, of univer­
sity-industry collaboration and of new firms established with technologies 
invented in universities. It is not that there are no cases of collaboration 
between universities and industries in Japan; in fact there are many. Yet, 
institutional rigidity surrounding Japanese universities, mainly because 
major universities are national, has often forced university researchers to 
collaborate with the industry only on an informal basis (Odagiri, 1999). 
This rigidity has been gradually relaxed but there is still much to be 
improved. 
The other challenge is the globalization of Japanese industry. This has 
two implications. First, in several industries, a major part of the production 
activity has shifted overseas, most importantly to East Asian countries 
(including China). Since technology accumulation takes place not only by 
formal R&D but also through learning at the shop floor level, interaction 
between these two levels is often essential for efficient innovation and for 
maintaining high technological capabilities. The disappearance of produc­
tion facilities from Japan may make this interaction difficult, causing the 
problem of 'hollowing-out'. Many firms in fact maintain some plants 
usually the most advanced ones - within Japan despite higher labour costs, 
precisely to prevent such hollowing-out of the technological base. 
Second, many Japanese firms have established R&D facilities abroad. 
Some, particularly in East Asia and other developing countries, are small 
and geared mainly to adapting products and processes to local conditions. 
Others, particularly those established by automobile, electrical equipment 
and pharmaceutical producers, have been set up in the USA and Europe to 
conduct major R&D, often in collaboration with local universities (Odagiri 
and Yasuda, 1997). Maintaining effective collaboration among these labor­
atories and headquarters laboratories in Japan has become a difficult issue 
for many companies. 
No doubt, these challenges will loom larger for Japan in coming years. 
Institutional and organizational innovation to resolve them has to be 
undertaken by Japanese firms. Whether they succeed will be one of the 
keys, if not the key, to continued technological advance. 
NOTES 
I. 	 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop on 'Technology 
Development in East Asia' sponsored by the World Bank Institute in Indonesia. 
December 2000. We wish to thank Linsu Kim, Sanjaya Lall and other participants of the 
workshop for helpful comments. 
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2. 	 Toyota also negotiated a technological agreement with Ford but failed because the US 
government restricted foreign investment and the sending of engineers abroad after the 
Korean War broke out (Inoki, 1989). 
3. 	 See Ekonomisuto (1984). Case studies of teehnology import in this section are taken 
largely from this book. 
4. 	 The same can be said about domestic R&D activities. Even when firms do not have formal 
R&D establishments and researchers, learning often takes plaee at their production sites 
and other places. This activity is not captured by R&D statistics. 
5, 	 Science and Technology Agency, Kagaku Gijutsu Hakusho (White Paper on Science and 
Technology), various years. 
6, For more details, see Goto (1993). 
7. 	 All the figures here are taken from NISTEP (2000). 
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5. 	 Overseas R&D activities and intra­
firm technology transfer: the case of 
Japanese multinationals 
Shujiro Urata and Hiroki Kawai! 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of technology in detennining competitiveness, for firms as 
well as for countries, has increased. For developing countries assimilating 
foreign technology has always been crucial to economic growth. Indeed, 
many successful cases of economic development, including Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan in East Asia, indicate that the successful assimilation of foreign 
technology played a very important role. Various channels exist for devel­
oping countries to obtain technology from foreign countries. The import of 
capital goods and technology through licensing were major channels for 
obtaining technology for Japan and Korea in the post-World War II period, 
while foreign direct investment (FDI) was also an important channel for 
Taiwan. In addition, visits by foreign researchers and engineers were used 
as channels for obtaining foreign technology for these countries. 
The role of FDI in technology transfer has grown greatly in recent years, 
for several reasons. First, FDI has risen rapidly, faster than other interna­
tional transactions. Thus, world trade in goods and services increased 1.6 
times from 1990 to 1998, while FDI increased 3.2 times. Asia recorded the 
fastest growth in FDI inflows in the world in this period, growing 4.2 times. 
Second, firms have come to prefer FDI to exporting products or licensing 
foreign firms as a mode of exploiting their competitive technologies 
abroad. This preference stems from possible market failures in the technol­
ogy market: the more sophisticated technologies are, the more difficult it is 
to value them appropriately and thus the more difficult it is to trade them 
in arm's length transactions. Furthermore, it is often difficult to monitor 
the use or abuse of technology by the licensee. To avoid these problems, and 
to reap the rewards of increasingly expensive R&D, firms tend to use FDI 
as the main means of deploying technologies (in particular new technolo­
gies) in foreign countries. 
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FDI transfers technology in two ways. One is intra-firm (technology 
transfers from a parent company to its affiliates). The other is technology 
spillover from affiliates to local firms in host countries. Both contribute to 
upgrading technological capability of host countries. For foreign firms 
undertaking FDI, intra-firm technology transfer is very important because 
the success or failure of intra-firm technology transfer affects performance 
of their affiliates. Given the growing importance of FDI, it is also becom­
ing more important for host countries to maximize the spillover effects of 
affiliates and effectively assimilate them. 
This chapter analyses the R&D activities of Japanese firms and their 
impact on intra-firm technology transfer to developing countries, particu­
larly in East Asia. We choose Japanese firms for two reasons. One is the 
large size of Japanese FDI in Asia, which makes the analysis useful and 
interesting for Asian countries. The other is the availability of detailed firm­
level data, derived from a survey conducted by the Japanese Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). An analysis of firm-level data 
provides interesting insights that are not obtained from more aggregated 
figures. Section 2 reviews briefly the recent development of Japanese FDI. 
Section 3 analyses overseas R&D activities by Japanese firms. Section 4 
examines intra-firm technology transfer by Japanese firms. Section 5 pre­
sents some concluding remarks. 
2. 	 RAPID EXPANSION OF JAPANESE FDI IN THE 
1980S AND SUBSEQUENT SLOWDOWN IN THE 
1990S 
Japanese FDI increased rapidly in the latter half of the 1980s, undergoing 
major changes in its regional and sectoral composition (Figures 5.1 and 
5.2).2 The number of overseas investments each year increased sharply 
from around 2500 in the early 1980s to more than 6000 in the latter half of 
the decade. Equally dramatic, however, was the pace at which Japanese FDI 
declined after peaking in 1989. The decline continued through 1994, when 
the number of overseas direct investments was less than 40 per cent of the 
level in 1988. From 1994 through 1997, the year of the financial crisis in 
East Asia, the number of annual investments remained more or less stable, 
before recording another large drop in 1998. 
Both 'push' and 'pull' factors explain recent trends in Japanese FDI. The 
push factors are those in the home country (Japan), while the pull factors 
are those in the host countries. There were several push Jactors behind the 
rapid growth of Japanese FDI in the latter half of the 1980s. 
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• 	 The rapid and steep appreciation of the yen against other currencies 
was the most important macroeconomic factor; the real effective 
exchange rate of the yen appreciated by 37 per cent between 1985 and 
1988. This stimulated Japanese FDI in two ways: the 'relative price' 
effect and the 'liquidity' or 'wealth' effect. The former significantly 
reduced the international price competitiveness of Japanese prod­
ucts, inducing many Japanese firms to relocate production overseas, 
especially in East Asia where production costs were lower. The yen 
appreciation also made Japanese firms more 'wealthy' in terms of 
increased collateral and liquidity, and enabled them to finance over­
seas investments more cheaply than foreign competitors. Japanese 
firms undertook many FDI projects in real estate by taking advan­
tage of this liquidity effect. 
• 	 Another important push factor was the emergence of the 'bubble' 
economy in Japan. The liquidity effect was strengthened by the rapid 
rise in the prices of such assets as shares and land. The average share 
price in Japan more than doubled between 1985 and 1989, the index 
of share prices rising from 45.7 in 1985 to 117.8 in 1989. 
• 	 The growth of outward FDI also reflected the growing managerial 
and technological capabilities of Japanese firms, based not just on 
domestic production but also on export experience. 
• 	 Once the largest Japanese firms set up facilities overseas, a number of 
their suppliers followed them to retain their customers. 
• 	 Growing labour shortages and rising wages in Japan forced some 
firms, especially SMEs, to move their operation abroad. 
The decline in Japanese FDI in the early 1990s resulted mainly from the 
bursting of the bubble economy in 1989, which made it difficult for firms to 
raise financial resources for FDI. The depreciation of the yen also contrib­
uted. In the 1990s the depressed economic situation in Japan, with a con­
sequent poor financial performance by Japanese firms, exacerbated the 
constraints on FDI. 
Japanese FDI in the second half of the 1980s was directed largely to 
North America and Europe and focused on non-manufacturing sectors like 
services and real estate. These two regions together accounted for more than 
50 per cent of the number of overseas investments in this period.3 Although 
a smaller share of FDI went to Asia, in the 1980s the main focus was on 
manufacturing. The 1990s saw changes in FDI patterns. First, the share of 
Asia, particularly East Asia including the NIEs,4 ASEAN (Association of 
South East Asian Nations) and China, rose sharply.s Indeed, the share of 
Asia in the number of overseas Japanese investments increased from 25.6 
per cent in 1990 to 56.9 per cent in 1995; thereafter, however, this share 
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declined rapidly, reaching 33.6 per cent in 1998. The major pull factors in 
Japanese FDI in East Asia included the region's robust economic growth, 
low unit labour costs, and trade and FDI policy liberalization. 
Since the mid-1980s, the geographical distribution of Japan's FDI in 
Asia has changed significantly, shifting from the NIEs to the ASEAN4, and 
then to China and other Asian countries.6 The NIEs attracted considerable 
Japanese FDI until the late 1980s; policymakers in Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore, in particular, promoted inward FDI in their pursuit of high-tech 
industrialization. Japanese FDI in the NIEs reached a peak in 1988; the 
NIEs then started to lose their cost advantages due to rapid wage increases 
and currency appreciation. Firms in Japan and other advanced economies 
started to look to other East Asian countries such as the ASEAN4 as hosts 
for investment. One important factor in attracting manufacturing FDI to 
the ASEAN4 was the shift in strategy from inward to outward-orientation, 
carried out through the liberalization of trade and FDI policies. 
FDI in China grew quickly after 1990 due to China's economic reforms, 
liberalization of trade and FDI policies and political and social stability 
(despite the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989). By 1995, China was the 
largest recipient of Japanese FDI in Asia. The attractiveness of China as a 
host country increased as costs in the ASEAN countries rose, with rising 
wages, material and service costs, in turn reflecting currency appreciation, 
growing labour shortages, infrastructure bottlenecks and other factors'? 
Japanese FDI in Asia has been distinguished by its emphasis on manu­
facturing, with the share of manufacturing around 50 per cent through the 
1980s, and reaching over 70 per cent in 1995. Within manufacturing, tex­
tiles and electrical machinery increased their share in the I 990s, accounting 
for 20.8 and 14.0 per cent, respectively, in 1995.8 Reflecting Japanese FDI 
as a whole, the geographical distribution of FDI in most manufacturing 
subsectors shifted from the NIEs to the ASEAN4 and then to China over 
the period. This shift was most pronounced in the textile sector. 
3. OVERSEAS R&D ACTIVITIES 
3.t The Pattern of Overseas R&D by Japanese Firms 
The analysis of R&D in overseas Japanese affiliates is based on a 1992 
MITI survey of the overseas activities of Japanese firms.9 Before conduct­
ing the analysis, a discussion of the database used for the analysis is in 
order. Table 5.1 shows the geographical and sectoral distribution of over­
seas affiliates in the sample. In 1992 there were 7096 overseas affiliates of 
Japanese firms in the world. Asia was the most popular destination, hosting 
Table 5.1 Overseas affiliates of Japanese firms (number) 
North Latin Asia East NIEs Hong Korea Singapore Taiwan ASEAN4 
America America Asia Kong 
Agriculture 8 18 17 15 0 0 0 0 0 14 
Mining 17 7 6 6 I 0 0 I 0 5 
Manufacturing 707 163 1528 1469 676 109 145 163 259 656 
Food 50 I3 67 63 27 7 5 8 7 26 
Textiles 10 22 129 128 36 19 8 1 8 57 
. 
11 3 22 22 9 1 I 3 4 I 
Chemicals 95 14 225 219 103 9 23 22 49 103 
..... 
c 
Co 
Coal & oil products 
Iron & steel 
3 
36 
2 
5 
4 
58 
4 
56 
2 
19 
0 
2 
0 
4 
I 
8 
I 
5 
I 
33 
N on-ferrous metals 30 6 47 47 13 0 3 7 3 33 
General machinery 70 15 91 90 60 7 10 19 24 24 
Electric machinery 160 45 416 408 208 34 37 65 72 170 
Transport machinery 107 20 171 148 51 2 8 4 37 86 
Precision machinery 27 2 37 37 24 4 7 4 9 6 
Other manufacturing 108 16 261 247 124 24 39 21 40 106 
Construction 41 14 114 108 37 8 2 12 15 64 
Commerce 531 140 548 543 405 174 7 151 73 133 
Services 375 121 304 296 176 78 10 69 19 101 
Others 188 42 78 76 46 22 1 17 6 20 
Total 1867 505 2595 2513 1341 391 165 413 372 993 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand China Middle Europe Oceania Africa Total 
East 
Agriculture 6 1 6 1 1 0 7 8 4 62 
Mining 3 0 2 0 0 3 24 29 3 89 
Manufacturing 126 210 69 251 137 10 529 78 13 3028 
Food 3 6 3 14 10 0 13 13 1 157 
Textiles 21 10 3 23 35 0 8 3 I 173 
Wood, pulp 5 5 1 0 2 0 9 3 0 48 
Chemicals 22 29 12 40 13 3 68 10 I 416 
Coal & oil products 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 1 0 13 
Iron & steel 7 10 4 12 4 I 2 2 2 106 
..... 
c Non-ferrous metals 5 II 2 15 1 0 7 4 1 95 
'0 General machinery 5 6 3 10 6 0 73 5 0 254 
Electric machinery 14 90 11 55 30 4 183 9 3 820 
Transport machinery 23 11 20 32 11 0 56 15 2 371 
Precision machinery 0 3 I 2 7 0 20 2 0 88 
Other manufacturing 21 29 9 47 17 2 87 11 2 487 
Construction 13 20 8 23 7 7 24 5 2 207 
Commerce 10 46 12 65 5 19 730 122 11 2101 
Services 18 26 13 44 19 1 241 67 39 1148 
Others 1 4 6 9 10 2 96 23 32 461 
Total 177 307 116 393 179 42 1651 332 104 7096 
Source: MITI, Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Comprehensive Survey of Overseas Activities of Japanese Firms), no. 5, Tokyo, 1993. 
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2595 affiliates (36.6 per cent). North America and Europe were the next 
most popular destinations. with 1867 and 1651 overseas affiliates, or 26.3 
and 23.3 per cent of total, respectively. Within East Asia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Hong Kong, and Taiwan hosted similar numbers of Japanese 
affiliates, around 400 each (5-6 per cent of the total number of affiliates 
each). These were followed by Malaysia with 307 affiliates (4.3 per cent), 
and China, Indonesia and Korea with approximately 170 affiliates each (2.5 
per cent each). 
In terms of the sectoral distribution of affiliates, manufacturing 
accounted for the largest number at 3028 (42.7 per cent). Trade and services 
followed with 210 I and 1609 (29.6 and 22.7 per cent). Among manufactur­
ing subsectors, electrical machinery had the largest number of affiliates at 
820, far ahead of chemicals, which came second with 416. The share of 
manufacturing was higher, and that of services lower, in Asia relative to the 
rest of the world. Among manufacturing subsectors, electrical machinery, 
chemicals, transport machinery and textiles had high shares. 
Table 5.2 shows the geographical and sectoral spread of the overseas 
R&D units of Japanese MNCs in 1992. There were 291 such units in total, 
with North America hosting the largest number at 143; this share, 49.1 per 
cent, was significantly higher than the corresponding share for overseas 
affiliates (26.3 per cent), indicating the technological strength of the region. 
Asia was the second most popular region, with 81 R&D units (27.8 per 
cent). Taiwan accounted for the largest number in Asia, with 34 units (11.7 
per cent). Korea came next with 12 units, followed in descending order by 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, China, Philippines, Indonesia and Hong 
Kong. By industry, chemicals, electric machinery and food each had large 
numbers of R&D units throughout the world. In East Asia, food and 
chemicals had by far the largest number of units; Taiwan hosted as many 
as 21 and 8 R&D units in food and chemical industries, respectively. 
The intensity of Japanese overseas R&D, as measured by the ratio of 
overseas R&D units to affiliates, was highest in North America (7.7 per 
cent), compared to 4.1 overall and 3.1 for Asia. These average figures mask 
substantial variations between countries, with Taiwan at 9.1, higher than 
North America, and Korea at 7.3, almost comparable to North America. 
The position of East Asia for overseas R&D by Japanese MNCs differs 
by the indicators used to measure R&D activities. In terms of R&D spend­
ing East Asia had a very low rank, accounting for only 4.2 per cent of total 
overseas R&D (Table 5.3). By contrast, North America and Europe 
accounted for 43.5 and 50.6 per cent, respectively. This is also reflected in 
the R&D/sales ratio of Japanese affiliates: East Asia registers 0.04 per cent, 
significantly lower than North America (0.19 per cent) or Europe (0.28 per 
cent).IO Within Asia, Japanese affiliates in Taiwan and Korea have far 
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higher figures than other economies; Malaysia and the Philippines register 
relatively high values in the ASEAN4. 
The regional R&D gap appears smaller, however, if R&D activities are 
measured by numbers of researchers (Table 5.4). Japanese affiliates 
employed the largest number of researchers in East Asia (40 per cent of the 
world total), while North America and Europe employed 29 and 18 per 
cent, respectively. The considerably higher expenditure per researcher in the 
industrialized regions presumably reflected both the higher cost of research 
staff as well as the more advanced nature of R&D undertaken. Among East 
Asian economies, Thailand had the largest number of researchers, while the 
Philippines and China each had a very small number of researchers. 
Taking the ratio of the number of researcher to total employees in affil­
iates, we find that the ratios are higher for North America (4.1%) and 
Europe (3.8%) than in East Asia (2.9 per cent). Unlike R&D-sales ratios, 
researcher-employee ratios are comparable across East Asian economies 
except for Thailand, where the ratio is notably high. 
R&D units serve several functions, including information collection, 
production and sales support and new product development. It is impor­
tant to recognize the functions of R&D units when assessing their effective­
ness in transferring technology. According to Table 5.5, a large number of 
R&D units in Asia were set up to provide production support, II with 
approximately one out of every two R&D units established for that 
purpose. There is an interesting pattern in the share of R&D units provid­
ing production support in East Asia. Some 71 per cent of Japanese R&D 
units in China are assigned to production support, while the correspond­
ing share in the ASEAN4 is 47.2 per cent and in the NIEs 39.3 per cent. 
The development of products for the local market is the second most 
important function in East Asia, with 38.8 per cent of units devoted to this 
purpose, particularly in the NIEs and the ASEAN4. R&D units in East 
Asia perform two more functions: modification of imported products for 
local sales and collection of information on the local market, 23.1 per cent 
and 20.7 per cent by number of R&D units, respectively. The pattern differs 
from industrialized countries, where R&D units are more focused on new 
product development and basic research and less on production support. 
The geographical allocation and functions of Japanese R&D units are 
consistent with differences in technological capabilities in the different 
regions. Most economies in East Asia are competitive in production using 
standard technologies, and the major role of R&D units is to provide pro­
duction support. However, it should also be noted that many East Asian 
economies do possess strong technological capabilities, which are reflected 
in the relatively high proportion of economies hosting R&D units for the 
deVelopment of new products. In developed countries, with their richer 
Table 5.2 Overseas R&D units of Japanese firms (number) 
North Latin Asia East NIEs Hong Korea Singapore Taiwan ASEAN4 
America America Asia Kong 
Agriculture 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 () () 
Mining () 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 () () 
Manufacturing 107 13 77 73 51 0 12 5 34 16 
Food 16 () 23 23 22 () () I 21 I 
Textiles () I I 0 () () 0 0 I 
Wood, pulp 0 I I I 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Chemicals 24 6 20 20 14 0 4 2 8 6 
.... 
.... 
~-> 
Coal & oil products 
Iron & steel 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
() 
0 
0 
() 
0 
N on-ferrous metals 5 2 2 2 I 0 I 0 0 I 
General machinery 11 3 6 6 6 0 4 1 I 0 
Electric machinery 34 0 6 5 2 0 I I 0 3 
machinery 7 0 10 7 4 0 I 0 3 3 
Precision machinery I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other manufacturing 5 0 8 8 ') "­ 0 0 1 0 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Commerce 1l 0 4 4 3 I 0 2 0 I 
Services 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 143 15 81 77 54 12 7 34 17 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand China Middle Europe Oceania Africa Total 
East 
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Mining 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manufacturing 2 6 2 6 6 0 34 3 0 234 
Food 0 I 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 41 
Textiles 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Wood, pulp 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Chemicals 1 1 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 54 
Coal & oil products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iron & steel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
...... 
...... Non-ferrous metals 0 I 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 10 
...... 
General machinery 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 27 
Electric machinery 0 2 0 0 0 9 0 0 49 
Transport machinery I 0 1 0 0 5 0 23 
Precision machinery 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 4 
Other manufacturing 0 0 0 0 6 0 5 0 0 18 
Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Commerce 0 0 I 0 0 0 5 0 0 20 
Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 13 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 21 
Total 2 6 3 6 6 0 49 3 0 291 
Source: MITf, Klligai Jigyo Katsudo Kihol1 Chosa (Comprehensive Survey of Overseas Activities of Japanese Firms), no. 5, Tokyo, 1993. 
Table 5.3 Overseas R&D by Japanese firms (million 
North Latin Asia East NIEs Hong Korea Singapore Taiwan ASEAN4 
America America Asia Kong 
Agriculture 10 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mining 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manufacturing 48071 319 6585 5627 4187 15 893 653 2626 1416 
Food 130 0 91 91 83 0 1 10 72 8 
Textiles 0 2 172 172 43 0 38 0 5 126 
Wood, pulp 10 93 130 130 10 0 0 0 10 120 
Chemicals 10956 21 827 827 728 0 477 25 226 94 
...... Coal & oil products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
...... 
~ Iron & steel 764 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Non-ferrous metals 477 138 62 62 16 0 12 4 0 36 
General machinery 5453 35 209 209 201 0 17 70 114 8 
Electric machinery 23664 30 1959 1941 1049 15 309 511 214 892 
Transport machinery 3719 0 1157 219 151 0 16 6 129 68 
Precision machinery 90 0 151 151 151 0 2 27 122 0 
Other manufacturing 2808 0 1827 1825 1755 0 21 0 1734 64 
Construction 2 11 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Commerce 631 0 285 285 277 191 0 86 0 8 
Services 4737 0 5 5 5 0 0 0 5 0 
Others 7088 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 60539 396 6877 5919 4469 206 893 739 2631 1425 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand China Middle Europe Oceania Africa Total] 
East 
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 23 
Mining 0 0 0 0 () 0 0 0 0 60 
Manufacturing 45 984 162 225 24 0 68974 1291 6 125246 
Food 0 () 0 8 0 0 80 25 0 326 
Textiles 18 l3 0 95 3 0 302 0 2 478 
Wood, Pulp 0 0 120 0 0 0 0 0 () 233 
Chemicals 1 44 0 49 5 0 1320 0 0 13124 
Coal & oil products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iron & steel () 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 764 
Non-ferrous metals 4 2 10 20 10 () 45 136 0 858 
"­
"­
'"" 
General machinery 0 0 0 8 0 0 3286 0 0 8983 
Electric machinery 0 844 20 28 0 0 54222 66 0 79941 
Transport machinery 22 20 12 14 0 0 2403 1 046 4 8329 
Precision machinery 0 0 0 0 0 () 689 18 0 948 
Other manufacturing 0 61 0 3 6 0 6627 0 0 11262 
Construction 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 14 
Commerce 0 0 8 0 0 () 307 1 0 1224 
Services 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 4761 
Others 0 0 0 I 0 0 1248 57 0 8790 
Total 45 984 170 226 25 0 70555 1349 6 139326 
Nole: I The totals ae for North America, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Oceania, and Africa. 

Source: MITI, Kaigai Jigyo Kalsudo Killon Chosa (Comprehensive Survey of Overseas Activities of Japanese Firms), no. 5, Tokyo, 1993. 

Table 5.4 Researchers at overseas affiliates by Japanese firms (number) 
North Latin Asia East NIES Hong Korea Singapore Taiwan ASEAN4 
America America Asia Kong 
Agriculture 15 16 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Mining 4 633 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Manufacturing 11147 1692 17184 16161 5613 696 1342 1649 1926 9753 
Food 183 3 433 433 145 0 10 29 106 281 
Textiles 205 64 4892 4892 113 10 93 0 10 4574 
Wood, pulp 92 0 16 16 1 0 0 I 0 15 
Chemicals 1393 219 2047 2047 971 40 449 168 314 1022 
"­
"- Coal & oil products 5 0 35 35 30 0 0 0 30 50, 
Iron & steel 107 0 21 21 3 0 0 2 16 
Non-ferrous metals 630 109 586 586 81 0 55 22 4 466 
General machinery 1047 90 973 973 817 480 52 132 153 154 
Electric machinery 3474 570 2733 2592 1258 41 300 405 512 1197 
Transport machinery 1688 386 3352 2775 1162 0 212 867 83 1348 
Precision machinery 5 0 230 230 210 10 20 18 162 3 
Other manufacturing 2318 251 1866 1561 822 llS 151 5 551 672 
Construction 220 58 1393 1393 451 76 3 131 241 873 
Commerce 768 43 774 774 262 196 0 66 0 512 
Services 515 69 72 72 26 0 23 0 3 4 
Others 1343 4 624 624 468 0 468 0 0 156 
Total 14012 2515 20053 19030 6820 968 1836 1846 2170 11304 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand China Middle Europe Oceania Africa Total 
East 
Agriculture 6 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 56 
Mining 0 0 0 0 0 35 7 0 434 1113 
Manufacturing 1804 1601 312 6036 795 45 7791 492 1106 39457 
Food 61 152 0 68 7 0 112 31 0 762 
Textiles 437 195 0 3942 205 0 5 0 1096 6262 
Wood, pulp 0 2 13 0 0 0 139 0 0 247 
Chemicals 544 137 3 338 54 35 695 10 0 4399 
Coal & oil products 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 40 
Iron & Steel 0 6 10 0 2 2 0 0 10 140 
"­
...... Non-Ferrous metals 128 35 25 278 39 0 18 10 0 1353 
"I General machinery 10 93 2 49 2 0 870 0 0 2980 
Electric machinery 0 592 216 389 137 8 1618 10 0 8413 
Transport machinery 481 51 40 776 265 0 399 430 0 6255 
Precision machinery 0 3 0 0 17 0 187 0 0 422 
Other manufacturing 143 335 3 191 67 0 3748 I 0 8184 
Construction 169 117 57 530 69 16 174 0 0 1861 
Commerce 0 100 12 400 0 0 337 317 0 2239 
Services 0 I 0 3 42 0 71 38 0 765 
Others 0 0 134 22 0 0 276 4 0 2251 
Total 1979 1819 515 6991 906 96 8675 851 1540 47742 
Source: MITl, Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Comprehensive Survey of Overseas Activities of Japanese Firms), no. 5, Tokyo, 1993. 
Table 5.5 Functions of affiliates' research centres 
Information Collaboration Sales Production Product Modification 
collection with university support support design of imports 
North America 31.5 8.7 33.7 30.4 21.7 15.2 
Latin America 14.3 7.1 14.3 21.4 0.0 21.4 
Asia 20.7 0.8 11.6 44.6 2.5 23.1 
East Asia 19.8 0.9 11.2 44.8 2.6 13.8 
NIEs 2104 1.8 12.5 39.3 1.8 19.6 
Hong Kong 20.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 
Korea 20.0 6.7 6.7 20.0 0.0 13.3 
...... 
...... Singapore 25.0 0.0 25.0 58.3 0.0 16.7 
Co Taiwan 20.8 0.0 8.3 41.7 4.2 25.0 
ASEAN4 18.9 0.0 11.3 47.2 3.8 7.5 
Indonesia 22.2 0.0 11.1 33.3 Il.l 0.0 
Malaysia 27.3 0.0 13.6 36.4 0.0 4.5 
Philippines 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 16.7 
Thailand 12.5 0.0 12.5 68.8 6.3 12.5 
China 14.3 0.0 0.0 71.4 0.0 14.3 
Middle East nJa nla nJa nla n/a nla 
Europe 8.7 0.0 19.6 32.6 10.9 1704 
Oceania 50.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 
Africa 33.3 0.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 0.0 
Total 22.3 3.6 20.5 37.1 lOA 19.1 
Development of Development of Development Basic Others Sample size 
local product new products of exports research 
North America 41.3 22.8 18.5 16.3 12.0 92 
Latin America 64.3 0.0 7.1 0.0 0.0 14 
Asia 38.8 4.1 7.4 4.1 5.0 121 
East Asia 38.8 6.0 8.6 2.6 5.2 116 
NIEs 41.1 7.1 7.1 3.6 5.4 56 
Hong Kong 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 5 
Korea 53.3 20.0 13.3 0.0 0.0 15 
Singapore 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 12 
Taiwan 58.3 0.0 4.2 4.2 4.2 24 
.... 
.... ASEAN4 39.6 5.7 11.3 0.0 5.7 53 
\C 
Indonesia 33.3 22.2 22.2 0.0 ILl 9 
40.9 0.0 13.6 0.0 9.1 22 
Philippines 50.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 6 
Thailand 37.5 0.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 16 
China 14.3 0.0 0.0 14.3 0.0 7 
Middle East nla nla nla nla nla nla 
Europe 52.2 6.5 8.7 2.2 2.2 46 
Oceania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 
Africa 66.7 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 3 
Total 43.2 10.4 11.5 7.6 6.5 278 
Source: MITI, Kaigai Jigyo Kalsudo Kihon Chasa (Comprehensive Survey of Overseas Activities of Japanese Firms), no. 5, Tokyo, 1993. 
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base of scientists and engineers, competitiveness lies in developing new 
products and conducting basic research. 
3.2 The Determinants of Overseas R&D Activities by Japanese Firms 
This section examines the determinants of overseas R&D by Japanese 
MNCs, starting with previous studies of this subject. Odagiri and Yasuda 
(1996 and 1997) conduct detailed analyses of overseas R&D by Japanese 
firms, using industry and firm-level data. They find that Japanese MNCs 
active in overseas R&D activities have the following characteristics: large 
size, high export sales ratios, high overseas to total (parent and affiliates) 
sales ratios, large numbers of overseas production units, high R&D-sales 
ratios and low technological advantage. Their findings suggest that R&D 
activities are subject to economies of scale and scope, and that firms with 
high sales dependence on overseas markets tend to undertake more R&D in 
foreign countries. Overseas R&D is conducted to provide support for local 
manufacturing and firms set up overseas R&D units to acquire technology. 
Their analysis of overseas R&D in Asia is broadly similar, except that the 
relationships are not statistically significant except for one variable, the 
technological level of the host country. Unlike the finding for the sample as 
a whole, Japanese firms set up R&D units in Asia in countries where they 
have a technological advantage. This seems to indicate that Japanese firms 
set up R&D units to deploy their technology in Asia rather than to acquire 
new technology. 
As far as affiliates are concerned, Odagiri and Yasuda (1996) find that 
affiliates with R&D have large sales, high dependence on local sales and 
high local input content. Furthermore, they find that parent firms with high 
R&D-sales ratios are also active in R&D activities overseas. These findings 
are consistent with the findings from their firm-level study (1997), where 
they find that firms with large sales, high R&D intensity, high dependence 
on local or overseas market for their sales as well as purchase of their inputs 
tend to be active in overseas R&D. 
We now present the result of regression analysis using firm-level data 
from the MITI survey. One advantage of this data set is that we can link 
information on parents to overseas affiliates. We first analyse the determi­
nants of the decision to set up overseas R&D units, and then the determi­
nants of the level of R&D activities by affiliates. for the analysis of the 
decision to establish R&D units we use a binary variable that takes the 
value I for the presence of an R&D unit and zero otherwise. For the analy­
sis of the determinants of level of R&D activities in overseas affiliates, we 
use the value of R&D expenditure and the number of researchers as indi­
cators. 
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For both analyses, we use the characteristics of parent firms and affili­
ates as explanatory variables. Specifically, we use the following variables as 
the characteristics of parent firms (with the variable names and expected 
signs in parentheses): R&D~sales ratio (PRD, +), the number of overseas 
affiliates (POA, +), export-sales ratio (PEX, +), overseas production ratio 
(POP, +), royalty receipts~sales ratios (PRS, +), and worldwide sales 
(PWS, +). 
For overseas affiliates we use the following variables: affiliates' sales/ 
worldwide sales (ASW, +), local sales ratio (ALS, +), local procurement 
ratio (ALP, +), local procurement ratio for investment goods (ALP!, +), 
number of years in operation (AYR, +), share of equity held by parent 
company (AEQ, +) and technology transfer requirement (ATT, +). The 
expected signs are derived mainly from Odagiri and Yasuda (1996 and 
1997). Basically, firms with large-scale, active R&D and high dependency 
on overseas sales are assumed to be active in overseas R&D. 
An explanation of the expected signs for two of the variables is in order. 
The share of equity in an affiliate is likely to influence positively the level of 
affiliate R&D since a parent with high equity participation would spend 
more on R&D where it can appropriate a larger share of the returns. The 
parent would also be willing to spend more on transferring technology 
effectively to such affiliates. Technology transfer requirements imposed by 
host governments will also tend to raise affiliate R&D, since MNCs would 
presumably seek to comply with local policies. 
In addition to the characteristics of parent firms and affiliates, we include 
four characteristics of host economies as independent variables: the quality 
of human capital (HC), the level of R&D (RD), the share of manufactur­
ing in GOP (MANF) and the cumulative number of Japanese investments 
(CFDl). The quality of human capital is measured by educational attain­
ment ratios, taken from Barro and Lee (2000), while the level of R&D is 
measured by the share of R&D expenditure to GOP. The expected impact 
of all these variables on R&D by overseas affiliates is positive. 
The results of the analysis are shown in Tables 5.6-5.8. On the determi­
nants of the decision to establish overseas R&D, we find that Japanese 
parents with active R&D (PRD), high technological capability (PRS) and 
large worldwide sales (P WS) tend to set up R&D units in developed coun­
tries (Table 5.6). However, this relationship is not significant for developing 
countries. Turning to foreign affiliates, we find that affiliates with high local 
procurement (ALP) and long periods of operation (AYR) tend to have 
R&D units in developed countries. In deVeloping countries, affiliates with 
large shares in worldwide sales (ASW) and those subject to technology 
transfer requirement (ATT) are likely to set up R&D units in East Asia. 
Technology transfer requirements also have positive effects on affiliate 
Table 5.6 The determinants of establishment of overseas R&D units (probit estimation) 
Total Developed countries Developing countries East Asia 
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic 
Characteristics of parent firm 
PRD 1.738 1.227 5.491 2.624*** -6.117 -1.250 -7.323 1.186 
POA -0.002 -0.742 -0.002 -0.573 -0.001 -0.282 -0.002 -0.417 
PEX -0.269 -0.637 0.497 0.854 -0.407 -0.600 -0.364 -0.426 
.... 	
POP -0.265 -0.411 -1.463 1.637 -0.019 -0.017 -1.240 -0.795 
~ 
~ 	 PRS 24.473 2.015** 27.746 1.702* 22.900 1.455 40.935 1.015 
PWS 0.154 2.793*** 0.169 2.201 ** 0.087 1.000 0.185 1.S55 
Characteristics of affiliates 
ASW 1.185 1.275 -2.012 -0.995 1.568 1.I48 3.159 1.670* 
ALS 0.135 0.774 0.073 0.313 0.363 \.150 0.257 0.662 
ALP 0.578 3.244*** 0.737 3.078*** 0.440 1.341 0.024 0.056 
ALP! 0.007 1.443 0.009 1.443 O.OlD 0.923 0.001 0.070 
AYR 0.347 2.485** 0.346 1.872* 0.267 1.083 0.373 1.186 
AEQ 0.000 1.566 0.000 1.241 0.000 1.067 0.000 -0.271 
ATT 0.326 1.888* -0.130 -0.327 0.715 3.220*** 0.662 2.448** 
Characteristics of host countries 
HC 0.008 1.518 0.013 1.946* 0.007 U51 0.069 1.342 
RD 0.211 1.078 0.204 0.480 0.041 1.215 0.280 1.770* 
MANF 0.102 0.672 1.871 1.227 0.030 0.131 0.080 0.207 
CFDI 0.008 0.116 0.295 1.204 0.219 1.835* 0.732 1.310 
R2 0.163 0.176 0.244 0.255 
InL -246.616 -145.234 -82.512 -54.131 
OBS 1493 650 843 710 
..... 
t...) 
"" Notes: 

Characteristics of parent firm: PRD: R&D/sales ratio; POA: number of overseas affiliates; PEX: exports/sales ratio; POP: overseas production 

ratio; PRY: royalty receipts/sales ratio; PWS: In (worldwide sales). 

Characteristics of overseas affiliates: ASW: sales/worldwide sales; ALS: local sales ratio; ALP: local procurement ratio, ALP1: local procurement 

ratio of investment goods; AYR: number of years in operation: AEQ: equity participation ratio; ATT: technology transfer requirement. 

Characteristics of host countries: HC: education attainment rate; RD: R&D expenditure/GOP; M ANF: log (GOP of manufacturing sector); CFD/: 

log (accumulative FDI); ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at I, 5. and 10 per cent, respectively. 

Source: Authors' estimation. 
Table 5.7 The determinants of R&D expenditure at overseas affiliates of Japanesejirms (dependent variable =/n (R&D 
expenditure in affiliates) (Tobit Estimation) 
Total Developed countries Developing countries East Asia 
Censored 1305 544 761 642 
Unsensored 190 106 84 68 
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic 
Characteristics of parent firm 
PRD 13.984 2.187** 26.638 2.710*** 9.938 0.879 11.267 0.879 
POA -0.027 -2.542** -0.047 -2.358** -0.010 -1.059 -0.008 -0.787 
PEX -0.440 -0.261 2.316 0.841 -1.023 -0.577 -0.4\0 -0.208 
~ 
-- POP -0.739 -0.278 -9.204 -2.108** 4.953 1.651 * 3.310 0.977""­
PRS 61.694 3.014*** 92.594 3.115*** 26.248 1.052 31.526 1.236 
PWS 0.921 3.969*** 1.307 3.324*** 0.342 1.383 0.380 1.349 
Characteristics of affiliates 
ASW 9.012 2.357** 0.721 0.083 3.447 0.937 5.358 1.294 
ALS -0.272 -0.370 1.192 -1.021 0.240 0.302 0.155 0.165 
ALP 4.654 5.747*** 6.483 4.991 *** 3.043 3.367*** 2.136 2.130** 
ALP! 0.029 1.243 0.045 1.335 0.019 0.678 -0.002 -0.071 
AYR 2.639 4.276*** 1.599 1.695* 2.892 4.124*** 3.658 4.340*** 
AEQ -0.001 1.381 -0.001 -0.614 -0.001 1.255 -0.001 -0.692 
ATT 1.931 2.554** 1.869 1.121 1.732 2.616*** 1.931 2.540** 
Characteristics of host countries 
HC 0.054 1.975* 0.003 1.049 0.043 1.529 0.189 1.445 
RD 0.818 1.631 1.677 1.811 * 0.323 1.661 * 0.239 1.402 
MANF 0.127 0.202 2.824 0.417 0.606 1.025 1.372 1.719* 
CFDI 0.053 0.193 1.747 1.447 0.603 1.767* 2.081 2.352** 
R2 0.085 0.076 0.110 0.125 
lnL -864.170 -488.574 353.828 -279.097 
..... 
N 
V, 
NOles: 
Characteristics of parent firm: PRD: R&D/Sales ratio; PDA: number of overseas afliliates; PEX: exports/sales ratio; POP: overseas production 
ratio; PRY: royalty receipts/sales ratio; PWS: In(worldwide sales). 
Characteristics of overseas afliliates: ASW: sales/worldwide sales; ALS: local sales ratio; ALP: local procurement ratio, ALP/: local procurement 
ratio of investment goods; A YR: number of years in operation; AEQ: equity participation ratio; ATT: technology transfer requirement. 
Characteristics of host countries: HC: education attainment rate; RD: R&D expend iture/G DP; MA NF: log (GDP of manufacturing sector); CFD/: 
log (accumulative FDI); ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at I, 5, and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Source: Authors' estimation. 
Table 5.8 The determinants of the number of researchers at o)lerseas affiliates of Japanese firms (dependent )lariable In 
(number of researchers in affiliates) (tobit estimation) 
Total Developed countries Developing countries East Asia 
Censored 1335 556 779 662 
Uncensored 160 94 66 48 
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficien t t-statistic coefficient t-statistic 
Characteristics of parent firm 
PRD 9.091 2.119** 16.583 2.741*** 19.359 1.847* 15.034 1.297 
POA -0.015 - 2.127** -0.022 -2.024** -0.006 -0.716 -0.005 -0.482 
"­
"" 
PEX 0.012 0.010 1.019 0.616 0.460 0.274 0.193 0.097 
0\ POP -2.069 1.096 -7.053 -2.674*** 2.024 0.708 1.719 0.519 
PRS 39.741 2.906*** 53.606 3.118*** 35.709 1.627 44.686 1.966* 
PWS 0.855 4.914*** 0.958 3.916*** 0.390 1.576 0.503 1.778* 
Characteristics of affiliates 
ASW 9.538 3.580*** 0.456 0.083 6.299 1.808* 5.776 1.437 
ALS 0.364 0.706 0.425 0.608 0.282 0.371 -0.300 -0.337 
ALP 2.506 4.339*** 3.211 4.138*** 1.957 2.226** 0.607 0.596 
ALPI 0.024 1.472 0.020 1.009 0.039 1.389 0.020 0.625 
AYR 2.127 4.805*** 1.377 2.446** 3.020 4.347*** 4.421 4.819*** 
AEQ - ().()O 1 -1.684* 0.000 -0.198 -0.002 -2.544** -0.002 -2.242** 
ATT 0.734 1.342 -0.630 -0.545 1.458 2.354** 1.787 2.469** 
Cbaracteristics of bost countries 
HC 0.004 1.206 0.021 1.570 0.010 1.125 0.029 1.250 
RD 0.967 2.622*** 0.248 1.215 0.492 2.040* 0.287 1.549 
MANF 0.549 1.281 1.440 0.376 0.275 0.507 0.002 0.003 
CFDI 0.230 1.201 0.991 1.462 -0.014 0.043 0.219 0.311 
R2 0.101 0.086 0.152 0.175 
InL -667.499 387.988 -260.664 -191.916 
h.... 
I-v 
'..j 
Notes: 

Characteristics of parent firm: PRD: R&D/sales mtio; POA: number of overseas affiliates; PEX: exports/sales ratio; POP: overseas production 

ratio; PRY: royalty receipts/sales ratio; PWS: In(worldwide sales). 

Characteristics of overseas affiliates: ASW: sales/worldwide sales; ALS: local sales ratio; ALP: local procurement ratio, A LPI: local procurement 

ratio of investment goods; AYR: number of years in operation; AEQ: equity participation ratio; ArT: technology transfer requirement. 

Characteristics of host countries: HC: education attainment rate; RD: R&D expenditure/GOP; MANF: log (GOP of manufacturing sector); CFD/: 

log (accumulative FOT); ***. **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 per cent, respectively. 

Source: Authors' estimation. 
128 Competitiveness, FD! and technological activity in East Asia 
R&D in developing countries. Although this suggests that technology 
transfer requirements are effective, it should be noted that such a policy 
may discourage foreign firms from investing in countries with such policies 
in the first place. 12 
Let us turn to the determinants of the level of overseas R&D by Japanese 
MNCs (Tables 5.7 and 5.8). The variables affecting the decision to establish 
R&D, not surprisingly, also affect the level of affiliate R&D. However, for 
parent firms the level of globalization (the number of overseas affiliates, 
POA) has a negative impact on the level of R&D by affiliates in developed 
countries. One explanation for this unexpected result may be that R&D is 
concentrated in a few locations by the parent firm to maximize the benefits 
of scale economies in R&D activity. In developing countries, we find that, 
in addition to technology transfer requirements, affiliates with strong 
dependence on local inputs (ALP) and long periods in operation (AYR) are 
more active in R&D. 
The characteristics of host countries also significantly affect the R&D 
activities of Japanese affiliates. The availability of human capital (He) and 
R&D resources (RD) in the host countries are positively related to R&D by 
affiliates in developed and developing countries, as is the share of the man­
ufacturing sector in the economy (MANUF). The presence of Japanese 
firms in the host country (CFDI) similarly promotes R&D by affiliates. 
These findings suggest that affiliates undertake R&D to meet the demand 
for high quality products in the host market. 
4. INTRA-FIRM TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
4.1 Patterns of Intra-Firm Technology Transfer by Japanese Firms 
FDI has, as noted, become one of the most important means of transfer­
ring technology. Governments in host countries have sometimes used poli­
cies like technology transfer requirements, to promote such transfers by 
MNCs. Of course, efficient technology transfer is as important for MNCs 
as it is for the host country, since the performance of affiliates depends 
largely on the technological capabilities developed in the affiliates. 
However, there may be differences between host countries and MNCs on 
the depth of technology transfer desired. 
This section investigates the extent of technology transfer by Japanese 
MNCs, at least as far as the data allow. We noted earlier the two types of 
MNC technology transfer: intra-firm (within the MNC) and technology 
spillovers to 10caJ firms. Intra-firm technology transfer is achieved, among 
other means, by training (on the job, in parent companies and so on). 
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Technology spillovers take place in various ways: when local workers, who 
have acquired technology and skills by working at foreign affiliates, move 
to local companies, when local firms imitate technology and managerial 
know-how in foreign affiliates, and so on.13 
We examine intra-firm technology transfer because of data availability. 
Before conducting an analysis of technology transfer, we investigate train­
ing programmes for local employees given by Japanese affiliates, because 
training programmes are likely to play an important role in technology 
transfer and also because such programmes tend to indicate the attitude of 
Japanese affiliates toward technology transfer in that those affiliates with 
training programmes are eager to undertake technology transfer. 
Training programmes in Japanese MNCs vary widely according to the 
nature of the programmes and the characteristics of participants. We 
examine the presence or absence of training programmes and the extent of 
adoption of the four types of programmes: training at the parent firm, 
training in Japan but not at the parent firm, training in the affiliate, and 
training in the host country but not in the affiliate. Table 5.9 presents the 
relevant information. 
Some 9 per cent of Japanese affiliates have training programmes. Those 
in Asia have the highest percentage (13.4 per cent); within the region, the 
ASEAN4 and China exhibit high shares. In terms of the types of pro­
grammes, training in parent firms is the most popular, with three out of 
four affiliates with training programmes using this method. In the absence 
of comparable information on other MNCs, it is impossible to judge 
whether training at parent firms is particularly important for Japanese 
firms. However, it seems that Japanese firms regard training at parent firms 
as particularly important for employees to learn the corporate culture. 
Training in affiliates is the next most popular mode, one out of three firms 
with training programmes using this mode. Training outside the firm either 
in the host country or in Japan is less used (one out of five affiliates). 
Technology transfer is difficult to measure. 14 Some researchers of 
Japanese MNCs have used evaluations of the transfer by the personnel 
involved, like Yamashita (1991) who asked about the extent of the tar­
geted level of technology transfer achieved, that is, 100 per cent, 50 per 
cent and so on. One of the problems of this approach is the subjectivity 
of the evaluation. A manager in charge of technology transfer is likely to 
give a high evaluation, while a person actually engaged in production may 
give a low evaluation. To overcome this problem, Urata (1999) used infor­
mation from a questionnaire survey on the nationality of staff given 
responsibility for such specific tasks as the maintenance of production 
lines and product development. If local staff, rather than expatriates, are 
in charge, it is assumed that the technology has been transferred. We 
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Table 5.9 Training programmes at overseas affiliates (%) 
Of the affiliates with training programme 
Total Training Training Training Training Others 
affiliates at parent in Japan at affiliate in host 
with training firm country 
programme 
North America 6.6 67.5 8.3 50.0 29.2 3.3 
Latin America 8.5 82.9 36.6 31.7 19.5 0.0 
Asia 13.4 85.0 22.4 30.9 13.9 4.6 
East Asia 13.3 86.1 21.9 30.7 14.2 4.0 
NIEs 9.6 80.3 12.4 35.8 19.0 2.9 
Hong Kong 1.8 40.0 10.0 70.0 10.0 0.0 
Korea 15.2 82.1 10.7 32.1 17.9 0.0 
Singapore 9.2 82.5 12.5 27.5 27.5 5.0 
Taiwan 15.9 84.7 l3.6 37.3 15.3 3.4 
ASEAN4 17.4 89.6 31.9 25.8 11.5 4.9 
Indonesia 19.2 81.8 45.5 30.3 3.0 0.0 
Malaysia 18.6 90.2 26.2 24.6 23.0 8.2 
Philippines 13.8 84.2 31.6 31.6 5.3 0.0 
Thailand 16.8 94.2 30.4 23.2 7.2 5.8 
China 17.9 90.9 6.1 36.4 9.1 3.0 
Middle East 2.4 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Europe 7.0 69.3 4.4 50.0 41.2 2.6 
Oceania 3.3 63.6 9.1 45.5 54.5 0.0 
Africa 2.9 50.0 0.0 75.0 25.0 0.0 
Total 9.1 78.2 17.2 38.4 22.5 3.7 
Source: 	 MITr. Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo Killon Cllosa (Comprehensive Survey of Overseas 
Activities of Japanese Firms), no. 5, Tokyo, 1993. 
adopt a similar methodology, one that is admittedly very simplistic and 
possibly inaccurate. However, in the absence of workable methodology 
largely because of lack of necessary information, our methodology may 
be justified. 
The MIT! survey asked Japanese MNCs whether local staff were respon­
sible for R&D in affiliates; the results are shown in Table 5.10. On average 
this was the case in one out of every four affiliates, with very small varia­
tions between regions except for Africa, where the figure was only one out 
of ten affiliates. There are variations in the figures among East Asian econ­
omies, with a very high share (61.3 per cent) in Korea and lower shares for 
the affiliates in Singapore, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Thailand. On sector­
al patterns, no clear pattern emerges. 
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There is a clear need to conduct a more detailed analysis of the determi­
nants of technology transfer. The measures used above are very simple and 
partial, and do not capture the depth of technology transfer and the costs 
involved. For instance, they do not allow us to judge whether the transfer 
is 'truncated', with MNCs transferring production know-how rather than 
innovation capabilities (R&D may, as noted, be largely geared to produc­
tion support). However, in the absence of better measures and data, this 
analysis is a useful step forward. 
4.2 Determinants of Intra-Firm Technology Transfer 
This section analyses the determinants of successful intra-firm technology 
transfer. As noted earlier, there are very few studies of this subject for 
Japanese MNCs. One is by Urata (1999), who analysed 133 cases of intra­
firm technology transfer by Japanese firms to Asian affiliates. He found a 
positive correlation between the extent of technology transfer and the share 
of equity held by the parent company, when the technologies involved were 
simple (for example, for equipment maintenance). The opposite was found 
when sophisticated technologies (such as design technologies, development 
of new machines and development of new technologies) were involved. He 
concluded that Japanese MNCs were reluctant to transfer sophisticated 
technologies to affiliates, transferring such technologies only when there 
was pressure from joint-venture partners. Urata also found that technology 
transfer was successful only when MNCs adopted specific measures to 
promote the transfer, such as providing manuals in local languages and 
seminars in local areas. 
Before we take up the determinants of intra-firm technology transfer we 
should identify the determinants of training programmes, which are impor­
tant in determining the outcome of intra-firm technology transfers. We use 
the same explanatory variables as for the determinants of the adoption of 
training programmes, but we include additional variables for the determi­
nants of successful technology transfer. The variables and expected signs 
are: presence of R&D units (ATRU, +), presence of training programmes 
(ATRN, +), R&D expenditure (ARDE, +) and the number of researchers 
(ARES, +). The expected signs are based on the assumption that R&D as 
well as training programmes are effective in transferring technology. The 
probit estimation method was used for both analyses, since in both cases 
the dependent variables are binary. 
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5.11. Parents with high 
R&D-sales ratios (PRD) and low export ratios (PE%) tend to have train­
ing programmes in overseas affiliates. Parents with high R&D-sales ratios 
tend to set up training programmes in affiliates in developing countries and 
Table 5.10 Technology tramfer at overseas affiliates of lapanesefirms 
North Latin Asia East NIEs Hong Korea Singapore Taiwan ASEAN4 
America America Asia Kong 
Agriculture 57.1 53.8 63.6 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 66.7 
Mining 11.1 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Food 34.2 71.4 39.2 37.5 33.3 0.0 100.0 28.6 14.3 29.4 
Textiles 0.0 23.5 28.9 28.9 60.9 45.5 83.3 0.0 66.7 12.2 
Wood, pulp 71.4 0.0 21.4 21.4 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 16.7 
Chemicals 47.1 55.6 46.4 45.7 50.0 28.6 91.7 23.5 52.9 41.4 
Coal & oil products 0.0 0.0 33.3 33.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
...... 
Iron & steel 44.0 75.0 33.3 34.8 37.5 100.0 100.0 25.0 0.0 30.8
'"" 
'" 	 Non-ferrous metals 40.7 50.0 21.6 21.6 27.3 0.0 66.7 0.0 33.3 20.0 
(Jenera 1 machinery 32.0 30.8 24.6 25.0 28.6 0.0 83.3 26.7 16.7 13.6 
Electric machinery 40.6 47.8 22.5 21.9 25.0 10.0 44.4 13.2 29.4 14.2 
Transport machinery 13.8 43.8 25.4 22.3 35.9 0.0 37.5 33.3 35.7 15.2 
Precision machinery 66.7 0.0 33.3 33.3 35.3 0.0 83.3 0.0 16.7 40.0 
Other manufacturing 34.1 7.1 25.0 25.8 36.3 43.8 57.1 18.8 22.6 14.8 
Construction 17.1 44.4 18.9 18.4 21.4 16.7 100.0 20.0 10.0 17.0 
Commerce 17.6 11.5 13.4 13.4 12.4 11.3 20.0 11.2 17.5 16.5 
Services 14.4 12.5 28.0 27.3 26.2 19.0 62.5 22.0 41.7 30.0 
Others 10.5 6.7 11.8 12.1 15.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 24.1 25.3 25.0 24.5 26.6 17.9 61.3 15.8 29.3 20.1 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand China Middle Europe Oceania Africa Total 
East 
Agriculture 50.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 40.0 100.0 52.3 
Mining 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 11.1 33.3 10.9 
Food 0.0 0.0 50.0 44.4 71.4 0.0 45.5 75.0 0.0 42.6 
Textiles 0.0 20.0 100.0 15.8 32.0 0.0 50.0 33.3 0.0 27.6 
Wood, pulp 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 36.0 
Chemicals 30.8 42.1 28.6 48.4 45.5 100.0 57.4 83.3 100.0 50.2 
Coal & oil products 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 
Iron & steel 0.0 60.0 100.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.3 
Non-ferrous metals 20.0 22.2 100.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 42.9 0.0 100.0 32.1 
..... 
t.." 
General machinery 25.0 16.7 0.0 11.1 50.0 0.0 47.8 50.0 0.0 33.5 
t.." Electric machinery 12.5 14.8 25.0 11.6 45.5 100.0 39.8 33.3 33.3 31.2 
Transport machinery 21.1 12.5 26.7 4.2 14.3 0.0 45.7 45.5 0.0 26.4 
Precision machinery 0.0 33.3 0.0 50.0 20.0 0.0 52.9 50.0 0.0 47.7 
Other manufacturing 13.3 8.0 12.5 20.0 27.3 50.0 35.8 44.4 0.0 28.7 
Construction 0.0 17.6 20.0 23.8 16.7 25.0 15.4 50.0 0.0 20.0 
Commerce 0.0 21.9 37.5 10.0 0.0 0.0 17.1 23.2 0.0 16.1 
Services 22.2 35.7 50.0 26.1 25.0 0.0 15.0 7.1 0.0 17.1 
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 15.4 7.1 0.0 9.6 
Total 16.1 20.2 30.6 19.1 34.5 25.9 25.7 25.0 9.0 24.7 
Note: The figures indicate the percentage share of affiliates where major responsibility in R&D seetion is taken by local staff. 

,<,'ource: MrTl, Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo KillOn Chosa (Comprehensive Survey of Overseas Activities of Japanese Firms), no. 5, Tokyo, 1993. 

Table 5.11 The determinants of training programmes at overseas affiliates of lapanesefirms {dependent variable = 
training programme at overseas 
Total countries Developing countries East Asia 
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic 
Characteristics of parent firm 
PRD 1.841 1.960* 0.148 0.114 5.394 2.972*** 5.677 2.824*** 
POA -0.001 -0.829 -0.003 -1.205 0.000 -0.019 0.000 0.213 
PEX -0.644 -2.959*** -1.166 -3.222*** -0.405 ] .388 -0.357 1.122 
.... 
v., 
-t.. 
POP 
PRS 
0.046 
-6.742 
0.132 
1.146 
0.578 
-6.328 
1.062 
-0.794 
-0.325 
-6.911 
-0.660 
-0.800 
-0.200 
-8.159 
-0.366 
-0.854 
PWS 0.003 0.125 0.120 2.451 *** -0.073 -2.014** -0.078 1.961 * 
Characteristics of affiliates 
ASW 0.762 ].395 1.661 1.479 0.590 0.849 0.416 0.551 
ALS 0.126 1.399 0.537 3.663*** -0.103 -0.857 -0.133 -0.972 
ALP 0.248 2.364** 0.390 2.348** 0.158 1.102 0.194 l.220 
ALP! 0.007 2.349** 0.011 2.415** 0.006 1.266 0.000 0.019 
AYR 0.382 4.611 *** 0.363 2.949*** 0.432 3.698*** 0.384 2.990*** 
AEQ 0.001 5.107*** 0.001 4.2] 7*** 0.000 2.865*** 0.000 2.392** 
ATT 0.533 5.176*** 0.497 2.049** 0.557 4.798*** 0.511 4.034*** 
Characteristics of host countries 
HC 0.005 1.498 0.000 0.026 0.022 1.627 0.072 1.795* 
RD 0.015 1.256 0.556 2.425** 0.032 1.415 0.060 1.707* 
MANF 0.200 1.848* 0.755 0.985 0.126 1.461 0.102 1.899* 
CFDI 0.003 1.105 0.243 1.917* 0.042 1.770* 0.383 1.597 
R2 0.080 0.116 0.087 0.098 
InL -930.804 -378.768 -528.545 -440.639 
.... 
OBS 1493 650 843 710 
t.,; 
v, 
Notes: 
Characteristics of parent l1rm: PRD: R&D/sales ratio; POA: number of overseas affiliates; PEX: exports/sales ratio; POP: overseas production 
ratio; PRY: royalty receipts/sales ratio; PWS: In(worldwide sales). 
Characteristics of overseas affiliates: ASW: sales/worldwide sales; ALS: local sales ratio; ALP: local procurement ratio; ALP!: local procurement 
ratio of investment goods: AYR: number of years in operation: AEQ: equity participation ratio; ATT: technology transfer requirement. 
Characteristics of host countries: He: education attainment rate; RD: R&D expenditure/GDP; M ANF: log (GDP of manufacturing sector): CFDI: 
log (accumulative I'DI); ***, **, and • indicate statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 per cent, respectively. 
Source: Authors' estimation. 
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East Asia, but not in developed countries. This suggests that Japanese 
MNCs transfer technology needed for production to developing countries. 
Parent firms with high export-output ratios are less likely to set up train­
ing programmes in affiliates in developed countries, indicating that export­
oriented firms do not need to train local stafr because exporting from the 
parent firm is the main means of serving foreign markets. The magnitude 
of worldwide sales has different impacts on affiliates in developed and 
developing/East Asian countries. Parents with large worldwide sales tend 
to train in affiliates in developed countries but not in affiliates in develop­
ing and East Asian countries. This is unexpected, and may reflect that 
Japanese firms with large worldwide sales tend to use affiliates in develop­
ing countries as assembly bases where only limited training is needed. 
As for affiliates in developing and East Asian countries, those with longer 
periods in operation (AYR), high equity participation by the parent firm 
(AEQ) and subject to technology transfer requirement (ATT) tend to have 
training programmes. In affiliates in developed countries, in addition to 
these characteristics, high local sales ratio (ALS), high local procurement 
ratio (ALP), and high local procurement ratio for investment goods (A LPl) 
are also likely to have training programmes. 
These findings are consistent with expectations and suggest the follow­
ing. Parent firms tend to put greater efforts in transferring technology to 
affiliates in which they have higher equity stakes. Technology transfer 
requirements seem to induce affiliates to meet the requirements by training 
local staff. In developed countries, affiliates with local market orientation 
in sales and procurement feel the need to improve the quality of local 
employees by training. This is consistent with the earlier observation that 
parent firms with strong export orientation were less likely to have training 
programmes. 
Turning to the characteristics of the host countries, we find that host coun­
tries with good human resources (HC), R&D (RD), large manufacturing 
sectors (MANE) and a large presence of Japanese MNCs (CFDI) tend to 
have training programmes. This suggests that both supply and demand-side 
factors are important in deciding on setting up training programmes. On the 
supply side, firms set up training programmes in host countries with well­
educated popUlations and strong R&D capabilities. On the demand side, 
large manufacturing sectors and a strong presence of Japanese firms induce 
affiliates to improve the quality of local employees to meet their needs. 
Table 5.12 presents the results of the analysis of the determinants of suc­
cessful intra-firm technology transfer. MNCs successful in transferring 
technology tend to have high R&D-sales ratios (PRD) and large numbers 
of overseas affiliates (POA), particularly those with affiliates in developing 
countries and Asia. Parent firms with high R&D-sales ratios tend to be 
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particularly successful in transferring technology to affiliates in developing 
countries and Asia. This may indicate that MNCs with a strong technology 
orientation invest in developing countries to use their technology. The 
observation that MNCs with many affiliates are sueeessful in transferring 
technology suggests the importance of accumulated experience. It is some­
what surprising to find that parent firms with large worldwide sales seem to 
be unsuccessful in transferring teehnology to affiliates in developing eoun­
tries or Asia. However, this finding appears consistent with the earlier 
observation that large Japanese MNCs are not active in conducting R&D 
nor adopting training programmes in affiliates in developing countries or 
in East Asia. 
As to the characteristics of affiliates in developing countries, the results 
suggest that those with a strong local market orientation in sales have a 
good record in intra-firm technology transfer: these affiliates have to 
improve technological capabilities to modify or develop technology to meet 
local market needs. A somewhat surprising result is a negative and statisti­
cally significant coefficient on equity participation by the parent (AEQ) for 
affiliates in developing and East Asian countries. This may indicate that 
dependence on high equity participation for the supply of technology by 
parent companies is characteristic of affiliates that are not able successfully 
to absorb technology. 
The presence of R&D and training programmes has a positive impact on 
technology transfer to affiliates in developing countries. In developed host 
countries, affiliates with large worldwide sales, strong dependenee on local 
markets for the purchase of investment goods and active R&D contribute 
to successful technology transfer. These findings are consistent with our 
expectations. 
Finally, findings on the characteristics of host countries suggest that the 
availability of skills and R&D resources, and the presence of a large man­
ufacturing sector promote intra-firm technology transfer by Japanese firms 
in East Asian countries. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Acquisition and assimilation of technology have played an important role 
in promoting economic development. Among various channels for acquir­
ing technology, technology transfer involving foreign direct investment has 
increased its importance in recent years. In light of these developments, this 
chapter has attempted to discern the patterns and the determinants of 
R&D activities which contribute to technology transfer and intra-firm 
technology transfer at overseas affiliates of Japanese firms. 
Table 5.12 	 The determinants of the extent of technology transfer achieved (dependent variable =affiliates where local 
staff takes the main responsibility in R&D) (probi! estimation) 
Total Developed countries Developing countries East Asia 
coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient I-statistic coefficien t t-statistic 
Characteristics of parent firm 
PRD 2.161 1. 731 * 1.920 1.276 4.331 1.975** 6.737 2.613*** 
POA 0.004 2.865*** 0.006 2.801 *** 0.003 2.063** 0.003 1.995* 
PEX -0.084 -0.340 0.213 0.544 -0.031 -0.093 -0.140 -0.365 
POP -0.893 -2.198** -2.573 -4.029*** -0.Q35 -0.060 OA08 0.607 
PRS 7.995 1.227 6.060 0.781 9.634 1.101 8.973 0.981 
...... 
......, PWS -0.Q35 1.099 -0.019 -0.345 -0.080 1.861 * -0.135 -2.662*** 
00 
Characteristics of affiliates 
ASW lA45 2A04** 2.263 1. 768* 0.859 1.l20 0.611 0.697 
ALS 0.273 2.663*** 0.361 2.191** 0.233 1.661 * 0.095 0.579 
ALP 0.132 !.I 15 0.083 OA40 0.221 1.349 0.274 IA86 
ALP! 0.008 2.266** 0.007 1.302 0.007 1.426 0.005 0.845 
AYR -0.053 -0.560 -0.212 -IA91 0.121 0.893 0.127 0.814 
AEQ 0.000 -2.922*** 0.000 -2.132** -0.001 -2.857*** -0.001 -2.680*** 
ATT 0.008 0.065 -0.656 -2.054** 0.136 1.023 0.135 0.888 
ARDU 0.099 OA72 -0.272 -0.916 0.575 1.718* 0.599 IA71 
ATRN 0.157 1.892* 0.215 1.620 0.197 1.740* 0.173 1.348 
ARDE 0.172 4.331 *** 0.244 4.802*** 0.062 0.731 0.115 1.290 
ARES 0.128 1.825* 0.143 lA05 0.082 0.724 0.060 OA68 
Characteristics of host countries 

HC 0.011 1.548 0.005 0.583 0.026 1.629 0.048 2.064** 

RD 0.311 4.428*** 0.148 0.599 0.280 3.114*** 0.324 3.343*** 

MANF 0.082 1.018 1.213 1.398 0.213 2.085** 0.216 1.944* 

CFDI 0.046 1.287 0.107 0.806 0.055 0.844 0.244 1.906* 

R2 0.132 0.204 0.129 0.160 

InL -678.960 -288.802 -362.847 -280.129 

DBS 1493 650 843 710 

......
....., 
\Q 
Notes: 

Characteristics of parent firm: PRD: R&D/sales ratio; POA: number of overseas affiliates; PEX: exports/sales ratio; POP: overseas production 

ratio; PRY: royalty receipts/sales ratio; PWS: In (worldwide sales). 

Characteristics of overseas affiliates: ASW: sales/worldwide sales; ALS: local sales ratio; ALP: local procurement ratio; ALP!: local procurement 

ratio of investment goods; AYR: number of years in operation; AEQ: equity participation ratio; ATT: technology transfer requirement; ARDU: 

R&D unit; ARTRN: training programme; A RDE: R&D expenditure; A RES: researchers. 

Characteristics of host countries: HC: education attainment rate; RD: R&D expenditure/GDP; MANF: log (GDP of manufacturing sector); CFDI: 

log (accumulative FDI); ***. **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 per cent, respectively. 

Source: Authors' estimation. 
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Our analysis revealed a number of useful and important observations, 
Japanese firms were found to undertake R&D activities at their affiliates in 
developing and East Asian countries mainly to support production and 
develop local products, As to the determinants of R&D activities at their 
affiliates in developing countries, we found that the affiliates with strong 
dependence on local markets for their procurement of intermediate inputs 
as well as those with long operation periods actively undertake R&D, 
Concerning the determinants of successful intra-firm technology transfer 
at affiliates in developing and East Asian countries, we found that the avail­
ability of educated people and R&D resources as well as the large manu­
facturing sector and a large number of Japanese affiliates contributed to 
intra-firm technology transfer. 
Our findings have several important policy implications for developing 
countries that are interested in obtaining technology by attracting foreign 
firms. First, it is important to have supporting industries, which supply 
parts and components to the assemblers, in order to promote R&D activ­
ities by foreign firms. Second, developing countries have to improve quality 
of labour, engineers and researchers to be able to successfully assimilate 
technology from foreign firms. Finally, developing countries should be 
reminded of the importance of having an FDI-friendly environment to 
attract FDI in the first place, before thinking about R&D by foreign firms 
or intra-firm technology transfer. An FDI-friendly environment is com­
prised of various elements including a liberalized economic environment, 
a well-functioning legal system, a well-developed infrastructure and a 
sound macroeconomic environment. To achieve these objectives, govern­
ments in developing countries are advised to utilize effectively economic 
and technical cooperation from various sources such as multilateral and 
regional organizations as well as bilateral schemes. 
NOTES 
I. 	 Waseda University and Japan Center for Economic Research, Tokyo and Keio 
University, Tokyo, respectively. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 
Workshop on Technology Development in East Asia, sponsored by the World Bank, 
Bali, Indonesia, 14--15 December 2000. The authors thank tbe workshop participants 
for helpful discussions and comments 
2. 	 The discussion of Japanese FDI in this section draws on Kawai and U rata (1998). 
3. 	 In terms of value, these two regions absorbed more than 60 percent of Japan's FDI, indi­
cating tbat the average size of Japanese FDI in terms of value in developed regions is 
greater than that in developing regions. 
4. 	 The NIEs are Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan. 
5. 	 The Asian NIEs are Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, while the members of 
ASEAN are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
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6. 	 The ASEAN4 countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
7. 	 See Urata (1993) for a detailed discussion. 
8. 	 The figures for 1995 are not shown in Table 5.2. In terms of cumulative value from 1986 
to 1995, electric machinery has the largest share among the manufacturing subsectors, 
followed by textiles and chemicals. 
9. 	 The MIT! has conducted a comprehensive survey of overseas activities of Japanese firms 
every three years starting in 1980. The results of the survey are published under the title 
of Kaigai Toshi Kokei So ran (Comprehensive Survey of Overseas A ctivities of Japanese 
Firms). In the 1992 survey, a questionnaire was sent to 3378 Japanese multinationals, 
1594 of whom responded. The respondents covered the activities of 7108 overseas affil­
iates. The MIT! has also conducted an annual survey with the more limited number of 
questions except for the years of Comprehensive Survey. The results of the survey are 
published under the title of Wagakuni Kigyo no Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo (Overseas 
Activities of Japanese Firmsj. Motives behind FDI are asked for in the comprehensive 
surveys but not in the annual surveys. 
10. 	 The figures shown here refer to R&D ratios for all affiliates including those without R&D 
expenditure. The R&D-sales ratios for affiliates with R&D expenditure are significantly 
higher, 1.1 per cent for all affiliates, 1.1, 2.5 and 0.2 per cent for the affiliates in North 
America, Europe, and Asia, respectively. 
II. 	 Our finding is consistent with the findings by Odagiri and Yasuda (1996), who found in 
their study of Japanese firms' overseas R&D activities that the main purpose of R&D at 
affiliates in developing countries is to support local manufacturing by transferring tech­
nology from Japan, while the main purpose of R&D at affiliates in developed countries 
is to gain access to the leading scientific and technological knowledge. 
12. 	 See Fukao and Yue (1997) for the discouraging impact of performance requirements on 
Japanese firms' decision on FDI. 
13. 	 See Navaretli and Tarr (2000) for a review of studies on technology spillover. 
14. 	 There exists a vast amount of literature on international technology transfer. However, 
the main issue has been the mode and costs of international technology transfer rather 
than the extent of the transfer. See for example, Reddy and Zhao (1990) for a detailed 
survey and U rata and Kawai (2000) for a brief survey of recent studies. 
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6. 	 The dynamics of technology 
development: lessons from the 
Korean experience 
Linsu Kim 
INTRODUCTION 
No nation has come as far and as fast, from handicrafts to heavy industry 
and from poverty to prosperity, as the Republic of Korea (Vogel, 1991). 
Korea has transformed itself from a subsistence agrarian economy into a 
newly industrialized one in the space of only four decades. In 1961, Korea 
exhibited most of the symptoms of underdevelopment that poor countries 
show today. From 1962, the Korean economy grew at an average annual rate 
of almost 9 per cent, raising GNP per capita in current prices from US$87 
in 1962 to US$10550 by 1997 (Kim, 1997a). Despite undergoing the worst 
economic crisis since the Korea War in 1997, it bounced back impressively 
in 1999 with a growth rate of 10 per cent, followed in 2000 with 8 per cent. 
Korea also achieved phenomenal growth in its exports, which increased 
from a mere US$40 million in 1963 to US$143 billion in 1999. The structure 
of manufactured exports changed radically over time (see Table 6.1). The 
share of primary products fell from 64.4 per cent in 1960 to 2.7 per cent in 
1999, and that of manufactures rose from 17.6 per cent to 91.5 per cent. The 
share of simple manufactures shows an inverted U-shape, rising from 17.3 
per cent in 1960 to 54.9 per cent in 1980 and then declining to 28.7 per cent 
by 1999. Within manufactured exports, the share of simple products 
decreased steadily from 98.5 per cent in 1960 to 63.7 per cent in 1980, and 
to 31.4 per cent in 1999. The share of complex manufactures in total exports 
increased steadily from 0.3 per cent in 1960 to 62.7 per cent in 1999; within 
manufacturing, their share rose from 1.5 per cent to 68.6 per cent. High­
technology products accounted for 52.4 per cent of complex manufactures 
by 1999, indicating a significant technological upgrading of Korean exports. 
Moreover, unlike most developing countries, which depend heavily on 
multinational firms for technology-intensive exports and technological 
upgrading, in Korea the main agents of change were domestic firms. 
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Table 6.1 Korea's exports by technology intensity 
Classification 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Primary products 64.42 35.75 21.28 15.34 7.21 5.03 3.51 2.48 2.68 
Manufactured products 17.56 61.10 68.68 66.58 86.19 90.11 90.60 91.69 91.47 
products 17.30 52.56 62.51 53.60 54.93 43.86 41.07 26.02 28.73 
-­
Resource-based 8.17 15.80 12.51 9.16 10.64 6.51 5.24 6.14 9.75 
-l>.. 
-l>.. Low-tech 9.12 36.76 50.00 44.44 44.29 37.36 35.83 19.88 18.98 
manufact 0.27 8.55 6.16 12.98 31.26 46.25 49.53 65.68 62.74 
Medium-tech 0.27 8.55 6.16 12.98 21.63 34.95 29.55 35.55 29.85 
High-tech 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.63 11.30 19.98 30.13 32.89 
Others 18.01 3.14 10.04 18.09 6.60 4.85 5.89 5.82 5.84 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Sources: Uniled Nations. Year Book o!'fnternatlonal Trade Stellisties; Korean Foreign Trade Association (I999)./·()reign Trade Slatisties. 
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Such phenomenal growth and structural change may be attributed to 
many social, economic, and technological factors, but most important is 
probably rapid technological learning by domestic firms (Kim, 1997a). This 
chapter addresses the following related issues: (1) the initial conditions, (2) 
the role of technology transfer and technology spillover effects of multina­
tional corporations (MNCs), (3) domestic technological activities, (4) the 
role of education and technology institutions, (5) the efficacy of public pol­
icies, and (6) lessons of the Korean experience for other developing countries. 
THE INITIAL CONDITIONS 
Unlike the great majority of developing nations, Korea was a unified, inde­
pendent state for more than 1200 years since the Silla Dynasty. But sur­
rounded by big powers China in the west, Mongolia and Russia in the 
north and Japan in the east -- Korea was frequently subject to foreign inva­
sion. The most recent was by the Japanese, culminating in colonial rule 
from 1910 to 1945. 
Under Japanese colonial rule, manufacturing growth averaged 9.7 per 
eent per annum between 1910 and 1941 (Suh, 1978). Japanese capital 
accounted for 94 per cent of the authorized capital of manufacturing estab­
lishments. There were some 1600 Korean technicians in the manufacturing 
sector, but they accounted for only 19 per cent of all technicians in Korea. 
Nearly 300000 Koreans had some experience of mining and manufactur­
ing by the time Korea gained independence in 1945, leaving it with a larger 
base of industrial experience than in most countries gaining independence 
around that time. However, most Korean workers had experience of low­
level jobs. 
Modern education, first introduced to Korea by American missionaries, 
was expanded by the Japanese colonial government. However, the Japanese 
limited Koreans mainly to the primary grades, seeking a source of labour 
for simple tasks in agriculture and industry. At the end of Japanese rule, 
only 2 per cent of the Korean population over the age of fourteen had com­
pleted secondary schools and the illiteracy rate stood at 78 per cent. 
The chaos following the end of Japanese rule, the division of the nation 
into North Korea and South Korea and the ensuing civil war, all between 
1945 and 1953, left Korea a 'nation with little left of its past and facing a 
bleak future' (Mason et al., 1980, p. 58). US aid helped bring Korea back 
to its pre-war economic level, but the economy suffered from almost all the 
problems facing most resource-poor, low-income countries today. Korea 
started on industrial development with a far lower economic and technical 
base than other newly industrializing economies (NIEs). 
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THE ROLE OF MNCS 
Lacking domestic technological capabilities, Korea had to depend heavily 
on foreign technology. However, it chose to rely as little as possible on FDI. 
It encouraged domestic firms to build extensive global networks, with 
foreign firms providing technology via licensing, capital goods and original 
equipment manufacture (OEM) contracts. These networks were a major 
source of technological learning for Korean firms. 
Intra-Firm Technology Transfer 
Korea restricted inward FDI when technology was not a critical element 
and the relevant mature technologies could be acquired more easily by 
other modes than FDL These arm's length mechanisms included reverse­
engineering, OEM, and foreign licensing (FL). There was some FDI in this 
restrictive policy environment (Table 6.2), rising from a mere US$45.4 
million in I 962~66 to over US$8.4 billion in 1992~96. This steady increase 
indicates a gradual relaxation of FDI policy over the years. 
The value of FDI and its share of external borrowing were, however, sig­
nificantly lower in Korea than in the other NIEs. For example, Korea's 
stock of FDI in 1983 was only 7 per cent of Brazil. 23 per cent of Singapore, 
and less than half of Taiwan and Hong Kong. The proportion of FDI to 
total external borrowing was only 6.1 per cent in Korea, compared with 92 
per cent in Singapore, 45 per cent in Taiwan and 21 per cent in Brazil (KEB, 
1987). As a result, FDI played a relatively small role in the Korean 
economy. Thus, the contribution of foreign firms to the growth of Korean 
GNP was only 1.3 per cent in 1972~80; its share of total value-added was 
only 1.1 per cent in 1971 and 4.5 per cent in 1980. Its contribution to manu­
facturing value-added was only 4.8 per cent and 14.2 per cent during the 
same periods (Cha, 1983). 
Manufacturing MNCs set up foreign plants to optimize their global 
sourcing of inputs and production of outputs. To do this, they transfer the 
production and management capabilities needed to ensure efficient produc­
tion. Some MNCs also undertake R&D in host countries, but this is mainly 
in order to adapt products to local or regional needs. Very rarely do they 
transfer advanced engineering and innovation capabilities. 
A comparative analysis of technological learning and market perfor­
mance in Hyundai Motor, an independent domestic firm, and Daewoo 
Motor, a joint venture with GM (the world's largest company, with the 
highest R&D expenditures), is illustrative. Hyundai licensed technologies 
from several sources and integrated them into an efficient mass-production 
system. This was a very risky venture, but it forced and motivated Hyundai 
Table 6.2 Foreign technology transfer to Korea, 1962-99 
Source 1962-66 1967-72 1971-76 1977-81 1982-86 1987-91 1992-96 1997-99* Total 
direct investment 
Japan 8.3 89.7 627.1 300.9 876.2 2122.3 1548.3 3260.0 8832.7 
USA 25.0 95.3 135.0 235.7 581.6 1477.7 2551.8 9910.5 15012.5 
All others 12.1 33.6 117.3 184.0 309.6 2035.9 4305.1 18194.1 25194.3 
Total 45.4 218.6 879.4 720.6 1767.7 5635.9 8405.1 31364.6 48859.4 
Foreign licensing 
Japan 5.0 58.7 139.8 323.7 1383.6 2437.0 1461.7 5809.5 
"­
"" 
USA 0.6 7.8 21.3 159.2 602.7 2121.9 3687.5 4271.4 10872.4 
'1 
All others 0.2 3.5 16.6 152.4 258.5 853.9 1193.3 1458.1 3936.5 
Total 0.8 16.3 96.6 451.4 1184.9 4359.4 7317.8 7l91.2 20618.4 
Capital-goods 
Japan 148 1292 4423 14269 20673 54641 80775 40574 216795 
USA 75 472 1973 6219 12434 33098 64681 43129 162081 
All others 93 777 2445 7490 17871 33213 75387 50529 187805 
Total 316 2541 8841 27978 50978 120952 220843 134232 566781 
Note: '" The data for 1999 covers only through November. 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Energy. 
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to assimilate foreign technologies as rapidly as possible. In the process, 
Hyundai invested heavily in R&D in order to build design and innovation 
capabilities. 
That was how in 1975 Hyundai developed its first indigenous car model, 
the 'Pony', making Korea the second nation in Asia (after Japan) to man­
ufacture its own automobile. The car had 90 per cent local content, and, by 
dint of R&D, improved rapidly in terms of quality over time. As a result, 
Hyundai's local market share for passenger cars increased from 19.2 per 
cent in 1970 to 73.9 per cent in 1979. Hyundai exported nearly 63000 Ponys 
(to Europe, the Middle East and Asia), accounting for 67 per cent of 
Korea's total auto exports in 1976-80 and 97 per cent of total passenger car 
exports in 1983-86. The Pony accounted for 98 per cent of Hyundai's 
exports in these periods (Kim, 1998). 
In contrast, Daewoo, constrained by GM's global objectives, relied solely 
on the MNC for technology and did relatively little to develop its own tech­
nological capability and even less to design its products. Technology trans­
fer by joint venture, where the supplier guarantees the performance of the 
technology transferred, is apt to lead to a passive technological attitude on 
the part of the recipient. Investments in product and process improvement 
by Daewoo in 1976-81 were only 19 per cent of those undertaken by 
Hyundai, although its production capacity, on average, was approximately 
70 per cent as large. As a result, though their products were comparable in 
engine size and price, in 1982 Daewoo was able to operate only at 19.5 per 
cent of installed capacity as compared with 67.3 per cent for Hyundai 
(Table 6.3). The differential in labour productivity was as stark: only 2.61 
cars per head at Daewoo compared with 8.55 cars per head at Hyundai. 
Consequently, Daewoo had only 17 per cent passenger car market share 
compared to 73 per cent for Hyundai. 
Daewoo improved its product/process development and market perfor­
mance only a year after the local partner took over managerial control from 
GM in 1983. The management established a fully-fledged R&D depart­
ment, adopted the Japanese 'kanban' system, streamlined production, insti­
tuted a quality control programme and strengthened its marketing drive. 
Nevertheless, conflicts between the partners continued to plague the joint 
venture, giving the smaller Kia a chance to outpace Daewoo. In 1992 the 
partners finally separated, allowing Daewoo to set its own global strategy 
and recapture the second position after Hyundai. 
The semiconductor industry shows a similar picture: MNCs transferred 
production capabilities but not design or innovation capabilities. Several 
MNCs - Signetics, Fairchild, Motorola, Control Data, AMI and Toshiba 
- began to assemble discrete devices in Korea in thc 1960s and I 970s, taking 
advantage of cheap local labour. The operations involved simple packag­
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Table 6.3 	 Basic parameters andperformance between Hyundai and 
Daewoo, 1982 
Hyundai Motor Daewoo Motor 
A Capital (million won) 64.4 44.5 
B. Number of workers 9129.0 5675.0 
C. Sales (billion won) 4.3 1.9 
D. Capacity (cars) 116000.0 76000.0 
E. Production (cars) 78071.0 14845.0 
F. Exports (cars) 13573.0 114.0 
Capacity utilization (E/D) 67.3 19.5 
Labour productivity (E/B) 8.55 2.16 
Capital productivity (E/A) 1212.0 333.6 
Export coefficient (FIE) 17.4 0.8 
Market share 73.0 13.0 
Source: Adapted from Amsden and Kim (1989). 
ing processes in bonded operations by the wholly-owned subsidiaries, with 
all parts and components imported from the parent companies and re­
exported to them. The operations required only about six months' training 
of unskilled workers, transferring little design or engineering capability to 
Korea. 
The largest chaebols Samsung, Hyundai and LG marshalled the 
resources needed to enter into very large scale integrated (VLSI) chip 
design and production. Leading foreign producers refused to license VLSI 
technology to the chaebols. For instance, Texas Instruments and Motorola 
in the USA and NEe, Toshiba and Hitachi in Japan, refused to license 
Samsung 64K DRAM technology. But the chaebo/s were able to find small 
distressed semiconductor companies in the USA that were ready to sell chip 
designs and processes to find cash for survival. Samsung licensed 64K 
DRAM design from financially troubled Micron Technologies, and bought 
a high speed MOS process for US$2.1 million from Zytrex. To master the 
licensed technologies, Samsung set up an R&D outpost in Silicon Valley in 
1983 and hired five Korean-American PhDs in electronics engineering with 
semiconductor design experience at IBM, Honeywell, Zilog, Intel and 
National Semiconductors. The outpost also provided opportunities for 
Korean engineers to participate in training and research in the USA, ena­
bling them to enhance their learning of VLSI technology (Kim, 1997b). 
The Asian crisis, however, forced technologically sound but financially 
weak Korean firms to invite FDI to cope with pressing cash flow prob­
lems. They placed not only peripheral but also core businesses on sale. 
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Consequently, unlike China and Southeast Asian countries that witnessed 
sharp falls in FDI (for example, Singapore 24.8 per cent and Taiwan and 
Malaysia 19 per cent in 1998), Korea had a sudden increase in FDI. Thus, 
FDI in manufacturing rose from US$2.3 billion in 1997 to US$8 billion 
in 1998 and to US$15.5 billion in 1999. The lion's share of the new FDI 
took the form of mergers with and acquisitions of existing Korean firms. 
Hewlett-Packard purchased a 45 per cent stake in its Korean subsidiary 
from its joint venture partner, Samsung Electronics, for US$36 million. 
Dow Chemical took over Ulsan Pacific Chemical by purchasing a 20 per 
cent stake. Philips purchased a 50 per cent stake in LG's highly profitable 
flat panel display business for US$IA billion. Volvo purchased Samsung's 
construction machinery division for US$730 million. 
If assets sales are included, the top five chaebols in Korea raised over 
US$7.4 billion in the year after the crisis. The Korean economy is, there­
fore, now linked to a far greater extent with foreign multinationals than 
before. But in most recent cases the FDI transfers neither new processes nor 
new product technologies. They do transfer managerial capabilities, which 
introduces transparent and accountable management systems, which 
Korean firms previously lacked. 
Some MNCs have also started to conduct R&D locally. Thirty-nine 
MNCs, or 1.4 per cent of the total number of MNCs operating in Korean 
manufacturing, have set up R&D centres. Thirty-three of these were estab­
lished in the 1990s, after Korea had developed a significant R&D base. 
MNC R&D units, however, account for less than I per cent of the total 
number of corporate R&D centres. Most of MNC R&D involves adapting 
products to local markets, suggesting that local innovation by MNCs is 
fairly insignificant compared to domestic firms. 
More recent investors, such as Motorola and Lucent Technologies, have 
come to Korea to tap Korea's leading edge technologies in semiconductor 
memory chips, flat panel displays, and code division multiple access (CDMA) 
mobile telecommunications, in which Korea is ahead of Japan and the USA. 
Motorola acquired a Korean venture firm, Appeal Technology, to tap its 
advanced design and innovation capabilities and to source a highly compact 
mobile telephone set for global markets. Lucent Technologies is in the process 
of establishing an R&D centre in Korea to tap local capabilities in telecom­
munications. In this sphere, therefore, FDI in Korea is very similar to that in 
highly advanced economies. 
Inter-Firm Technology Transfer 
In contrast to the minimal contribution of FDI to Korea's acquisition of 
foreign technologies, arm's-length methods such as reverse engineering, 
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original equipment manufacturing (OEM), and foreign licensing (FL) have 
been critical to transferring technologies and supplementing local efforts. 
In the 1960s and 1970s Korea promoted technology transfer through 
reverse engineering of turnkey plants and capital goods. The rapid growth 
of the Korean economy required commensurate growth in investment. 
Government policy favoured the import of turnkey plants and capital 
goods to strengthen the competitiveness of local industries. This led to the 
massive import of equipment at the cost of retarding the development of 
the local capital goods industry. Protection of the machinery industry was 
relatively low until the mid-1970s. The chemical, cement, steel and paper 
industries, established in the 1960s and early 1970s, all resorted to the 
import of turnkey plants and machinery for their initial setup. Such 
turnkey plants and foreign capital goods served as an important means of 
technology transfer for two reasons. First, they embodied new technolo­
gies. Second, their use led to technological capabilities and to the develop­
ment of similar products through reverse engineering (Kim and Kim, 
1985). Korean firms assimilated the technologies so rapidly that they could 
undertake subsequent expansions and improvements with little assistance 
from foreign suppliers (Kim, 1997a). 
Of the three categories of technology transfer listed in Table 6.2, capital 
goods imports far surpassed other means in terms of value. Through 1996, 
capital goods imports were 24.7 times the value of FDI and 32.2 times the 
value of FL. The total value of capital goods imports was 14 times that of 
the other two categories combined. Although the values of different modes 
of technology transfer are not strictly comparable since they measure differ­
ent things, they are useful indicators when compared with other countries. 
Among NIEs, the proportion of capital goods imports to total technology 
transfer was highest in Korea. Korea clearly acquired more technology 
through capital goods imports than such NIEs as Argentina, Brazil, India 
and Mexico (Kim, 1997a). The contribution of reverse engineering cannot 
be quantified, but in-depth studies reveal that such practice was dominant 
and widespread in electronics (Kim, 1980), chemicals (Westphal et al. 1985), 
machinery (Kim and Kim, 1985), computers (Kim et aL 1989) and pharma­
ceuticals (Kim et aL 1989). 
Several other instruments promoted the inflow of foreign equipment. 
For example, the slight overvaluation of the local currency, tariff exemp­
tions on imported capital goods and the financing of purchases by suppli­
ers' credits (with low rates of interest relative to the domestic market), all 
worked to increase the attractiveness of these imports. The current account 
pressures generated were overcome by rapid export expansion based on the 
efficient use of the imported equipment. 
OEM contracts were another major mechanism through which Korean 
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firms accelerated their technological learning. No official statistics are 
available on OEM, as OEM sales are not separated from other exports, but 
several studies reveal that OEM accounts for a significant share. According 
to the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation, OEM accounted for over 40 
per cent of Korea's total exports in 1985. The Korea International Trade 
Association records that 61 per cent of all exports to Europe were on an 
OEM basis. In electronics, OEM accounted for 70 to 80 per cent of exports 
in 1990 (Ernst, 1996). In personal computers, OEM accounted for about 80 
per cent of exports in 1989, compared to about 40 per cent in Taiwan. In 
Samsung Electronics, most reverse engineering projects were followed for 
several years by OEM exports (Cyhn, 1999). 
OEM buyers offered various forms of technical assistance to Korean 
producers to ensure that the products met their technical specifications. The 
buyers provided not only blueprints but also training for engineers and 
technicians. They also helped producers improve facilities, manufacturing 
systems and quality control systems. When a Korean firm provided a proto­
type to an OEM buyer on the basis of its reverse engineering, the buyer 
made significant contributions to improving quality to meet its specifiea­
tions. For instance, when Daewoo undertook OEM manufacture of colour 
television sets for NEC in Japan, the latter identified over 80 problems 
ranging from poor sound quality to faulty control knobs and helped 
Daewoo correct them. Intensive interactions between engineers of the two 
sides in ten different meetings (lasting more than 30 days per year) Jed to 
the transfer of a significant amount of design, production, packaging, 
styling and quality control knowledge (Cyhn, 1999). 
Such learning allowed Korean firms to progress from OEM to more 
demanding stages: own design manufacturing (ODM) and own brand 
manufacturing (OBM) (Hobday, 1995). By the late 1980s, Korean firms 
had acquired enough capabilities to design their own products. MNCs 
tested these products and placed large orders. Technology transfer, 
however, has been far less in ODM arrangements than in OEM. 
Korean reliance on FL has increased significantly over time as the 
economy has approached international technology frontiers. Korean policy 
on FL was quite restrictive in the 1960s. The I 970s, however, saw a signifi­
cant change as attempts were made to access sophisticated technologies 
that were mostly protected by intellectual property rights. As a result, 
royalty payments for FL increased significantly (Table 6.2) from US$0.8 
million during the first Five Year Economic Development Plan (1962·66) 
to US$451A million in the fourth Plan (1977-81). The 19805 and 1990s saw 
much larger increases. Most foreign licensing in the early years was asso­
ciated with technical assistance to train local engineers to run turnkey 
plants (Kim, 1997a). 
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In sum, Korea restricted FDI but promoted technology transfer through 
other means such as capital goods imports, OEM and FL in the early years. 
Capital was acquired through foreign loans. Such a policy, designed to 
maintain independence from MNCs, was effective in forcing Korean firms 
to take the initiative in learning from externalized foreign sources such as 
reverse engineering, OEM and FL. The high debt ratio, however, contrib­
uted to the financial crisis in 1997. 
DOMESTIC TECHNOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES 
As Korea entered progressively more technology-intensive industries, loeal 
R&D became more important to sustaining international competitiveness. 
As a result, R&D investment has seen a quantum jump in the past three 
decades. Table 6.4 shows that the total R&D increased from US$28.6 
million in 1971 to US$3.4 billion in 1990 and to US$9.5 billion in 1998 
(1998 was the first year after the Asian crisis and R&D expenditure then 
was about 13 per cent less than in 1997). Though the Korean economy 
recorded one of the world's fastest growth rates, R&D rose even faster. 
R&D as percentage of GDP increased from 0.32 per cent to 2.52 in this 
period, surpassing many West European countries. 
The government launched various programmes to increase private R&D. 
Spurred partly by these programmes and partly by increasing competition 
in the international market, the number of corporate R&D laboratories 
rose from 1 in 1970 to 3760 in 1998 and 4810 in 1999, a clear reflection of 
the seriousness with which Korean firms pursued high-technology develop­
ment. There were significant structural changes in R&D, the government 
dominating in early years but private firms taking an increasing role over 
time. The private sector accounted for only 2 per cent of the total R&D in 
1963 and over 80 per cent in 1994, one of the highest in both advanced and 
newly industrialized countries. 
The growth rate of total R&D as a share of GDP in Korea (24.2 per cent 
in 1981~91) was the highest in the world, compared to 22.3 per cent in 
Singapore, 15.8 per cent in Taiwan, 11.4 per cent in Spain and 7.4 per cent 
in Japan. The annual growth rate of business R&D as a share of GDP was 
also the highest in Korea (31.6 per cent), compared to 23.8 per cent in 
Singapore, 16.5 per cent in Taiwan, 14.0 per cent in Spain and 8.8 per cent 
in Japan (DIST, 1994). 
Two factors ~ the 'reverse brain drain' and the chaebol- played an impor­
tant role in this R&D growth. Korean firms recruited trained scientists and 
engineers of Korean origin resident in the USA. Many had left Korea over 
a decade earlier, doing PhDs in leading US universities and rising through 
Table 6.4 Research and development expenditures, 1965-98 ($ million and percentage) 

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 

R&D expenditure 2.1 10.5 42.7 282.5 1237.1 3349.9 9440.6 11336.6 
Government 1.9 9.2 30.3 180.0 306.8 651.0 1780.9 3051.8 
Private sector 0.2 1.3 12.3 102.5 930.3 2698.9 7659.7 8276.4 
Govt vs private 61:39 97:03 71:29 64:36 25:75 19:81 19:81 27:73 
University R&D n1a 0.4 2.2 25.9 118.8 244.3 770.9 1265.1 
Govt research institutes R&D nla 8.9 28.1 104.5 367.2 731.0 1766.7 1979.2 
Corporate R&D 0.2 1.3 12.3 81.4 751.0 2374.5 6903.0 8092.3 
R&D/GNP 0.26 0.38 0.42 0.77 1.58 1.95 2.51 2.52 
Manufacturing sector 
.... 
R&D expenditure n1a nla 16.7a 76.0 688.6 2134.7 5809.9 6439.2 
v, 
.... 
Percent of sales nla nla 0.36a 0.50 1.51 1.96 2.72 2.64 
Number of researchers (total)h 2135 5628 10275 18434 41473 70503 128315 129767 
Govt research institutes 1671 2458 3086 4598 7542 10434 15007 12587 
Universities 352 20ll 4534 8695 14935 21332 44683 51 162 
Private sector 112 1 159 2655 5141 18996 38737 68625 66018 
R&D expenditure per researcher 967 1874 4152 15325 27853 47514 73574 87361 
(W 1000) 
Researcher per 10000 population 0.7 1.7 2.9 4.8 10.1 16.4 28.6 27.9 
Number of corporate R&D centres 0 Ie 12 54 183 966 2270 3760 
Notes: 
a for 1976. 
h The ligures do not include research assistants technicians and other supporting personnel. 
c for 
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology. 
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the ranks of major firms such as IBM, Fairchild, Intel and National 
Semiconductor. The number of scientists and engineers recruited abroad 
by corporate R&D centres was substantial, 427 in 1992 alone. The outflow 
of technical graduates posed a serious problem to Korea in the 1970s, when 
97 per cent of scientists and 88 per cent of engineers who received training 
abroad (mainly in the USA) remained there, compared with 35 and 30 per 
cent for all countries (Hentges, 1975). However, this helped form an impor­
tant international technical network and a high calibre pool of skills for 
Korea's development. It later helped it to become a serious contender in 
several cutting-edge technologies. 
The chaebols were key players in technological learning in Korean indus­
try: (l) they were, as noted, in the best position to attract high quality 
human resources from abroad; (2) they developed the organizational and 
technical resources to identify, negotiate and finance foreign technology 
transfer; (3) they had the resources to expand and deepen industrial R&D; 
and (4) highly diversified chaebols applied experience in one field of busi­
ness to others, resulting in rapid diffusion of technological capabilities 
across subsidiaries. As a result, the 20 largest chaebols now account for 72 
per cent of corporate R&D in Korea. 
While increasing in-house R&D, Korean firms began to globalize their 
innovation activity. LG Electronics, for instance, built a network of R&D 
laboratories in Tokyo, California, Chicago, Germany and Ireland. These 
laboratories monitor frontier technological change, develop strategic alli­
ances with local firms and develop state-of-the-art products through 
advanced R&D. LG Technology in California, for instance, plays a pivotal 
role in designing the latest personal computers, display terminals and high 
resolution monitors, while the laboratory in Chicago concentrates on 
HDTV, digital VCR and telecommunications equipment. Samsung, Daewoo 
and Hyundai Electronics have similar R&D outposts. Samsung has R&D 
facilities in San Jose, Maryland, Boston, Tokyo, Osaka. Sendai in Japan, 
London, Frankfurt and Moscow. Daewoo has two in France, one in the UK, 
and one in Russia. Hyundai has outposts in San Jose, Frankfurt. Singapore 
and Taipei. 
Another indicator of Korea's growth in R&D is patent registrations at 
home and abroad. Patenting in Korea has grown significantly in the past 
two decades. It rose by 48 per cent in the 14 years from 1965 to 1978, then 
almost tripled in the next 11 years (1979-89) and almost tripled again in the 
next four (l989~-93), reflecting the increasing importance of innovation and 
the declining significance of reverse engineering. There is still a large patent 
gap in comparison with advanced countries, but the gap is closing rapidly. 
The share of Koreans in local patent registration increased from 11.4 per 
cent in 1980 to 69.2 per cent by 1999 (see Table 6.5). Korea ranked fifth in 
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Table6,j Patent applications and patents granted 
1981 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Applications 
National 1319 2703 9082 59236 55970 
Foreign 3984 7884 16738 19263 24672 
Total 5303 10587 25820 78499 80642 
Patents granted 
National 232 349 2554 6575 43314 
Foreign 1576 1919 5208 5937 19321 
Total 1808 2268 7762 12512 62635 
Source.' Korea National Statistics Office. 
the world in 1999 in the number of domestic industrial property applica­
tions, after Japan, the USA China and Germany. In terms of industrial 
property applications by local residents per head of population, Korea 
ranks second after Japan. 
Patent registration in the USA is often used as a measure of international 
competitiveness. The number of patent registrations in the USA by 
Koreans is far below that by Taiwanese, let alone that by advanced coun­
tries. The cumulative number of patents granted to Koreans by the USA 
between 1969 and 1992 was 1751 compared to 4978 for Taiwan. However, 
Korea jumped from thirty-fifth place in the number of patents in the USA 
(among 36 countries listed in an NTIS report) in 1969 to eleventh in 1992, 
giving an average annual growth rate of 43 per cent (NTIS, 1993). 
This growth rate was the highest of the countries in the report. A more 
recent report shows that Korea jumped to sixth place in 1999, with 3679 
patents, after only Japan, Germany, Taiwan, France and the UK. Samsung 
Electronics, the most R&D-intensive firm in Korea, ranked fourth 
with 1545 US patents, coming only after IBM, NEC and Canon. These 
figures again indicate how rapidly Korea has gained in technological 
competitiveness. 
The crisis of 1997 appears to have made a significant dent in Korean 
R&D. In order to improve liquidity, the large chaebols reduced R&D by 
some 13 per cent in the year following the crisis (Kim, 1999). At the same 
time, there was a surge of small technology-based firms as well-trained sci­
entists and engineers laid offby chaebols set up on their own, with a strong 
emphasis on technology. The promotion of venture capital by the govern­
ment also played a role in fostering this surge. As a result, the number of 
R&D laboratories increased from 3060 at the time of the crisis to 5200 two 
years later. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SM Es) account for 95 per 
157 LessonsFom the Korea experience 
cent of this increase. This shift may signify a structural change in the 
skewed Korean industrial structure. 
Korea now leads the world in several advanced technologies such as 
memory semiconductors, flat panel displays and CDMA mobile telephone 
sets in terms of product development and production. It has the largest 
world market shares in satellite receiving systems and videotapes. The 
International Standardization Organization (ISO) has recently adopted 
fifteen new technologies in the multimedia area developed by Korean firms 
as global standards. Nine more are under review. 
In conclusion, Korean firms acquired mature technologies through imi­
tative reverse engineering in the early years, but then invested heavily in 
R&D to enhance their competitiveness in the face of rapidly changing tech­
nologies. Korea is now one of the most R&D-intensive countries in the 
world, in terms of the share of GDP devoted to innovation. 
THE ROLE OF EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY 
INSTITUTIONS 
The government and the private sector invested heavily in order to achieve 
rapid expansion in the education sector in Korea. Many other developing 
countries attained an equally rapid growth in elementary education; what 
was unique in Korea was the well-balanced expansion at all levels. This 
rapid expansion created short-term unemployment problems among the 
educated, but the formation of human capital laid the foundations for 
the acquisition and assimilation of mature labour-intensive technologies in 
the 1960s and 1970s. As Korea underwent major structural change in the 
I980s, three sets of institutions - universities, government-supported 
research institutes (GRTs) and SME technical extension services - became 
important for local technology development. 
Universities 
Universities played a fairly marginal role in the early years of Korean 
industrialization. They were primarily undergraduate teaching-oriented 
institutions that undertook little research. University R&D, only US$I.3 
million in 1970, constituted about 3.5 per cent of the nation's total R&D 
while accounting for 35.7 per cent of the number of researchers. Frustrated 
in its efforts to reform the universities, the government founded a research­
oriented S&T school· the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and 
Technology (KAIST) in 1975. KAIST played a pivotal role in training a 
large number of high calibre scientists and engineers. 
158 Competifivenes3~ FIJI and technological activity in East Asia 
Another effort to upgrade university R&D capabilities began in the late 
1970s and 1980s. The government established the Korea Scientific and 
Engineering Foundation in 1977, and later the Korea Research Foundation 
in 1981, to fund basic research in universities. The government also enacted 
the Basic Research Promotion Law in 1989, explicitly targeting basic 
research as one of the nation's top technological priorities. As a result, uni­
versity research has also expanded significantly as shown in Table 6.4, 
almost tripling in eight years from US$341.2 million in 1990 to U S$1.06 
billion in 1998. The number of university researchers more than doubled 
from 21332 to 51162 in this period. In addition, emulating the US experi­
ence, the government started in 1989 to establish Science Research Centres 
(SRCs) and Engineering Research Centres (ERCs) in the leading univer­
sities. The number of SRCs and ERCs increased from 13 in 1990 to 84 by 
2000, each receiving grants from the government for nine years. 
There are also encouraging signs on the quality of university research. 
The number of scientific publications by Koreans cited by the Science 
Citation Index increased slowly from 27 in 1973 to 171 in 1980, then more 
rapidly to 1227 in 1988, to 3910 in 1994, and to 10918 in 1999. This meant 
a rise from thirty-seventh place in the world in 1988 to twenty-fourth in 
1994 and sixteenth in 1999. The ranking, however, is still low compared 
with its eleventh place in gross national product. 
The financial crisis prompted the government to formulate an ambitious 
reform programme to transform a dozen leading universities into first-class 
research-oriented institutions. The government earmarked about US$1.4 
billion over seven years for this programme. It is too early to assess the 
outcome, but if implemented properly the programme is expected signifi­
cantly to upgrade the quality of scientists and engineers that Korean uni­
versities will produce. In addition, leading universities have established 
techno-parks and business incubators in order to link their research with 
leading firms and to foster technology-based small enterprises spun off 
from university R&D laboratories. This means that universities will play an 
increasingly important role in Korea's pursuit of high-technology indus­
tries in the future. 
Government Research Institutes 
Given the weak research base in universities, the government set up GRIs 
by recruiting overseas-trained Korean scientists and engineers. GRIs dom­
inated R&D in Korea in the early years, accounting for 83.9 per cent of 
total R&D expenditures and 43.7 per cent of researchers in 1970. GRIs, 
however, faced numerous obstacles in the 1970s. They had poor linkages 
with industry. Most Korean scientists and engineers in the GRIs came from 
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academic institutions or R&D organizations. There was little demand from 
industry for the services GRIs offered. Expertise was particularly lacking 
in manufacturing know-how and the development of prototypes, which 
were in great demand in the early years. 
This does not mean that GRls did not produce any results. The problem 
was that their usable research output was ignored or distrusted by the 
private sector, which preferred turnkey plants or licences from experienced 
foreign firms. Large projects like fertilizer, chemical and cement plants 
relied completely on turnkey projects, while consumer electronics resorted 
to licensing. Over time, however, the situation changed. The government set 
up specialized GRIs (for example in chemical, machinery, electronics, 
ocean, standardization, nuclear energy, biotechnology, system engineering, 
aerospace and so on) to serve the increasingly diverse and complex needs 
of the private sector. GRIs began to play an important role in strengthen­
ing the bargaining power of local enterprises in acquiring foreign technol­
ogies. For instance, when Corning Glass refused to transfer optical fibre 
technology to Korea in 1977, two large copper cable producers in Korea 
entered a joint R&D project with a GR!. After seven years of R&D, the 
locally deVeloped optical cable was tested successfully on a 3~~km route in 
1983. Although this effort eventually ground to a halt, due mainly to slow 
progress in R&D, it helped local firms in bargaining for foreign technology. 
Four firms entered licensing agreements with multinational enterprises in 
1984 (Kim, 1993). 
Another important effect on local technology development of GRIs was 
a sharp cut in import prices. For example, no sooner had a GRI successfully 
developed Betamethasone in 1979 than its import price went down from 
Wonf30000/kg to Wonf15000/kg. When the GRI developed Rifamycine in 
1982, its import price dropped from Wonfl OOOOOO/kg to Won/450000/kg 
(KIST, 1994). 
The most important but unintended role of GRIs in the early years 
of industrialization in Korea was the creation of experienced researchers. 
When the private sector began to invest in R&D in the 1980s, the research­
ers trained in GRIs moved to corporate R&D centres as well as to new 
GRIs and universities. For example, over 2800 experienced researchers left 
from KIST, a leading GRI: 420 went to private R&D centres, 784 to uni­
versities, and 1594 to newly-established GRIs (KIST, 1994). 
In addition, the government introduced two major sets of national R&D 
projects: the Industrial Generic Technology Development Project (IGTDP) 
and the National R&D Project (NRP). IGTDP concentrated on current 
problems in 'existing' technologies with high externalities. NRP projects 
focused on future problems in 'new' (to Korea) technologies with a high risk 
of failure or with high externalities, thus warranting public support. 
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Although these projects were also open to universities and corporate R&D 
centres, GRIs played a dominant role in these projects through the mid­
1990s. 
Nevertheless, in the face of the rapid expansion of private R&D and the 
increasing intensity of university R&D, the role of GRls weakened rela­
tively over time. This was so for two reasons. First, GRls, being under 
government bureaucratic control, were less dynamic than corporate R&D 
centres, which responded more dynamically to market signals and techno­
logical change. Second, GRls had difficulties in retaining competent 
researchers. The best research staff tended to leave for academic institutions 
for prestige and freedom or for corporate R&D laboratories for higher sal­
aries. The reform of GRls has been under discussion for some time, but 
inertia and the labour unions have made it difficult to implement. 
SME promotion 
The government has been so preoccupied with mission-oriented projects 
that it has failed to develop an effective infrastructure for SME promotion. 
The technical extension networks developed in the 1980s have not been ade­
quate to meet the technology development needs of SMEs. A few industry­
specific R&D institutes for SMEs were (belatedly) established in the 1990s, 
but their effectiveness remains to be seen. 
In conclusion, despite the rapid growth of demand for technological 
innovation, Korea's network of technological institutions was not adequate 
for industrial needs. GRIs played a useful role in some areas in the early 
decades, but their role needs to be redefined now. The role of universities 
has become increasingly important, but they have yet to become first-rate 
research institutions. The incumbent government is determined to reform 
educational systems and raise R&D capabilities, but it will take a decade or 
longer before substantial results can be seen. 
THE EFFICACY OF PUBLIC POLICIES 
The Korean government has adopted an array of policy instruments to 
facilitate technological learning in industry and so strengthen international 
competitiveness. This history can be best understood from the perspective 
of market demand and supply (Kim and Dahlman, 1992). This involves 
analysing three aspects: (I) policies to create market needs for technology 
development (demand side); (2) policies to increase S&T capabilities 
(supply side); and (3) policies to provide effective links between demand 
and supply (linkage). 
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Demand Side 
Demand-side policies can cover three areas: export promotion, competi­
tion policy and government procurement. Export promotion, by pushing 
firms into highly competitive international markets, has been more influen­
tial than other policies in forcing firms to expedite technological learning. 
Export-oriented industries accounted for the bulk of foreign licensing, 
capital goods imports and R&D in Korea. Exporters also created capacity 
in excess of local market needs to achieve economies of scale; this led to 
crises and forced them to accelerate technological learning to maximize 
capacity utilization. Export promotion brought in many OEM buyers, who 
provided valuable help in acquiring capabilities through interactive tutorial 
processes. As a result, firms in export-oriented industries learned signifi­
cantly more rapidly and grew faster than firms in import-substituting 
industries. 
Competition policies such as antitrust, trade liberalization and intellec­
tual property protection also increased the need for technological effort. In 
response to the increasing economic power of the chaebol, the government 
enacted the Fair Trade Act in 1980 to prohibit unfair practices in the 
market and to restrict the growth of the chaebols. At the same time, the 
government began to liberalize the local market, bringing down tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, so forcing Korean firms to compete against multina­
tional firms not only in exports but also in the domestic market. In 1986, 
the government introduced legislation to protect intellectual property 
rights, pre-empting the reverse engineering of foreign products. These pol­
icies forced Korean firms further to intensify technological effort. 
Government procurement is often mentioned in the literature as an 
important tool in creating local demand for technological effort. However, 
except for significant government procurement of personal computers at 
the formative stage of the industry in the early I 980s (Kim et aI., 1987), this 
policy did not playa significant role in Korea in creating demand for tech­
nological effort. 
Supply side 
Major supply-side policies cover human resource development, technology 
transfer and domestic R&D. Given its lack of natural resources, Korea 
invested heavily in human resource development in the 1950s and 19608 to 
prepare for industrialization. As a result, given its relative per capita GNP, 
Korea achieved the highest educational attainment among NIEs. The for­
mation of human resources enabled it to master mature production tech­
nologies through reverse engineering in the early years. However, the 
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Korean government made a critical mistake in neglecting to invest in 
research-oriented tertiary education in preparation for knowledge­
intensive industries, creating a major bottleneck in innovative technologi­
cal learning in the 1990s. 
Foreign technology transfer generally plays a major role in technological 
learning, providing tacit and cxplicit knowledge as well as interactions with 
foreign suppliers. Korea restricted reliance on FDI. enabling local firms to 
retain managerial independence and allowing them to set the direction of 
technological learning. The restriction on foreign licensing also enabled 
Korean firms to strengthen their bargaining power in negotiating the trans­
fer of mature but complex technologies; however, it may have resulted in 
slow learning owing to the restricted inflow of new foreign technologies. 
The promotion of capital goods imports forced Korean firms to rely heavily 
on reverse-engineering foreign goods in early years. Well-trained and hard­
working employees were motivated to maximize technological learning 
from readily available foreign goods; they had sufficient tacit knowledge to 
reverse-engineer them successfully in the early years. 
The government gradually relaxed restrictions on licensing in the 19705, 
as Korean industries progressed into more complex technologies. Policies 
had to adapt to the changing economic environment and to facilitate the 
inflow of more sophisticated foreign technologies. 
The government's role in R&D was small relative to other countries, 
accounting for only about 20 per cent of total R&D in the 1 990s. The gov­
ernment's R&D was largely directed to keeping increasingly weak GRIs 
afloat (in the mid-1990s over 80 per cent of public R&D expenditures went 
to GRls) and to mission-oriented national projects. Some national projects 
had significant results, such as the development of electronic switching 
systems and COMA mobile telephone systems, making Korea the first suc­
cessfully to commercialize COMA technology. In general, however, R&D 
policy neglected diffusion-oriented projects like upgrading the quality of 
tertiary education and university research. Consequently, Korea tended to 
produce half-baked human resources while spending heavily on R&D, 
resulting in relatively low R&D productivity. However, the government's 
initiative in establishing the first venture capital firm facilitated the growth 
of the private venture capital industry in subsequent years. 
Linkage 
Preferential financing and tax incentives are the major instruments that 
lubricate the linkage process between demand and supply. During the 1970s 
the interest rate on R&D loans was one of the highest, reflecting the low 
priority of R&D in government policies. At the same time, preferential 
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financing was largely ignored by industry because of its lack of a felt need 
to invest in R&D (given the ease of acquisition and assimilation of foreign 
technologies). It was only in the early 1980s that preferential R&D loans 
became more important for financing private R&D. The impact of prefer­
ential financing on facilitating R&D activities, however, is dubious. Its 
interest rates, ranging from 6.5 to 15 per cent, were far higher than similar 
loans in other countries. 
Tax incentives were another indirect mechanism for making funds avail­
able for corporate R&D. In Korea, tax incentives fell into five categories 
according to objectives served. The most important were tax incentives for 
corporate R&D, reduced tariffs on the importation of R&D equipment 
and supplies, deduction of annual non-capital R&D expenditures and 
human resource development costs from taxable income, and the exemp­
tion of real estate tax on R&D related properties. 
In conclusion, preferential financing and tax incentives definitely pro­
vided funds for corporate R&D activities and lowered their costs, but were 
peripheral in promoting R&D in Korea. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Many political leaders, economic planners and corporate managers in 
other developing countries have shown a keen interest in learning from the 
Korean experience. To what extent can and should they emulate the Korean 
experience? 
Many parts of Korea's experience may be emulated. First, the expansion 
of education, particularly at the secondary and tertiary levels, provides the 
essential base for subsequent industrialization. Many studies support this 
argument. For instance, Baumol et al. (1991) conclude that the quantity 
and quality of education are a major influence on whether an economy can 
catch up with advanced countries. Many developing countries have 
achieved parity with advanced countries in terms of enrolments in primary 
schools: it is the provision of secondary and higher education that explains 
differences in national wealth. A small cadre of highly-educated elites is not 
sufficient for industrialization; what is required for rapid industrialization 
is the provision of quality secondary and tertiary education to the whole 
population. 
Second, countries can emulate the programmes that the Korean govern­
ment used to facilitate technological learning. Most important of all was 
the creation of a competitive market, particularly through export promo­
tion. Competing in world markets forces firms to undergo a continuous 'life 
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or death' struggle for survival, for which they have to accelerate learning by 
importing and rapidly assimilating foreign technologies and deepening 
local efforts to innovate new technologies. And the government has a deci­
sive role to play in turning an economy into an export-oriented one. 
Third, countries can adopt a liberal policy with respect to the brain 
drain. High calibre human resourees abroad can provide valuable overseas 
technical networks and skill pools for subsequent development. Taiwan's 
surge in high-technology ventures can largely be attributed to Chinese engi­
neers in Silicon Valley. In Korea, the government offered a very attractive 
incentive package for Korean~American scientists and engineers to return 
home through the 1970s. The chaebols foHowed the same strategy after the 
mid-l 980s. 
There are also aspects of Korean policies that are difficult to emulate. First, 
the new rules of international trade under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) make it difficult to protect infant industries. The growing pressures to 
liberalize domestic markets for products, services and investment make it 
more difficult now to stay independent of multinationals. 
Second, stronger intellectual property rights protection restricts the imi­
tation of foreign technologies. China, for instance, faces enormous pres­
sures from the USA to honour intellectual property rights, which Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan did not face during their early industrialization. 
Third, not all developing countries can emulate the cultural and histori­
cal conditions that inculcated an entrepreneurial and hard-working spirit in 
Koreans. These include: (1) a neo-Confucian culture that emphasizes disci­
pline, learning and harmonious interpersonal relations; (2) the Korean War 
that transformed Korea from a rigid, closed and class-based society into a 
dynamic, flexible and classless society; (3) the adversity imposed by several 
climatic conditions; (4) the social competition caused by a dense population; 
and (5) the adaptability resulting from frequent foreign invasions. 
There are also two aspects of Korea's experience that other countries 
should not emulate. The first is Korea's promotion of large conglomerates, 
which, despite their strengths, stifled the healthy growth of SMEs. It is 
better to have well-balanced growth of both large and small firms, as in 
Japan and Germany. 
Second, the Korean government was so preoccupied with short-term 
production and export goals in the 1970s and 1980s that it failed to invest 
in building the infrastructure needed for the future. One of the most strik­
ing examples is under-investment in upgrading the quality of tertiary edu­
cation. Public policies may be introduced overnight, and technology and 
capital may be imported relatively quickly, but creating human resources 
requires long-term investment. 
The Korean experience also offers other lessons. Foreign technology 
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transfer should not be viewed as a substitute for in-house efforts or vice 
versa. The two are complementary. Foreign technology transfer can 
provide new knowledge and serve as a catalyst for technological change, 
enabling firms in developing countries to make quantum jumps in techno­
logical learning. In-house efforts can, on the other hand, raise local capa­
bilities, strengthen bargaining power in transfer negotiations and enable 
recipients to rapidly assimilate imported technology. 
FDI transfers production capability quickly and efficiently, but does not 
necessarily transfer design or innovation capability, particularly when the 
parent company uses affiliates to exploit the local market in host countries. 
Should firms in developing countries then go independent or enter into 
joint venture with technology suppliers? When firms in developing coun­
tries invest aggressively in technological learning and can deepen their 
capabilities, it is better to remain independent of foreign equity participa­
tion (quadrant I in Figure 6.1), particularly when they have a global vision. 
Even if some equity participation is allowed, management independence 
should be maintained. Otherwise (quadrant 3) conflicts can arise between 
the joint-venture partners. When technology recipients are not aggressive 
in technological learning, a joint-venture arrangement is preferable (quad­
rant 4); learning is, however, at the pace set by the foreign parent company. 
As a result, recipients may remain dependent for technology on the parent. 
Foreign licensing in a 'packaged' form from a single source involves little 
risk to the technology recipient, as the supplier guarantees the performance 
of the transferred technology. However, it leads to a passive attitude by the 
recipient in the learning process. In contrast, when the recipient unpack­
ages technologies, acquires them from multiple sources and is responsible 
Strategy for technological learning 
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Figure 6.1 Strategy for technology 
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for integrating them into a workable system, it undertakes significant risk. 
This can subsequently force and motivate the recipient to expedite techno­
logical learning, In other words, when the recipient has adequate tacit 
knowledge, it is better to undertake the integration to force technical per­
sonnel to expedite learning. 
Finally, the Korean experience suggests that the role of GRls should 
evolve over time. In the early years of industrialization, GRls should 
provide the private sector with technical assistance, strengthening its bar­
gaining power in technology transfer and helping it to assimilate and adapt 
imported technology rapidly. At this stage, GRIs should not be evaluated 
in terms of the number of patents or significant research results generated 
and commercialized, but in terms of the number of experienced research­
ers created who could playa role in R&D in the private sector. They should 
also be evaluated in terms of their role in helping the private sector to 
absorb foreign technologies economically and improve them effectively. 
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7. Technology acquisition and 
development in Taiwan 1 
Bee-Yan Aw 
Like many developing countries, the earliest and most common sources of 
new technology for Taiwan were foreign direct investment (FDI), joint ven­
tures, licensing agreements and, more indirectly, technology embodied in 
imports of new capital goods. During the period from 1960 to the mid­
1970s, the process of acquiring and using foreign technology was facilitated 
by the availability of an educated labour force as well as the emphasis on 
the production of goods using relatively simple technologies. However, over 
the past two decades, with the rapid growth of real wages, the focus has 
shifted to new industries characterized by more capital- and technology­
intensive processes. This development implies a significant increase in the 
demand for improved or new local technological capabilities among firms. 
In the quest to stimulate private firms to increase R&D and training 
activities, various government incentives were enacted in 1983 and 1984 to 
enhance the profitability of such activities and to reduce the risk to inves­
tors. The Ten Year Science and Technology Development Plan (1986-95) 
called for R&D expenditures to rise from 1.04 per cent of GNP in 1986 to 
2 per cent by 1995. It also called for an increase in the share of the private 
sector in total R&D from 40 per cent to 60 per cent in this period (Dahlman 
and Sananikone, 1990; Hou and San, 1990). 
In Section I we document the initial conditions of Taiwan's economic 
development and the role of government policy in the early phases of 
industrialization. We also analyse the evolving roles of FDI, R&D and 
export activities in Taiwanese firms, the principal goal being to examine 
their access to technology from abroad and its interaction with firm-level 
efforts to learn new technology. In Section 2, firm-level data on nine of 
Taiwan's manufacturing industries are used to examine the characteristics 
of firms that invest in the three technology-enhancing activities. This reac­
tion also provides insights into the changing importance of each of these 
activities on firms' productivity levels. We also review in detail three recent 
studies that use micro data to examine the technological characteristics of 
Taiwanese firms and the direct and indirect productivity effects of firms 
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that invest in activities such as R&D, exports and FDI. The final section 
provides a summary and some policy conclusions. 
1. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Initial Conditions 
Several historical, political and economic factors have facilitated Taiwan's 
postwar economic development. The most important of these are the 
Japanese colonization of Taiwan (1895 to 1945), the immigration of an 
educated elite from mainland China and the role of US economic assis­
tance. 
The Japanese colonial legacy laid the economic foundations for Taiwan's 
industrial development via the establishment of economic infrastructure 
such as transportation systems, educational development programmes and 
subcontracting and trading networks patterned after the ones in Japan. 
Although these efforts were directed to serve Japan's needs, the result was 
the gradual development of industrial entrepreneurship adapted to func­
tioning in a market economy. The immigration of skilled professionals 
from China in the mid-1940s after the end of Japanese occupation was 
crucial in bridging the skill gap left by the departure of the Japanese admin­
istrators, technicians and skilled personnel. Many of these immigrants were 
wealthy entrepreneurs in the textile and food processing industries on the 
mainland and they were encouraged to re-establish their expertise in tex­
tiles and flour milling, with the assistance of US-financed imports of raw 
materials. 
This early phase of Taiwan's post-war development laid the foundation 
for the rapid growth of Taiwan's industrial sector, with an emphasis on low 
capital intensity industries such as textiles, various food processing indus­
tries, plastics and eleetronics assembly. Levy (1988) identifies highly active 
traders and subcontractors as the primary factor that enabled firms to start 
production with very low initial investment costs compared to their 
counterparts in South Korea. This network of small traders and sub­
contracting relationships, initiated during the regime of Japanese coloniza­
tion, thrived and grew as the economy expanded to include the lucrative 
export market during the 1960s and 1 970s. By 1973 there were four times 
as many export traders in Taiwan as in South Korea. 
In contrast to South Korea where government policy favoured large 
firms, the Taiwanese government encouraged the proliferation of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by requiring foreign investors to hook up 
with local suppliers and assembly operators. Over time, this relationship 
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between foreign investors and small-scale local suppliers developed into a 
viable, efficient and dependable network of small subcontractors able and 
ready to act as local suppliers to foreign investors. Through subcontracting 
with foreign firms, local SMEs acquired the technology needed to produce 
goods of internationally competitive quality as well as having a ready 
market for their output. Thus, the contribution of foreign firms in Taiwan 
goes beyond making improved technology more accessible to local firms. 
They fuelled the development of the intricate network of permanent link­
ages between the local economy and the international economic system. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Taiwan's reliance on FDI has been much higher than in Japan or South 
Korea. Nevertheless, in sheer volume, the direct contribution of FDI to 
Taiwan's economy has not been significant. Since the first inflows of FDI 
into Taiwan in the early I 960s, its share of gross investment in the manu­
facturing sector ranged from 5.56 per cent from 1962-69 and II per cent in 
the period from 1973-94. The bulk of this investment (80-90 per cent) came 
from foreign (non-Chinese) investors and went into electrical/electronic 
and the machinery industries. The average annual rate of growth of FDI 
has fallen from 27.5 per cent in the 1980s to 13.6 per cent from 1990-97 
(Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 Fore(gn direct investment 
Year Value (lJS$ million) Average annual 
growth rate (,X» 
1952-69 420.33 27.2 
1970-79 1832.11 12.7 
1980-89 8697.41 27.5 
1990-97 18038.56 13.6 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) were first attracted to Taiwan 
because of the cheap and disciplined labour force as well as the well­
developed economic infrastructure. Local SME investors entered rapidly 
growing industries, aggressively seeking out foreign partners or, with 
government assistance, entered into subcontracting arrangements with 
MNCs. Hobday (1995) documents that during the start-up phase, many 
Taiwanese companies learned the art of manufacture by relying heavily on 
foreign firms for training and licensing agreements. 
Policies such as local content requirements were used to generate back­
ward linkages and create a market for a host of small local suppliers and 
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assembly operations. This pattern of foreign investors generating a dense 
network of smaIl-scale local suppliers took hold over the years, boosting 
export production and acting as an important channel for the transfer of 
technology through specification requirements. In addition, the growing 
numbers of local SME investors constantly competed for orders from 
foreign firms, resulting in a highly competitive market structure both in the 
domestic and international markets. 
In contrast to the 1960s and early 1970s, when the focus of government 
policy towards FDI was on labour-intensive industries and processes, after 
about 1973 Taiwan's overall economic policies towards FDI shifted toward 
the promotion of more sophisticated, technology-intensive products and 
processes. The single most striking eontrast in the teehnology development 
of Taiwan relative to Korea lies in the market structure that evolved. While 
the major players in the Korean manufacturing sector over the last three 
decades were large conglomerates, those in Taiwan were predominantly 
SMEs. 
The electronics industry is a case in point. Rather than encouraging the 
growth of firms to a size at which they would become capable of undertak­
ing serious technology development, the Taiwanese government took three 
simultaneous steps. First, it encouraged smaller firms to enter into sub­
contracting arrangements with larger foreign firms. Second, it developed a 
specialized infrastructure to stimulate the diffusion of technology to small 
local firms via various state-sponsored institutions such as the factory sat­
ellite system, the Industrial Teehnology Research Institute (ITRI), and the 
Hsinchu Science and Industry Park. Finally, it empowered industry associ­
ations to establish technology links between FDI firms and local producers 
and suppliers. 
Export and local content requirements imposed on foreign firms, 
coupled with the transfer of foreign expertise in the areas of production, 
technical know-how, quality control and management assistance to local 
suppliers led to technological upgrading as well as the necessary backward 
linkages in the local economy (Schive, 1990). In exchange for their exper­
tise, the government ensured an efficiently run subcontracting network, a 
ready supply of relatively inexpensive educated workers, and entrepreneurs 
with the strong potential to reduce the overall cost of production of the 
foreign enterprises. Most importantly, the creation of the Hsinchu Science 
and Industrial Park with its proximity to major universities and the leading 
technology research institute meant that MNCs could benefit from the 
ready availability of skilled personnel in addition to the generous financial 
and fiscal incentives within the park. Another purpose of the park was to 
capture spillovers from the presence of foreign firms in terms of training, 
technology transfer and direct cooperation with local firms. 
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The foreign firms' links with local producers were further strengthened 
by pro-active industry associations. The electronics industry association, 
TEAMA (the Taiwan Electric Appliances Manufacturers' Association), 
aggressively recruited members from both foreign and local firms and, with 
the support of the government, actively promoted the local content pro­
gramme. This programme was instrumental in establishing the link 
between local producers and MNCs (Kuo, 1995). Local producers wanted 
to take advantage of the technology, management skills and sales networks 
of MNCs. Foreign producers stood to benefit from the local content pro­
gramme because it reduced labour and transportation costs as long as local 
supplies met their quality standards. Consequently, the response of MNCs 
was enthusiastic. They began to train local technicians, provide technical 
know-how and management skills to suppliers and cooperate with techni­
cal schools on internship programmes. These links were further strength­
ened through the establishment of production satellite systems, which 
formally connected local producers and MNCs as well as small producers 
of parts and components and large assemblers. 
In sum, anecdotal and case-study evidence indicates that FDI helped 
upgrade the technological capabilities of the manufacturing sector through 
subcontracting and technical cooperation agreements between foreign and 
local producers. In this chapter. we take the existing literature further by 
quantifying both the direct effects of FDI and the indirect effects. the latter 
by measuring the spillover to local firms located in the same geographical 
region as well as in the same industry. 
In addition to linkages created with foreign investors. Taiwan formed 
other important linkages with the wide network of overseas Chinese. These 
overseas Chinese constitute an important source of foreign direct invest­
ment and marketing. The bulk of initial investments into Taiwan came 
from Asia, and local manufacturers relied on the Chinese network to 
market their products in those countries. As Taiwan moved into the high­
technology sector of development, ethnic Chinese living in advanced indus­
trialized countries began to invest in Taiwan and more importantly. to 
provide a source of technical manpower as they returned to work in high­
tech corporations in Taiwan. The government has been very successful in 
luring back overseas Chinese with fiscal and financial incentives. Many 
returning nationals were educated in US and Japanese universities and have 
assumed positions of leadership in large Taiwanese corporations. Their 
strategic role is even more apparent at the Hsinchu Science Industrial Park, 
where the majority of computer companies are owned by overseas Chinese 
or by Taiwanese who used to work overseas (Dahlman and Sananikone, 
1990). 
Despite the policy emphasis on developing this system of intricate net­
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works, the dynamism that fuelled Taiwan's economic growth came primar­
ily from the private sector. In particular, small and large, foreign and 
domestic firms were drawn towards the rapidly expanding export market. 
Exports 
The government's policy of emphasizing exports in the 1960s and 1970s 
stimulated local entrepreneurs to export, initially in textiles and processed 
foods and later in electronics. During this period, as Taiwan's reputation as 
a low-cost, flexible and efficient supplier grew, foreign buyers from large 
retail chains in the USA set up offices in Taiwan to deal directly with small 
manufacturers. Contacts between local producers and foreign buyers were 
frequent and deepened Taiwan's ties with the international community by 
linking local producers with foreign customers. 
More recent research has revealed that these links with foreign buyers are 
more than just sources of demand for Taiwanese goods. They are also 
important sources of foreign technology transfer (Westphal et aI., 1984; 
Pack, 1992). Levy (1994), using detailed field interviews in several develop­
ing countries, concludes that foreign buyers and traders are among the 
most important sources of technological information and support for 
SMEs. Foreign buyers, eager to purchase from cheaper sources, often pro­
vided Taiwanese firms with product designs and technical assistance to 
upgrade their technology and meet their quality standards and specifica­
tions. 
This focus on foreign contacts as a conduit for new information on tech­
nology is based in large part on the observation that the bulk of Taiwan's 
exports are made to order and sold under the foreign buyer's brand names 
(Sease, 1987). In order to ensure better quality, low-cost products, buyers 
such as Walmart and Ie. Penney's were often willing to transmit knowl­
edge from alternative, often OECD-member suppliers and pass on the 
information to local suppliers (Evenson and Westphal, 1995; World Bank, 
1993; Westphal et aI., 1984). According to Evenson and Westphal (1995), 
'a good deal of information needed to augment basic capabilities has come 
from the buyers of exports who freely provide product designs and offered 
technical assistance to improve process technology in the context of their 
sourcing activities. Some part of the export-led development must therefore 
be attributed to externalities derived from exporting' (p. 2264). Through the 
constant adaptation of their production methods to specifications provided 
by foreign purchasers, the authors cite evidence of substantial transfer or 
inflow of non-proprietary technology. 
The industry that has been found to gain most from these opportunities 
and to learn to design new products is electronics (Gee and Kuo, 1998). 
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According to Westphal (2002), the combination here of continuous and 
rapid technological change and clearly articulated supply chains among 
producers has enabled countries like Taiwan to move to higher levels of 
technological development, progressing to more skill- and technology­
intensive activities. Therefore, to the extent that these export-related tech­
nology transfers lead to significant and incremental technological change, 
participation in the export market can be a source of productivity gains for 
the firm. This hypothesis is tested in the empirical exercise for the 
Taiwanese electronics industry in Section 2 of this chapter. 
Research and Development 
The role of R&D in firm-level efficiency was recognized in the early work 
of Allen (1977) and Mowery (1983). They proposed that firms invest in 
R&D to maintain their ability to learn, absorb and use new knowledge, 
achieving a level of technical capability that keeps them abreast of the latest 
technological developments, 
Table 7.2 R&D expenditure indicators 
Year Amount ';:<,ofGDP Ratio of public 
(US$ million) to private 
1986 820 1.01 60:40 
1991 3178 1.70 52:48 
1996 5040 1.85 42:58 
Table 7.2 gives the values of R&D expenditures and their share of GDP 
in 1986, 1991 and 1996. Although R&D expenditures as a share of GDP 
rose from 1 per cent in 1986 to 1.85 per cent ten years later, it is consider­
ably lower than the 2.5-3 per cent in industrialized countries, Exploring the 
efficiency implications of the ways in which firms acquire and effectively 
appropriate technology has important policy implications in NICs such as 
Taiwan, where enterprises are heavily dependent on government and 
foreign sources for new or improved technology. By virtue of their size and 
limited capita!, Taiwanese SMEs have generally ignored the potential value 
of long-term commitment to research and therefore spend little on R&D. 
It is the larger firms that undertake R&D or import technology from 
foreign sources either through joint research or consultancy. 
The Taiwanese government's policy has been to compensate for the 
handicaps faced by SMEs in conducting R&D or buying foreign technol­
ogy by importing technology on their behalf and establishing the infra­
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structure to disseminate technological information. The most innovative of 
these institutions is the Center Satellite Factory system, established in 1984. 
The purpose of this was to form a subcontracting network between small 
and medium-sized firms and large firms, linking them to exploit their 
common interests and mutual benefits. The lead firm would provide tech­
nical assistance to satellite SMEs in exchange for dependable and eventu­
ally low-cost inputs. By 1988, 50 lead firms with 10 15 satellite SMEs had 
been established. 
However, despite the importance of public institutions, recognition of 
the crucial role played by firms in the development of technological capa­
bility is clearly revealed in government policy. Since the early 1980s, poli­
cies have been devised to shift the burden of activities related to the 
upgrading of technology gradually away from the government to firms, and 
to encourage the latter to expend their own resources in acquiring new tech­
nology. Column 3 of Table 7.2 shows that between 1986 and 1996 the share 
of public expenditure in total R&D fell from 60 to 42 per cent. In addition, 
in the 19908 government policy to encourage technology development 
switched from a policy that targeted specific industries such as electronics 
to one that targeted functions, including conducting R&D or manpower 
training and environmental compliance. 
In a 1987 survey, 1406 firms in various industries were asked to indicate 
the most effective government policy for promoting technological deVelop­
ment (San, 1989). Table 7.3 reports the results of the survey. Only a small per­
centage of firms considered fiscal incentives the most effective way of 
advancing their technological capability. The more important forms of 
government assistance were: educating more R&D personnel (18.8 per cent), 
coordinating firms to conduct joint research (18.6 per cent), introducing new 
tcchnology from abroad (17.2 per cent) and transferring technology through 
Table 7.3 	 Firms' views about the most effective lvays in which government 
could promote a satisfactory technology level (%) 
Educating more R&D people 18.8 
Coordination among firms to do joint research 18.6 
Introduction of new technology from abroad 17.2 
Transferring technology through government-sponsored research 15.6 
institutions 
Helping firms to establish their own brand names 8.8 
Offering low-interest loans for R&D activities 7.6 
Tax credits from R&D expenditures 7.8 
Standardization of parts and components nla 
Others nla 
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government-sponsored research institutions (15.6 per cent). These results 
point to the importance of policies involving investments in education and 
R&D manpower development. acquiring technology from abroad via formal 
and informal means, and effective diffusion of technological information 
and R&D results through well-integrated, government-sponsored research 
institutions such as the Industrial Technology Research Institute. The over­
riding goal of investments in R&D, public or private, is to exploit the public 
good property of investments in R&D and aid firms in capturing the spill­
overs of these investments. 
Technology Spillover 
The empirical literature on spillovers falls into several categories defined by 
the units of observation in the data or the source of spillovers. There are 
country studies, patent studies and micro-data studies. Country studies 
such as Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et a1. (1997) use countries as the 
basic unit and explore the transmission of knowledge from one country to 
another. Patent studies such as those conducted by Jaffe (1986) use patent 
data to determine the 'knowledge distance' between two firms and then esti­
mates the effect that one firm's technology investments has on its neigh­
bours' incentive to invest in additional knowledge. Micro-data studies use 
firm-level census or survey data to assess the magnitude of knowledge spill­
overs across firms. Several studies have been done using data on FDI. These 
empirical models hypothesize that foreign firms bring portions of their 
stocks of knowledge with them when they invest overseas and that domes­
tic firms are able to learn from their presence. Examples of these studies are 
Aitken et al. (1997) and Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1998). 
Other empirical models test the hypothesis that firms learn by exporting 
rather than by hosting foreign firms and that their domestic competitors 
benefit from their knowledge. Learning may occur because firms gain 
knowledge about foreign markets or because the importers in developed 
markets share technical knowledge with their suppliers in less developed 
countries. Examples of such studies are Aw et al. (2001), CIeri des et a1. 
(1998) and Bernard and Jensen (1999). 
If the knowledge transmission process takes time, access to a large stock 
of proximate knowledge today is likely to affect future total factor produc­
tivity (TFP) or growth in productivity. Several building blocks are needed 
to specify any testable model of spillovers: a source of spillovers, a measure 
of the knowledge proximity of two firms, and a measure of firm perfor­
mance. 
Most models of international spillovers can be more precisely illustrated 
as in Figure 7.1. 
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Knowledge 
of foreign 
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Figure 7.1 International spillovers 
The knowledge source is a body of knowledge that a firm can access. The 
conduit is the means by which this knowledge is passed to each firm. Figure 
7. I implies that local firms do not have direct access to the knowledge of 
foreign firms. Instead, local firms benefit only from the knowledge of 
similar local firms. The knowledge of foreign firms finds its way into the 
local knowledge pool through FDI, production for export and so on. Thus 
the conduit may be something as simple as a firm observing the successful 
practices of another firm, so that knowledge transmission is facilitated 
between neighbouring firms. Alternatively, firms within the same industry 
(narrowly defined) are more likely to benefit from each other's technologi­
cal activities relative to firms in industries producing very different goods. 
The literature suggests other possible conduits for knowledge such as inter­
mediate goods and labour movements. A firm that incorporates a new 
(higher quality) good into its final product may reap some of the benefit of 
the knowledge used by its supplier. As workers move from one firm to 
another they may transfer knowledge from their old employer to their new 
employer. 
Access to the source of knowledge generally has two effects. First, a firm 
may learn from the body of knowledge and therefore improve its perfor­
mance, and second, it may choose to invest in additional knowledge, the 
feedback effect. The literature suggests many characterizations of knowl­
edge that could spill over from one firm to another. It may be product 
design, production techniques, knowledge of domestic or foreign markets, 
marketing expcrience, knowledge of financing opportunities and so on. In 
terms of policy, the presence of spillover effects on other firms producing 
either for the domestic or export market provides the basis for some form 
of government action to ensure the socially optimal level of technology 
development in the economy. 
In the next section we describe the technological characteristics of 
Taiwanese firms in the Census of Manufactures and survey the empirical 
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evidence to date of the links among FDI, exports and R&D expenditure in 
firm performance. 
2. 	 TECHNOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
TAIWANESE FIRMS 
Incidence of FDI, Exports and R&D by Industry 
Table 7.4 shows the characteristics of the nine major manufacturing indus­
tries in Taiwan for 1986-96. In 1986 and 1996, the electric/electronics 
industry has the highest share of firms with FDI, at 3.5 and 2.1 per cent, 
respectively. A close second is the transportation industry. In any given 
year, the remaining industries have less than I per cent of firms with FDI. 
The variance across industries is smaller for expenditure on R&D, although 
the percentage of firms involved in R&D in the electrical/electronics indus­
try is 10.6 per cent, a figure at least twice that in other industries. The rela­
tively low proportion of firms that report such expenditures suggests that 
only formal R&D and training are being captured by these variables, the 
understatement being most acute in smaller firms where these activities 
tend to be more informal. 
In all industries, a much larger proportion of firms are involved in export 
activity. Throughout the decade 1986-96, the industry with the highest pro­
portion of exporting firms is electrical/electronics, where the share for all 
census years has stayed relatively constant at between 20~22 per cent. 
Cross-Sectional Evidence of the Links between FDI, Exports, R&D and 
Productivity 
There are two papers in the literature that explore the roles of technology­
enhancing activities such as FDI and R&D on productivity using firm-level 
data for Taiwan. The first paper, Aw and Batra (1998), is based on the 1986 
Census of Manufactures while the second paper, Chuang and Lin (1999), 
uses survey data from large manufacturing firms in 1991. 
Using micro-data from the 1986 Taiwanese Census of Manufactures, Aw 
and Batra (1998) estimate the technical efficiency of firms. Firm-specific 
characteristics, which include the firm's own investments in R&D and on­
the-job training, are used to quantify efforts undertaken by firms to assim­
ilate or modify acquired technology. These characteristics are introduced 
into a stochastic production frontier model to obtain consistent estimates 
of the correlations of R&D/training investments and international linkages 
with firm efficiency. Given the apparent importance of foreign technology 
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in Taiwan, they also include characteristics reflecting the firm's links to the 
international marketplace in the form of firm-level export sales and the 
presence of FDI in the firm. 
The results of the paper confirm the positive correlations between tech­
nology investments and firm-level productivity found in other countries 
using recently available micro-data (Tybout and Westbrook 1995 f'Or 
Mexico; Roberts and Tybout 1997 for Colombia and Morocco). Contact 
with foreign purchasers by itself is associated with higher levels of techni­
cal efficiency, particularly in the more modern industries. They also find evi­
dence that firm-level export activities have higher payoffs if accompanied 
by complementary investments in in-house technological capabilities, 
although this relationship appears to be industry-specific. 
More generally the results suggest that efficiency and firm investments in 
R&D/training are positiVely correlated in all industries among both export­
ers and non-exporters. This correlation is significant in 9 out of 10 indus­
tries among non-exporters and in five industries among exporters. Thus, 
although there appears to be an additional 'bang' to exporters from simul­
taneous investments in R&D and job training in some industries, investing 
in R&D and training on its own appears to be significantly correlated with 
higher technical efficiency. 
The results of the Aw and Batra paper suggest that to understand the 
correlation between efficiency and exports (or f'Oreignlinkages more gener­
ally) it is important to account for firm-specific investments in R&D and 
training that increase the capacity to absorb or improve new technology. 
The cross-sectional nature of the data set used in the Aw and Batra paper 
does not allow the authors to make conclusive statements on the issue of 
causality between these technological investments and efficiency. Panel 
data are essential for this. 
Chuang and Lin (1999) also use cross-section data from a random 
sample of manufacturing firms in Taiwan to examine the spillover effects 
of FDI and R&D investments on firm productivity. Using the shares of 
foreign assets (or R&D) at the industry level as their measure of spillover, 
their regression results indicate that both effects are positive and statisti­
cally significant. The authors conclude that the evidence of positive spill­
over effects from FDI in the industry may theref'Ore serve to reduce the 
incentives f'Or local firms to strengthen their technical capability by unilat­
eral investments in R&D. In this chapter, we present an alternative measure 
of spillover that is related more closely with the physical distance between 
firms undertaking an activity than simply aggregate measures of an activ­
ity. 
Table 7.4 Mean characteristics of' Taiwanese manufacturing industries, 1986 
Percentage of firms with 
Industry Number of firms Size Age Capital-labour ratio POI Exports R&D 
Textiles 
1986 7634 37.44 6.44 0.690 0.72 20.0 4.10 
1991 7736 26.47 7.88 1.82 14.0 
1996 6276 23.81 10.07 2.81 0.33 10.5 
Clothing 
1986 3262 44.97 5.47 0.432 0.83 30.0 4.54 
1991 3603 28.27 7.05 1.15 18.2 
-­
00 
c 1996 5176 19.79 9.44 1.83 0.43 12. 
Paper/publishing 
1986 3.91 
1991 I 151 71.57 10.07 3.18 20.0 
1996 1151 73.34 12.86 4.44 23.4 
Plastics 
1986 10387 29.34 5.29 0.560 0.51 20.1 3.47 
1991 13088 17.00 6.63 1.46 12.0 
1996 13648 13.50 9.07 2.26 0.43 10.0 
Iron and Steel 
1986 2837 27.87 6.91 1.23 0.74 12.0 3.56 
1991 4788 23.58 7.57 2.43 7.16 
1996 5656 20.59 9.39 4.16 0.85 8.00 
Machinery 
1986 
1991 
1996 
Chemicals 
1986 
1991 
1996
..... 
Dc 
..... 	 Electric/electronics 
1986 
1991 
1996 
Transport equipment 
1986 
1991 
1996 
9763 
14964 
18458 
980 
3804 
3981 
7504 
11619 
14063 
4076 
5407 
5955 
11.54 
11.30 
10.35 
67.83 
18.17 
15.77 
9.82 
39.74 
38.07 
29.57 
24.49 
24.90 
6.70 
7.15 
8.90 
8.10 
7.84 
10.02 
0.67 
6.44 
8.36 
6.70 
7.76 
9.61 
0.724 
1.80 
2.42 
1.63 
2.09 
2.45 
0.600 
1.51 
2.70 
0.664 
1.65 
2.23 
0.51 
0.47 
4.18 
0.58 
3.53 
2.12 
1.25 
1.18 
12.3 3.28 
9.64 
10.1 
19.0 11.8 
5.31 
4.72 
2.0 10.6 
22.0 
20.0 
17.3 4.69 
13.0 
9.30 
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Panel Data Evidence of Links between «'01, Exports, R&D and 
Productivity 
In this section, we report the results of Aw (200 I) where an attempt is made 
to quantify the direct and indirect (spillover) productivity effects of firm­
level investments in R&D, FDI and exports, The objective of this chapter 
is to see if it is possible to predict higher efficiency or productivity for firms 
that commit their own resources to enhancing their technological capabil­
ity, or that have direct access to foreign technology, or both, Details of the 
empirical model estimated are contained in the appendix, 
Aw (2001) estimates the empirical model for the Taiwanese electronics 
industry using a panel data set constructed for 1986 and 1991. Questions 
regarding the assimilation of foreign technology are especially relevant in 
this industry for several reasons. First, it is Taiwan's fastest growing and 
most dynamic export industry, Output growth in the electronics industry 
skyrocketed after 1985 with exports growing at an average annual com­
pound rate of almost 37 per cent between 1985 and 1988, By the late 1980s 
it was the largest industrial sector, accounting for over 25 per cent of total 
exports and over 5 per cent of GNP in 1987. Second, it is the industry with 
the highest share of exporting firms and firms with FDI and R&D expen­
ditures in the manufacturing sector. Third, the electronics industry has reg­
ularly been cited in the literature as possessing the ideal characteristics for 
export-related technology transfer and has been shown to experience 
extraordinary technology transfer and assimilation. Finally, the industry's 
successful development has had a substantial effect on other industries, 
encouraging new firm entry and the development of foreign market con­
tacts. It has also been the focus of government efforts to stimulate technol­
ogy diffusion through the rest of the manufacturing sector. 
In the empirical model, we also hypothesize that firms located in the 
same industry or geographical region or county as those that engage in 
exports, FDI and R&D investments are more likely to henefit from the 
diffusion of new knowledge associated with these activities. This 'spillover' 
of foreign technology is obtained by taking the number of firms in a given 
county (or industry) that are involved in a given activity divided by the total 
number of firms in the industry.2 
Table 7.5 contains the results of the TFP growth regressions controlling 
for a sample selection.3 Columns 2 and 3 report the results of including the 
spillover variables expressed as participation rates for SMEs and large 
enterprises, respectively. 
The most striking pattern using the participation measure of spillover is 
that the coefficient estimates of the R&D, exports and FDI variables as well 
as two of the six variables used to capture technology spillover are positive 
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Table 7.5 Coefficient estimates of TFP growth regression byfirm size 
Firm size 
Variable Small Large 
TFP growth equation: N=3164 N=416 
Constant -0.195*** (0.058) --0.051 (0.096) 
RD 0.071 * (0.041) 0.021 (0.035) 
Exports 0.039* (0.023) 0.010 (0.063) 
FDI 0.143* (0.089) 0.043 (0.039) 
County RD -0.036 (0.026) -0.031 (0.043) 
Industry RD -0.D35 (0.038) -0.085 (0.058) 
County exports 0.015 (0.048) 0.021 (0.070) 
Industry exports 0.081 ** (0.038) -0.037 (0.070) 
County FDI 0.030** (0.016) 0.030 (0.020) 
Industry FDI 0.018 (0.024) -0.051 (0.096) 
"­ 0.877*** (0.015) 0.828*** (0.045) 
Notes: 
" represents the inverse Mill's ratio retrieved from the survival equation estimated in the /irst 

step. The estimated coefficients of the survival equation in each separate case do not deviate 

significantly from the ones reported in the appendix and are therefore not reported here. 

u* Statistically significant at I'X, level. 

** Statistically significant at 5% level. 

• Statistically significant at 10% level. 
and statistically significant for small firms but not for large firms. For these 
SMEs, the magnitude of the coefficient for FDI is more than three times 
that of exports and one-and-a-half times that of R&D. In addition, a 10 
per cent increase in the share of firms within the county that has FDI 
increases firm productivity growth by 3 per cent, while the corresponding 
figure for exports within each 4-digit industry is much bigger at 8.1 per 
cent. The coefficients for participation in R&D are negative but not statis­
tically significant. 
Given that the three investment activities are generally undertaken by 
larger firms, the presence of industry spillovers in the case of exports and 
geographical spillovers in the case of FDI from larger to smaller firms jus­
tifies policies that recognize the importance of these activities in technol­
ogy diffusion. The evidence is particularly true for FDI and export 
activities since. in addition to the returns to own investments in these activ­
ities, benefits are generated within the industry as well as within geograph­
ical regions. 
Table 7.6 reports the results of the 'pure effects' of the spillover variables 
for exports and FDI by restricting our observations in the regressions to, 
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Table 7.6 	 Coefficient estimates of TFP growth regression for non­
exporters and non-FDlfirms 
Variables 	 Non-exporters Non-FDI 
TFP growth equation: N=2177 N=3423 
Constant -0.342*** (0.078) -0.191 ** (0.053) 
RD 0.142** (0.072) 0.098** (0.031) 
Exports 0.048* (0.022) 
FDI 0.097 (0.252) 
County RD -0.033 (0.033) -0.044 (0.024) 
Industry RD 0.009 (0.047) -0.023 (0.035) 
County exports -0.038 (0.062) 0.033 (0.044) 
Industry exports 0.030 (0.046) 0.059* (0.035) 
County FDI 0.024 (0.021) 0.029* (0.014) 
Industry FDI -0.005 (0.030) 0.012 (0.022) 
l\ 0.906*** (0.015) 0.867*** (0.015) 
Notes: 
'it represents the inverse Mill's ratio retrieved from the survival equation estimated in the first 
step. The estimated coefficients of the survival equation in each separate case do not deviate 
significantly from the ones reported in the appendix and are therefore not reported here. 
*** Statistically significant at 1% leveL 
** Statistically significant at 5%, level. 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. 
first, non-exporters (column 2) and second, firms without any FDI (column 
3). A surprising result from examining column 2 is that the spillover bene­
fits from the export activity within 4-<iigit industries (Table 7.5) do not go 
to non-exporters. In the case of FDI, there is strong evidence of geograph­
ical spillover of county FDI activity to firms without any FDt Thus, in 
contrast with the export activity, there are 'pure' geographical externalities 
from having a larger share of firms that have FDI involvement. 
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
FDI is a traditional channel of technology acquisition by firms in develop­
ing countries. In Taiwan, it has been widely cited as an important conduit 
for firms wishing to upgrade their technological capabilities. Much of the 
transmission of knowledge has been said to occur through subcontracting 
and technical cooperation agreements between foreign and local producers. 
In addition, many researchers also stress the importance of private invest­
ment in technological capability such as R&D and worker training. These 
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researchers propose that firms invest in R&D or on-the-job training to 
maintain their ability to learn, absorb and use new knowledge, thus achiev­
ing a level of capability that keeps them abreast of the latest technological 
developments. 
However, more recent case studies and anecdotal evidence on the acqui­
sition of foreign technology in NIEs strongly suggests that the most impor­
tant conduits for technological diffusion are neither formal R&D nor FDI 
but rather the informal contacts firms have with others in the industry 
through export activity. Proponents of this view claim that the transfer of 
technology related to export activity may be an especially crucial means for 
learning in the SMEs that dominate the Taiwanese manufacturing sector. 
Our review of the few empirical papers based on firm-level data in Taiwan 
reveals several key points. First, the export activity by itself is associated with 
higher levels of technical efficiency, particularly in the more modern indus­
tries. This is consistent with every empirical study that has examined the rela­
tionship between exports and productivity. In addition, exports appear to 
have higher payoffs if accompanied by complementary investments in devel­
oping in-house technological capabilities such as R&D and worker training. 
Second, there is some evidence that there are positive spillover effects of 
industry-level FDI and R&D investments on firm productivity. 
Finally. our examination of electronics firms in 1986 and 199 I indicates 
that export, R&D and FDI are positive direct sources of growth in produc­
tivity. Of the three activities, FDI appears to have the strongest significant 
and positive direct effect on TFP growth. However, in terms of spillover 
benefits from these activities, only FDI and exports provide an additional 
boost to TFP growth. In the case of the export activity, within-industry 
spillovers are reaped primarily by SMEs and among exporting firms. In the 
case of FDI, geographical spillovers are positive and have a statistically sig­
nificant effect on TFP growth of firms without FDI. There is no evidence 
of any geographical spillover from exporters to non-exporters but some 
evidence of within-industry spillover. Coupled with the recent finding that 
it is the 'good' (high productivity) firms that penetrate export markets, 
rather than exports being the 'cause' of higher productivity, our results 
indicate that pure spillover effects, if they exist, are far less important than 
the direct returns to the activity to exporters. 
Given Taiwan's status as a technology latecomer, it is not surprising that 
foreign firms and exporters have higher rates of productivity growth (being 
more exposed to continuing flows of technical knowledge) than firms with 
no foreign equity or non-exporters. Moreover, in industries such as elec­
tronics where the production frontier is shifting rapidly, such knowledge 
transfers have a larger impact on productivity growth for firms that have 
the technical ability and resources effectively to absorb this knowledge 
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(Pack, 1992). To the extent that R&D expenditures fulfil this role, it 
explains the positive and significant relationship between R&D and pro­
ductivity growth. 
These results are consistent with the findings of positive spillovers from 
industry-wide FDI to firm productivity levels in 1991 in Chuang and Lin 
(1999). The key returns to FDI are likely to be a reflection of the success of 
efforts of the government and industry associations in linking foreign inves­
tors with local producers. Concerted efforts by the government in encour­
aging and establishing an efficient system of subcontracting networks have 
contributed significantly to the rapid transfer of technology and the 
upgrading of technology as well as to backward and forward linkages in 
the economy. 
The lesson for other developing countries is that under certain conditions 
FDI can facilitate technology transfer within industries and more impor­
tantly, within regions. These conditions are likely to be closely related to an 
economic infrastructure that includes, for Taiwan, a dense network of local 
producers available to provide the necessary link with the foreign presence. 
This factor may be just as important as the FDI itself. 
R&D by private firms in Taiwan is crucial for building the ability to 
absorb and use imported technology. Given that the era of low-cost acqui­
sition of non-proprietary information has come to a close, firm-level invest­
ments in R&D may assume increasing importance as product cycles 
become even shorter and markets more competitive. Our results suggesting 
the lack of any spillover of firm-level expenditures on R&D to other firms 
in the county or industry may reflect the firm-specific nature of R&D. 
Alternatively, our R&D measure may be an imperfect reflection of firm 
investments in technological capability. 
Finally. our empirical results provide some insights into the sources of 
higher productivity growth among SMEs. In contrast to large firms, all 
three technological activities are positively and significantly correlated to 
TFP growth in SMEs. We also find evidence of geographical spillovers from 
FDI and industry spillovers from export activity among SMEs.4 These 
results are consistent with the literature on the role of SMEs in the indus­
trial development of Taiwan, as enterprises possessing greater flexibility 
and having greater contributions to productivity growth (Levy, 1988; Pack, 
1992) than their larger counterparts. 
APPENDIX 
In this appendix, we summarize the methodology and data used to estimate 
the direct and spillover effects of the three investment activities of exports, 
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R&D and FDI. Further details of the model can be found in a related paper 
by Aw (200 I). 
The principal equation of the empirical model is one describing the 
growth in firm TFP from 1986 to 1991 as a function of firm-level efforts to 
formally or informally accumulate or assimilate advanced technology. This 
is written as 
where the dependent variable is the surviving firm's growth in relative TFP, 
measured as the difference in the levels of relative TFP in 1986 and 1991. 
This is regressed on ZIS, which include three separate dummy variables rep­
resenting the three activities undertaken by firms. These dummy variables 
take on the value of 1 for firms with positive expenditures on R&D, foreign 
direct investments and exports. Given the predominance of SMEs in 
Taiwan, the observations in the estimation work are separated into SMEs 
(firms with 100 or fewer employees) and large employees (firms with more 
than 100 employees). 
In addition to these three dummies we also include six variables that 
reflect the 'spillover' effects of R&D, FDI and exports at the county and 
industry levels. The spillover measures of R&D, FDI or exports are repre­
sented by the share of the number of total firms (in the county or 4~digit 
industry) that record positive values for these variables. These measures are 
useful in determining if productivity is related to the rate of participation 
in these activities. 
Given that TFP growth rates are not observed for those firms that fail 
between 1986 and 1991, only survivors remain in the data set and do not 
represent randomly selected members of the population. The sample selec­
tion problem that results is accounted for using the Heckman (1981) two­
stage estimation technique. The basic results indicate that firms with higher 
initial year TFP levels and higher initial year R&D, FDI and exports are 
more likely to survive into the next period. 
32 is the parameter vector estimated from the growth equation, and Cz is 
the covariance between the disturbance terms in the survival equation 
described below. The expression N(Xi 3 1)/(1 ~M(Xi 3 1» is the inverse Mill's 
ratio, 8, from the survival equation and Nand M are, respectively, the 
density and distribution function for the standard normal random variable. 
The denominator of the Mill's ratio represents the probability that a pop­
ulation observation with characteristics, Xi is selected into the observed 
sample. Recall that this is constructed in order to control for the probabil­
ity of selection into the sample of firms used in the TFP growth regress­
sions. If the disturbances affecting the sample selection are independent of 
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the disturbances affecting the growth equation « '2 0), then 8 may be 
ommitted as a regressor. That is, 3, is an unbiased estimator only if either 
(12 or 8 is zero. In our analysis, all the ZiS, except for exports, are based on 
initial values of the variables in 1986. 
The model estimated above is similar to models estimated by Evans 
(1987), Hall (1987) and Doms et al. (1994). Unlike the Evans and Hall 
models, where the XiS are identical to the Z,s, identification of the param­
eters is achieved through the nonlinearity of the Mill's ratio in Xi and the 
fact that the variables that influence the survival probability are different 
from those that enter into the growth equation in the second stage. To 
control for the likelihood of the problem of heteroskedasticity in the data, 
standard errors that are consistent under heteroskedasticity are con­
structed following White (1980). 
NOTES 
I. 	 I would like to thank the conference participants for very helpful comments and Tor 
Winston for invaluable research assistance. 
2. 	 We also used a second measure of spillover that captures the intensity of an activity by 
taking the sum of export values (or R&D) of other firms in the same industry or region. 
In general. our results are not sensitive to the different measures. The only exception is 
that while the county FDI for large firms is not statistically significant with the participa­
tion measure of spillover, it is statistically significant when spillover is measured in terms 
of intensity. 
3. 	 Our estimation of the survival regression indicates that the inverse Mills ratio represented 
by lambda is large, positive and statistically significant. This suggests that if sample selec­
tion was not controlled, the coefficient estimates of the growth equation are likely to be 
biased. 
4. 	 A possible explanation for why the technology variables are not statistically significant for 
the large enterprises is that large firms in the industry are likely to be more productive 
because of their greater skills and/or better organizational and management capabilities. 
Grouping firms by their size is likely to take these (unobservable) ractors into account, 
blurring the productivity effects or the firm's own investments in technological capability. 
Another possibility is if that firm size is a good proxy for the degree or technological activ­
ity and sharing among firms and that this feature may have a more important effect on its 
productivity growth than the other activities. 
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8. 	 From using to creating technology: 
the evolution of Singapore's 
national innovation system and the 
changing role of public policy 
PohKam Wong 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Singapore has achieved impressive economic growth since independence in 
1965 (Table 8.1). In 1999, and despite the impact of the Asian financial 
crisis, Singapore's per capita GNP stood, on a purchasing power parity 
(PPP) basis, at over US$27000. This was the highest in Asia, even includ­
ing Japan, and globally came behind only Luxembourg, the USA and 
Switzerland (World Bank, 2000). In 1965, Singapore's PPP-adjusted per 
capita income was less than 16 per cent of that of the USA; as recently as 
1980. it was stiIlless than 50 per cent (Wong, 2001 a). 
The rapid economic expansion of Singapore was achieved through con­
tinuous industrial re-structuring and upgrading (Wong, 2001 a). In the first 
decade after independence, growth was led largely by labour-intensive man­
ufacturing. In the two subsequent decades it was propelled by the rapid 
technological upgrading of manufacturing, The development of Singapore 
into an increasingly important business, financial, transport and commu­
nications services hub in the Asia-Pacific region provided additional 
engines of growth (Table 8.2). Nevertheless, manufacturing has remained 
important to the economy, with its share of GDP remaining above 25 per 
cent for most years in the last two decades. 
As in Korea and Taiwan, the growing technology intensity of 
Singaporean industry was supported by significant government initiatives 
in technical manpower development and infrastructure investment. The 
Singapore government was also a lead user of new technologies, especially 
information technology (IT). However, unlike Korea and Taiwan, 
Singapore's technology development was, until recently, largely dependent 
on multinational corporations (MNCs) rather than on indigenous compa­
nies (the chaebol in Korea (Amsden, 1989) and small and medium-sized 
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Table 8.1 Aggregate economic growth performance, 1960-2000 

1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1990-97 1997 1998 1999 2000 

GDP 8.7 9.4 7.1 7.5 8.4 8.5 0.1 5.9 9.9 
Labour productivity n.a 4.3 4.8 3.4 3.6 2.3 -2.7 6.3 5.6" 
('X, real growth per annum) 
...... 
\Q GNP per capita ]960 ]970 ]980 ]990 1997 1998 1999 2000

'" (8$ at current prices) ] 330 2825 9941 20090 39310 38418 39721 42212P 

Notes: 

P Preliminary figures. 

Sources: Calculated from MTI (1990), Yearbook ol Statistics Singapore (1993, 1997,2000), Economic Survey oj Singapore (1998, 2000). Mid-year 
population estimate for 2000 obtained from Singstat website, http://www.singstat.goY.sglFACT/KEYIND/keyind.html. 
Table 8.2 Singapore GDP distribution by sectors, 1960~2000 
Industry 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 1999 
Agriculture & mining 3.9 2.7 1.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Manufacturing 11.7 20.2 28.1 28.0 26.3 25.0 25.9 
Utilities 2.4 2.6 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.7 
Construction 3.5 6.8 6.2 5.4 7.0 7.8 6.0 
"­
Commerce 33.0 27.4 20.9 16.3 17.3 17.3 19.1 
\C 
"'" 
Transport & communication 13.6 10.7 13.5 12.5 12.4 11.1 ILl 
Financial & business services 14.4 16.7 18.9 25.5 25.5 26.2 25.3 
Other services 17.6 12.9 8.7 9.9 9.8 10.8 10.9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: 
Figures may not add up to 100 due to rounding. 

Total GOP excludes owner-occupied dwellings and calculations for taxes and duties on imports and imputed bank service charges. 

Sources: Calculated from MTT (1990). Yearbook of Statistics Singapore (1993. 1997. 2000). Economic Survey of Singapore (2000). 
2000 
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firms in Taiwan (Dahlman and Sananikone 1990». About three-quarters 
of Singapore's manufacturing output in recent years came from MNCs, 
and more than 60 per cent of equity in its manufacturing sector was foreign 
(Wong, 200Ia). Technology transfer from MNCs was therefore the major 
source of technological upgrading in Singapore, not indigenous research 
and development. Publicly funded R&D was also on a smaller scale than 
in Taiwan and Korea. As a result, Singapore's R&D as a ratio of GDP 
lagged behind Korea and Taiwan, let alone most advanced industrial coun­
tries (Table 8.3). 
Table 8.3 	 Comparative R&D indicators, Singapore and selected 
OECD/Asian NIEs 
Grouping Country Year R&D/GDP 
(%) 
RSEIIOOOO 
labour force 
G-5 Japan 
Germany 
CSA 
UK 
France 
1998 
1998 
1999 
1998 
1997 
3.1 
2.3 
2.8 
1.8 
2.2 
96 
60 
74 (1993) 
55 
61 (1996) 
Industrialized 
small 
countries 
Finland 
Switzerland 
Sweden 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Norway 
Australia 
New Zealand 
1999 
1996 
1997 
1997 
1996 
1998 
1997 
1996 
1996 
3.1 
2.7 
3.9 
1.4 
2.1 
2.1 
1.7 
1.7 
0.9 
94 (1998) 
55 
86 
51 
46 
59 (1997) 
76 
66 
35 (1995) 
Asian NIEs Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
1998 
1998 
1996 
1999 
2.5 
2.0 
0.3 
1.8 
48 
66 
na 
70 
Sources: National Science & Technology Board. ST! Outlook (1996. 1998). STI 
Scoreboard (1999). APEC/PECC Pacific S&T profile (1995). Far Eastern Economic Review 
(l4 May 1998). Science & Engineering Indicators (1998), and various national sources. 
Since the late 1980s, however, the pace of science and technology devel­
opment in Singapore has accelerated. The Singapore government has inten­
sified efforts to promote R&D and technology-intensive activities with the 
establishment of a National Science and Technology Board (NSTB) and 
the launching of a National Technology Plan (NTP) over 1991~95. fol­
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lowed by a more ambitious second National Science and Technology Plan 
(NSTP) over 1996-2000, Local companies are beginning to invest more in 
innovation, while an increasing number of MNCs are investing in R&D 
activities and in upgrading manufacturing technologies in Singapore, In the 
new millennium in Singapore, the pace of S&T development is likely to 
intensify, supported by an increasing policy focus on high technology entre­
preneurship and basic research. The national innovation system of 
Singapore is being transformed from one emphasizing the assimilation and 
diffusion of technology through leveraging MNCs to one promoting indig­
enous innovation capability and local high-technology start-ups. 
This chapter analyses the changing structure of Singapore's innovation 
system and S&T policies in response to the needs of global competition. 
The organization of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a 
theoretical framework for analysing the structure of the national innova­
tion system (NIS) and its relationship to economic performance. The 
framework highlights how public policy can shape and influence the 
systcm. Section 3 applies this framework to a stylized analysis of the evo­
lution of Singapore's innovation system over four stages of economic devel­
opment. Section 4 discusses how the role of public S&T policy has changed 
over time to support NIS development and describes the emerging institu­
tional framework for S&T policy coordination in Singapore. Section 5 
highlights the emerging S&T policy challenges facing Singapore. Section 6 
provides a brief conclusion. 
2. 	 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL 
INNOVATION SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
2.1 	 Concept of ~ational Innovation System 
The impact of science and technology policy is best examined by looking 
at innovation systems: how firms and public institutions interact systemi­
cally in building and using S&T resources. A national innovation system 
encompasses all innovative activities, not just formal R&D (DECD, 1993). 
While there is by now a vast literature on NIS in mature industrial coun­
tries (Dosi et al., 1988; Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1992; DECD, 1997), its 
emphasis is on elements relevant to advanced than to developing econo­
mies. The analysis of NIS in late-industrializing countries is just emerging, 
and it suggests the need to adapt the NIS framework to their particular con­
ditions (Kim and Dahlman, 1992; Suh, 1998; Wong, 1999a). 
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2.2 NIS Framework for Small, Late-Industrializing Economies 
This chapter builds upon the analytical framework for NIS in late-industri­
alizing countries proposed in Wong (1 995a, 1999a). Figure 8.1 provides a 
summary view of this framework. In essence, it identifies three key groups 
of innovation actors: the firm, public S&T institutions and the manpower 
development sector. These groups of actors interact with one another to 
achieve the two key objectives: efficiently to build the stock of scientific and 
technological resources; and effectively to allocate and deploy these 
resources to the innovation actors. Technological resources come not only 
and industry I National technological 
linkages • resources 
I Tangible Intangible skills, 
• technological knowledge 
, I assets and creativity 
InternatIOnal. embodied in embodied
-I; - r;r ­ - -1- .... EQUIPMENT AND in PEOPLE 
ans • INTELLECTUALI PROPERTY 
• Technology Labour market 
~ market institutions institutions .1f. I.....•.••• Financial market ,it. institutions Public Public S&T and Manpower R&D 0( Education , development 
and S&T t institutions 
~ Education and ~ 
Regional and global market/competitive 
International linkages 
Social and political Macroeconomic, 
environment 
\ 
trade and financial 
Inter-firm policies I 
Industrial and S&T 
," ........ competitio;n 
\ ," ............... 

Public S&T • r-----"-''--------,"\ Industry and 
manpower 
• linkages 

\

. 
\ International 
.... t -~o;e;;e;;-t ­
. 
\ 
Legend: 
...--"linkages 
-------.. deployment of resources - - - ... (induced) flows of resources 
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Figure 8.1 Analytical framework for national innovation systems 
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from technology development within an economy but also from the import 
or transfer of technology from abroad. Similarly, technologies developed 
within an economy need not be deployed domestically but also overseas. 
Technological resources developed or deployed through innovation can 
be divided into two broad categories: (i) tangible know-how as embodied in 
capital equipment (hardware as well as software) and tangible intellectual 
property as embodied in patents, copyrights, trademarks and so on; and (ii) 
intangible know-how (skills, tacit knowledge and creativity) as embodied in 
people ('humanware'). The creation of tangible and intangible assets takes 
place in all three innovation actors. For example, the development of tech­
nical skills does not take place within formal education and training insti­
tutions alone; it also occurs within firms and R&D institutions through 
learning-by-using (acquired by utilizing a technology) and learning-by­
doing (acquired by engaging in R&D). 
Both technological resource development and deployment consume 
technological as well as non-technological resources. The performance of 
an NIS is thus measured by the effectiveness of deployment (use) as well as 
the development (creation) processes. High development effectiveness is not 
sufficient by itself: if deployment is not effective, the system is left with 
under-utilized (or mis-utilized) technological resources, resulting in low 
returns to development. As termed by Romer (1992), there needs to be a 
good balance between 'using ideas' and 'producing ideas'. 
Figure 8.1 also highlights the importance of effective linkages among the 
three groups of innovation actors. Thus, there has to be close interaction 
between suppliers and buyers or users, technology alliances between firms, 
university-industry R&D collaboration, industry involvement in the design 
of the programmes of training institutions, and so on. Only then can tech­
nological resources be properly developed and deployed in the national 
system. 
An important part of NIS, particularly in small, newly industrializing 
economies, is international technology linkages between local and external 
actors (in other national innovation systems). These linkages can take 
several forms: intra-firm technology transfer between the parent and affili­
ates of a transnational company, arm's-length transactions (equipment pur­
chase, technology licensing and so on), or other intermediate forms of 
technology relationships (for example, international R&D consortia, tech­
nical standards coalitions, cross-licensing of technologies or long-term sup­
plier-buyer relationships). Linkages between actors from different national 
systems provide flows of non-human embodied technological resources 
across national borders. They are also a major driver for international flows 
of technical manpower, through such means as intra-company staff trans­
fer among MNC business units and company-sponsored participation in 
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international conferences or trade-shows. The international flow of techni­
cal manpower also has a dynamic of its own, through voluntary migration, 
education overseas and the return of graduates and experienced employees 
to their home countries. 
2.3 The Role of Market Institutions 
It is useful to conceptualize technology development and deployment pro­
cesses as mediated through market institutions, using the term to connote the 
full spectrum of transactional governance mechanisms, from internal hier­
archies to relational contracting to arm's-length spot markets (Williamson, 
1985). Three interacting sets of markets are critical to the NIS: markets for 
allocating tangible intellectual property, labour markets for allocating tech­
nical skills and talents, and financial markets for allocating risk capital 
(venture capital, 'business angel' capital and so on) to R&D and new ven­
tures and facilitating their exit (public equity market or private mergers and 
acquisition market). These markets tend not to be perfectly competitive, even 
in advanced industrial countries, reflecting the complex nature of technolog­
ical assets and intellectual property, the non-rivalrous nature of knowledge, 
the problem of pricing intangible and tacit know-how and the high degree of 
uncertainty in R&D and venture investments. There has therefore been a 
strong historical presence of public institutions in each of these markets. 
This is particularly true for late-industrializing countries, where private 
market mechanisms are relatively underdeveloped. 
2.4 The Role of Public Policies and Institutions in Shaping NIS 
Most countries have established government institutions and policy instru­
ments to promote S&T development. However, our analytical framework 
suggests that the role of government in NIS is not confined to these special 
institutions and policy instruments. In principle, any government policy or 
institution that aflects the behaviour and performance of any component 
of the NIS should be taken into account, regardless of whether or not it is 
aimed explicitly at S&T development. We can divide the role of government 
into two broad categories: 
(i) 	 The direct role of operating state-owned enterprises, public R&D 
institutions and public education and training institutions. Here the 
government is directly involved in innovation efforts, and its effective­
ness may be evaluated in terms of the amount of technological 
resources created (number of patents and publications or numbers 
trained). In an NIS framework, however, it may be more useful to 
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assess impact in terms of the eventual deployment of the resources 
generated (the number of patents actually licensed or the actual 
employment of graduates). 
Oi) 	 The indirect role of policies and regulatory frameworks that affect the 
performance of the three markets identified above. The policies and 
regulations likely to affect NIS performance include not only 'proxi­
mate' S&T policies such as R&D grants or tax incentives for innova­
tion, but also more general policies that affect the incentive structure. 
This includes incentives of firms to innovate or of individuals to train 
and learn new skills or to start new firms to commercialize knowledge. 
General policies also relate to the efficient functioning of domestic 
linkages (for example, university-industry or inter-firm linkages) as 
well as international ones (MNCs transferring technology to their 
affiliates). The set of relevant policies and institutions is thus rather 
broad. It ranges from macroeconomic policies (for example, interest 
rates or inflation) and financial policies (especially with respect to 
development of venture capital industry and public equity market for 
exit) to trade, industrial and competition policies (controls over tech­
nology export and import, fiscal incentives, foreign investment poli­
cies). It also includes specific technology policies (subsidies for R&D 
in general or in particular areas, incentives for acquisition of certain 
technology goods, training grants for specific skills, intellectual prop­
erty rights protection, and so on). 
Although the NIS literature tends to focus on proximate S&T policies, 
there is no a priori reason to neglect general economic policies that may 
have a stronger effect. For example, macroeconomic stability and trade 
orientation (World Bank, 1993) or competition policy (Porter, 1990) may 
affect innovation more than tax incentives for R&D spending. The phe­
nomenal success of Silicon Valley owes much more to the existence of a 
vibrant venture capital industry, a liquid public market for initial public 
offerings (NASDAQ), and a highly mobile labour market than to proxi­
mate S&T policy interventions. Our analytical framework therefore incor­
porates all the important policies that affect the behaviour of innovation 
actors. In addition, significant political and social changes in the national 
as well as international environments may also have significant impacts on 
the behaviour of actors and need to be taken into account (summarized in 
Figure 8.\). This framework is particularly relevant for analysing NIS in 
developing countries because these countries have less developed market 
institutions as well as less stable macroeconomic policies and less open 
competition and trade policy regimes. 
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2.5 	 Summary 
Our NIS framework distinguishes three groups of innovation actors (the 
firm, public R&D and manpower development sectors) and examines how 
they interact dynamically to create and deploy S&T resources. In this frame­
work, the effect of public and S& T policies on technological development is 
analysed in terms of three market institutions (intellectual property, skills 
and risk capital), The framework highlights the need to consider all policies 
that directly or indirectly affect NIS performance. We adopt this holistic 
approach to study the dynamics of technological change in Singapore. 
3. 	 DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN SINGAPORE'S 
NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM 
3.1 	 Phases in the Evolution of Singapore's NIS 
The evolution of Singapore's NIS can, like its overall economic develop­
ment, be analysed as going through four phases in the last four decades 
(Wong, 2001 a}. 
(a) 	 Industrial take-off The period from the early 1960s to the mid 1970s, 
characterized by high dependence on technology transfer from 
foreign MNCs. 
(b) 	 Local technological deepening. The period from the mid 1970s to the 
late 19805, characterized by rapid growth of local process technolog­
ical development within MNCs and the development of local sup­
porting industries. 
(c) 	 Applied R&D expansion. The period of the late 19805 to the late 
1990s, characterized by the rapid expansion of applied R&D by 
MNCs, public R&D institutions and, later, local firms. 
(d) 	 High-tech entrepreneurship and basic R&D development. The period 
from the late 1990s onwards, characterized by the emerging emphasis 
on high-tech start-ups and the shift towards technology creation capa­
bilities. 
(a) Industrial take-off phase (mid-1960s to mid-1970s) 
The decade after independence from Malaysia in 1965 marked a period of 
rapid industrial take-off based on export-oriented manufacturing by 
MNCs. The tangible S&T resources of Singapore were built primarily 
through the transfer of manufacturing technologies by foreign direct 
investment (FDI) while the intangible (skill) resources were being built 
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through expansion of primary and secondary education and technical 
training institutions and by 'Iearning-by-using' among MNC employees. 
There were few innovation links between MNCs engaged in labour­
intensive manufacturing and the rest of the economy in this period. Few 
local supporting industries existed and the main advantage of Singapore as 
a production base for MNCs lay in the abundant supply of cheap labour. 
The main form of technological learning was skill upgrading in the opera­
tors and technicians working for MNCs. 
(b) Local process technological deepening phase (mid-1970s to late 1980s) 
The mid-1970s saw the beginning of rapid growth of indigenous manufac­
turing process capabilities. The local operators, technicians. engineers and 
managers working in MNCs were no longer just learning to use the tech­
nologies transferred from abroad but were beginning to adapt and improve 
upon them through learning-by-doing. They were also able to absorb more 
sophisticated process technologies. A base of local supporting industries 
began to emerge, and these firms started to invest in acquiring and exploit­
ing imported technologies on their own. in addition to learning from their 
MNC customers through 'learning by transacting' (Wong, 1992. 2001b). 
The development of technical skills shifted from operators to more 
advanced technicians and engineering manpower through the rapid expan­
sion of polytechnics and university engineering courses (Table 8.4). In addi­
tion, Singapore started to attract a large number of tertiary-educated 
manpower from overseas, especially from Malaysia. 
Table 8.4 	 Average output of technical manpower from tertiary education 
institutions in Singapore, 1970-99 (number ofgraduates per 
year) 
1970-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
University level" 680 1040 2162 3198 4863 
Polytechnic levelh 1516 2463 4836 6639 8493 
Total 2197 3504 6998 9837 13356 
University graduates as 31.0 29.7 30.9 32.5 36.4 
percentage of total 
Notes: 

a Includes degree courses from SIM. 

h Includes diploma courses from ISS. 

Sources: Calculated from Singapore Yearbook 0/ Labour Statistics (various years), 
Singapore Yearbook 0/ Manpower Statistics (1997, 1998). 
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(c) Applied R&D expansion phase (late 19808 to late 1990s) 
After the shock of a severe economic downturn in 1985, the manufacturing 
sector recovered in the second half of the 19805. Successive new waves of 
FDI led to the upgrading of manufacturing process technologies, and there 
was a rapid rise in R&D from the late 19805. An increasing number of MNCs 
started to establish R&D activities in Singapore for the first time, alongside 
the establishment of new public R&D institutions and the expansion of 
R&D in tertiary institutions (Tables 8.5-8.7). Some of the more technology­
intensive local firms started to invest in applied R&D. In particular, the 
strong growth of the Singapore Technology Group and other large govern­
ment-linked companies (GLCs) added impetus to local R&D. Much of this 
rapid growth in R&D focused on incremental, applied work. For example, 
much of the R&D in public R&D institutions at this time was to comple­
ment and support MNC operations in Singapore, resulting in low intellec­
tual property creation as measured by patenting and technology spin-offs. 
Table 8.5 Growth of R&D in Singapore. 1978-99 
Year GERD (S$m) GERD/GDP ('X,) RSEs RSEIlOOOO 
labour force 
1978 37.80 0.21 818 8.4 
1981 81.00 0.26 1193 10.6 
1984 214.30 0.54 2401 18.4 
1987 374.70 0.86 3361 25.3 
1990 571.70 0.84 4329 27.7 
1991 756.80 1.00 5218 33.6 
1992 949.50 1.17 6454 39.8 
1993 998.20 1.06 6629 40.5 
1994 1174.98 1.10 7086 41.9 
1995 1366.55 1.13 8340 47.7 
1996 1792.14 1.39 10153 56.3 
1997 2104.56 1.49 11302 60.2 
1998 2492.26 1.76 12655 65.5 
1999 2656.29 1.84 13817 69.9 
Compound average growth rate per annum (0/,,) 
1978-90 25.4 14.9 
1990-95 19.0 14.0 
1995-99 18.1 13.5 
Noles: GERD is gross expenditure on research and development. 
RSE is research scientists and engineers. 
Source: National Survey of R&D in Singapore (various years), NSTB. 
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Table 8.6 Number of organizations performing R&D, 1978-1999 
Year Private Higher Government Public research Total 
sector education sector sector institutes 
1978 63 4 23u 90 
1981 135 4 38a 177 
1984 143 4 20a 167 
1987 191 4 20a 215 
1990 266 5 4 7 292 
1991 311 5 9 6 331 
1992 331 5 13 5 354 
1993 410 6 15 5 436 
1994 427 6 16 5 454 
1995 440 6 14 10 470 
1996 496 6 11 13 526 
1997 508 6 14 15 543 
1998 571 6 13 14 604 
1999 593 6 12 13 624 
Notes: 
a Figures include public research institutes. Definition of government R&D organizations was 
changed from 1990 onwards. resulting in a smaller number of organizations being counted. 
Source: National Survey ofR&D in Singapore (various years). NSTB. 
At the same time local process capabilities continued to deepen, result­
ing in some major MNCs establishing lead manufacturing plants in 
Singapore (for example. Glaxo, Seagate and IBM data storage). An increas­
ing number of MNC plants also took on process technology transfer station 
roles, that is, to provide the engineering to develop new processes to support 
product launches and later to transfer them to other countries. Several 
MNCs (for example, Philips consumer electronics, HP ink-jet printers and 
hand-held computers) also began to locate selected world product charter 
operations in Singapore, with full responsibility for product innovation 
from R&D and product launch to marketing and sales. 
In terms of the development of technological skills, the emphasis shifted 
from technician training to increasing enrolments in technology courses at 
local universities. As shown in Table 8.4, the rate of growth of university 
graduates began to exceed that of polytechnic graduates. Significant tech­
nological development in local supporting industries was induced by the 
MNCs through increasing outsourcing and intensification of 'learning by 
transacting'. Finally, rising R&D provided an important training ground 
for the acquisition of new innovative skills. 
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Table 8.7 R&D expenditure by sectors, 197899 
Year Private Higher education Government Public research Total 
sector (SSm) sector (S$m) sector (S$m) institutes (SSm) (S$m) 
1978 25.5 8.2 4.1 37.8 
1981/82 44.2 24.3 12.5 81.0 
1984/85 106.7 69.6 38.0 214.3 
1987/88 225.6 95.4 53.7 374.7 
1990 309.5 119.7 99.4 43.1 571.7 
1991 442.1 147.1 96.8 70.8 756.8 
1992 577.6 156.0 105.0 110.8 949.5 
1993 618.9 157.3 106.5 115.5 998.2 
1994 736.2 179.5 142.1 1l7.2 1l75.0 
1995 881.4 193.4 110.4 181.4 1366.6 
1996 1133.4 238.7 166.8 253.2 1792.1 
1997 1314.5 277,7 216.1 296.2 2104.6 
1998 1536.1 305.8 299.8 350.5 2492.3 
1999 1670.9 310.0 304.9 370.6 2656.3 
1978 67';10 22% 11'/<, 100% 
1984/85 50% 32'X, 18%, 100°;') 
1990 54% 21% 17"/0 8% 100'% 
1991 58'1., 20'X, 13% 9"//u 100% 
1992 61% 16% 13% 12%, 100% 
1993 62% 16'X, 11% 12% 100% 
1994 63% 15% 12'Yt, 10% 100% 
1995 65% 14% 8% 13% 100% 
1996 63% 13% 9% 14% 100% 
1997 63% 13% 10% 14'% 100% 
1998 62% 12% 12% 14% 100'X, 
1999 63% 12% 12% 14% 100% 
Source: National Survey of R&D in Singapore (various years), NSTB. 
(d) High-tech start-up development & R&D deepening phase (late 1990s 
onwards) 
As the Singapore economy enters the new millennium, another phase 
appears to be emerging: the beginning of high-tech entrepreneurial start­
ups similar in spirit and style to Silicon Valley. Whereas earlier local start­
ups were mainly in manufacturing and primarily as suppliers and contract 
manufacturers to MNCs, the new start-ups were more based on product 
innovation and increasingly focused on IT, software, internet applications, 
biotechnology and life sciences. Venture capital (VC) and business angels 
became increasingly important as a source for funding. As can be seen from 
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Table 8.8 Growth of Singapore's venture capital industry 1985~2000 
Year Cumulative funds Government initiatives to promote VC industry 
under management 
(S$billion) 
1985 0.16 Launch of EDB VC Programme 
1986 0.26 Launch of first major local VC Fund; first Pioneer 
VCawarded 
1988 0.4 Promoted first USVC to set up in Singapore 
1989 0.6 
1990 1.2 Initiated first Seed VC Fund 
1991 2.1 
1992 2.4 
1993 2.6 Initiated Singapore Venture Capital Association, 
EDB as patron 
1994 3.5 Initiated second Seed Fund and set up Regional 
Investment Fund 
1995 5.3 Initiated first Speeialized Communications and 
Media Fund 
1996 6.2 
1997 7.4 Initiated first Specialized Info Tech Fund, and 
Pharm Bio Growth Fund 
1998 7.7 Set up Life Science Investments 
1999 8.8 Initiated third Seed Fund. Set up PLE Investments. 
Launched US$1 billion Technopreneurship fund 
2000 10.2 Launched M-Commerce Fund and launched US$1 
billion fund for life sciences 
Source: EDB Yearbook 199912000. 
Table 8.8, the VC industry began to take off rapidly from the mid-1990s, 
with the cumulative amount of funds managed exceeding S$/O billion in 
2000. In 1999, 71 start-ups received S$252 million of venture capital 
funding, with 50 per cent in information and communications/media tech­
nologies, 15 per cent in electronics, 17 per cent in transportation and logis­
tics, and 12 per cent in industrial products. The cumulative number of 
VC-backed start-ups in Singapore at the end of 1999 was estimated at 375, 
of which 66 had gone public; the majority were technology-based (EDB, 
2000). In particular, spin-offs from universities and public R&D institu­
tions were beginning to increase in frequency. 
Another feature is the deepening of R&D in Singapore with a distinct 
shift towards longer-term, more basic research, away from the prevailing 
emphasis on short-term applied R&D. As Table 8.9 shows, the number of 
Table 8.9 R&D output indicators for Singapore, 1993-99 
No. of patents applied for in the year 
No. of patents awarded for the year" 
Total no. of patents owned as of 31 Decemberh 
Revenue from royalties & licensing of patents/new 
technologies developed in Singapore (S$ million), 
Sales revenue derived from commercialized products/processes 
h..J 
~ attributable to R&D performed in Singapore (S$ million) Sales revenue derived from commercialized products/processes 
attributable to R&D performed in Singapore and launched 
within the last 2 years (S$ million) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
142 
52 
200 
24.34 
263 
58 
204 
23.95 
242 
51 
256 
27.23 
316 
91 
614 
27.34 
490 
132 
831 
26.61 
579 
136 
847 
50.97 
673 
161 
1,077 
671.89 
6381.02 
7.2'%)d 
5035.31 
9647.26 
(9.6'X»d 
6097.24 
13369.92 
(7.6%I)d 
8026.11 
10663.94 
(1O.2IX» 
8060.49 
NOles: 
a 1993-95 is awarded to Singapore organizations only. 
1993-95 is for Singapore organizations only. 
, 1993-95 revenue from royalties and licensing of new technology/products developed in-house (S$m). 
d Percentage of total sales revenue. 
Sources: National Survey of R&D in Singapore (various years), NSTB. 
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patent application doubled in 1996-99, while the number awarded 
increased by 80 per cent. Although stiIllow in comparison with advanced 
countries, the growth of basic research is expected to increase very rapidly 
over the next five years under the new, as yet unpublished National S&T 
Plan 2001-2005. A new US$1 billion Life Sciences Fund was also 
announced in 2000 to accelerate the funding of R&D and technology com­
mercialization in the life sciences. 
In summary, Singapore has shifted over the last four decades from 
emphasizing using technology to creating it (Figure 8.2). Each successive 
phase has built upon the resources accumulated earlier. The momentum 
has continued as new forms of growth were introduced, involving new 
actors and new forms of linkage among existing actors. In particular, there 
was a phased building up of MNCs, local manufacturing enterprises (par­
ticularly in the electronics supporting industries), public research institutes 
and centres (PRICs) and university R&D, and, in the last phase, local high­
tech start-ups pioneering new products. In terms of technology capability 
development, there was a sustained shift from learning to use (with high 
reliance on internal transfer by MNCs) to learning to adapt and improve 
(via 'Iearning-by-doing' within MNCs as well as 'learning by transacting' 
in local firms acquiring external technology), learning to innovate (mainly 
applied R&D in product or process), and finally, learning to pioneer (creat­
ing indigenous intellectual property and commercializing it in the market­
place). 
Technological capability relative to world frontier 
Categories of 
technological capabilities Low~'__..=-c:-___=-::-c:-___c-:-:~_-c-H=-,ig,,-:h:-l 
1970s 1980s I 990s 20008Operating Phase I 
capability 
Adaptive Phase II 
capability 
Innovative Phase III 
capability 
Pioneering Phase IV 
capability 
--Technology capability profile --..Primary profile thrust in each phase 
Figure 8.2 	 Stylized profile of technological capabilities of Singapore 
over the four phases of NIS development 
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3.2 	 The Emerging Characteristics of Singapore's NIS at the Turn of the 
Millennium 
It is useful to look at the emerging structure of Singapore'sNIS at the turn 
of the millennium in terms of the portfolio of technological activities. As 
indicated in a stylized fashion in Figure 8.2, while Singapore's technology 
deployment capabilities (to operate and adapt technologies) are now close 
to the world frontier, its capability to create technologies (to innovate and 
pioneer new technologies) is still lagging considerably behind this frontier. 
While precise measures are absent, the stylized interpretation of Figure 8.2 
is consistent with the ranking of Singapore in 1999-2000 by the World 
Competitiveness Report and the Global Competitiveness Report on a range 
of technological indicators (Table 8.10). Singapore ranks very high (among 
the top five to ten countries in the world) in terms of technology-using indio 
cators. These include the quality of school science and technology educa­
tion, adoption of information and communications technology (lCT), 
licensing of foreign technologies, use of advanced technologies in produc­
tion and process management capabilities. In contrast, its ranking is lower 
in technology-creation indicators like R&D spending and R&D personnel, 
availability of venture capital and intellectual property protection (ranking 
between tenth and seventeenth in the world). It is lowest in specific meas­
ures of innovation like intellectual property generation, quality of basic 
research institutions, product design, entrepreneurship and creation of 
firms (mostly lower than the top twenty). 
Supplementing this ranking, Singapore was ranked fourth in the world 
in 2000 in terms of rCT usage by the Information Society Index (IDC, 
2000). It was found to have product/process innovation performance levels 
comparable to the second half of OECD countries in a recent study by 
Wong et al. (200 I). However, in terms of entrepreneurial propensity, 
Singapore was ranked nineteenth out of 21 countries covered in the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor 2000 study (Reynolds et aI., 2000). Similarly, 
although improving rapidly over time, Singapore was ranked outside the 
top twenty in the world in terms of scientific publications in the Science 
Citation Index. 
Thus, while Singapore still lags considerably behind the world leaders in 
terms of innovation, the structure of Singapore's NIS by the end of the 
1990s has become much more balanced, with technology development 
capabilities catching up with deployment capabilities. 
Emerging pattern of technology deployment capabilities 
There are no direct statistical measures of how advanced the technologies 
deployed by organizations in Singapore are. However, indirect indicators of 
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Table 8./0 	 Singapore's ranking in technological capability-related 
indicators 
Ranking 
Overall competitiveness ranking 	 2 
Overall technological development indicators 
Overall science and technology competitiveness ranking 	 9 
Technology using capability indicators 
Scientific environment* 
Science and education is adequately taught in compulsory schools I 
Science and technology interests the youth of the country 2 
Technology management* 
Technological cooperation is common between companies 8 
Technology transfer between companies and universities is sufficient 3 
Development and application of technology is supported by the legal 
environment 
Qualified engineers are available in your country's labour market 9 
Qualified information technology employees are available in your 6 
country's labour market 
Employee training is a high priority in companies 2 
Process management is emphasised in your country I 
University education meets the needs of a competitive economy 4 
Technology creation capability indicators 
R&D expenditure* 
Total expenditure on R&D per capita 1998 16 
Total expenditure on R&D ('% of GDP) 1998 14 
Business expenditure on R&D per capita 14 
R&D personnel* 
Total R&D personnel nationwide per capita 1998 16 
Total R&D personnel in business enterprise per capita 1998 17 
Intellectual property 
Number of patents granted to residents (average annual number) 1996-97 34 
Number of patents secured abroad by country residents 1997 35 
Patent and copyright protection is enforced in your country 15 
Number of patents in force 1997 12 
Creation of firms is common in your country 15 
Managers generally have a sense of entrepreneurship 19 
Notes: 
Ranking is for 2000 unless otherwise stated. 
* Only relevant indicators are included. 
Source: World Competitiveness Yearbook 2000, IMD. 
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Table 8.10 (continued) 
(b) Global Competitiveness Report 1999 
Ranking 
Overall competitiveness ranking 
Overall technological development indicators 
Technological sophistication 	 Overall, your country is a world leader 9 
in technology 
Technology using capahilit}' indicators 
Maths and science education The school system in your country 
excels in maths and basic science education 
Adoption of new technology The companies are aggressive in 9 
absorbing new technology 
Technology transfer Foreign direct investment is an 2 
important source for technology transfer 
Licensing of foreign Licensing of foreign technology is a 
technology common means to acquire new technology 
Use of computers Use of computers is highly 11 
sophisticated and widespread 
Internet use 	 Do you use the internet at all? 1 (tied) 
Computers per 1000 1997 10 
population 
Production processes Production processes generally employ 9 
the world's best and most efficient technology 
Management use of computers Managers personally use computers 5 
and information technology extensively 
Technology creation capability indicators 
Supply of venture capital Venture capital is readily available for 13 
new business development 
Scientists and engineers Scientists and engineers are prevalent 13 
and of high quality 
Research institutions Scientific research institutions in your 21 
country are truly world-class 
Commitment to R&D Substantial publie resources are 6 
spending committed to non-military R&D 
Private sector spending on The business sector spends heavily on 14 
R&D R&D 
Protection of intellectual Intellectual property is well-protected 13 
property in your country 
Product design Product designs are developed locally 23 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report 1999, World Economic Forum. 
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adoption of new technologies strongly suggest that Singapore has become 
one of the most advanced adopters of new ICTs and manufacturing tech­
nologies in the world. For example, Singapore has a very high rate of diffu­
sion by international standards in computer, internet, broadband and 
wireless technologies (Wong, 1998, 200 I c; IDC, 2000). It also ranks quite 
high in the adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies such as CNC 
machines and robotics (SIAA, 1996; and UNECE, 1997). The pace of 
deployment is generally higher among large firms in general and MNCs in 
particular, with SMEs lagging. However, with the spread of internet tech­
nologies and the rapid recent growth of local start-ups, the pace of deploy­
ment in SMEs has accelerated. 
The public sector has been very aggressive in using new technologies, 
especially IT. Many of the major statutory bodies in Singapore have 
become lead users of technology not just locally but probably in the world 
as a whole. For example, Singapore Airlines, the Port Authority of 
Singapore and Changi International Airport Services all boast world-class 
levels of service. Before privatization, Singapore Telecoms was a fast 
adopter of new telecommunications technologies, resulting in Singapore 
having one of the most advanced telecommunications infrastructures in the 
Asia-Pacific region, The recent liberalization of the telecommunications 
market has further spurred technology adoption in this sector, Although 
these bodies perform relatively little R&D, they are aggressive investors in 
deploying new technologies to improve their competitiveness and quality. 
The same aggressiveness is found in the public sector at large. The Ministry 
of Environment was among the first in Asia to adopt incineration technol­
ogy for waste disposal. The Ministry of Communications was also the first 
in Asia to deploy electronic road pricing. Singapore was among the first in 
the world to automate trade document submission and approval using elec­
tronic data interchange, and has achieved among the highest penetration 
rates of internet filing of income tax returns. 
Emerging patterns of technology development capabilities 
Singapore's gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) had increased seven-fold 
between 1987 and 1999, reaching S$2.66 billion in 1999, or 1.84 per cent of 
GOP (Table 8.5). The number of research scientists and engineers (RSEs) 
per 10000 labour force reached 70 in 1999. Although still behind the most 
advanced OECD countries and Korea, Singapore has overtaken more than 
a dozen OECD countries and has caught up with Taiwan in terms of the 
GERD/GDP ratio. While both the public and private sectors had contrib­
uted to this impressive performance, Table 8.6 shows that private sector 
R&D grew faster from the mid-1980s to the mid- I 990s; thereafter the two 
have grown at a comparable pace, with the share of the private sector 
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stabilizing at around 63 per cent. Within the public sector, the share of 
higher education has declined while that of public research institutes has 
increased. 
In terms of sectors, manufacturing firms account for the lion's share of 
R&D spending, peaking at 88 per cent of total private R&D in 1996 before 
declining to 80 per cent by 1999 (Table 8.11). Manufacturing R&D efforts 
were highly skewed, with over 60 per cent concentrated in the electronics 
sector in 1999, followed by precision engineering (over 20 per cent) and 
chemicals (close to 10 per cent). This is consistent with the fact that elec­
tronics and IT have been the most important and dynamic sectors since the 
1980s, which in turn stimulated the precision engineering industry. 
Among private firms, MNCs account for the bulk (56 per cent) of R&D 
spending, though the share of local firms has grown over time (Table 8.12). 
Reflecting the concentration of MNCs in electronics and chemicals, the 
largest share of their R&D is in these two sectors, which accounted for close 
to two-thirds of their total R&D. The dominance of MNCs in R&D is also 
most pronounced in these industries: over 69 per cent in electronics and 79 
per cent in chemicals (Table 8.13). Unlike MNCs, local enterprises have 
more diversified R&D activities. While the two largest industries, electron­
ics and precision engineering, together accounted for 58.2 per cent of local 
enterprise R&D in 1999, there was also sizeable R&D in IT and communi­
cations, light industries and transport engineering. 
Among the local firms that engage in R&D, we can distinguish three 
groups. The first consists of the more technically advanced SMEs operat­
ing in supporting industries to MNCs, particularly precision engineering. 
Good examples include Amtek (metal stamping), MMI (precision metal 
engineering), Meiban and Lixin (precision plastic moulding), Gul technol­
ogy and Circuit Plus (printedlflexible circuit board), and Venture 
Manufacturing and Omni Industries (contract manufacturing). The main 
focus of their R&D is to improve manufacturing process capabilities to 
meet the stringent quality, cost and delivery demand of their MNC custom­
ers, although a small number have also started to diversify into product 
innovation. 
The second group consists of the state-controlled enterprises set up to 
spearhead local participation in high-tech industries. Called 'govern­
ment-linked companies' (GLCs), these companies have strong financial 
backing from holding companies established by the government and have 
been able to commit significant resources to innovation. The more signifi­
cant players include companies within the Singapore Technology Group, 
Sembawang Group, Keppel Group and Natsteel Group. The Singapore 
Technology Group, for example, has subsidiaries engaged in aerospace 
repair/maintenance engineering (ST Aerospace), semiconductor fabrication 
Table 8.11 Distribution ofprivate sector R&D expenditure by industry, 1993~99 
Total R&D spending by industry (S$m) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Manufacturing 
Electronics 
502.1 
318.1 
580.0 
361.3 
729.7 
433.7 
1000.2 
603.1 
1110.1 
625.8 
1335.4 
741.5 
1336.0 
756.1 
tv 
.....
..., 
Chemicals 
Engineering 
Precision engineering 
Process engineering 
engineering 
Life sciences 
34.4 
104.1 
69.5 
7.7 
26.8 
24.8 
54.4 
123.2 
93.1 
6.5 
23.6 
38.6 
79.6 
171.7 
131.8 
15.2 
24.7 
34.4 
177.0 
168.8 
120.6 
13.8 
34.4 
37.9 
202.6 
208.7 
148.8 
12.1 
47.8 
58.3 
166.4 
348.7 
295.0 
9.6 
44.1 
63.8 
126.6 
340.1 
276.1 
9.7 
54.4 
89.7 
Light industries/other manufacturing 20.8 2.4 10.3 13.4 14.6 15.1 53.5 
Services 116.7 156.3 151.7 133.2 204.4 200.7 304.8 
IT and communications 20.0 23.9 41.6 103.8 134.5 141.1 176.9 
Finance & business 
Other services 
26.6 
70.2 
70.1 
62.3 
38.2 
71.9 
14.7 
14.6 
28.4 
41.5 
21.2 
38.4 
31.2 
96.7 
All industry groups 618.89 736.2 881.4 1133.4 1314.5 1536.1 1670.9 
Table 8.11 (continued) 
Total R&D spending by industry 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Manufacturing 
Electronics 
81.1 
51.4 
78.8 
49.1 
82.8 
49.2 
88.2 
53.2 
84.5 
47.6 
86.9 
48.3 
80.0 
45.3 
tv 
...... 
"'­
Chemicals 
Engineering 
Precision engineering 
Process engineering 
Transport engineering 
Life sciences 
5.6 
16.8 
11.2 
1.2 
4.3 
4.0 
7.4 
16.7 
12.6 
0.9 
3.2 
5.2 
9.0 
19.5 
15.0 
1.7 
2.8 
3.9 
15.6 
14.9 
10.6 
1.2 
3.0 
3.3 
15.4 
15.9 
11.3 
0.9 
3.6 
4.4 
10.8 
22.7 
19.2 
0.6 
2.9 
4.2 
7.6 
20.4 
16.5 
0.6 
3.3 
5.4 
Light industries/other manufacturing 3.4 0.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 3.2 
Services 18.9 21.2 17.2 11.8 15.5 13.1 18.2 
IT and communications 
Finance & business 
3.2 
4.3 
3.2 
9.5 
4.7 
4.3 
9.2 
1.3 
10.2 
2.2 
9.2 
1.4 
10.6 
1.9 
Other services 11.3 8.5 8.2 1.3 3.2 2.5 5.8 
All industry groups 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: National Survey of R&D in Singapore (various years), NSTB. 
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Table 8.12 Foreign companies' share of industry R&D expenditure, 
1993~99 
Year Share in total private R&D ("/.,) 
1993 67.6 
1994 74.5 
1995 64.3 
1996 67.0 
1997 61.2 
1998 55.8 
1999 55.8 
Source: National Survey 0/ R&D in Singapore (various years), NSTB. 
Table 8.13 Foreign companies' share of industry R&D expenditure, 1999 
Industry group (1) Foreign (2) Local (3) Total (1 )/(3) 
majority owned majority owned R&D 'X, 
companies companies spending 
(S$m) (S$m) by industry 
(SSm) 
~~-..--..--..--.-­
Manufacturing 780.99 585.1 1366.0 57.2 
Electronics 518.32 237.8 756.1 68.5 
Chemicals 99.89 26.7 126.6 78.9 
Engineering 102.41 237.7 340.1 30.1 
Precision engineering 84.13 191.9 276.1 30.5 
Process engineering 6.02 3.7 9.7 61.8 
Transport engineering 12.26 42.1 54.4 22.6 
Life sciences 58.55 31.1 89.7 65.3 
Light industrieslother 1.82 51.7 53.5 3.4 
manufacturing 
Services 151.84 153.0 304.8 49.8 
IT and communications 71.17 105.7 176.9 40.2 
Finance & business 18.98 12.3 31.2 60.8 
Other services 61.69 35.0 96.7 63.8 
All industry groups 932.83 738.0 1670.9 55.8 
Source: 1999 National Survey of R&D in Singapore, NSTB. 
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(Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing), electronics systems integration 
(ST Engineering) and computer software systems (SCS). The Natsteel 
group has diversified from steel making into electronics contract manufac­
turing (Natsteel Electronics and Natsteel Broadway). 
The third group of local enterprises consists of a small but rapidly 
increasing number of entrepreneurial high-tech start-up firms that seek to 
pioneer innovative products through R&D and brand development. Early 
examples of such firms include PC firms such as IPC and GES, audio-card 
firms such as Creative and Aztech, industrial electronics firms such as 
Powermatics, Teledata and Eutech Cybernetics, machine tool makers and 
industrial machinery makers such as Excel Machine Tools and Falmac, 
software companies such as CSA and Ednovation, and pharmaceutical! 
biotech firms such as Genelabs and Zagro. Although most of these are 
independent start-ups, some are also ventures financed by large local con­
glomerates trying to diversify into high-tech industries. for example, 
HawPar HeaIthcare Products belonging to the HawPar group, and 
Wearnes Technologies belonging to the Wearnes group. Over time, larger 
firms have absorbed some of these independent start-ups (for example, 
Eutech Cybernetics has been acquired by CSA, which in turn has been 
acquired by an American software giant). 
More recently, a second wave of start-ups is emerging, particularly in the 
IT, telecommunications, internet and e-commerce areas. Unlike the earlier 
start-ups where the founders had typically worked in industry (especially in 
MNCs). the new wave of entrepreneurs tend to come from tertiary institu­
tions and public R&D institutions. Examples include more than 10 internetl 
e-business start-ups by former staff of the National Computer Board (for 
example. Silkroute, WizOffice and CommerceAsia); a dozen spin-offs from 
the Kent Ridge Digital Lab (KRDL), a public software R&D institute (for 
example, Third Voice, Transparity. BuzzCity); and about two dozen 
high-tech spin-offs by professors from the National University of 
Singapore (for example, ReasonEdge, iDNS). At the height of the internet 
boom, many Singaporean entrepreneurs chose to start up in Silicon Valley 
(for example, ECNet) or to list on the NASDAQ (for example, Interwoven). 
Although the bursting of the internet bubble and the consequent meltdown 
of NASDAQ dampened the rate of internet start-ups (as happened world­
wide) the number of spin-offs from university and public R&D institutes 
continues to grow. 
The growing technological capabilities of Singapore can also be gauged 
in terms of patents and revenues from product or process innovation. Table 
8.9 shows that the total number of patents filed by Singapore-based organ­
izations (including foreign affiliates) increased from 142 in 1993 to 673 in 
1999, while the numbers granted increased from 52 to 161. In 1999, revenue 
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derived from commercialized products and processes attributed to R&D 
performed in Singapore amounted to 10.2 per cent of total revenues of the 
R&D-performing companies, up from 7.2 per cent in 1996. Revenues gen­
erated from licensing intellectual property to outside parties have also 
increased steadily over the period 1993-99. 
4. 	 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC S&T POLICY IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF SINGAPORE'S NIS 
4.1 	 Historical Overview of Science and Technology Policy in Singapore 
Public policies have played a major role in shaping Singapore's NIS. 
However, until the late 1980s, much of the impact came from general eco­
nomic policies on industrial growth and upgrading rather than from 
narrow S&T policy instruments. Indeed, until 1991 Singapore did not have 
a formal institution to develop and implement science and technology 
policy. A Ministry of Science and Technology was formed in 1968, but its 
role was marginal and it was closed down in 1981. Most of the ministry's 
duties were passed to the Singapore Science Council (SSC), established in 
1967 to promote scientific research and public interest in science. However, 
the role of SSC continued to be quite limited, and mainly of an advisory 
nature. Most programmes were carried out through implementation agen­
cies in the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTl) and the Ministry of 
Education. It was only when the SSC was reorganized in 1991 to form the 
National Science and Technology Board (NSTB) that an overall organiza­
tional framework for integrated science and technology policy implemen­
tation was established. 
Despite the lack of a formal S& T framework for much of the period, 
technological upgrading was a central focus of much of economic policy­
making in Singapore even if the policy instruments were not labelled as 
such. The political leadership always displayed a clear understanding of the 
importance of technological upgrading in sustaining growth, but until the 
late I 980s, it was believed that Singapore should focus its resources on 
exploiting available technologies from advanced countries rather than on 
innovating. This focus was particularly in evidence through the 1970s and 
19805. For example, in the aftermath of the 1985 recession, a high level 
Economic Committee was formed to chart a strategy for economic recov­
ery. In the strategic document produced by this committee (The Singapore 
Economy: New Directions), the focus on promoting technology deployment 
was explicitly stated: 'our goal should be to achieve higher value-added, not 
high technology per se' (MTl, 1986, p. 147). Similarly, in the National 
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Information Technology Plan (NITP) in 1985 and the National 
Automation Masterplan in 1988, the overriding goal was to promote the 
diffusion and utilization of IT and advanced manufacturing technologies 
to boost productivity, Even though both plans called for some modest 
investment in R&D institutions (establishment of the Information 
Technology Institute (ITI) as an R&D arm under the National Computer 
Board (NCB) and expansion of the GINTIC Institute for Manufacturing 
Technology (GIMT)), they were geared primarily to providing R&D 
support to the technological upgrading needs of industry, 
The strong policy focus on promoting technology deployment did not 
entirely preclude the promotion of technology creation, Indeed, as early 
as 1980, the national budget for the first time provided tax incentives for 
manufacturing companies that undertook R&D in Singapore and for the 
R&D institutes that worked with them. An Initiatives in New Technology 
(INTECH) scheme was established in 1984 to make loans for the partial 
or full funding of research projects, even though its primary objective was 
to support companies sending their staff for training in high technologies 
such as robotics, microelectronics, IT, biotechnology, optical and laser 
technology, engineering science and materials science (Chng et al., 1986). 
Nevertheless, the level of public commitment to R&D remained low 
through the 1980s, and was confined largely to scientific research in public 
universities and defence R&D, both of which had little commercial linkage 
to industry. 
The first significant recognition of the economic importance of R&D 
came in 1989 when a Committee of Ministers of State was formed to 
outline the long-term strategy and direction of Singapore's development. 
The result was The Next Lap', which highlighted the need to focus on 
R&D and specialization in high-tech niches (Government of Singapore, 
1991). The importance of innovation gained more recognition in the 
Strategic Economic Plan formulated in 1991 (MTI, 1991). This new empha­
sis on S&T led to the formulation of the first Five Year National 
Technology Plan (NTP) and the establishment of an entirely new statutory 
board, the National Science and Technology Board (NSTB) in 1991. The 
intention was to promote industrially relevant R&D, build up S&T man­
power, and develop an S&T support infrastructure. A S$2 billion allocation 
was given. This was followed by the formulation of a second five year plan 
in 1996, called the Second National Science and Technology Plan (NSTP), 
where the budget allocation was doubled to S$4 billion, and where the 
importance of investing in science was recognized in addition to technol­
ogy. 
While the second NSTP intensified public investment in R&D and 
emphasized the development of scientific research capabilities, there was no 
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real change in strategic direction from the earlier plan, Two major develop­
ments in the global environment in the second half of the 1990s prompted 
the government to introduce more drastic policy changes with respect to 
S&T development. The first was the financial crisis in mid-1997, which sig­
nificantly affected investor confidence in East Asia in general and neigh­
bours like Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in particular. The severity of 
the regional economic downturn prompted the government to establish a 
high-level Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness (CSC) in early 1998 
to formulate urgent short-term policy measures as well as long-term strat­
egies. The deliberations of the CSC took into consideration another trend 
in the global economy: the emergence of the 'New Economy' where growth 
was seen as increasingly driven by knowledge-based innovations and 
technology-based entrepreneurship. Thus, by the time the CSC released its 
report towards the end of 1998, the shift of emphasis towards technologi­
cal innovation has become central. The acceleration of knowledge-based 
industrial growth through investing in innovation and promoting 'techno­
preneurship' (high-tech entrepreneurship) had become the cornerstone of 
Singapore's economic development strategy. 
Reflecting these strategic thrusts, several new policy initiatives were 
announced in 1998. These included the Industry21 strategy by the Economic 
Development Board, the Manpower21 master plan by a newly enlarged 
Ministry of Manpower (MOM) to promote skills upgrading and accelerate 
the attraction of foreign talents, and the Technopreneurship 21 (or T21 for 
short) initiative to foster high-tech start-ups. In response to the completion 
of the Genome Mapping project, the government announced in late 2000 a 
strategic push to promoting life sciences research and industry development 
with the launch of a US$1 billion Life Sciences Fund. 
The most significant of these initiatives was the T21 strategy, repre­
senting a significant departure from the traditional reliance on leveraging 
foreign MNCs. Several factors prompted the leadership to embark on such 
a radical change. First and foremost was the Asian financial crisis. This 
raised concerns about the need to diversify markets and achieve greater 
penetration of European and North American markets. This clearly 
required Singapore to have a higher technological competitive edge. 
Secondly, given currency devaluations by regional neighbours, Singapore 
would be subject to even greater cost pressures. To stay competitive without 
lowering standards of living, Singapore needed to sharpen its technologi­
cal edge with respect to regional competitors. Finally, the leadership had 
become increasingly impressed by the Silicon Valley model of high-tech 
innovation (including the successful Israeli and Taiwanese variants) as the 
key to success in the global knowledge-based economy. 
These considerations led to a new consensus in the political leadership 
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that Singapore needed to supplement the leveraging model with the promo­
tion of technopreneurship. First articulated by the deputy Prime Minister, 
Dr Tony Tan, in late 1998, the T21 initiative was subsequently fleshed out 
by a high-level inter-ministerial committee (T2l Committee for short) 
chaired by him. Unlike previous strategic action plans, the T2l initiative did 
not come in the form of a detailed document. Instead, the T2l committee 
(together with a private-sector led committee chaired by a very successful 
local technopreneur, Mr Sim Wong Hoo, the founder of Creative 
Technology) met regularly and introduced a series of policy changes, 
directing NSTB or other government agencies to implement them. 
Although somewhat ad hoc, the T2l initiative led not only to a major 
restructuring of the NSTB (to become the lead agency implementing T21 
programmes) but also to the announcement of changes to a range of busi­
ness regulations that were thought to stifle start-ups. These included 
changes to bankruptcy laws, the revision of regulations and taxation gov­
erning company stock options and new tax offset provision for losses 
incurred by investors in high-tech start-ups. A public US$1 billion 
Technopreneurship Fund was launched in 1999 to stimulate the develop­
ment of Singapore as a regional venture capital hub. 
The breadth and comprehensiveness of the policy changes proposed 
clearly shows that the government was taking a holistic view of the high­
tech entrepreneurship challenge rather than framing the response in narrow 
S&T terms. Thus, although the government may have come to the realiza­
tion somewhat late, it appeared to be moving decisively once the decision 
had been taken to shift direction. 
Despite the NASDAQ meltdown in April 2000 and the worldwide 
decline in venture capital funding for high-tech start-ups thereafter, the 
Singapore government remained firmly committed to promoting the 
growth of local high-tech firms. None of the T21 policies had been with­
drawn. The bursting of the internet bubble did make policymakers realize 
the need for start-ups to have truly innovative technologies and defensible 
intellectual property, and hence the need to raise basic research and inno­
vative capabilities. This is reflected in the new third National S&T Plan 
200l~2005, which has not only increased the budget allocation to S&T 
(from S$4 billion to S$7 billion) but has also allocated a larger proportion 
to long-term strategic and basic research. 
4.2 The Changing Role of Public R&D Institutions 
Compared to Korea and Taiwan, public R&D in Singapore has tradition­
ally been smalL For a long time, public R&D was concentrated at the 
National University of Singapore (NUS) the only university in the 
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country until the early 1990s and the Singapore Institute for Standards 
and Industrial Research (SISIR) formed in the I 970s. Other public 
research institutes were set up only after the late I 980s. Table 8.7 shows the 
growth of the public research institutes and centres (PRICs) since then 
in terms of R&D spending. Over 1990-99, R&D spending by PRICs 
grew nearly ninefold, faster than the growth of private R&D. By 1999, the 
13 PRICs accounted for over S$370 million (or 14 per cent) of R&D 
spending. 
The initial mission of the PRICs was to develop the applied technologies 
deemed critical for the industrial clusters in existence in Singapore. In addi­
tion, some institutes had to develop core competencies in the new generic 
technologies (for example, IMCB in molecular and cell biology, CWC in 
wireless communications) needed to attract new high-tech industries. The 
emphasis on applied R&D can be seen in Table 8.14: only 13.6 per cent of 
R&D in 1999 was in basic research, compared to 36.3 per cent for applied 
R&D and 50 per cent for experimental development. 
Table 8.14 Deepening oj Singapore's R&D system 
1993 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Pereentage of Masters and PhD 
holders among RSEs (FTE) 
Pereentage breakdown of 
R&D expenditure: 
Basie research 
Applied research 
Experimental development 
39.3 43.5 41.6 44.1 44.1 
16.1 1l.8 12.8 12.3 13.6 
39.1 39.6 43.8 34.4 36.3 
44.9 48.7 43.3 53.3 50.1 
Source: National Survey of R&D in Singapore, respective years. NSTB. 
The tertiary institutions (two universities and four polytechnics) raised 
their R&D by nearly three times over 1990--99 to reach S$310 million by 
the end of the period. While the R&D portfolio of the universities was sup­
posed to be skewed towards basic scientific research, in reality they were 
under great pressure to do more applied R&D for industry. The key perfor­
mance criteria for university academic staff was international journal pub­
lication, but the extent of technology licensing to the private sector and the 
number of R&D collaborations with industry were also used to evaluate 
R&D by tertiary institutions. 
The rapid growth of the PRICs met the quantitative targets of public 
R&D spending and manpower, but it is unclear how effective their activ­
ities were. Moreover, their changing role over time may have led to a 
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number of problems. First, PRICs were initially asked by NSTB to spin off 
high-tech start-ups. This appears to have been hastily implemented without 
working out the eonflict with the objective of licensing existing companies. 
Some PRICs began to keep technologies they had developed from being 
licensed and to encourage their staff to start companies to commercialize 
the technologies, receiving sizeable equity ownership in these start-ups. 
Secondly, the PRICs did not have incentives to cooperate with each other 
in research or in technology or market intelligence gathering and intellec­
tual property management. 
In response to these problems, the government introduced an institu­
tional restructuring in early 2001. The responsibility for implementing T21 
was taken out of the hands of NSTB and transferred to EDB. NSTB was 
reorganized to focus on promoting research and developing R&D man­
power through the formation of two new councils. The Bio-Medical 
Research Council (BMRC) was set up to award research grants and develop 
R&D manpower in the life sciences, and the Science and Engineering 
Research Council (SERC) to do the same in selected scientific and techno­
logical fields. In effect, NSTB's role became more like that of the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) in the USA, focusing on fostering research 
excellence and R&D manpower. Technology commercialization policies 
were left to EDB. 
4.3 The Changing Role of Manpower Development Institutions 
Public policies have played an important role in technical manpower devel­
opment (see, for example, Soon 1992; Wong, 1995b). Singapore has one of 
the best systems of industrial and vocational training in the world, trans­
forming its unskilled workforce into a highly skilled one over only two 
decades. While primary and secondary education was critical to the devel­
opment of skills, the task of upgrading industrial manpower was per­
formed by vocational and technical training institutions. The early 
development of industrial vocational training programmes under the 
Institute for Technical Education (lTE) was an important source for skill 
upgrading in the take-off phase. In the second phase of industrial develop­
ment, manpower development policy shifted to more advanced training 
through a range of specialized industrial training programmes in such 
areas as computer numeric control (CNCs), precision machining, tool and 
die making and robotics. A distinguishing feature of many of these pro­
grammes was that they were established and run as collaborative ventures 
between EDB and reputed overseas partners. Some were with well-known 
MNCs (Philips, ABB and Seiko). Others were collaborations with 
highly-regarded industrial training institutes: the French-Singapore 
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Institute cooperated with the French Electrical/Electronic Industry 
Federation, and the German-Singapore Institute with the German Agency 
for Technical Cooperation. 
In the third phase, some training programmes were upgraded in content 
(for example, the French and German collaborations were improved and 
absorbed into the polytechnic system). A number of new specialized tech­
nical training programmes were also established, including the Institute of 
Systems Science (ISS), the Information Communications Institute of 
Singapore (ICIS), the Japan Singapore Artificial Intelligence Centre 
(JSAIC) and the Automation Application Centre (AAC). 
The changing emphasis of skill development policy can be seen in Table 
8.4, which tracks the growth in annual output of tertiary technical man­
power. While polytechnic output grew faster than university output in the 
1980s, the order was reversed in the I 990s. In addition, there were a large 
number of part-time tertiary diploma and degree programmes operated by 
overseas universities on a 'distance learning' basis. However, most of these 
were in non-technical fields, with the result that the total number of tech­
nical graduates from these programmes was relatively small and confined 
largely to IT-related fields. 
To respond to the rapid advances in technology and changing demand 
for technical skills, local universities and polytechnics had constantly to 
revise their curricula for degree programmes. This process was facilitated 
by a strong industry presence on the advisory councils of these institutions, 
the policy of encouraging competition among them and a growing empha­
sis on international benchmarking. In addition, the EDB established a new 
Capabilities Development Division to pro-actively fund new training pro­
grammes based on its targeting of new industries and its knowledge of 
potential new inward FDI. For example, in anticipation of semiconductor 
wafer fabrication FDI in the second half of 1990s, the EDB funded new 
programmes for rapid training of wafer fabrication engineers in local uni­
versities and by attachment overseas. 
To supplement local manpower supply, the government consistently 
adopted a liberal immigration policy to attract overseas skills, The focus of 
this policy was initially to allow MNCs to bring expatriate managerial and 
technical expertise to facilitate the start-up of new operations. Over time, it 
was broadened to aUract a range of professionals to handle subsequent 
MNC operations. As R&D expanded, the government increasingly focused 
on attracting foreign scientists and engineers to work in the PRICs. By 
1999, 17.3 per cent of the scientists and engineers engaged in R&D in 
Singapore were foreign. However, this is a gross underestimate: it does not 
include the sizeable number that had been offered permanent residence and 
were not counted separately (NSTB Annual Report, 2000). China and the 
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Indian subcontinent provided the bulk of the foreign experts working in 
Singapore. 
Despite industry concerns about shortages of R&D manpower, the 
government appears to have played a relatively effective role in increasing 
the supply of such manpower in a very short period. Nevertheless, as 
Singapore continues to deepen its R&D efforts, the existing institutions 
need to undertake even greater changes. NUS has recently revamped its 
salary and promotion structure to make itself more globally competitive in 
attracting and keeping star researchers. The university admission system 
has also been revamped to become less examination results oriented. so as 
to encourage greater creativity. University curricula are being revised to 
inject a more liberal arts elements and make students more rounded. 
Technopreneurship elective courses and business plan competition have 
been introduced to encourage greater interest in start-ups. 
4.4 	 The Changing Public Policy Roles in Promoting Linkages among 
Innovation Sectors 
Linkages and interaction among innovation sectors are important determi­
nants of the performance of any national innovation system. In Singapore. 
policy appears to have played a significant role in promoting such linkages. 
but its effectiveness has been uneven, with evident gaps when compared to 
the advanced countries. The linkages that were most actively promoted 
were those between MNC subsidiaries and their parents or associates over­
seas. The principal device used was investment incentives tied to the intro­
duction of higher value-added operations or to the training of local staff. 
The government also offered incentives to MNCs to send Singaporean 
engineers to headquarters to acquire new technical skills. 
Linkages between industry and education and training institutions were 
also quite strong, particularly at the polytechnic and industrial training 
level. Indeed. close consultation with industry and the anticipatory plan­
ning and rapid response of the government to meet industrial skill needs 
have been important contributing factors to the rapid industrialization of 
Singapore (Soon and Tan. 1993). The government did not hesitate to 
recruit expatriates with significant MNC experience to head new training 
institutes. Indeed, many of the early industrial training institutes were run 
jointly by MNCs to establish a reputation for their programmes. 
Linkages between public R&D institutions and tertiary training institu­
tions also appear to be strong. Academic staff at the universities and poly­
technics hold the dual function of R&D and teaching, and much of their 
research findings can be transferred into the teaching curriculum. Most 
PR ICs are housed in universities and many principal investigators in their 
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R&D programmes are drawn from the academic staff of the universities. 
These linkages will be further strengthened under the newly reorganized 
NSTB. 
In contrast, linkages between the universities/PRICs and the enterprise 
sector were less developed, at least until the late 1990s (Wong, 1999b). To 
encourage R&D collaboration between industry and PRICs, NSTB set 
targets for the PRI Cs to recover a certain proportion of their costs from 
funding by industry. NSTB also monitored the performance of the PRICs 
in terms of extent of patenting, licensing of technologies to private indus­
tries and joint R&D with private firms. However, because of the gestation 
time needed for PRICs to establish their core capabilities, the extent of link­
ages between PRICs and private industries began to increase only in the last 
3-4 years. Partly to protect proprietary technologies, many MNCs looked 
to their headquarters and associate companies for technological needs. 
They also preferred to tap R&D subsidies offered for in-house R&D, so 
that they would own the intellectual property generated. 
Inter-firm innovation linkages between enterprises have also been rather 
weak, but have strengthened since the late 1980s. This is particularly so for 
linkages between local suppliers and MNC buyers. These relationships have 
contributed significantly to technological development of local firms (Wong 
1992, 1999c), less through the deliberate efforts of MNCs to transfer tech­
nology than through the exposure to their procedures and technologies in 
the buyer-supplier relationship. Long-term supply relationships also helped 
reduce the risk of investing in new technologies to the suppliers, contribut­
ing to greater technological effort by local supporting industries. 
Various studies (Wong, 1999c; Soon, 1992) indicate that the government 
played an important role in facilitating links between MNCs and local sup­
pliers through such programmes as the Local Industry Upgrading 
Programme (LIUP) implemented by EDB. Wong (l999c) documents how 
the LIUP contributed to the rapid technological development of precision 
engineering firms supplying MNCs making hard disk drives. More recently, 
through the Industry Cluster Development strategy, EDB has facilitated 
joint ventures and technology alliances between Singaporean firms and 
major MNCs in several high-tech industries, including semiconductor 
wafer fabrication and chemicals. 
In contrast, inter-firm innovation linkages among local firms have been 
much weaker. There are few reported cases of joint R&D among local 
firms, and the kind of R&D consortia found in Taiwan and Japan have 
been largely absent in Singapore. There had also been few reported cases of 
industry-wide collaboration in technology deployment. There appears to 
have been inadequate policy attention to promoting innovation collabora­
tion among local enterprises. Despite some recent attempts at promoting 
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R&D consortia by some PRICs (for example, IME and DSI), the extent of 
inter-firm collaboration pales in comparison to countries such as Taiwan 
and Finland. 
4.5 	 Public Policy Role in Promoting the Development of Venture Capital 
Industry 
A key component of a national innovation system is institutions providing 
risk capital for technological activity. As MNCs provided risk capital in the 
early years of Singapore's development, there was little need to develop 
financial institutions to support high-technology investment. The financing 
needs of local SMEs were met mainly through the conventional financial 
institutions. The government did, however, support SMEs with various 
subsidized loan-financing schemes, particularly to subsidize investment in 
new technology and innovation. 
It was only from the mid-1980s that the government began to promote 
the venture capital (Ve) industry. Even then, the effort consisted mainly of 
investment incentives to attract foreign VCs to set up in Singapore, with 
very small-scale injection of public funds into the industry (unlike the case 
of Taiwan). It was in the first half of the 1990s that the government began 
to playa more active and direct role in the VC industry, creating new funds 
such as Vertex Management and EDB Ventures. The real growth of the VC 
industry occurred towards the late 1 990s (see Table 8.11), with the growing 
interest of European, American and Taiwanese VC companies in Asia. The 
establishment of new public VC funds in 1997-98 contributed to the 
growth, culminating in the US$1 billion Technopreneurship Fund to 
induce leading VCs to use Singapore as their regional operation hub and 
train a core of experienced VC professionals. The Fund had been success­
ful in attracting several leading US VCs to Singapore (for example, Draper 
Fisher Jurvetson, Crimson Ventures). 
To encourage start-ups, the government also relaxed listing requirements 
on the national stock exchange in 1999, making it easier for new ventures 
to access the market without stringent track records. The flow of Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs) by high-tech start-ups increased following this 
policy change, although several Singaporean start-ups have chosen to list 
in NASDAQ. NSTB also started a programme of promoting business 
angels through a tax incentive and co-investment scheme. These initiatives 
have enabled Singapore to establish itself as the preferred location for VC 
regional hub operations in Southeast Asia, but in terms of the volume of 
venture deal flows Singapore still lags considerably behind Taiwan. 
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4.6 The Changing Institutional Framework for S&T Policy Coordination 
One of the key challenges for S&T policy is to ensure coordination 
between S&T policies and other economic policies on the one hand, and 
coordination among different S&T policies on the other. The institutional 
framework for coordinating S&T policymaking and implementation in 
Singapore has undergone considerable changes over the years. The key 
principle, which the government appears to have adopted in designing the 
institutional framework for S&T policy, appears to have stayed constant. 
This has been to subsume S&T policymaking and implementation largely 
within the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI), the ministry most 
directly responsible for promoting economic development. This not only 
simplifies the coordination between S&T and other policies, it facilitates 
the coordination of policy implementation. This arrangement has given 
strong coherence to policies supporting NIS development in Singapore. 
However, it may also have delayed the shift towards more upstream, 
longer-term basic research capabilities. 
EDB - Economic Developmem Board DSTA - Defence Science and Technology Administration 
NSTB - ~ational Science and Technology Board DTG --- Defe_ncc Technology Group 
PSB - Productivity and Srandards Board DSO - Defence Science Organization 
IDA - Infocomm Develupment AuthQrity 
Figure 8.3 	 Emerging institutionalframeworkfor S&T policy in 
Singapore as of2001 
Figure 8.3 shows the institutional framework for coordinating S&T pol­
icies in Singapore at the turn of thc millennium. With the exception of the 
Ministry of Education (MOE), which oversees public education at al1levels 
as well as funding of basic research at universities, the other major agencies 
responsible for economic development are all under MTI together with the 
National Science and Technology Board (NSTB). These include EDB, the 
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Productivity and Standards Board (PSB), the Trade Development Board 
(TDB) and, until very recently, the National Computer Board (NCB). 
Virtually all the major policies to promote the technology development 
in Singapore fall under one or more of the agencies within MTL Besides 
EDB, TDB and PSB, whose functions fall naturally within trade and indus­
try development, MTI also oversaw the National Computer Board (NCB) 
and the National Science and Technology Board (NSTB). NCB was origi­
nally established under the Ministry of Finance in the early 1980s to 
promote computerization in the public and private sectors. By the 
mid-1980s, with the formulation of a comprehensive National IT Plan 
(NITP), NCB became the lead agency to implement the plan. Its role was 
thus expanded to include the promotion of IT industry, the development 
and training of IT professionals and the promotion of IT culture and 
awareness among Singaporeans. In the late 1980s, NCB expanded its 
mission further by establishing an R&D arm, and its IT industry promo­
tion and manpower development roles also expanded, with the agency 
transferred to MTI for better coordination. In the early 1990s, another IT 
plan (called IT2000) was formulated, calling for the establishment of a 
broadband national information infrastructure (NIl) to transform 
Singapore into an 'intelligent island' by 2000. NCB was put in charge of 
spearheading the implementation of this plan. 
The decision to establish the National Science and Technology Board 
(NSTB) in 1991 within MTI reflects the strategy of the government to make 
R&D policies industrially driven. NSTB was established with the mandate 
to plan and manage the development of PRICs and to design and implement 
programmes to promote private R&D. In addition, the board was entrusted 
with R&D manpower development, planning and managing the develop­
ment of S&T infrastructure such as science parks and incubators, and intro­
ducing policies to promote an environment conducive to innovation. In its 
first five years of operation (1991-95), NSTB was given a S$2 billion R&D 
fund, doubled to S$4 billion for the second period (1996--2000). 
Reflecting the applied orientation of the policies and programmes of 
NSTB, the first National Technology Plan (NTP) for 1991-95 did not even 
include the word 'science' in its title. It was only in the second plan for 
1996-2000 that NSTB recognized the importance of science. Even then, the 
key focus remained promoting short to medium-term technological devel­
opment. As shown in Figure 8.4, the second plan stilI envisaged the bulk of 
NSTB funding would go into building short to medium-term technologi­
cal leadership for Singaporean industries. Funding for longer-term R&D 
had to be justified on the ground of strategic relevance. In monitoring the 
performance of PRICs, external financing was used as an important indi­
cator of the relevance of the R&D performed. 
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Besides subsuming S&T policy largely within MTI, the Singapore 
government set up ad hoc high-level inter-ministerial committees from time 
to time to formulate strategic action plans in response to perceived exter­
nal challenges or opportunities. The 1986 'New Directions' Action Plan 
(following the 1985 recession), the 1991 Strategic Action Plan (SEP) (fol­
lowing the formulation of The Next Lap vision statement), and the 1998 
esc Action Plan (following the Asian financial crisis) are examples of such 
action plans. It is through such strategic action plans that the context and 
impetus for new S&T policies are defined. Singapore is different from most 
other developing countries in that there are no regular five-year develop­
ment plans. The system is more flexible, with strategic responses formulated 
and implemented as the need arises to maximize the speed of reaction to 
deal with unexpected threats or to capitalize on new opportunities. 
This concentration of S&T resources in MTI notwithstanding, there has 
been some increase in S&T resources given to other ministries over the last 
three years. A new Ministry of Manpower (enlarged from the old Ministry 
of Labour) was established in late 1997 to better coordinate manpower 
development policies. It took over some industrial manpower development 
functions previously performed by EDB. Three other ministries have also 
begun to have an influence over S&T development. First, the Ministry of 
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Defence, which has a large budget for defence-related R&D, has been 
looking at dual-use technologies. In anticipation of the need to establish 
linkages with private industry, a Defence Science and Technology Agency 
(DSTA) was established in 1999 to corporatize defence R&D functions. 
Second. in 1999, the government recognized, somewhat belatedly, the 
growing convergence of computers and telecommunications. It transferred 
NCB to an enlarged Ministry of Information and Communications 
Technology (MICT) and merged it with the existing telecommunications 
regulatory authority (Telecommuncations Authority of Singapore or 
TAS), forming a new entity called the Infocom Development Authority 
(IDA). Although IDA's primary mission was to promote infocom technol­
ogy deployment rather than development, its policies will have a strong 
influence on internet-related innovations. Despite speeding up the pace of 
telecommunications deregulation in recent years, MICT needs further to 
liberalize competition policies to stimulate innovation. For example, the 
government has stopped short of merging the Singapore Broadcasting 
Authority (SBA) (which regulates the media and broadcasting industry 
under the Ministry of Information and the Arts) with IDA, despite the 
growing convergence of broadcasting with telecommunications. Finally, 
with the growing importance of life sciences and healthcare, the Ministry 
of Health is expected to playa more important role in promoting life sci­
ences R&D. 
The greater involvement of these ministries in S&T development will 
increase the complexity of coordination in the future. As a step towards a 
more pluralistic approaeh, the government, in its Third National Science 
and Technology Plan (2001-2005), established two new research councils ­
the Biomedical Research Council (BMRC) and the Science and 
Engineering Research Council (SERC) in NSTB. These will better coordi­
nate and manage public sector R&D from basic to applied research and 
across PRICs and institutions of higher learning. NSTB is restructured to 
play more of an R&D funding role, with greater autonomy from short-term 
industry concerns, while its previous T21 responsibilities and private R&D 
incentive functions are being corporatized or transferred to EDB. It is 
hoped that this restructuring will enable more public resources to be 
invested in longer-term upstream research capabilities. 
Finally, we must mention the role of other ministries and government 
bodies in promoting technology deployment. While the other ministries do 
not directly shape S&T policies, most have an active policy to deploy new 
technology in the agencies under their jurisdiction. As mentioned, all 
government agencies involved in the provision of public infrastructure have 
been aggressive in deploying new technologies. This is part of the overall 
'total business hub' strategy of the government to ensure that the public 
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sector contributes to the productivity of the economy by providing 
world-class services. All parts of the public sector are constantly bench­
marked against global 'best practice' to ensure that the public sector main­
tains a high level of productivity. While this management philosophy has 
the beneficial effect of putting pressure on agencies to exploit new technol­
ogies, it may have an inherent bias towards conservatism: it encourages 
public agencies to become fast followers, but not necessarily pioneers in 
adopting new technologies. In particular, in the classic 'make or buy' 
choice, the policies of some agencies may be slanted towards procuring 
proven technologies from foreign suppliers rather than supporting the 
development of new but unproven technologies by indigenous firms, espe­
cially small local start-ups. 
To overcome this conservative mindset, the government has started to 
experiment with new incentive schemes to fund proposals for radical inno­
vations in public services too risky and unproven to be adopted within the 
normal administrative system. Whether such experiments will become 
institutionalized remains to be seen. 
4.7 Summary Assessment of the Impact of Public Policy 
Despite the significant role of policy in Singapore, there have been few 
systematic empirical studies to assess the impact of these policies on the 
development of technological capabilities. The rapid advancement in tech­
nological capabilities in Singapore relative to other developing countries 
that were at comparable levels four decades ago suggests that policies were 
important. However, it is difficult to isolate the contribution of various pol­
icies and programmes. Methodologically, any attempt to do this should be 
based upon a comparative analysis across countries. An attempt of this sort 
was made by McKendrick et aI. (2000), examining the impact of policy on 
the development of technological capabilities in the hard disk drive indus­
try in Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia. The inadequate attention to 
external policy evaluation and impact assessment by the government has 
contributed to the paucity of independent public research. 
In the absence of comprehensive evaluation, the finding of Young (1992) 
that Singapore achieved almost zero total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
over 1960~80 became very controversial, raising questions about the viabil­
ity of Singapore's development model. However, Hsieh (1997) has ques­
tioned the validity of Young's findings, highlighting problems with the 
capital data used by Young. Hsieh's estimate of Singapore's TFP (using a 
different method) was substantially higher. More recent estimates of 
Singapore's TFP growth in the 1980s and 1990s all yield substantially 
higher values (Collins and Bosworth, 1996; Rao and Lee, 1996; Singapore 
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Department of Statistics, 1997; MTI Economic Survey of Singapore, 
2001). On balance, empirical evidence appears to support the view that 
TFP performance in Singapore was low but not zero in the 1980s, adding 
about 1.5 per cent to annual economic growth (about 20 per cent of the 
total economic growth of 7.1 per cent over the period). TFP performance 
improved substantially in the 1990s, adding about 2.5 per cent economic 
growth per annum, or about one-third of the total growth of 7.5 per cent 
for the period. 
Even if Singapore's growth up to the 1980s can be accounted for largely 
by growth in inputs, with little TFP contribution, this does not negate the 
importance of investment in technology absorption capability. Indeed, the 
rapid growth achieved by Singapore in the 1970s and 1980s (over 7 per cent 
per annum) required a rate of absorption of new capital and labour inputs 
that had been rarely witnessed elsewhere. It would not have been possible 
without absorption capability being developed correspondingly. 
The fact that Singapore began to register higher TFP in the 1990s is con­
sistent with the empirical observation that Singapore did not begin to invest 
substantially in R&D until the later 19805. Recent econometric estimates 
by Toh and Wong (2001) show that R&D contributes significantly to TFP 
growth from the mid-1980s to 1997. Another recent study (Wong and He, 
2001) using data from a cross-sectional survey of over 100 manufacturing 
firms performing R&D, shows that R&D support programmes had a sig­
nificant impact on innovation performance after controlling for the inter­
nal climate for innovation of the firms concerned. While much more 
empirical research remains to be done, the available evidence does point to 
a positive role of government policy in technological development. 
5. 	 EMERGING S&T POLICY CHALLENGES AND 
RESPONSES 
Singapore's NIS has to be transformed at an even faster pace in the future 
than in the past. To spur this, the government has to continue to make sig­
nificant changes to S&T policy. The recent policy shift towards greater 
emphasis on technopreneurship is a welcome change from the previous 
focus on technology transfer from MNCs. However, this policy shift by 
itself is likely to be inadequate. Four supporting S&T policy changes need 
to be made in the medium term. 
First, the government needs to continue to raise investment in R&D to 
levels found in advanced industrial countries. Second, this must be accom­
panied by a significant shift in the focus from incrcmental, applied R&D to 
basic research. Third, thc existing funding and management mechanisms 
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for the PRICs and research at institutions of higher learning need to be fine 
tuned. Related to this, new policymaking capabilities need to be developed 
to enable the introduction of new policies and programmes. Fourth, the 
government needs to playa more pro-active role in promoting international 
cooperation and networking with other advanced countries in R&D. 
5.1 Intensification of R&D investment 
Despite the steady growth in R&D in recent years, with the GERD/GDP 
ratio rising from less than 1 per cent in 1990 to 1.84 per cent in 1999, 
Singapore's R&D intensity remains lower than in industrial countries and 
Korea (though, as noted, it has caught up with Taiwan). Given its smaller 
size and the need to achieve minimum critical mass in most areas of scien­
tific and technological endeavour, it is even more important for Singapore 
to increase its R&D intensity to the levels of advanced industrial countries. 
In this regard, it is instructive to look at the rapid growth in R&D intensity 
in small countries like Finland and Israel, contributing to the recent 
improvement in their global competitiveness in high-tech industries. 
5.2 Shift towards More Basic Research 
Besides raising overall R&D. there is an urgent need to shift resources 
towards the development of basic research capabilities. In contrast to the 
prevailing emphasis on applied R&D, Singapore needs to emphasize the 
development of basic research capabilities that can provide more radical or 
breakthrough solutions, or that anticipate future problems of industry. It 
is through the tapping of such basic yet economically relevant R&D capa­
bilities that Singaporean companies can hope to achieve more durable com­
petitive advantages. Without a concomitant investment in basic research 
capabilities, the T21 strategy may run the risk of producing too many 'me 
too' type of start-ups that lack technological depth and hence are likely to 
be overwhelmed by global competitors. The leading regions of high-tech 
entrepreneurial vitality in the world, especially Silicon Valley and Israel, 
invariably feed on wellsprings of leading edge technologies which are gen­
erated by a strong focus on basic research capabilities. 
Because private firms are unlikely to invest heavily in basic research, the 
development of basic research capabilities must remain a major responsibil­
ity of the public sector. This is the case worldwide. In Singapore, this means 
that PRICs need to shift their R&D portfolio towards programmes with 
longer gestation but greater potential for high pay-offs. More importantly, 
there is a need to boost the basic R&D budget in local universities. Despite 
significant progress, the level of basic R&D funding at the two universities 
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in Singapore remains signifieantly below those of the major state univer­
sities in the USA. An increase in the basic R&D budget is also needed to 
attract top foreign talent, which can then draw good doctoral students and 
post-doctoral fellows to build critical mass. To ensure that investment in 
basic research does not become completely 'blue-sky' and unfocused, 
however, a portfolio management approach needs to be adopted. This will 
combine a stronger focus on selected areas where Singapore can be a centre 
of global excellence while allocating funds to novel research. In addition, 
'use-inspired basic research' is needed to focus research on problems with 
significant industrial impact. 
5.3 Mechanisms for Funding and Managing Public R&D Institutions 
The criteria for selecting R&D programmes for funding and evaluating 
R&D performance differ, depending on whether the R&D concerned is 
largely applied or incremental work or with longer-term basic research. 
With a shift towards basic research, NSTB needs to evolve new funding and 
management mechanisms and incentive structures. In addition, potential 
conflicts within PRIes between maximizing technology diffusion and spin­
ning off companies of their own need to be addressed. Better intellectual 
property management and technology transfer practices need to be estab­
lished and pooled to avoid unnecessary duplication. Finally, incentives 
need to be introduced to encourage PRIes and universities to cooperate 
with one another as well as with industry partners through eonsortia. 
S&T policymaking and evaluation capabilities and accountability mech­
anisms need to be established within NSTB and MTI. The combination of 
consultation with industry and international advisers, benchmarking 
against best practice, setting clear performance objectives and frequent self­
monitoring of programme relevance has been eflectively used in the past. 
However, these need to be supplemented by more rigorous policy research 
and impact studies, as the sophistication of policy instruments increases 
and the relationship between policy instruments and industry becomes 
more complex. There is also the need to use more independent researchers 
to evaluate public policies and programmes. 
5.4 Promoting International R&D Cooperation and S&T Networking 
To become a viable player in global R&D competition, R&D institutions 
in Singapore need to develop more collaborative partnerships with leading 
R&D institutions overseas. This is particularly so in view of the latecomer 
nature of Singapore in many advanced R&D areas, and the limited pool of 
domestic R&D talents. The government can playa catalytic role in helping 
235 The evolution of Singapore's N IS 
local R&D institutions to establish closer networking and colIaboration 
with carefully targeted partner institutions in Europe, Japan and North 
America. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
If there is one primary lesson to be drawn from Singapore's experience for 
other small developing countries, it is the need to combine long-term stra­
tegic commitment to upgrade technological capability with an institutional 
capability for flexible and rapid policy change. This apparently paradoxical 
combination, termed Strategic Pragmatism (Schein, 1996), appears best to 
capture the essence of the success of Singapore in technological develop­
ment. This institutional capability covers not only implementation but also 
the ability to transform institutions as circumstances change (Wong, 
200Ia). 
A second important lesson is the need for a proper sequencing of differ­
ent types of technological capabilities over time. Rather than devoting too 
many resources to basic R&D at the start, developing countries should focus 
initially on building operational and adaptive capabilities. It is only after a 
firm foundation for such capabilities has been laid that investment in R&D 
becomes viable. A country like China may have overemphasized investment 
in basic R&D in earlier years when many local enterprises lacked the capa­
bilities and incentives to exploit upstream knowledge. On the other hand, 
developing countries should not become too complacent in relying on FDI 
in manufacturing, and delay investing in indigenous innovation for too long. 
Our analysis suggests that Singapore may have erred in this regard com­
pared to countries like Taiwan and Korea, although the problem may be 
more serious for other economies with a high reliance on FDI like Malaysia 
and Hong Kong. A comparative analysis of the NIS characteristics of 
Singapore with other FDI-dependent countries may be instructive. 
A final lesson of Singapore's experience is that the effectiveness of NIS 
is influenced by not just the proximate S&T policies, but also the wider 
industrial, trade and competition policy framework. Although this paper 
has focused on proximate S&T policies, in Singapore these are in a context 
not often found in developing countries. Singapore has been exceptionally 
open to trade and investment. It has enjoyed political and social stability 
and sound macroeconomic policies. It possesses an efficient, relatively cor­
ruption-free public service which is professionally run and attracts highly 
talented staff. It has invested heavily in physical and social infrastructure, 
education and training. Without these contextual factors, similar S&T pol­
icies may not work well, if at all. 
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Despite its achievements, the path ahead for Singapore is likely to be much 
more difficult as it competes increasingly against not just regional neigh­
bours and other NIEs but also advanced countries in technologically 
advanced industries. In seeking to evolve its S&T strategies, Singapore could 
therefore do well to study the experience of other advanced countries. 
However, while certain elements of the institutional models that have worked 
well in places such as Silicon Valley, Finland or Israel can be borrowed and 
adapted, wholesale duplication is not possible. The national innovation 
system evolves in a path-dependent manner and needs to respond to the 
unique endowments and contexts of each country (Nelson, 1993). In the 
final analysis, therefore, the key S&T policy challenge for Singapore will be 
to evolve its own unique vision of how a small country can compete in 
global. knowledge-intensive industries. To borrow the terminology of Romer 
(1992) once again, the two paths to economic development - using and pro­
ducing ideas - need to be increasingly integrated in a virtuous cycle. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Ms Annette Singh 
in the compilation of data for this study. 
REFERENCES 
Amsden, A. (1989), Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Tndustrialization, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chng, M.K.. L. Low, A. Tyabji and B.N. Tay (1986), Technology and Skills in 
Singapore. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Studies. 
Collins, S. and B. Bosworth (1996), 'Economic growth in East Asia: accumulation 
versus assimilation', Brookings Papers in Economic Activity, 2, 135-204. 
Dahlman, c.J. and O. Sananikone (1990), 'Technology strategy in the economy of 
Taiwan: exploiting foreign linkages and investing in local capability', mimeo, 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
Dosi, G.. C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg and L. Soete (1988), Technical 
Change and Eronomic Theory, London: Frances Pinter. 
Eeonomic Development Board (various years), EDB Yearbook. Singapore: EDB. 
Economic Development Board (2000), The Singapore Venture Capital Tndustry 
Survey 1999. Singapore: EDB. 
Government of Singapore (1991), The Next Lap, Singapore: Government of 
Singapore. 
Hsieh. c.T. (1997), 'What explains the industrial revolution in East Asia? Evidence 
from factor markets', unpublished paper, Department of Economics, University 
of California, Berkeley. 
IMD (2001), H/or/d Competitiveness Report 2001, Lausanne, Switzerland. 
237 The evolution of Singapore's NIS 
Kim, L. and C. Dahlman (1992), 'Technology policy for industrialization: an inte­
grative framework and Korea's experience', Research Policy, 21: 437~52 
LundvaJl, B. A. (ed.) (1992), National Innovation System, London: Frances Pinter. 
McKendrick, D.G., R.E Doner and S. Haggard (2000), From Silicon Valley to 
Singapore: Location and Competitive Advantage in the Hard Disk Dril1e Industry, 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (various years), Economic Survey of Singapore, 
Singapore: MTI. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (1986), The Singapore Economy: New Directions. 
Singapore: MTI. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (1991), Strategic Economic Plan: Towards a 
Developed Nation. The Strategic Economic Plan, Singapore: MTI. 
National Computer Board (1992), IT2000: Vision for an Intelligent bland, 
Singapore: NCB. 
Nelson, R.R. (cd.) (1993), National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis, 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
National Science and Technology Board (1991), National Technology Plan, 
Singapore: NSTB. 
National Science and Technology Board (1996), National Science and Technology 
Plan, Singapore: NSTB. 
National Science and Technology Board (various years), Annual Report, Singapore: 
NSTB. 
National Science and Technology Board (various years), National Survey of R&D 
in Singapore, Singapore: NSTB. 
OECD (1993), Oslo Manual, Paris: OECD. 
OECD (1997), National Innovation Systems, Paris: OECD. 

Porter, M.1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London: Macmillan. 

Rao, B.V:V. and C. Lee (1996), 'Sources of growth in the Singapore economy and 
its manufacturing and services sectors', Singapore Economic Review, 40(1), 
83115. 
Reynolds, P.D., WD. Bygrave, E. Autio, L.W Cox, and M. Hay (2000), Global 
bntrepreneurship lWoni/or 2000: Executive Report, Kauffman Center for 
Entrepreneurial Leadership. 
Romer. P. (1992), Two strategies for economic development: using ideas vs. pro­
ducing ideas', World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 
Washington DC, April 30-May 1. 
Schein, E. (1996), Strategic Pragmatism: The Culture of the Economic Development 
Board of Singapore, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Singapore Department of Statistics (1997), 'Multifactor productivity growth in 
Singapore: concept. methodology and trends', occasional paper on economic sta­
tistics. 
Soon, T.W. (1992), 'Human resource development and management in Singapore'. 
in P.K. Wong and c.y Ng (eds), Human Resource Development and Utilization in 
the Asia-Pacific: A Social Absorption Capacity Approach, Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 
21-30. 
Suh, 1. (1998), 'OECD project on NIS in catching up economies', paper presented 
at the workshop on OECD Project on NIS in Catching Up Economies, Taipei, 
Taiwan, April 20-22. 
Toh, M.H. and P.K. Wong (2001), The impact of R&D on Singapore's economy', 
Singapore: CMIT working paper, National University of Singapore. 
238 Competitiveness. FDI and technological activity in East Asia 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (1997), f,Vorld Industrial Robots, 
New York: United Nations. 
Williamson, o.E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms. Markets. 
Relational Contracting, New York: Free Press. 
Wong, P.K. (1992), 'Technological development through subcontracting linkages: 
evidence from Singapore', Scandinavian International Business Review, 1(3), 
28-40. 
Wong, P.K. (I995a), National Innovation System: The Lase of Singapore, Seoul, 
Korea: Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI). 
Wong, P.K. (l995b), 'Developing technology managers in Singapore: issues and 
challenges', in K. Minden and P.K. Wong (eds), Developing Technology Managers 
in the Pacific Rim, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 62-92. 
Wong, P.K. (1998), 'Leveraging the global information revolution for economic 
development: Singapore's evolving information industry strategy', Information 
Systems Research (US), 9(4),323-41. 
Wong, P.K. (l999a), 'National innovation system for rapid technological catch-up 
by small, late-industrializing economies', Singapore: CMIT working paper, 
National University of Singapore. 
Wong, P.K. (1999b), 'University-industry technological collaboration in Singapore: 
emerging patterns and industry concerns', International Journal of Technology 
Management, 17(3/4),270-84. 
Wong, P.K. (l999c), The dynamics of HDD industry development in Singapore', 
working paper, San Diego: Globalization of Data Storage Industry Project. 
Wong, P.K. (2001a), 'The role of the state in Singapore's industrial development'. 
in P.K. Wong and C.YNg (eds), Industrial Policy. Innovation & Economic Growth: 
The Experience of Japan and the Asian NIEs, Singapore: Singapore University 
Press 
Wong, P.K. (2001 b), 'Learning by transacting: A process for accelerated techno­
logical learning by late-entrant manufacturing firms?' Singapore: CMIT working 
paper, National University of Singapore 
Wong, P.K. (2002), 'ICT production and diIIusion in Asia: digital dividends or 
digital divideT, Information Economics and Policy, 14(2), 167-87. 
Wong, P.K., A. Singh, and F. Wong (2000), 'National innovation survey of 
Singapore manufacturing industry', Singapore: CMIT working paper, National 
University of Singapore. 
Wong, P.K. and Z.L. He, (2001), The moderating eIIect of firm's internal innova­
tion climate on the impact of public R&D support: empirical evidence for 
Singapore', Singapore: CMIT working paper, National University of Singapore. 
World Bank (1993), The East Asian Afiracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, 
New York: Oxford University Press 
World Bank (2000), World Development Report 2000/2001, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
World Economic Forum (2000), Global Competitiveness Report 1999, Geneva: 
WEE 
Young, A. (1992), 'A tale of two cities: factor accumulation and technical change in 
Hong Kong and Singapore: NBER lvfacroeconomic Annual 1992, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
9. In search of balance: technological 
development in China 

Yang Yao1 

China is unique among the developing countries in terms of technological 
development. Its planning legacy left the economy with a solid industrial 
and technological foundation as well as with distortions. Even though the 
role of the planning system has been gradually reduced over some 20 years, 
this legacy still leaves a clear mark as innovation initiatives still come exclu­
sively from the government. This is both a blessing and a curse. It is a bless­
ing in that it allows China to concentrate its limited resources on the 
development of the key technologies that it needs to promote economic 
development. China has a well-trained industrial workforce, a relatively 
complete education system, a capable research system, and a leading edge 
in technologies like satellite launching, nuclear power and some areas of 
biotechnology and new materials. It has grown from being an exporter of 
primary goods to becoming the developing world's largest exporter of 
manufactured goods. Yet, the concentration is also a curse. It has resulted 
in a distorted industrial structure with a relatively highly developed heavy 
industry and a much less well developed light industry. There is over­
investment in the state-owned sector, leading to moral hazard problems and 
inefficient use of resources. It has created powerful vested interests that are 
resistant to market-oriented changes. 
The 1990s saw tremendous changes in the Chinese economy. The most 
significant one is perhaps the growth of the non-state sector. Although the 
state sector is still a significant player, especially in terms of urban employ­
ment and tax revenues, its share in China's GDP has been decreasing 
rapidly, totalling only 37 per cent by 1998. In contrast, the growing private 
sector (domestic and foreign) contributed 33 per cent of China's GDP in 
the same year. In terms of industrial output, the domestic private sector's 
share was close to 35 per cent in 1998, compared to the state sector's share 
of 33 per cent.2 However, there is a significant lag between the change of 
industrial ownership and resource allocation. More than 80 per cent of 
commercial bank loans, the largest block of resources controlled by the 
government, still flow to the state sector (SSB, 1999). Although this may 
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have some rationale since the state sector is still the most significant actor 
in technological terms, the mismatch is likely to take its toll on long-run 
technological development in China. 
The government understands this mismatch and is trying to change the 
system. However, there are two constraints. First, the government still 
wants to dominate innovation and dissemination. Second, various levels of 
government emphasize the need to upgrade technology in their industrial 
sectors, confusing efficiency with advanced technologies. This is evident in 
the mushrooming of high-tech industrial parks throughout the country. 
These factors suggest that the government will continue to dominate tech­
nology development even though it may not be the right strategy in an 
increasingly market-based economy. 
In this chapter, we present a general description of technological devel­
opment in China. We also discuss the adequacy of the strategy to improve 
China's technological status. Section I provides an overview of China's 
technological development. Section 2 describes China's domestic innova­
tion efforts, concentrating on the role of public institutions and govern­
ment initiatives. Section 3 surveys the patterns of technology ditTusion in 
China, with special attention to the role of FDI. Section 4 concludes with 
a brief appraisal of the government's technology development strategy, 
emphasizing the importance of a balance between technical elevation and 
proper utilization of China's human and financial resources. 
1. 	 HISTORICAL AND CURRENT STATUS OF 
TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA 
We start with an overview and appraisal of China's technology develop­
ment since 1949. The half-century is divided into three periods, 1949-59, 
1960-78 and 1979-99. We then consider China's current technological 
status, using export composition as the main indicator. 
1.1 	 History 
1949-59 
China's technological build-up in the early 1950s relied heavily on the 
Soviet Union. In China's first five-year plan of 1953-58, the Soviet Union 
provided 156 major industrial projects, predominantly in heavy industry, 
led by electricity, steel and heavy equipment manufacturing. In addition, 
China imported 426 sets of equipment and 122 technologies and produc­
tion lines from the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries and several 
Western countries (Chen, 1997). These imported technologies laid the 
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foundations of China's modern industry, and their impact can be felt even 
today. China's economic structure changed swiftly: in 1949, the share of 
heavy industry in gross national output was only 7.9 per cent and by 1962 
it had reached 35.5 per cent. Within the industrial sector, the share of heavy 
industry rose from 26.4 per cent in 1949 to 53.5 per cent in 1962 (Chen, 
1997). 
The imported technologies brought not only modern industry to China, 
but also new knowledge and skills. Thanks to the more than 3000 Soviet 
experts and many others from the Eastern European countries, China 
quickly acquired industrial skills and trained a capable workforce. In addi­
tion, more than 20000 people were sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries for formal education or training. These people formed 
the baekbone of China's technological capacities until the new generation 
of college graduates after the Cultural Revolution matured in the late 19805 
and early 1990s. The industrial projects were allocated to reduce regional 
disparities in industrial development, with many located in the central and 
western regions. Of the 106 completed civil projects, 50 were in the north­
east and 32 were in the central provinces. Of the 44 military projects, 21 
were in just two western provinces (Bo, 1993). At the same time, thousands 
of workers, scientists and technicians were mobilized to move from the 
eastern coast to central and western provinces. 
However, some authors have criticized the heavy industry development 
strategy as the most important deterrent to China's economic development 
(for example, Lin et al., 1996). To be sure, with a weak industrial base and 
low national savings, this strategy relied on distorted price signals; the most 
significant distortion was the suppression of agricultural prices to maintain 
a low-wage workforce. Another consequence was the suppression of light 
industry; the result was that the heavy industrial sector found itself with less 
and less demand. The large-scale movements of the population also caused 
serious problems. This was especially true for military projects, many of 
which were deliberately located in mountains for security reasons. In the 
1980s, many of these factories had to move out of the mountains. Except 
for a few exceptional cases (such as Xichang SatelJite Launch Centre), the 
remaining ones now face serious problems due to the loss of skilled workers 
and technicians and lack of access to markets and information. 
It is important to evaluate the heavy industry development strategy from 
a historical perspective. Import-substitution was the dominant develop­
ment strategy of the time, even in non-socialist economies. With the strong 
influence of the Soviet Union, it is not surprising that China undertook the 
heavy industry development strategy in the I 950s. There was also a certain 
amount of national pride involved in setting up complex, capital-intensive 
industries; at the time steel, machinery making and so on were the symbols 
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of a modern country. Perhaps most important was the political situation, 
which did not allow China to pursue a different development strategy at 
that time. After the Korean War, China had severed its ties with Western 
countries. It went into complete isolation after it broke up with the Soviet 
Union in the early 1960& Inside the country, several ultra-left political 
movements mobilized by Mao Zedong flooded the country for 20 years, 
preventing China from any attempt to adopt a more outward-looking 
development strategy. 
From a historical perspective, we can not only understand why the heavy 
industry development strategy was adopted, but also reach a balanced 
appraisal of its achievements and misfortunes. However, dwelling on the 
past is not useful, we need to focus on this strategy's impacts on today's 
affairs. The misfortunes of this strategy on the physical side have been cor­
rected by the 20 years of the open-door policy and restoration of the light 
industrial sector. However, psychologically this strategy lingers on and is 
manifested by the government's dominance in technological innovations 
and its determination to concentrate on quick upgrading of China's domes­
tic technologies. We will come back to a discussion of this in later sections. 
1960-78 
The fast growth of the 1950s ended with the Great Leap Forward, launched 
in 1958, and the subsequent famine that took at least 20 million lives in just 
three years (Lin, 1990). In the subsequent 18 years, China was in an abyss of 
political upheaval and economic stagnation. In the early 1970s, after the 
frenzy of the Cultural Revolution abated, the government of Zhou Enlai 
tried to revive China's modernization by proposing 'Four Modernizations' 
(agriculture, industry, science and the military) to be achieved by the end of 
the century. This led to a new wave of technological importation. This time 
the sources were exclusively Western. In the period of 1972-76, US$5.14 
billion was spent to equip new factories with imported equipment. The 
emphasis now was on the the heavy chemical industry. In 1977, the new party 
chairman, Hua Guofeng, proposed new plans to catch up with the Western 
world and a new wave of heavy industry development was launched. In 1978 
alone, total investment reached 50.1 billion yuan RMB, a 31 percent increase 
over 1977. Many technology import contracts were signed hastily, and as a 
result foreign reserves dropped by nearly US$10 billion that year (Chen, 
1997). This wave, subsequently called the 'Foreign Leap Forward', was 
stopped when Deng Xiaoping took over the government in 1979. 
1979--99 
After the Third Plenary of the Eleventh Communist Party Congress at the 
end of 1978, China's economic policy became more pragmatic. Technology 
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imports and technical development went through fundamental changes. 
Higher education, which had been held back in favour of primary and sec­
ondary education, was restored and expanded. Many government research 
agencies were restored, several new ones were set up. Technology flows from 
research institutions to firms and inter-firm technical transfers were 
renewed. 
The most significant event in the 1980s was perhaps the emergence of 
the rural industrial sector and technical transfers from urban industry to 
this seetor. The rural industrial sector is characterized by high labour 
intensity and has become a major engine for China's economic growth. 
Two events from the early 1990s are worth mentioning. One is the emer­
gence of private firms and their absorbing of technologies from the state 
sector. The other is the maturity of the domestic home electronics indus­
try. In the 1980s, foreign home appliances, notably products from Japan, 
dominated China's market. In the 1990s, domestic firms began to gain 
ground and by 2000 domestic products almost monopolized the home 
electronics market. A good example is Changhong, a TV manufacturer 
located in Sichuan. A military factory before the 1 980s, it began to produce 
colour TV sets in the mid-J980s. After 10 years, it became the largest 
colour TV maker in China and has maintaincd a lion's share of 23 per cent 
in China's domestic market. 
The pattern of technology imports after 1978 changed substantially. 
Equipment imports were curtailed and technology licences became the 
main mode of technology import. According to a survey of 4302 tech­
nological import contracts in the period of 1979~90 conducted by the 
State Planning Commission, 41.4 per cent were technology licences, 9.3 
per cent technical consultation, 5.3 per cent joint production or design 
and the remaining 44 per cent equipment imports (Chen, 1997). 
Although equipment imports remained large, the situation was quite 
different 30 years earlier when over 90 per cent of technology imports 
consisted of equipment. Import of equipment, especially imports of 
complete plants, may have been the only alternative for China when its 
production capacities were weak. However, this alternative involves a 
large amount of initial investment and has the effect of locking a country 
into a specific path of technological development. On the other hand, 
technology licensing has several advantages. It allows a country more 
room for selection and for mixing foreign technologies with local ones. 
Therefore, China's shift from equipment imports to technology licensing 
was a correct choice. 
The 1990s also witnessed a boom in China's export of manufactures. In 
1990, the five top exports from China were garments, crude oil, cotton 
fabric, refined oil and silk products; in 1995, they were garments, home 
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electronics, telecommunication equipment, toys and steel (Chen, 1997). 
This change reflects the rapid technological upgrading of China's compet­
itiveness. 
1.2 Contribution of Technological Progress 
Although it has many defects, total factor productivity (TFP) is still the 
most frequently used indicator of a country's technical progress. Table 9.1 
shows the TFP growth for China during 1953-95. In this period, China's 
GOP rose by 8.3 per cent annually while TFP grew by 3.1 per cent, contrib­
uting 20.8 per cent to GDP growth. In the period after 1978, GOP grew by 
10. J per cent per year and TFP by 5. J per cent. In the 1953-59 period, by 
contrast, GOP grew rapidly but TFP rose by only 1.7 per cent. The average 
contribution of TFP to growth was negative, and economic growth in this 
period was driven by capital and labour mobilization. The three years of 
1960-62 were the period of famine, with negative GOP growth rate and 
even more negative growth rate of TFP. 
The period 1963-78, despite the Cultural Revolution, witnessed remark­
ably strong GOP and TFP growth. Indeed, it was not significantly behind 
Table 9.1 TFP in China, 1953-95 (%)* 
Year GDP Capital Labour TFP TFP 
growth rate growth rate growth rate growth rate contribution** 
1953 13.17 21.88 2.94 4.55 34.53 
1954 5.78 17.95 2.60 -1.43 -24.65 
1955 6.44 14.37 2.03 0.71 10.99 
1956 14.11 16.54 2.40 7.47 52.93 
1957 4.50 18.46 3.05 - 3.17 -70.5! 
1958 22.10 24.68 8.75 8.57 38.78 
1959 8.06 30.78 5.71 -5.17 -64.16 
1960 1.42 23.26 0.86 -9.00 
1961 18.43 3.45 1.07 --18.72 
1962 -6.51 -0.09 -0.73 -5.97 
1963 10.70 2.55 1.59 8.82 82.45 
]964 16.95 4.31 3.46 13.24 78.08 
1965 16.95 9.08 3.79 11.57 68.28 
1966 17.02 8.!7 3.71 11.97 70.34 
1967 -7.24 4.60 3.62 -11.15 
1968 -6.54 2.33 3.43 -9.64 
1969 19.36 4.20 3.81 15.43 79.72 
1970 23.22 9.86 3.95 17.50 75.35 
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Table 9.1 (continued) 
Year GDP Capital Labour TFP TFP 
growth rate growth rate grm\'th rate growth rate contribution** 
1971 9.13 9.67 3.76 3.60 39.40 
1972 2.85 8.31 2.25 1.22 -42.74 
1973 8.30 9.91 1.55 4.24 51.11 
1974 1.15 8.35 2.15 -2.86 -248.70 
1975 8.32 8.48 2.23 4.22 50.66 
1976 -2.65 7.25 2.18 -6.35 
1977 7.79 8.43 1.78 4.02 51.54 
1978 12.27 9.85 1.86 8.01 65.31 
1979 7.60 10.91 2.24 2.76 36.30 
1980 7.81 8.63 2.89 3.20 40.95 
1981 5.26 5.66 3.38 1.20 22.74 
1982 0.82 8.20 1.27 -2.53 -308.41 
1983 19.90 8.04 5.32 13.76 69.17 
1984 15. I 8 9.09 3.22 10.20 67.19 
1985 13.47 12.06 3.73 7.24 53.76 
1986 8.86 13.22 2.99 2.80 31.61 
1987 11.57 10.40 3.20 6.21 53.67 
1988 11.27 10.52 3.01 6.01 53.30 
1989 4.07 9.49 2.37 -0.44 10.71 
1990 3.83 8.97 2.17 -0.38 -9.92 
1991 9.16 12.00 2.40 3.88 42.36 
1992 14.24 14.00 2.21 8.49 59.64 
1993 13.50 12.84 2.30 8.04 59.54 
1994 12.66 11.47 2.26 7.64 60.32 
1995 10.17 11.54 2.20 5.17 50.82 
1953-59 10.59 20.67 3.93 1.65 -3.15 
1960-62 -8.79 8.87 -0.31 -11.23 
1963-78 8.60 7.21 2.82 4.46 32.37 
1979--88 10.17 9.67 3.13 5.08 12.03 
1989~90 3.95 9.23 2.27 -0.41 10.32 
1991-95 12.64 12.46 2.24 7.33 57.58 
1953-78 6.92 11.07 2.79 1.65 17.55 
1979-95 10.09 10.31 2.75 5.06 22.75 
1953-95 8.25 10.78 2.76 3.08 20.84 
Notes: 
* Following liang et al. (1998), the share for labour is 0.7. and the share for capital is 0.3. 
** Years with negative GDP growth rates are excluded from the calculation. 
Source: Data on GDP, capital and labour growth rates are from Li et al. (1998: 246~7). 
TFP figures are calculated by the author. 
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1979~88, and even outperformed the later period in terms of TFP contri­
bution. The two years of 1989 and 1990 were special because of the 
Tian'anmen Square event in the spring of 1989. Although GDP recorded 
low growth in these two years, TFP growth was negative. The most recent 
period considered in the table, 1991 ~95, was the golden age of China's 
recent economic development, with a GDP growth rate of 12.6 per cent, 
TFP growth rate of 7.3 per cent and TFP contribution of 57.6 per cent. 
There appears to be a positive correlation between TFP growth and GDP 
growth after 1963. This is remarkable in view of the inefficiency attributed 
to economic planning. The failure of planning in China was not so much 
manifested by slow TFP growth as by the lack of incentives (and ultimately 
the lack of political and economic freedom) and rigidities in the economic 
structure. 
1.3 Current Technological Status 
There are many ways to describe a country's technological status. Some will 
be presented later in this chapter. In this subsection, however, we will first 
follow Chapter 2 (Lall) in this volume to provide statistics on China's 
export composition in order to show the dynamics of its competitiveness. 
Table 9.2 shows the structural dynamics of China's exports from 1985 to 
1999. Until 1990, agricultural goods and resource-based metal and non­
mctal products were significant in exports. In 1985, these two categories of 
goods accounted for over 56 per cent of China's total exports, followed by 
textile products at 22.1 per cent. By 1990, the share of agricultural prod­
ucts had increased from 25.4 per cent to 28.5 per cent, but the share of 
metal and non-metal products had decreased to 17.6 per cent. In the mean­
time, textile products had raised their share to 23.9 per cent while other 
light industrial products had raised theirs to 17.7 per cent (from 6.0 per cent 
in 1985). By 1995, the share of agricultural product decreased to 12.7 per 
cent and that of metal and non-metal products to 10.3 per cent. Textiles 
and other light industrial products had become the two most exported cat­
egories of goods, accounting for more than 56 per cent of total exports. 
By 1999, the most significant feature of China's export structure was the 
development of the machinery sector, whose share in total exports had 
reached 20.5 percent (from 10 percent in 1995 and only 2 percent in 1985). 
Concomitantly, resource-based goods had declined substantially: agricul­
tural products to 6.2 per cent and metal and non-metal products to 5.7 per 
cent. The shares of simple labour-intensive products such as textiles and 
other light industrial goods had also dropped, and machinery had become 
the second largest export sector, just behind textiles. 
Table 9.3 shows China's 10 leading exports from 1985 to 1999. In 1985, 
Table 9.2 China's export composition, 1985-98 (9 million US$) 
1985 1990 1995 1999 

Volume 'X, Volume 'Yo Volume ,}(, Volume % 

Total exports* 25915.61 52067.32 148769.74 194930.00 
Agricultural products 6595.34 25.45 14820.44 28.46 18920.63 12.72 12147.15 6.23 
~ 
... 
'J 
Textile and related products 
Other light industrial products 
5729.43 
1564.28 
22.11 
6.04 
12416.66 
9192.38 
23.85 
17.65 
37498.37 
40141.03 
25.21 
26.98 
43412.18 
26772.28 
22.27 
13.73 
Metal and non-metal products 8125.62 31.35 9184.86 17.64 15251.75 10.25 11207.44 5.75 
Chemical products and medicine 860.97 3.32 2439.17 4.68 7668.33 5.15 10379.88 5.32 
Machinery 507.77 1.96 3723.62 7.15 14959.94 10.06 39886.45 20.46 
Note: * The total export volume does not equal to the sum of individual categories because of statistical discrepancy. As a result 
the percentages do not add up to 100. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook o/Foreign Trade and Commerce, 1986-1999. China Statistical Press. 
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Table 9.3 	 The ten most exported products in China: 1985-99 (US$ 
million) 
1985 	 1990 
%of 'X,of 
Rank Items Volume total Items Volume total 
Crude oil 5451.87 21.04 Crude oil 3817.75 7.33 
2 Refined oil 1460.24 5.63 Garment 3425.10 6.58 
3 Grain 1350.80 5.21 Cotton fabric 1531.33 2.94 
4 Garment 1166.27 4.50 Refined oil 1110.87 2.13 
5 Cotton fabric 938.87 3.62 Knitted products 934.88 1.80 
6 Cotton 420.03 1.62 Feeds 887.32 1.70 
7 Canned foods 382.40 1.48 Home appliances 873.23 1.68 
8 Chemical inputs 357.06 1.38 Silk fabric 782.28 1.50 
9 Silk fabric 356.78 1.38 Cotton yarn 777.77 1.49 
10 Silk 349.76 1.35 Steel 711.43 1.37 
1995 1999 
'X, of %of 
Rank Items Volume total Items Volume total 
Garment 16592.24 11.15 Garment 30057.85 15.42 
2 Home appliances 5656.84 3.80 Textile products 12316.88 6.32 
3 Comm. equipment 4621.05 3.11 Shoes 8672.70 4.45 
4 Toys 3396.54 2.28 Computer products 7922.03 4.06 
5 Steel 3219.54 2.16 Plastic products 5174.88 2.65 
6 Cotton fabric 3180.03 2.14 Toys 5112.14 2.62 
7 Cotton knitted 2583.82 1.74 Furniture 2707.81 1.39 
products 
8 Crude oil 2064.21 1.39 Cableeomm. 2311.50 1.19 
products 
9 Wool knitted 1888.42 1.27 Oil and products 2076.36 1.07 
products 
\0 Cotton textile 1877.Q7 1.26 Integrated circuits 2058.07 1.06 
products 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook of Fi)reign Trade and Commerce. 1986-1999, China 
Statistical Press. 
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crude oil was China's most exported product with a share of 21 per cent of 
the total export value in that year. The second most exported product was 
refined oil, and grain occupied the third place. Textile products occupied 
the next two positions; cotton and silk were also in the list, showing China's 
weak manufacturing position at that time. In 1990, while crude oil still 
occupied the first place, its share dropped dramatically to only 7.3 per cent. 
Concurrently, garments became thc second most exported goods, with a 
share increasing from 4.5 per cent in 1985 to 6.6 per cent. Home appliances 
took seventh place, an early indicator of China's improved manufacturing 
capacities. This trend continued in the second half of the I990s. While gar­
ments constituted the largest export item and most of the items in the list 
were textile products in both 1995 and 1999,3 electronic products appeared 
in the list. This was more prominent in 1999. In that year, computer prod­
ucts became the fourth largest export item; cable communication products 
and integrated circuits occupied the eighth and tenth positions. 
To summarize, in the last 15 years, China has changed from a resource­
based exporter to an exporter of labour-intensive and low-end electronic 
products. This matches the structural changes observed in Taiwan and 
South Korea in the 1970s and early I 980s, and points to a strengthening of 
China's technological capabilities and its international competitiveness. 
2. PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND R&D 
Public institutions and large state-owned enterprises dominate China's 
domestic R&D. Basic scientific research is mostly carried out in the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS), research institutions in government ministries 
and large research universities. Technological innovations show a similar 
pattern. We now describe the geographical and sectoral distribution of 
research, provide an introduction to China's hi-tech industry and key 
government-supported R&D projects, and present data on R&D achieve­
ments in terms of patents and scientific publications. 
2.1 Domestic R&D Resources 
By the end of 1996, China had 27.6 million professional technical person­
nel, of whom 407800 were engaged in R&D. This makes it the fourth 
largest country in terms of R&D personnel, after the USA (962700), 
Russia (870000) and Japan (526500) (You, 1998: p. 64). However, in terms 
of R&D personnel per million population, China is well behind the indus­
trial leaders. In 1996, it had 333 R&D personnel per million population, 
only about one-tenth of the USA. There were 4850 R&D institutes, but 820 
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did not conduct any meaningful research. In addition, there were 3400 
R&D institutes in universities. Many large enterprises also carried out 
R&D, and in 1996, there were 12033 R&D units at the firm level. This was 
double the figure in 1985 and equivalent to one R&D unit for every two 
large and medium firms (You, 1998: p.46). 
Compared with the developed and newly industrialized economies, China 
spends relatively little on R&D. Total R&D has been in the range of 0.5-0.7 
per cent of GDP, compared to 2.7-3 per cent in the developed economies 
and 1.8-2.8 per cent in the newly industrialized economies (You, 1998). 
In terms of the distribution of R&D personnel, there is a strong concen­
tration in government ministries. As a hangover from the planning period, 
almost every ministry has its own research institutes. Figure 9.1 compares the 
distribution of R&D personnel among government agencies, the industry, 
universities and others in the USA, South Korea and China. China has too 
many scientists in government-run institutions and too few scientists and 
technicians in industry. Figure 9.2 compares China with the USA, the 
European Union and Japan in terms of the distribution of R&D research 
funds provided by the government and industry. While 82 per cent of Japan's 
research funds come from industry and some 60 per cent in the USA and ED, 
USA South Korea 
Others Others 
agencies 
15% 
China 
Others 
Universities 
14% 
Government 
agencies 
7% 
3% 
Industry 
76% 
0% 
Industry 
55% 
Universities 
22% 
9% 
Government agencies 
42% 
Source: You (1998: 98--9). 
Figure 9.1 Comparison of the distribution of R&D personnel in the 
USA, South Korea and China, 1996 
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USA EU 
Other 
5% 
Other 
0% 
Government 
43% 
Industry 
52% 
Industry 
59% 
Japan China 
Other Other 
3% 22% 
Industry 
82% 
Source: You (1998: 142-3). 
Figure 9,2 	 Comparison of the distribution of R&D expenditure in the 
USA, EO, Japan and China, 1996 
in China the government share is about 55 per cent and that of industry only 
23 per cent. Much of the remaining 22 percent, classified as 'other', may well 
be channelled from the government because private donations (presumably 
accounting for the 'other' in the USA and Japan) are rare in China. 
Table 9.4 and Table 9.5 show the distribution of R&D personnel and 
expenditure among central government, the Chinese Academy of Science 
(CAS) and local provinces in three selected years in the 1990s.4 Central gov­
ernment's share is about 60 per cent in terms of both personnel and expen­
diture. Although there has been a weak declining trend in central 
government's share of personnel, its share of expenditure has remained 
roughly the same, if it has not not increased. 
Turning now to geographical distribution, the contrast between the east 
and the centre and west is obvious. The nine eastern provinces and mu­
nicipalities have about half of the country's R&D personnel, and their 
share of total R&D expenditure is over 60 per cent. This skewed distribu­
tion certainly matches the stages of development in the regions, but it is also 
caused by the concentration of resources in central government, most of 
whose agencies are located in Beijing, 
252 Competitiveness. FDI and technological activity in East Asia 

Table 9.4 Distribution of R&D personnel in Chinese research institutions 

1991 1994 1997 
IY() o/uNo. No. 'y" No. 
By affiliation 
Central government 485431 61.6 430291 52.9 359713 58.2 
CAS 48595 6.2 56029 6.9 38104 6.2 
Provinces 253852 32.2 327361 40.2 220288 35.6 
Total 787878 100.0 813681 100.0 618105 100.0 
By region 
East 396326 52.9 420894 55.6 308592 53.2 
Central 162855 21.7 175045 23.1 133285 23.0 
West 190298 25.4 161703 21.3 138124 23.8 
Total 749479 100.0 757642 100.0 580001 100.0 
NOles: 
East: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong. 

Central: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Anhui, liangxi, Hunan, 

Guangxi, Hainan. 

West: Inner Mongolia, Ninxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinhai, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Chongqing, 

Guizhou, Yunnan. 

Source: Chinese Slalislical Yearhook 0/ Science and Technology, 1992-1998, Beijing: China 
Science and Technology Press. 
One remaining issue is the distribution of R&D resources among indus­
tries. Table 9.6 and Table 9.7 show the situation in the industrial sector. The 
sector is divided into three sub-sectors, mining, light industry and heavy 
industry. The major components of light industry are food, textile, garment 
and paper production, the major components of heavy industry are steel, 
chemical, machinery and electronic industries. The shares of heavy industry 
in both personnel and expenditure are high and increased over the 1990s, and 
the shares of light industry decreased. The two tables also show the cases of 
three representative sectors, textiles, medicine and electronics. The shares of 
the textile sector decreased in the 19908, which might have been the major 
force bringing down the share of the light industry sector as a whole. 
Medicine and electronics are the two industries that are most likely to adopt 
high technologies. However, the shares of the electronic industry did not 
increase in the 1990s, and the shares of the medicine industry even showed a 
tendency of decline. These results are remarkable if we consider the Chinese 
government's emphasis on developing hi-tech industry. It seems that the 
research institutions have not responded to the government initiative, rather 
their behaviour has conformed to more fundamental economic forces. 
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Table 9.5. 	 Distribution of R&D expenditure in Chinese research 
institutions (million yuan) 
1991 1994 1997 
Expenditure % Expenditure % Expenditure 0'/0 
-----­
By affiliation 
Central 13,446.45 61.59 23,560.66 59.69 33,07l.66 67.98 
government 
CAS 1,397.50 6.40 2,958.41 7.50 3,517.11 7.23 
Provinces 6,988.95 32.01 12,950.38 32.81 12,057.33 24.79 
Total 21,832.90 100.00 39,469.45 100.00 48,646.09 100.00 
By region 
East 12,707.39 62.18 8,352.56 64.50 28,846.37 63.92 
Central 3,556.99 17.41 2,593.39 20.03 7,652.41 16.96 
West 4,17l.02 20.41 2,004.44 15.48 8,630.21 19.12 
Total 20,435.40 100.00 12,950.38 100.00 45,128.99 100.00 
NOle: East. central and west as Table 9.4. 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology. 1992-1998, Beijing: China 
Science and Technology Press. 
Table 9.6 	 Sectoral distribution of institute R&D personnel in the Chinese 
manufacturing sector 
1991 1994 1997 
Sector No. o/., No. % No. 'Yo 
Mining 19112 10.5 14890 6.3 13510 5.3 
Light industry 23062 12.7 19183 8.2 15477 6.0 
Heavy industry 139334 76.8 200732 85.5 227103 88.7 
Total 181508 100.0 234805 100.0 256090 100.0 
Selected industries 
Textile 7663 4.2 6135 2.6 4801 1.9 
Medicine 10055 5.5 6511 2.8 7816 3.1 
Electronics 62568 26.6 62221 24.3 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology. 1992-1998, Beijing: China 
Science and Technology Press, 
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Table 9.7 	 Institute R&D expenditure in the Chinese manufacturing sector 
(million yuan) 
1991 1994 
Expenditure "/r, Expenditure Expenditure fO0;', 	 01 
Mining 691.02 6.32 923.91 5.62 1578.20 7.57 
Light industry 883.32 8.08 1438.41 8.75 972.20 4.66 
Heavy industry 9353.05 85.59 14073.76 85.63 18307.39 87.77 
Total 10927.40 100.00 16436.08 100.00 20857.79 100.00 
Selected industries 
Textile 401.50 3.67 555.83 3.38 434.32 2.08 
Medicine 627.06 5.74 1134.28 6.90 1022.14 4.90 
Electronics 2131.32 19.50 3143.59 19.13 3989.99 19.13 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology. 1992-1998. Beijing: China 
Science and Technology Press. 
2.2 Government Initiatives 
The government is consciously using its leverage to stimulate technological 
advance. In this subsection, we present a description of key government 
initiatives, including several projects aimed at improving China's techno­
logical edge in the hi-tech industry as well as other programmes targeting 
basic scientific research and the technical capacities of SMEs. 
The National Science Foundation (NSF) provides funding for basic 
research in China. In 1997,4166 projects obtained a total of 78.8 million 
yuan (USS9.5 million). In 1991, by contrast, 4196 projects received 17.7 
million yuan. Thus in six years, funding per project incrcascd by almost five 
times. Nevertheless, the funding provided by NSF is still quite limited as the 
average funding per project was only about US$2200. 
The '863' Project was launched in March 1986 with the aim of improv­
ing China's education, research and application capacities in the hi-tech 
area. In 1997, 1087 projects obtained a total funding of more than 505 
million yuan (about US$61 million). Of this funding, the government pro­
vided 368.6 million yuan, or 72.9 per cent. Table 9.8 shows the distribution 
of the '863' projects which were concentrated in the four key areas of 
information technology, biotechnology, new materials, and automation 
technology and the Torch Project (see below). 
However, the performance of the '863' project has not been impressive. 
Table 9.9, adapted from an appraisal report on the project in 1996, shows 
that only 38.2 per cent of the projects funded in the 1986-96 period had 
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Table 9.8 	 Fund distribution of the '863' and Torch projects in 1997 
(1000 yuan) 
'863' Project 	 Torch Project 
No. of Expenditure Government No. of Expenditure 
projects funds projects 
Total 1087 505376 368571 1987 14444524 
Information 341 142401 102262 369 5265957 
technology 
Biotechnology 271 65382 60247 274 1899482 
New materials 202 77352 54825 475 2008300 
Energy* 14 126012 110271 243 1320934 
Automation 225 86505 33397 486 2423521 
Others 34 7724 7569 140 1526330 
Note: * Includes environmental technology for the Torch Project. 

Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook ol Science and Technology, 1998, Beijing: China 

Science and Technology Press. 

Table 9.9 	 Commercial applications of '863' projects, 1986-96 (%) 
Product Product Product in With substantial 
in test finalized production profit
-----.__._-_._-_. 
Biotechnology 24.2 3.9 32.7 3.9 
Energy 3.3 2.0 55.9 1.3 
New materials 15.1 12.9 38.4 2.6 
Automation 5.3 12.6 11.3 0.0 
Information technology 1.4 13.8 49.4 3.8 
Light electronics 2.8 15.0 49.1 1.9 
Total 8.2 10.7 38.2 2.5 
Source: Gu et at (1998: 364). 
gone into commercial application, and only 2.5 per cent had made substan­
tial profits. Although this record can be partially explained by the high risk 
of hi-tech activities, the very low percentage of projects making substantial 
profits may indicate a gap between research and commercial applications; 
this is perhaps not surprising in view of the dominance of government insti­
tutions in this programme. 
The Torch Project is another government project aiming at improving 
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China's technical capacities. Compared with the '863' Project, it is more 
application-oriented and does not support education. Its funding is much 
larger than the '863' Project, though. In 1997, 1987 projects obtained a total 
funding of 14.44 billion yuan (US$1.74 billion), with an average funding 
size of 7.3 million yuan (US$0.88 million). 
The Key Technology Project aims to solve key technical issues not only in 
manufacturing but also in agriculture and social development. The total 
funding in 1997 was 1.65 billion yuan (US$199 million), the number of pro­
jects covered was 1545 (Table 9.10). 
Table 9.10 KeJ' Technology Project in 1997 (1000 yuan) 
No. of projects Expenditure Government funds 
Total 1545 1651838 683382 
Agriculture 334 250769 165051 
Social development 685 475890 191 856 
Hi-tech industry 526 925179 326475 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology, 1998. Beijing: China 
Science and Technology Press. 
The Star Project aims at improving the technical capacities of small and 
medium-sized firms, especially rural firms, Table 9.11 shows the sectoral 
distribution of central government-funded Star projects in 1997. The total 
expenditure of the project in 1997 was 8.22 billion yuan (US$990 million), 
a total of 1561 projects were funded, with an average fund per project being 
5.3 million yuan, The Star Project has facilitated the development of small 
and medium-sized firms, but its coverage is limited relative to the popula­
tion of tens of thousand of SMEs. 
Hi-tech ::ones have been set up to take advantage of the geographic con­
centration of human capital in certain cities. Since 1988, the central govern­
ment has approved 52 national hi-tech zones. About the same number of 
local hi-tech zones have been set up by local governments. Central govern­
ment provides tax incentives for firms that are qualified to move or set up 
in the national hi-tech zones and local governments provide specific non­
tax incentives (such as preferential land prices) to firms in the local hi-tech 
zones. Most of the 52 national hi-tech zones are located in the east of the 
country. In 1998, there were a total of 13681 firms in these 52 hi-tech zones. 
These firms hired a workforce of 1.47 million employees, their total output 
value was 338.8 billion yuan (US$40.8 billion), and total profit was 20.7 
billion yuan (US$2.5 billion). Of this output, 6.5 billion yuan (U8$785 
million) were exported. This demonstrates that the export performance of 
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Table 9.11 The distribution of the Star Project in 1997 (1000 yuan) 

No. of Projects Expenditure 
Total 1561 8217701 
Agriculture and fishery 360 1836623 
Mining 19 67290 
Manufacturing 1070 5570299 
Utilitics 12 44505 
Construetion 35 159152 
Transportation 9 26520 
Wholesale and retailing 3 22600 
Finance and insurance 0 0 
Real estate 0 0 
Social services 9 71190 
Health, sports and welfare 16 167094 
Education, arts and media 3 26330 
Technical services 16 188746 
Government agencies 0 0 
Others 9 37352 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook of Science and Technology, /998, Beijing: China 
Science and Technology Press. 
these hi-tech zones remains weak. Indeed, many of the firms located in the 
zones are not engaged in hi-tech production at all. One study even shows 
that a quarter of the hi-tech zones are not qualified in terms of the avail­
ability of proper human resources, infrastructure and markets (Gu et al., 
1998). Hi-tech zones have also been used by local governments to compete 
for good firms, no matter whether they are hi-tech or not, by engaging in 
competitive offers of tax breaks as well as other financial incentives. That 
is why two neighbouring hi-tech zones (one national, one local) are fre­
quently observed in one city. 
2.3 Scientific Publications, Patents and Technology Contracts 
From the early 1990s to the late I 990s, the number of scientific publications 
nearly doubled, the number of patents more than doubled and the number 
of technology contracts (mainly licensing and technical assistance) more 
than tripled. 
Throughout the 1990s, the structure of the type of contract has been 
quite stable. About one-third of the contracts were technical development, 
about 40 per cent of them were technical services, another 16-18 per cent 
were technical transfers, and the remainder (less than IO per cent) were 
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technical consultation contracts, This shows that the transfer of ready-to­
use technologies constituted only a small portion of the total number of 
contracts, more frequent subjects of contracts were technical assistance 
and commissions relating to new technical innovations and developments. 
In terms of the types of provider, it is evident that research institutes, 
almost exclusively public, were the most important provider of technolo­
gies. However, their share has been decreasing in the 1990s, offset by uni­
versities and other providers. The enhanced role of universities was made 
possible by more R&D funding. In 1991, the total university R&D expen­
diture was 1.35 billion yuan (US$163.1 million); by 1997, that figure was 
multiplied by more than four times to reach 5.77 billion yuan (USS694.7 
million). Although the amounts are small compared with developed coun­
tries, they have contributed to improving the capacity of Chinese univer­
sities for innovation and development. 
2.4 A Summary Appraisal 
We can characterize China's R&D efforts thus. First, the central govern­
ment controls a disproportionately large share of research resources. 
Second, firm-level R&D initiatives are weak. Third, central government 
puts heavy emphasis on hi-tech areas. In terms of the outcomes, we have a 
mixed picture. On the one hand, the government's emphasis on the hi-tech 
areas seems to be paying off as China upgrades from a resource-based 
exporter to a major player in the world's lower-end electronic market. On 
the other hand, government-sponsored projects have not had matching 
commercial results. In addition, the weak support to labour-intensive tech­
nologies and SMEs may also take a toll on international competitiveness. 
After alL labour-intensive garment and textile industries are still China's 
most competitive industries. As pointed out before, the real issue is not 
whether China should spend on hi-tech industry, but the proper balance 
between high-tech and other industries. 
Some implications are as follows. 
• 	 First, government sponsored projects should have better targets, 
taking commercial viability into fuller consideration. Most public 
research institutes are not run as profit-making firms but as govern­
ment departments relying on government support for daily opera­
tion. Although a major reform is underway to transform these 
institutes into independent firms, the process is slow. 
• 	 Second, the business infrastructure for technology transfers is weak, 
creating a gap between R&D and commercial application. Many 
researchers in research institutes and universities complain that their 
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inventions cannot find buyers. Although this problem is related to the 
nature of the institutes and universities as non-profit organizations, 
it also reflects weak information flows and business intermediaries as 
well as weak protection of intellectual property rights. 
• 	 Third, labour-intensive industry is still a major base for China's inter­
national competitiveness. Although it may be proper for the central 
government to concentrate on financing hi-tech industry, local efforts 
should support local comparative advantage in less glamorous activ­
ities. The proliferation of the hi-tech zones indicates this bias. It 
diverts precious resources into highly risky and expensive endea­
vours, crowding out traditional but more profitable industries. 
However, persuading local government to take this view is difficult 
because officials do not only consider economic gains but also polit­
ical status and pride. 
3. 	 TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION AND THE ROLE 
OFFDI 
3.1 	 Regional Technology Transfers 
Regional technology transfers are important in narrowing the growing dis­
parities between regions that have attracted considerable attention in recent 
years. Table 9.12 provides a snapshot of the regional distribution of tech­
nology exporters and selected importers in 1993. The technology exporters 
are the developed coastal provinces and inland provinces with considerable 
human resourees and researeh eapacities (universities, research institutes 
and so on). The importers are inland provinces and fast growing coastal 
provinces, especially Guangdong and Jiangsu. 
The government has been facilitating regional technology transfers. A 
major initiative by central government is the one-to-one support of an 
advanced province for a relatively backward province. This pair-wise 
arrangement has a comprehensive coverage including poverty alleviation, 
business connections, cadre exchanges, personnel training and technical 
assistance. Take the example of the Jiangsu and Guangxi pair. Jiangsu is 
an advanced coastal province, Guangxi a backward autonomous region in 
southwest China. Since 1980, government officials from these two prov­
inces have met every year to discuss possible cooperative projects. In the 
19808, more than 1200 projects were implemented, covering almost all eco­
nomic areas. Jiangsu has a sound textile industry and many projects 
involved the transfer of technologies in this industry. For example, before 
1980, Wuzhou city in Guangxi province only had four textile factories 
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Table 9.12 	 Regional distribution of technology exporters and selected 
importers, 1993 (million yuan) 
Exporters 
Province Beijing Sichuan Shanghai Liaoning Hunan Hubei 
Net export value 1240 630 488 417 149 115 
Selected importers 
Province Guangdong Hainan Shandong Shanxi Jiangsu Guangxi 
Net import value 765 437 342 274 244 164 
Exporters 
Province Jilin Tianjin Henan Shaanxi Heilongjiang 
Net export value 101 85 60 52 31 
Selected importers 
Province Inner Zhejiang Fujiang Hebei Guizhou 
Mongolia 
Net import value 157 152 145 130 102 
Source: He et al. (1996: 381). 
producing less than 4 per cent of the city's total industrial output. Its 
partner in Jiangsu, Changzhou, happens to have a large textile industry and 
an experienced workforce. Changzhou sent more than 300 persons, techni­
cians and managers to help Wuzhou build its textile industry. By 1990, 
Wuzhou had become capable of producing a large variety of textile prod­
ucts, and the share of the textile industry in the city's industrial output 
increased to 17.6 per cent (He et aI., 1996). 
3.2 R&D and lechnology Transfers at the Firm Level 
R&D in Chinese firms is generally weak. In 1997, the 165080 state-owned 
and large and medium-sized private firms (with a sales volume of more 
than 5 million yuan) spent a total of 43.84 billion yuan on R&D, only 0.72 
per cent of their sales (265600 yuan per firm). Two surveys show similar 
results. One by researchers from Tsinghua University found that average 
R&D spending in China's manufacturing sector was 0.5 per cent of sales, 
and that smaller firms spent less. R&D by large, medium and small firms as 
percentages of their respective sales volume came to 0.78 per cent, 0.34 per 
cent and 0.37 per cent (Fu and Deng, 1994). Another study by the 
Development Research Centre under the State Council in Fujian and 
Gansu provinces in 1994 and 1995 showed higher R&D spending but the 
shares were still small, with similar patterns in relation to firm size. The per­
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centages for the three groups of firm, in the order presented above, were 
2.08 per cent, 1.30 per cent, and 1.15 per cent (Fan, 1997). 
However, small firms are keener than large ones to adopt suitable tech­
nologies and they put more emphasis on profitability. Wang and Yao (2002) 
identify several interesting patterns from survey studies. First, small firms 
tend to spend more on acquiring new existing technologies and using them 
efficiently. In contrast, large firms spend more on buying new equipment 
and saving on labour input. Second, small firms put more emphasis on 
obtaining suitable technologies while large firms tend to obtain advanced 
technologies, especially those embodied in imported equipment. Both may 
be rational because small firms mainly compete inside China while large 
ones face competition in the international market. Third, although small 
firms spend less on R&D, they have a higher success rate in converting tech­
nologies into profitable new products. This may have something to do with 
the different nature of R&D that the two groups of firms are engaged in, 
but is also related to their different aims, that is, small firms are keen on 
profitability, large firms on saving inputs. 
In terms of the sources of technologies, Wang and Yao (2002) also iden­
tify several patterns. First, large firms are more likely to innovate their own 
technologies; small firms are more likely to buy ready-made technologies. 
This probably reflects small firms' weaker innovation capacities. Second, 
small firms seldom buy foreign technologies while large firms do. Third, the 
most effective channel for small firms to get new technologies is to cooper­
ate with large firms to form joint ventures or to become a large firm's sub­
contractor. In this way, small firms can quickly obtain large firms' more 
advanced technologies as well as improve their efficiency by specializing. 
Fourth, rural firms rely on the city to provide them with technicians. Rural 
firms hire many urban retirees and a considerable number of urban techni­
cians work in rural firms as a second job. In recent years, many rural and 
urban private firms have begun to use their improved working and compen­
sation conditions as leverages to compete with large state-owned enter­
prises for qualified technicians and workers. 
3.3 FDI and Technical Diffusion in China 
In 1998, realized FDI in China was $45.5 billion, slightly higher than in 
1997. The contribution of FDI is evident in areas of employment and 
export; what is less clear is its contribution to China's technological 
upgrading. We first provide some statistics on FDr's sectoral distribution, 
and then discuss how FDI could contribute to improving China's technical 
stance. 
Wang (1997) documented the sectoral distribution of FDI by using the 
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second (1985) and third (1995) national industrial censuses. In 1985, the 
output of foreign affiliates comprised less than 0.5 per cent of China's 
industrial output, their sales value was less than 5 per cent in total indus­
trial sales. In 1995, the two figures had increased to 15.9 per cent and 15.8 
percent, respectively. Wang used the FDI concentration index (FDCCI) to 
show the relative concentration of FDI in Chinese industry, defined as the 
ratio between its share in total FDI sales and its share in the national sales, 
Table 9, 13 shows the result. In 1985, there were only four sectors where FDI 
showed strong concentration (FDCCI greater than 2): educational and 
sports products (including toys), transportation equipment, electronic and 
communication equipment, and apparatus and other measurement equip­
ment. Electronic and communication equipment had the highest index 
(10.45). There were three sectors where FDI showed weak concentration 
(just above I): foods, beverage, and plastic products. In 1995, there were 
four sectors with strong FDI concentration. Two of them were the same as 
in 1985 (educational and sports products and electronic and communica­
tion equipment) while two were new (garment and leather products). All 
the four highly concentrated sectors of 1985 had become much less concen­
trated in 1995, with the largest decline in electronics and communication 
equipment. In addition, there were now 11 sectors that had an FDCCI 
higher than one (the three sectors of 1985 remained). 
Two messages can be derived from Table 9.13. First, in the ten years 
between 1985 and 1995, FDI quickly spread into the Chinese economy, 
leading to less concentration as well as fuller coverage. In 1985, there were 
half a dozen sectors that either did not have FDI, or had little presence. In 
1995 there was no sector without FDI. Second, while in 1985 FDI was con­
centrated in relatively eapital-intensive and resource-based sectors, in 1995 
it had moved to sectors such as garments and leather products. 
There are two groups of foreign investors in China. One comprises firms 
that aim at the domestic market, mostly from developed countries (espe­
cially North America and Europe). These firms tend to invest in industries 
where China's technical capacities are weak. The other group consists of 
firms that want to use China's cheap labour and export facilities to produce 
exports. Most of them come from Hong Kong, Taiwan and overseas 
Chinese communities. Wang (1997) found that more export-oriented 
foreign firms tended to have lower capital intensity whereas less export­
oriented ones had higher capital intensity. 
The relationship between FDI and technology transfers in China can be 
illustrated by the technology import pattern. As reviewed in Section 1, 
China relied heavily on importing complete sets of equipment as a means 
of importing technologies before early 1980s, and this practice continued 
throughout the 1980s and early 19908, albeit to a lesser extent. However, in 
Table 9.13 FDI concentration in the Chinese manufacturing sector (sales volume), 1985 and 1995 
1985 1995 
All firms FDLCI All firms FDl firms FDI_CI 
Food 7.37 7.65 1.04 7.65 8.82 1.15 
Beverage 1.92 2.43 1.26 2.19 2.83 1.29 
Tobacco 2.55 0 0 2 0.06 0.03 
Textile 12.94 7.42 0.57 8.58 7.56 0.88 
Garment and fabrics 2.21 1.35 0.61 2.71 6.79 2.5 
Leather 1.11 0.49 0.44 1.8 4.79 2.66 
Wood processing 0.76 0.73 0.96 0.74 0.99 1.34 
Furniture 0.58 0.43 0.75 0.41 0.61 1.51 
Paper and products 2.04 0.38 0.19 1.94 1.63 0.84 
Printing 0.94 0.83 0.88 0.78 0.7 0.9 
Educational and sports products 0.49 1.96 3.99 0.71 1.76 2.5 
"" 0\ v... 
Oil refinery and related products 
Chemical products 
3.39 
7.36 
0 
2.79 
0 
0.38 
4.13 
7.24 
0.29 
4.5 
0.07 
0.62 
Medicine 1.62 0.5 0.31 1.82 1.64 0.9 
Chemical polyesters 1.19 0 0 1.58 0.98 0.62 
Rubber products 1.81 0.19 0.1 1.19 1.46 1.23 
Plastic products 1.85 1.89 1.03 2.11 3.43 1.63 
Non-metal mineral products 5.46 0.36 0.07 5.59 3.14 0.56 
Metal refinery and processing 7.06 0.97 0.14 7.59 2.33 0.31 
Non-ferrous metal refinery and processing 2.03 1.7 0.84 2.6 1.6 0.62 
Metal products 2.99 1.62 0.54 3.06 4.01 1.31 
Machinery 10.72 7.06 0.66 7.75 4.63 0.6 
Transportation equipment 5.66 18.58 3.28 6.42 7.97 1.24 
Electric equipment 4.51 1.28 0.28 5 5.95 1.19 
Electronic and communication equipment 3.27 34.11 10.45 4.89 14.63 2.99 
Apparatus and measuring equipment 1.31 3.52 2,68 0,84 1.61 1.91 
Other manufacturing 1.38 0.87 0.63 1.31 1.98 1.52 
Elect richy 4.35 0 0 6.2 3.27 O.S3 
Source: Wang (1997, table 2). 
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the second half of the 1990s, China no longer imported complete sets of 
equipment and relied mostly on FDI to acquire foreign technologies 
(Wang, 1997, table 12). 
However, studies show that FDI has not always brought the newest tech­
nologies (Wang, 1997). For instance, the first foreign car produced in 
China, the Volkswagen Santana, used the technology acquired in the early 
1980s for nearly 20 years without any substantial improvements. The tech­
nologies used by Hong Kong and Taiwan export firms are inferior even to 
those of many large domestic firms, though they may be appropriate to 
labour-intensive activities used in exports. 
The positive spillover effects of FDI may not come from the spread of 
'hard' technologies but from the spread of 'soft' technologies. 'Soft' tech­
nologies could include the following. First, the exchange of personnel 
between foreign firms and domestic firms, which helps to spread better 
managerial skills as well as production methods. This is particularly signifi­
cant for export-oriented foreign firms; many employees lcave and set up 
their own factories, usually acting as a subcontractor to the old employers 
(Uu et aI., 2002). Second, the entrance of FDI firms increases domestic 
competition, which leads to efficiency improvement on the part of domes­
tic firms. Since this improvement is indirect and rather intangible, commen­
tators often ignore it. Third. competition for high quality employees forces 
domestic firms, especially statc-owned enterprises, to improve their utiliza­
tion of human capitaL Lastly. foreign firms set high standards that are 
quickly recognised and which domestic firms come under pressure to 
imitate. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
There are two unresolved issues regarding China's technological develop­
ment. One is that China has not found the right balance between advanced 
technology and appropriate technology, the other is that domestic R&D is 
dominated by the government (including the public research institutes sup­
ported by government funds). This chapter suggests that this dominance 
does not help China's industrial technical efficiency, and may even harm it 
(through the crowding-out effect). The policy implication is strong and 
clear: R&D efforts should be decentralized to firms. 
However, this does not imply that China should give up financing public 
research institutes. At the current stage, it suffices to make the most of the 
public research institutes profit-seekers instead of pure research units. The 
Chinese government has begun to head in that direction, and the progress 
thus far is encouraging. The most significant change has happened to the 
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CAS, which has initiated a major reform to its research institutes. Except 
for a few that will remain in the basic research area, most institutes will have 
to change to profit-oriented applied research. In terms of the limited finan­
cial and human resources with which China is currently endowed, this 
change should focus research where it can serve to improve China's current 
competitiveness. Of course, it would also be a mistake for China to 
abandon its basic research. Not least because China has the largest basic 
research capacity in the developing world and should make good use of it. 
Linkages between basic research and users should be enhanced. 
Another balance that China has to maintain is between advanced and 
appropriate technologies. On the one hand, it is clear that China will remain 
a technological follower for some time into the future because it is still 
capital-constrained and lacks the necessary support of basic scientific 
research found in developed countries such as the USA. On the other hand, 
although China's comparative advantage is still in labour-intensive indus­
tries, we have seen from its recent export record that exports have moved up 
the technology scale rapidly in recent years. This trend will certainly con­
tinue and in fact is necessary to maintain China's competitiveness in the 
international market. Indeed, other labour-abundant countries, for 
example, Vietnam and Bangladesh, have emerged to challenge China's 
dominance in the world's textile and garment markets. To maintain export 
growth momentum, it is necessary for China to move up the technological 
ladder in order to keep its share in the international market. 
Therefore, investing in some key technologies in which China currently 
does not have an apparent comparative advantage may be conducive to sus­
tained growth. However, it is imperative for local governments to realize 
that only a handful of advanced localities can probably make such an 
investment, for the majority of cities the only option will be to stick to their 
current comparative advantage. 
This chapter also sheds lights on the role of FDI in disseminating tech­
nologies. Analysis shows that the role of foreign firms in disseminating hard 
technologies is weak or absent, rather, its spillover effect is likely to come 
from the interchange of personnel between foreign and domestic firms as 
well as from other kinds of information flow. The transfer of technologies 
may happen more inside the multinational firms. But this cannot be taken 
as evidence against FDI - after all, the setting up of an advanced firm by a 
multinational company is in itself good if the firm's business is well inte­
grated into the local economy. 
Corresponding to the above conclusions, the lessons that a developing 
country can learn from the Chinese experience are also threefold. First, 
public research institutes are generally much less efficient than firms in uti­
lizing R&D resources. Second, for a large country, a balance between 
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current comparative advantage and catching up with more advanced tech­
nologies should be carefully studied and pursued. Third, FDI generally will 
not disseminate advanced 'hard' technologies in the host country, but 
through exchange of personnel, the local economy will benefit from the 
presence of FDI by having a better labour force, more qualified managers, 
and more able entrepreneurs. 
NOTES 
I. 	 The author is Associate Professor, China Center for Economic Development, Beijing 
University. 
2. 	 All these figures are from IFC (2000). 
3. 	 In 1999 all textile products were grouped into one category. 
4. 	 The figures do not include R&D personnel in enterprises. 
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10. Can the Philippines ever catch up? 
Joy V. Abrenica and Gwendolyn R. Tecson 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Post-war industrial development in the Philippines presents a typical por­
trait of a developing country's struggle to achieve technological compe­
tence. However, few countries have squandered their potential with as much 
profligacy as the Philippines. Despite its rich base of human capital and its 
early lead, I the Philippines has performed poorly, particularly in a region 
where many other countries have successfully (often spectacularly) over­
come similar constraints to development. 
Various factors have been held to account for the Philippines' poor perfor­
mance. One account blames macroeconomic mismanagement. Alternating 
cycles of crisis and boom are said to have engendered uncertainty and dis­
suaded the private sector from investing in building technological capabil­
ities. One may, however, argue that no East Asian economy has been spared 
by the boom-bust cycle, though others have enjoyed longer periods of stabil­
ity. Other analysts point to the failure of the state to steer the country's tech­
nological development along a defined path (as in Korea or Taiwan) because 
of its liberal approach and over-dependence on market forces. However, 
policymaking in the Philippines has not always been liberal and market­
oriented. There have been ample market interventions in the past, although 
they may not have been well designed or implemented. Market liberalism is 
of recent vintage in Philippine policymaking; the country is still in transition 
from an inward-looking policy environment.2 
The technological lethargy of a country as well endowed with human 
capital as the Philippines cannot be easily explained. The boom~bust cycles 
certainly encouraged the business sector to be more speculative than innova­
tive (Fabella, 1994). The periods of boom were relatively short-lived, and the 
more frequent periods of crisis wrought deeper economic havoc. It is also true 
that some advocates of liberalization believe that technology development 
policies are less important than opening up the market, providing general 
infrastructure and ensuring macroeconomic stability. The pervasive view is in 
fact that market liberalization will stimulate FDI inflow and this will suffice 
to drive the country's technological development (de Dios, 1996). Thus, most 
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attention has been given to stimulating trade and investments while science 
and technology policies have been largely ad hoc and peripheral. 
This chapter traces the roots of Philippine technological underdevelop­
ment by examining the acquisition of industrial technology from various 
channels. It looks at the institutional setting under which the acquisition 
took place, and it examines the role of public policy in facilitating technol­
ogy development. Section 2 is an assessment of Philippine technological 
capability, presenting evidence of limited upgrading despite the powerful 
pressures of international competition. Section 3 discusses the sources of 
technological competence, foreign direct investment (FDI) and local tech­
nological effort. The failure of FDI to spur technological development is 
traced to the shallow linkage of MNC-dominated industries with the rest 
of the economy. Section 4 examines government policies in trade, industry, 
human resources and science and technology. It shows that these policies 
were discordant and bereft of a common long-range vision. The final 
section pulls together the different strands to offer an explanation of why 
technological catch-up has been elusive for the Philippines. 
2. 	 PHILIPPINE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY: 
MYTHS AND FACTS 
There are a number of myths about the technological vigour of the 
Philippines. Most are quite easy to debunk, but the analysis casts doubt on 
the efficacy of some technology indicators. 
Myth 1: The Philippine Manufacturing Sector is Dominated by High-Tech 
Industries. 
The high proportion of high-technology products in Philippine exports has 
created this myth (Table 10.1). Two-thirds of Philippine manufactured 
exports are defined as technology-intensive, a share exceeded only by 
Singapore. Yet what lies behind these figures? 
The Philippine export structure has certainly changed radically. 
Manufactured exports comprised a mere third of total exports in 1980, and 
by 1999 they accounted for 89%. 
Over this period, the composition of manufactured exports also 
changed, moving up the technological ladder. There was a rapid decline in 
the export share of natural-resource intensive manufactures like processed 
food, beverages and wood products, and a concomitant rise in the share of 
capital and technology-intensive exports from about half in 1980 to over 
three quarters in 1997. 
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Table 10.1 	 Exports of technology-intensive manufactures, selected Asian 
economies 
Value. 1998 Average annual Share in 
(in US$ million) growth 1994--98 total exports 
(per cent) (per cent) 
Phili ppines 20034 37 67 
Singapore 76628 6 70 
South Korea 52951 8 40 
Malaysia 39934 11 55 
Thailand 22253 12 42 
Indonesia 5094 19 10 
China 49213 22 27 
Sourre: International Trade Centre, United Nations. 
Using Balassa's index of 'revealed' comparative advantage (RCA), the 
structural change in Philippine exports can be benchmarked against 
changes in the rest of the world.} The shift in the Philippines' pattern of 
export specialization is evident from the changes in the RCA index over 
time, as shown in Figure 10.3. The Philippines traditionally specialized in 
resource-based exports, in particular processed food and other agro-based 
goods. The pattern started to change from 1975. The RCA index for agri­
culture-intensive exports fell below 1.0 in 1996, suggesting that the 
Philippines has started to specialize in other products: manufactured 
exports, especially labour-intensive goods. There was a sharp rise in the 
RCA for capital and technology-intensive goods, reaching 1.05 by 1996. 
Employing the OECD's classification of exports by technology intensity, 
Figure 10.4 shows that Philippine manufactured exports until 1995 con­
sisted mainly of low-technology manufactures, led by textiles and clothing, 
food, beverages and tobacco. As late as 1992, these comprised more than 
half of manufactured exports. However after 1995, high-technology 
exports grew rapidly and surpassed all other manufactured export groups. 
By 1999, they made up 82 per cent of all exported manufactures. 
On closer examination, however, high-technology exports are found to 
be highly concentrated in only two categories: electronics and communica­
tions, and computers and office machinery (Figure 10.5).4 The former 
makes up about 80 per cent of high-technology exports while the latter 
accounts for the remaining 20 per cent. Only three items dominate electron­
ics exports: integrated circuits (40 per cent), storage units (16 per cent), and 
parts and accessories of automated data processing machines (17 per cent). 
The high concentration in a few products is not only undesirable (it creates 
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extreme vulnerability), it also suggests that resource limitations have con­
strained diversification. 
These figures do not show that the Philippines' high-tech specialization 
is driven entirely by FDI: foreign investors have concentrated on the 
electronics industry. Of the eight activities in the electronics industry,S the 
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largest is components, which made up 42 per cent of the 588 electronic 
companies registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) and Philippine 
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) in 1996, followed by electronic data 
processing (EDP) and consumer electronics, comprising 17 per cent and 8 
per cent of the total, respectively. The components sector is involved mainly 
in the labour-intensive packaging of integrated circuits and the assembly of 
transistors, diodes. resistors, capacitors, coils, transformers and printed 
circuit boards (PCBs). Among the allied industries, the largest category is 
that of metal casting and stamping. 
The share of high-technology exports thus gives a misleading indication 
on the level of technological sophistication within the economy. Although 
the final product may have high technological content (such as Inters 
Pentium III drives or ball-grid arrays), the Philippines may by confined to 
the labour-intensive part of the value-added chain. Almost all complex 
parts and components are imported from the parent company or other 
foreign sources; wages are practically the only domestic value-added. 6 
Myth 2: The Technological Strength of the Philippines Lies in its Pool of 
Human Capital 
An index most often employed to measure human capital is enrolment rates 
in formal education (Table 10.2). By this measure, the Philippines compares 
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Table 10.2 Measures of human capitalformation 
Adult Primary Secondary Tertiary Public 
literacy enrolment enrolment enrolment expenditures 
rate. 1997 ratio (%age ratio «~I,J age ratio nl" age in education as 'X, 
cohort). 1997 cohort), 1997 cohort), 1995 of GNP, 1997 
Philippines 94.6 99.9 77.8 31 2.2 
Singapore 91.4 91.4 75.6 3.0 
South Korea 97.2 99.9 99.9 39 3.7 
Malaysia 85.7 99.9 64.0 5.2 
Thailand 94.7 88.0 47.6 19 4.1 
Indonesia 85.0 99.2 56.1 28 1.4 
China 82.9 99.9 70,0 37 2.3 
Source: UNESCO (1997). 
favourably with other countries in the region. It has one of the highest 
enrolment rates in primary, secondary and tertiary education. However, 
these rates disguise quality problems that beset the Philippine educational 
system.? 
The core of the problem is that while enrolment rates have soared in 
recent years, stimulated by the policy of compulsory education up to sec­
ondary level, the public budget on education has been fluctuating. During 
the 1950s and 1960s, the share of education in total government spending 
was about 30 per cent; that share has fallen to about 11-12 per cent in recent 
years (HDN, 2000). When benchmarked against other East Asian econo­
mies, Philippine public spending on education as a proportion of GNP 
income is among the smallest. Since the Philippines has also a smaller GNP, 
its spending per pupil in absolute terms compares dismally with its neigh­
bours.8 
Although no strict correlation has yet been established between spend­
ing and quality of education, many indicators (for example, the dwindling 
supply of textbooks to students) suggest that resource constraints hamper 
the effective delivery of education.9 Take the scores obtained by Filipino 
children in the Third International Mathematics and Science Test of 1995. 
The Philippines ranked thirty-ninth of 42 countries, and the scores of 
Filipino students were only better than those from Kuwait, Colombia and 
South Africa (HDN, 20(0). 
The supply of science and engineering graduates in the Philippines also 
needs careful scrutiny. Tan (2000) reports that about half the engineering 
graduates are in the civil engineering or agriculture fields. There are far 
fewer graduates in chemical, industrial and electrical engineering fields. In 
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addition, the quality of tertiary education in some 1300 colleges and uni­
versities in the country is poor. Only seven of these institutions meet inter­
national standards. 
In fact, the Philippines has a dearth of scientists and engineers in R&D. 
The most recent count places the number of scientists and engineers per 
million at 152 in the Philippines against 326 in Malaysia, 1284 in Singapore 
and 2576 in Taiwan (UNESCO, 1997). The standard set by UNESCO for 
industrializing economies is 380. As Table 10.3 shows, the Philippines turns 
out few innovations. This is expected in view of its small pool of S&T per­
sonnel and low spending on R&D. 10 
Myth 3: The Philippines is an Attractive Site for Foreign Investments 
because of its Strategic Geographic Location, a Large Pool of Educated 
and English-Speaking Labour and Generous Government Incentives. 
The factors that have attracted MNCs to the Philippines can be illustrated 
by the hard disk drive (HOD) industry. The HDD industry in the 
Philippines was born in 1988 with the entry of a US firm, Sunward 
Technologies (eventually taken over by Read-Rite), which started the 
assembly of magnetic heads. A Japanese firm then entered to assemble 
floppy and hard disk drives. But the inflow of HDD investments in the 
Philippines was halted by political and economic instability, and FDI 
resumed only in 1994 with the entry of Hitachi. At that time, the political 
crisis had been resolved and major economic reforms were under way. 
Three other Japanese major assemblers followed Hitachi in close succes­
sion: Fujitsu, Toshiba and NEe. Japanese MNCs came to dominate the 
HDD industry in the Philippines. Table 10.4 shows the industry players that 
entered during the period, some with fresh capital infusions into existing or 
new facilities. It should be noted that American and European MNCs dom­
inated the earlier waves of FDI in the Philippines. 
The fact that US HDD majors chose to establish themselves a decade 
earlier in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand (rather than in the 
Philippines), and more recently, in China, is significant on two scores. First, 
the early half of the 19808 was another politically turbulent period in the 
Philippines. Because of instability, the Philippines were not only bypassed 
by American HDD investments, but more substantially. by the Japanese 
investors that flocked to the rest of Southeast Asia following the yen appre­
ciation. Second, US MNCs had started electronics production in the 
Philippines as early as the I 950s, and introduced semiconductor assembly 
in the 19708. In fact, large electronic MNCs started to invest in the 
Philippines in the mid-1970s until the early 1980s, primarily to use the 
country as a manufacturing export base. Examples of large investments 
II 
Table 10.3 Comparatil·e S&Tperformance of selected Asian countries 
Inputs Outputs 
Overall Total R&D expenditure Scientists & Patents granted Patents secured Patents in 
productivity, expenditure as %of GOP engineers per to residents, abroad by force 
GDP(PPP) on R&D million average annual country 100000 
per person US$ million, population no. per 100000 residents, 1995 inhabitants) 
employed, 1996 habitantsh 
US$, 1997 
Phillipines 9413 115 0.218 152 0.057 1 
h" 
'I 
0­
Singapore 
Korea 
47945 
30856 
1271 
13522 
1.370 
2.790 
1284 
1990 
0.388 
13.661 
96 
2434 
502 
141 
Taiwan 45191 5048 1.861 2576a 75.981 2486 599 
Malaysia 27413 226 0.320 326 0.115 669 29 
Thailand 12795 208 0.126 173 0.127 1 
Indonesia 7947 187 0.092 181 
China 6497 3933 0.482 1128 0.129 213 2 
Notes: 
Authors' calculation using data reported in PECC (1999). 
h Based on 1994-95 data. 
Sources: World Economic Forum (1998); UNESCO (1997). 
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Table 10.4 Entry of MNCs in the electronics industry, 1994~96 

Year MNC Investment 
(million US$) 
Product Nationality 
1994 Read-Ritc 
Analogue Devices 
Cebu Mitsumi 
AmkorAnam 
Integrated 
Microelectronics 
Intcl Manufacturing, 
Phil. 
58 
60 
75 
95 
143 
347 
Magnetic heads 
Semiconductor dcvices 
Floppy disk drives (FDD) 
Semiconductor devices 
Magnetic heads & printed 
circuit boards (PCB) 
Semiconductor devices 
American 
Dutch 
Japanese 
British/Korean 
Filipino 
American 
1995 Acer Information 23 Motherboard assemblies Taiwanese 
products 
Hitachi 
Cypress Phils. 
Gateway Electronics 
Fujitsu Computer 
Amkor Anam 
Advance Packaging 
Intel Technology 
57 
64 
68 
124 
126 
235 
Hard disk drives (HDD) 
and parts 
Integrated circuits 
Integrated circuits 
Optical disk drive; HDD 
Ball grid array ICs 
Microprocessor- Pentium 
Japanese 
American 
American 
Japanese 
British/Korean 
American 
1996 Daeduck Industries 
Automated Technology 
Epson Precision 
NEC Components 
Allegro Mkrosystem 
32 
38 
44 
63 
88 
PCBs 
Electronic devices 
Terminal printer 
Printed wiring board & 
electronic components 
Semiconductor devices 
Korean 
Filipino 
Japanese 
Japanese 
American 
Sources: BOI and PEZA files: Department of Trade and Industry. 
were Intel Philippines (1974), Temic Telefunken Microelectronics (1974), 
Motorola (Phil) Inc. (1979), Texas Instruments Philippines (1979), and 
Philips Semiconductors Philippines (1981). However, the political and eco­
nomic instabilities of the 1980s deterred fresh FDI. 
By the time that FDI inflows resumed in the mid-I 990s, HDD produc­
tion networks were already well established in other East Asian economies. 
The Philippines had lost the opportunity offered by its early start to build 
a strong base and attract more high-value activities such as wafer fabrica­
tion. Instead, Philippine operations are still limited to the tail-end processes 
in the value chain. Even though the Philippines is competitive in these pro­
cesses, its competitive edge remains shallow and can be easily eroded by 
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economies with lower labour costs, such as China (which has, in addition, 
greater availability of technical skills and potential suppliers). 
Export-oriented MNC investments entered the Philippines in a big way 
after the passage of the Foreign Investments Act in 1991, which liberalized 
the investment regime. MNCs chose to locate in the export processing zones 
(EPZs), which, besides allowing tariff-free importation of parts and compo­
nents, also provided good infrastructure for importing components and 
exporting the final product. The Philippines also offered other advantages. 
Interviews with the four leading HDD firms suggest that they chose the 
Philippines over competing sites because of its proximity to Japan, the rel­
atively abundant supply of engineers and technical graduates, and the pool 
of relatively cheap English-speaking, semi-skilled and trainable labour. 
Locational advantages are, of course, a function of the technological 
needs of the industry. Physical proximity to Japan is important for Japanese 
MNCs because all R&D and ramp-up activities take place in the parent 
company. Benchmarking of productivity levels is undertaken vis-it-vis 
Japan. Japanese engineers and technicians are brought in to train nationals, 
and Filipino engineers, technicians and even operators are sent to Japan for 
training. Because of short product life cycles, it is important that technol­
ogy be transferred fast, from ramp-up to mass production: hence the need 
for a constant movement not only of parts and components but also of per­
sonnel between Japan, the Philippines, and other countries. Moreover, the 
short life cycle of the product means that it had to reach the market 'fresh' 
otherwise it would lose much of its value. 
The availability of engineers and technical graduates is important for the 
HDD industry because of its technology intensity, even at the labour­
intensive end undertaken in the Philippines. The country turns out about 
30000 engineering graduates yearly. In terms of enrolment in tcchnical sub­
jects that are directly relevant to industrial competitiveness (such as scicnce, 
mathematics and engineering), the Philippines has 0.33 per cent of its pop­
ulation enrolled in these areas. This is more than double the rates in 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand (but only a fifth and a third of those in 
Korea and Taiwan, respectively). Engineers and technicians are also rela­
tively cheap in the Philippines the lowest cost in ASEAN, even lower than 
in Indonesia. 
The widespread use of the English language in the Philippines was cited 
as its third advantage over other production sites in Asia. This again reflects 
the technological demands of the industry: the ability of workers and tech­
nicians to understand instructions in English facilitates training and the 
transfer of technology from Japanese engineers and supervisors. This facil­
ity, in turn, is considered essential because flexibility and learning are nec­
essary to cope with short product cycles. 
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Yet these advantages could be outweighed by other factors such as 
market size. The Philippines tried hard to attract automotive investments 
and become the automotive hub in the Southeast Asian region. Despite the 
incentives offered to global auto assemblers, however, it lost out to 
Thailand whose vehicle market was five times the size of that of the 
Philippines (before the financial crisis in 1997).11 
Investors vote with their feet. In a recent UNCTAD World Investment 
Report (2000), the Philippines ranks among the 10 biggest recipients of 
FDI in South, East and Southeast Asia. This, however, conceals the fact 
that FDI in the Philippines shrank during 1999 to a fourth of its value in 
the previous year. It also conceals that its share of FDI flows in East Asia 
has been steadily declining since 1990. 
Table 10.5 Netforeign investment inflows in selected Asian economies 
(billion US$) 
1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 1999 
Philippines -0.1 0.0 0.5 1.5 1.2 0.6 
Singapore 1.2 1.0 5.6 7.2 8.1 7.0 
South Korea 0.0 0.2 0.8 1.8 2.8 9.3 
Indonesia 0.2 0.3 1.1 4.3 4.7 -2.7 
Malaysia 0.9 0.7 2.3 4.2 5.1 1.6 
Thailand 0.2 0.2 2.4 3.1 3.9 6.2 
China 1.7 3.5 35.8 44.2 38.8 
Total of East Asia 4.1 16.2 57.9 70.0 66.8 
Share of Phil. (%,) 0 3.1 2.6 1.7 0.1 
Sources: UNCTAD (2000) and World Bank (1999). 
That the Philippines appears to be losing the competitive battIe for FDI 
can only add to the problem of declining productivity. Various studies, 
using different approaches for estimating total factor productivity (TFP), 
are unanimous in finding negative growth rates in TFP. Estimates by 
Hooley (1985) reveal 1.18 per cent TFP in 1956-60, sliding to -1.90 per 
cent in 1976-80. Austria and Martin (1992) calculated a -0.6 per cent TFP 
for the period 1950-87. On a yearly basis, Cororaton and Caparas (1999) 
found steady decline in TFP, from - 1.9 per cent in 1981 to -0.84 per cent 
in 1996. The contrast of the Philippines' TFP record with those of its neigh­
bours is apparent in Table 10.6. The only consolation is the recent estimates 
of Austria (2000) that show positive TFP growth, 0.93 per cent, during the 
period of market liberalization, 1986-96; however, negative TFP (-0.4 per 
cent) is still obtained for the longer period 1960-96. 12 
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Table 10.6 TFP growth rates in selected Asian economies (%) 
Period Philippines Malaysia Indonesia Thailand 
196(~73 0.7 1.0 l.l 1.4 
1973~94 -1.1 0.9 0.7 2.1 
1973-84 1.3 0.4 0.5 l.l 
1984-94 -0.9 1.4 0.9 3.3 
1960-94 -0.4 0.9 0.8 1.8 
Source: Felipe (1997), cited in Patalinghug (2000). 
Nevertheless, a few large and medium-sized firms have made significant 
technological improvements in response to competitive pressures in the 
domestic or global markets. This is particularly evident in consumer goods 
manufacturing, where tariffs were the first to be lowered at the start of trade 
reforms in the late 1980s. Similarly, local telecommunication carriers are in 
a close race to introduce new products and services in the deregulated 
market. What are the sources for technological upgrading? The major 
sources are foreign direct investment and local technological efforts, con­
sidered below. 
3. 	 EXPLOITING SOURCES OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
CAPABILITY 
Foreign Direct Investment 
We have noted already the role of FDI in the growth of high and medium­
high technology exports by the Philippines. Table 10.7 shows the sectoral 
breakdown of FDI since 1973. 
The share of machinery and supplies in FDI in medium-high and high­
technology industries has been increasing steadily, from 14 per cent during 
1973-88 to 58 per cent by the last half of the 1990s. Except for the lumpy 
investments in petroleum and coal in 1993 13 and in food in 1999, the picture 
is one of a steady decline in FDI in low and medium-technology industries 
and a concomitant rise in medium-high to high-technology industries. 
What technology does FDI bring in? MNCs are clearly a major source 
of new technology and productivity improvements, especially in industries 
with rapid technological change. Players in these industries continuously 
introduce new products and processes and improve their management 
methods. 14 They are at the forefront of raising labour productivity by using 
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Table iO.7 	 inflows offoreign direct investment in the manufilcturing 
sector ( US$ million) 
1973-88 1989-94 1995-2000 
01Value % Value /0 Value % 
Medium-high/high-technology 
Chemicals & chemical products 394.4 28.7 185.2 10.0 231.2 9.4 
Transport equipment 103.6 7.5 118.6 6.4 140.2 5.7 
Machinery and supplies 81.3 5.9 443.8 24.0 508.7 20.7 
Total 579.4 42.1 747.5 40.4 880.1 35.9 
Medium-low teehnology 
Metal & metal products 169.4 12.3 39.5 2.1 168.6 6.9 
Petroleum and coal 82.3 6.0 703.8 38.1 57.7 2.3 
Rubber 27.2 2.0 6.1 0.3 61.5 2.5 
Non-metallic mineral products 34.6 2.5 43.4 2.3 143.7 5.9 
Total 313.5 22.8 792.8 42.9 431.4 17.6 
Low-technology 
Food 289.3 21.0 102.0 5.5 1006.4 41.0 
Textile and garments 63.2 4.6 102.6 5.5 25.9 1.1 
Paper & paper products 26.6 1.9 6.8 0.4 28.7 1.2 
Wood, cane & cork 13.3 1.0 24.5 1.3 3.9 0.2 
Sugar and tobacco 19.9 1.4 14.3 0.8 0.4 0.0 
Leather products 3.4 0.2 12.0 0.6 2.4 0.1 
Printing, publishing & allied 5.5 0.4 3.5 0.2 4.1 0.2 
Others 62.6 4.5 42.5 2.3 70.7 2.9 
Total 483.7 35.1 308.0 16.7 1142.5 46.6 
Total manufacturing FOI 1376.6 100.0 1848.4 100.0 2454.0 100.0 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines. 
new organizational techniques like worker multi-skilling, sman-group 
activities (for example, quality circles) and innovation sharing plans 
(Raneses, 2001). Thus, local firms requiring significant technological 
upgrading tend to form joint ventures or strategic alliances with MNCs. 
This is commonplace in utility industries, banking, food processing and 
cement. Outside these partnerships, however, spillovers to the rest of the 
economy tend to be generally weak. In the electronics industry, for instance, 
exports are characterized by very low value-added in proportion to output. 
As Table 10.8 indicates, the value-added to output ratio is only about 30 per 
cent, and has hardly shown any improvement over time, testifying to the 
low level of local content. 
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Table 10,8 Selected ratios in the electronics industry, 1974-1994 
VA/output Output/firm Workers/ VA/worker No. of 
Year C%) (Pesos 000) firm (Pesos 000) establishments 
1974 
Assembly & parts 23.21 10480 154 25.04 141 
1983 
Assembly 38.42 35522 177 76.90 119 
Parts/sub-assembly 38.46 135601 981 53.15 32 
1988 
Assembly 29.27 69958 132 154.49 163 
Parts/sub-assembly 29.69 278925 643 128.87 51 
1994 
Assembly 31.29 302725 274 345.49 198 
Parts/sub-assembly 31.90 579195 735 251.48 73 
Source. NSO, Census of Establishments, various years. 
Backward linkages with the domestic economy are established through 
subcontracting or arm's-length purchases from domestic suppliers, Such 
linkages not only raise domestic value-added but also transfer new technol­
ogy and skills to domestic firms, which learn to produce according to the 
demanding specifications of foreign firms, Supply relationships have, 
however, remained quite underdeveloped in the Philippines, unlike in such 
East Asian countries as Korea or Taiwan, The degree of subcontracting in 
the manufacturing sector, measured by the share of output doneIor others 
in total industry output, was only 2.6 per cent in 1993, and was even lower 
than the corresponding figure in 1988 (3.2 per cent). 
Subcontracting activity as a share of the total output of an industry is 
highest in: non-ferrous metals lS (15.34 per cent), apparel 16 (12.80 per cent), 
machinery except electric (11.46 per cent), transport equipment (8.84 per 
cent), while the electronics industry registered a very low 1.49 per cent sub­
contracting ratio in 1993. This is partly on account of the dominance of 
large firms in the industry, As observed, subcontracting activity tends to 
decline with size. In the electronics industry, firms employing 1-9 workers 
showed a 43,85 per cent subcontracting ratio compared with 1.24 per cent 
for those with 200 and more workers, a figure close to the overall industry 
subcontracting ratio. Another indication of the degree of subcontracting 
activity is the extent of contribution to output of work done by others. Table 
10.9 shows that there is little difference between the subcontracting activity 
of firms with foreign equity and those without foreign equity. 
One reason cited in the explanation of the low degree of subcontracting 
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Table 10.9 Work done by others as a percentage of total output, 1994 (by 
size of employment and degree offoreign equity) 
Degree of foreign equity participation 2099 workers 100 or more workers 
in manufacturing firms 
----­
With no foreign equity 6.69 6.44 
With less than 10% foreign equity 5.37 4.44 
With 10% or more foreign equity 7.58 7.60 
Source: NSO (1994). 
is that distortions in the macroeconomic and trade policy environment 
encouraged vertical integration (World Bank, 1993). Specifically, protec­
tion and investment incentives engendered biases in favour of large firms 
(Power and Sicat, 1975). This in turn encouraged greater in-house produc­
tion at the expense of external sourcing and subcontracting. The chronic 
overvaluation of the peso and the bias towards capital-intensive produc­
tion stunted possibilities for growth of a technologically sophisticated and 
efficient small- and medium-scale sector that had been the wellspring of the 
industrial dynamism in Japan. Inappropriate foreign exchange policy pen­
alized export production and fragmented the already limited domestic 
market, resulting in lack of standardization and specialization, as typified 
by the automotive industry. In addition, as will be elaborated in Section 4, 
the emphasis on raising local content encouraged in-house production 
instead of su bcontracting (Hill, 1981). 
Given the presence of MNCs in export-oriented industries, it can be 
assumed that most technology transfer is internalized by the company (LalI, 
Chapter 2, this volume). The removal of foreign equity restrictions for firms 
that export 70 per cent of their output has led to the majority of foreign 
firms choosing to establish wholly-owned subsidiaries instead of joint ven­
tures. In the hard disk drive industry, the entry of the Japanese majors was 
almost immediately followed by that of component manufacturers, also 
mainly Japanese, who have been supplying the majors in Japan. Interviews 
revealed that the main factor that attracted them to the Philippines was the 
potential demand from the four HOD assemblers, and possibly other 
American HOO assemblers in the future, locating in the country. Almost 
invariably, their answer to the question on why they chose the Philippines 
was 'to be close to the HOO majors'. 
As one respondent noted, the 'majors' included Seagate, which at the 
time of interview had decided to locate itself in Cebu. This motivation 
undoubtedly holds for TOK with its recent investment in MR heads as well 
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as other component suppliers (for example, media) in the pipeline. 
According to the Tokyo-based respondent of Hitachi, many of the avail­
able vendors now operating in the Philippines came after the announce­
ment of the relocation decisions of Fujitsu and Toshiba in 1995, a year 
after Hitachi established itself in the country. Two of its own suppliers with 
whom the firm had close relationships in Japan - Pretech (precision 
machining and turned parts) and Sunpino Technology - decided to start 
operations in the Philippines while Hitachi was still doing its feasibility 
studies on its relocation. 
An interesting upshot of this development is a growing concentration of 
supply sourcing from two locations: Japan for major components (for 
example, wafer, media) produced by parent companies. and the Philippines 
for locally available components and sub-assemblies. This has implications 
for intra-regional trade. The entry of component manufacturers (for 
example, Nidec for spindle motors and eventually TDK for magnetic heads) 
into the country has led to shifts in sourcing away from other ASEAN coun­
tries. Indeed, one of the assemblers, Fujitsu, is in the process of recruiting 
technical personnel for its newest plant designed to produce media which 
has been previously sourced from Japan. Moreover, assemblers used to 
import components such as spindle motors from Thailand or certain PCBs 
from Singapore, but have increasingly turned to local sources once these 
have come on stream and have been found to be competitive. Even compo­
nent manufacturers such as Nidec have started to shift to Philippine-based 
parts (for example, machined or die-cast parts, bearings) as these became 
available from supplier firms that have relocated from Japan or from other 
Southeast Asian sites. Respondents also anticipated the components that 
would become available locally when TDK becomes operational. 
If a similar trend is found in other industries, then what appears as 
increases in value-added of exports may not actually reflect improvements 
in national technological capability. There are, in fact, apprehensions about 
the extent to which indigenous firms will be able to establish links with 
Japanese HDD assemblers and component manufacturers. 
The local engineering industry (consisting mostly of SMEs) is unable to 
exploit the presence of Japanese assemblers because of severe technologi­
cal handicaps. In 1996, the Metal Institute of Research and Development 
Centre found that the technology of the local metal casting industry was 
some 30 years behind Japan's and that the 1995 level of ductile iron in the 
Philippines had not even reached Japan's 1965 level. Moreover, even the 
most progressive foundries were still in the 'jolt-squeeze' stage of mould­
ing, that is, producing moulds at the maximum rate of 20 to 25 per hour per 
machine, while Thai foundries were already producing a minimum rate of 
120 moulds. Since this study, some technical assistance (mostly funded by 
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the Japanese) has been given to the industry, but improvements in techno­
logical levels are stilI small and concentrated. 
To what extent have FDI and exports contributed to Philippine techno­
logical development? Three studies have attempted to measure the contri­
butions of FDI and exports to total factor productivity (TFP). The findings 
are varied. Austria (2000) found a positive and significant effect of exports 
on TFP, but the FDI variable was insignificant. 17 Cororaton and Abdula 
(1997), on the other hand, found both exports and FDI variables to have 
positive and significant effects. They also obtained a negative coefficient for 
the tariff variable, suggesting that protection had a perverse impact on tech­
nological development. Finally, Okamoto (1999) did not find a significant 
impact of exports and FDI on TFP, consistent with the qualitative assess­
ment of the weak links between foreign and domestic firms. 
Local Technological Effort 
While statistical tests do not capture the spillover effects of FDI on domes­
tic firms, it is reasonable to expect that some local technological activities 
have been spurred by the interaction of local and foreign firms. In the 
I 970s, for example, the automotive development programme attracted 
MNCs and gave birth to a machine tool industry in the Philippines, at 
about the same time as Taiwan and South Korea. At that time, venturing 
into machine tools was regarded as too ambitious given the level of devel­
opment of the ancillary sector (machining, metal casting, heat treatment 
and the like). There were also doubts about the ability of the small domes­
tic market to support an industry. Yet it was also considered 'strategic' to 
develop a local machine tool industry since a country's capability to 
produce machines and equipment depended on its stock of machine tools. 
Unlike Taiwan and South Korea that deftly combined trade and financial 
instruments to assist machine tool producers and users, the Philippine 
government left producers to develop on their own. In the end. the local 
producers were unable to face competition from second-hand imported 
lathes that (ironically) came from Taiwan (Abrenica, 1994). 
A common complaint among inventors and entrepreneurs in the 
Philippines is the absence of public support for technological start-ups. The 
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) has supported a number of 
business incubators like the Institute of Small-Scale Industries at the 
University of the Philippines, but none has been as successful as counter­
parts in Taiwan and Korea. There are also no public-sector institutions 
similar to ITRI in Taiwan or KAIST in Korea, or venture capital institutions 
that can cooperate with inventors to commercialize local innovations. l8 
It is difficult, in the absence of detailed studies, to pinpoint any sector that 
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has built significant innovative capabilities in the Philippines. Technological 
activities are limited even in traded goods like electronics that face global 
competition. A survey of electronic firms by the Department of Trade and 
Industry shows that four-fifths of electronic firms are engaged in the simple 
assembly of basic or medium-level technology products such as TVs, video 
cassette recorders and passive components (resistors, coils, single and 
double-sided PCBs and so on). Nonetheless, manufacturing capability is 
judged to be higher in firms that assemble integrated circuits using the latest 
packaging technology. A few local firms, in particular Ionics Inc. (1982) and 
Pacific Semiconductors Inc. (1988), undertake substantial subcontracting 
with MNCs in wafer probe/inspection, die bonding and wire bonding for 
semiconductor packaging. 
In the electronic data processing industry, local firms are active in PCB 
assembly and module sub-assembly for computer hardware. The more 
prominent local firms are Integrated Microelectronics Inc. (1980) which 
has been assembling magnetic heads for US and Japanese MNCs, and 
lonics, Inc. which assembles PCs for IBM Corp. But the R&D activities of 
these firms are mostly directly related to the products that have been sub­
contracted to them. lonies is reported to have plans to set up R&D facil­
ities in the Philippines and the USA. In the case of foreign affiliates, Fujitsu 
(car stereo software), ROHM Megatech (LED and transistor frames), 
Casio (pagers), Sharp (televisions and karaoke machines), R&D activities 
are mostly production-related. R&D in new products and processes are still 
carried out in the parent companies. 
Among sectors highly protected in the past, for example, food process­
ing and cement, the import surge following a protracted reform of the tariff 
structure since 1986 prompted the large firms to source new technologies 
either through joint ventures or FDI. But there are few local firms with the 
capacity to attract foreign partners. Government programmes to help 
SMEs find foreign partners have had limited success. 
4. 	 PUBLIC POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
A number of factors explain the Philippines' weak national technological 
capability. Among these are government policies. We now assess these policies. 
Industrial Policy 
Like most developing countries, the Philippines embarked on industrializa­
tion based on an inward-looking import-substitution and later switched to 
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export-orientation. Unlike the NIEs in the Asian region, protection was 
protracted, lasting more than three decades. It was only in 1981 that a 
serious trade reform policy, culminating in a uniform tariff rate of 5 per 
cent by 2004, was adopted. More importantly, the Philippines was less suc­
cessful than the Asian NIEs in leveraging policy regimes. 19 
The import-substitution regime 
Comprehensive controls on imports and foreign exchange were introduced 
in the Philippines as early as 1949, four years after Independence, to create 
an industrial base, first in consumer goods and later in capital goods. The 
policy attracted tariff-jumping FDI in the consumer durable industry in the 
I 960s, to assemble cars and 'white goods' (refrigerators, washing machines, 
air-conditioners, and so on). Aldaba (1994) found the average effective pro­
tective rate (EPR) to be a highly significant determinant of Japanese invest­
ments in the Philippines, and to a lesser extent of US, European and total 
FDI in 1973-92. In the automotive industry, import barriers encouraged 
local assembly from imported CKD (completely knocked-down) kits. 
However, a local content policy was put in place in order to develop the 
local parts industry.20 A number of MNCs producing simple electrical 
appliances like electric fans, rice cookers, radios, TV sets and air condition­
ers were also attracted by the protected market. The extent of backward 
linkage achieved varied by product, ranging from 15 per cent in colour TV 
to 60 per cent in refrigerators (Morisawa 2000). 
How well did the Philippines manage its trade regime to build an indus­
trial base and acquire technological capability? The best illustration is 
perhaps the automotive industry. In the I 970s, the Philippines was among 
the first of the Asian economies to launch a vehicle development pro­
gramme. The programme attracted investments from Japanese, European 
and US automotive assemblers. Several decades later, unlike Korea, 
Thailand or Malaysia, the Philippine auto industry remains the smallest 
and the least advanced in the Southeast Asian region. The failure of the 
programme can be traced to faulty design and weak implementation 
(Abrenica, 1994). The experience provides important lessons on industrial 
strategies anchored in FDI. 
One important problem was that the government pushed for the local 
production of complex parts (engine blocks, axles and transmission) in the 
belief that this would facilitate greater transfer of technology and generate 
more export revenues. But the tight specifications required for such sophis­
ticated components only encouraged in-house production: the multina­
tional assemblers raised vertical integration. Subcontracting may have been 
promoted better if the localization efforts had concentrated on simpler 
parts such as brake linings, fan belts, radiators, brake drums or seats. 
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The programme implementers did not enforce localization very strictly. 
The lack of technical expertise and manpower to monitor compliance in 
fact rendered the local content regulations largely ineffective. This posed 
another problem. It had been assumed that the costs of complying with the 
local content requirements would encourage assemblers to limit the number 
of brands and frequency of model changes. However, since the enforcement 
of local content was weak, a large number of brands and models were 
assembled, depriving local manufacturers of the scale needed for technolog­
ical development. A more serious shortcoming was the neglect of the small­
and medium-sized parts manufacturers. Although some policies were osten­
sibly directed to support parts manufacturing, the results were not in line 
with intentions. The incentive structure was biased in favour of capital­
intensive and vertically-integrated operations. 
The implementers erroneously assumed that the cost penalty of localiza­
tion would compel the foreign assemblers to assist local parts producers, 
replicating the tight assembler-parts supplier links that existed in the home 
bases of the assemblers. The expectation did not materialize. Most of the 
foreign assemblers elected to bring to the host country their affiliate parts 
manufacturers; others, as noted, chose to manufacture the parts them­
selves. 
Export-oriented policy regime 
By the 1970s, the Philippine economy could no longer bear the burden of 
costs imposed by import-substitution policies. This prompted a shift to an 
outward-looking industrial development strategy. The Philippine peso was 
floated and a law providing incentives to exporters was enacted. Rules on 
foreign investments were relaxed SUbstantially to encourage export­
oriented FDI with the passage of the Omnibus Investments Code (0lC) in 
1987 and the Foreign Investments Act (FIA) in 1991. With the OIC, the 
Board of Investments (BOI) was mandated to draw up a list of preferred 
investments and offer a menu of incentives to investors in listed areas. The 
FIA liberalized existing regulations by allowing foreign equity participa­
tion of up to 100 per cent in all areas not included in the Foreign Investment 
Negative List (FINL), as long as the enterprise was exporting at least 60 per 
cent (instead of 70 per cent under the OIC) of their output. According to 
the World Bank (1993), the FIA brought the Philippine foreign investment 
regime closer to that of its Asian neighbours in structure, comparing 
favourably in terms of equity share allowances (except for Hong Kong). 
An important component of the FDI liberalization package was the 
establishment and expansion of industrial parks and export/economic pro­
cessing zones (EPZs and 'ecozones'). As of 15 April 1997, as many as 56 
ecozones had been identified. The Philippine Economic Zone Authority 
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(PEZA) was placed in charge of the ecozones. Investors in the ecozones 
received the same incentives as provided by the OIC but were free of obli­
gations imposed on enlisted investors. As a result, some 85 per cent of 
approved investments in the highly export-oriented electronics industry 
was recorded by PEZA in 1995, while only 15 per cent registered with the 
BOI. 
A recent World Bank comparison of incentives provided by EPZs in the 
region suggests that the Philippines' package is not only competitive but is 
'the most generous and flexible set of incentives available anywhere'.21 
Duty-free import privileges are said to be without parallel in their provi­
sion of complete exemption in perpetuity for export and free trade enter­
prises for almost all project-related inputs; other countries restrict such 
privileges to production-related items or to those not available locally, or 
make it available only once. Moreover, the range of promoted activities in 
the ecozones is very broad, allowing services, utilities, infrastructure devel­
opment and tourism in addition to manufacturing. The Philippine ecozone 
is also said to be unique in East Asia in that incentives are also provided to 
ecozone developers and other infrastructure providers (World Bank, 1997, 
p. 79). Being under the purview of PEZA, ecozones enjoy the benefits of a 
more efficient bureaucracy that simplifies procedures, coordinates national 
and local public agencies in activities affecting investors (such as payment 
of national and local taxes) and reduces the costs of importation. 
How well have these policies helped the Philippines to acquire technolog­
ical competence? The electronics industry is instructive in this context. FDI 
in the electronics industry, particularly in semiconductors, was drawn to the 
Philippines in the 1970s by the relative abundance of trainable labour for 
use in export production. However, despite the scale of demand in interna­
tional markets, hardly any backward linkages were struck. No local manu­
facturers of parts and components to semiconductor assembly emerged, 
with the exception of simple packaging (cartons, plastic containers). The 
semiconductor assembly industry was until recently almost completely 
dependent on imported inputs. With limited backward linkages, there was 
little, if any, technology diffusion from FDI to the Philippine economy. 
With the influx of Japanese semiconductor and HOD MNCs in the I 990s, 
a new phenomenon has emerged. Given the weaknesses of domestic suppli­
ers of parts and components, the network of supplier firms - whether or not 
members of the same keiretsu - of the Japanese assemblers are moving into 
the country to be close to their principals. Among the new foreign investors 
are Dowa Hightech and Mitsui Hightech (integrated circuit lead frame), 
Cebu Chip Connection (gold bonding wire), and Dexter (moulding com­
pound). Uniden, a Japanese assembler of telecommunications equipment, is 
said to have attracted seven of its suppliers to the country. 
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What accounts for the difference in the paths followed by the electrical 
appliance and the automotive industry on the one hand and the electron­
ics industry on the other? Morisawa (2000) explains it by the difference in 
the degree of technological sophistication required in the manufacture of 
parts and components. Foreign investors generally prefer local sourcing of 
parts and components to imports to minimize costs and maximize flexibil­
ity. However, the level of a host country's technological competence deter­
mines the speed at which domestic firms become suppliers to foreign firms. 
Very high-technology components like silicon wafers are produced only in 
the USA, Japan or Europe and a few NIEs. Many parts and components 
are characterized by significant economies of scale, requiring huge cost 
outlays on capital equipment embodying state-of-the-art technology (for 
example, wafer fabrication). As a result, these industries tend to be domi­
nated by MNCs; barriers to entry are too high for most developing country 
enterprises to overcome. 
The experience of Singapore is instructive: appropriate policies can 
create backward linkages even in sophisticated activities. In the 19705, a 
study of Singapore's electronic industry (Lim and Pang, 1982) painted a 
gloomy picture, similar to that of the Philippines today, with a high degree 
of MNC-dominance, rapid export growth based on electronics but few 
linkages to the host economy. A study by the same authors some years later 
(Pang and Lim, 1997) painted a very different picture. Over time, regard­
less of nationality and product type, MNC affiliates increasingly bought 
local inputs as they upgraded into more complex technologies. Singapore 
had been able to induce MNCs to develop local linkages by supporting 
capability development in local firms. The rapid growth of the assembly 
industries led to the birth and growth of numerous local supplier firms. 
If one were to assess the effectiveness of industrial policy, then the appro­
priate measure would be the extent to which it transformed the economy 
from 'first-stage' FDI-based international sourcing to a more mature stage 
where FDI was firmly rooted in the local economy by extensive backward 
linkages. By this measure, Philippine industrial policy has obviously foun­
dered. 
Human Resource Development 
The Philippines has a young and highly educated labour force. More than 
two-thirds of employed people are less than 45 years old; about 20 per cent 
belong to the 15-24 age bracket. To the extent that young workers are per­
ceived to be more flexible and trainable than their older counterparts, this 
is an important advantage. About 61 per cent of the labour force has spent 
at least a year in secondary school.22 The comparable figures in other devel­
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oping economies such as Mexico and Indonesia are 46 per cent and 37 per 
cent, respectively.23 
However, only two-thirds of the Philippine labour force is 'gainfully 
employed', with about 11 per ccnt unemployed and 22 per cent underem­
ployed.24 Even during the economic boom in 1996, when the economy was 
growing by 5.6 per cent, unemployment rate was stubbornly high at 7.4 per 
cent. Clearly the employment potential of the present production structure 
is insufficient to cope with an expanding labour force. 25 Many entrants to 
the job market are, as a consequence, compelled to accept low-paying or 
part-time jobs (Esguerra and Canlas, 2001). At the same time, the unit cost 
of labour is rising. Over a 10-year period from 1989, labour productivity 
declined by 0.9 per cent while the average wage increased by 85 per cent.26 
This is eroding the competitiveness of Philippine industry. Despite reforms 
in wage setting towards greater reliance on market mechanisms,27 the links 
between wages and productivity remain loose. 
An even more disturbing trend is high unemployment for highly edu­
cated young people. The unemployment rate for college undergraduates 
and college graduates was 15 per cent and II per cent, respectively, in 1999 
(when the aggregate unemployment rate was 9 per cent).28 The problem of 
educated unemployment has two faeets. The first is that it signals poor 
quality education. Recent studies on Philippine education29 concur that 
poor curriculum, inadequate training of teachers and low public and 
private investments in education are responsible for a declining quality of 
graduates (Tan, 2001). Many schools have become 'diploma mills' produc­
ing graduates that cannot be absorbed by the labour market. This is attested 
by a 1999 survey on the employment profile of new graduates, which found 
that those with degrees in computer science, computer engineering. elec­
tronic and communication engineering, and industrial and chemical engi­
neering were among those experiencing above-average difficulty in finding 
employment (FAPE, 1999). Thus, despite an increasing and pervasive 
demand for information technology (IT) skills, larger numbers of IT grad­
uates are unable to find jobs. 
A second facet of educated unemployment is the mismatch between 
industry requirements and the training provided by the education system. 
There are more graduates in several academic programmes than the market 
can absorb, specifically education and teacher training and business admin­
istration. These degree programmes accounted for 12 per cent and 24 per 
cent, respectively, of the total graduates in 1997. In contrast, graduates of 
engineering and mathematics and computer science accounted for only 10 
per cent and 8 per cent, respectively. The upshot is that graduates of aca­
demic programmes in less demand either land jobs that do not match their 
academic background or remain unemployed. Again, the 1999 survey 
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confirms a high proportion of those employed have academic backgrounds 
that do not match their work. The mismatch is particularly high among 
graduates of social science programmes. 
Paderanga (1998) traces the root of the mismatch to the dualistic indus­
trial structure created by the long history of import-substitution. Protected 
sectors could pay higher than average salaries while the unprotected sectors 
had to pay lower salaries. This influenced course selection by students, 
many choosing courses demanded by the protected sectors. The result was 
a disproportionate enrolment in courses such as business administration 
and a paucity in science and technical courses. 
There is broad consensus in the Philippines that educational reforms are 
needed, but the direction of reforms remains contentious. At the heart of 
the debate is the issue of equity versus quality of education: whether 
reforms should focus on broadening access to education or improving its 
quality. Politics favours the former and economic efficiency the latter. In the 
past, politics has prevailed over economics. State universities and colleges 
(SUC) mushroomed even as adjustments in public sector budgetary alloca­
tion for education lagged. There was only one SUC for half a century until 
1960; at present, there are 107 SUCs. Free education was extended to sec­
ondary schooling in 1989 without adequate consideration of its resource 
requirements. Tan (1999) reports that in real terms, the 1996 education 
budget per student was only slightly above the 1978 level. Considering the 
higher infrastructure costs of modern education, the budget allocated was 
clearly insufficient to allow for an upgrading of education to international 
standards. 
The dichotomy between equity and quality is deceptive. Tan (2001) notes 
that notwithstanding populist policies, access to higher education remains 
ineq uitable. This is shown by the wide differential between the proportion 
of those in lower income groups who are college graduates as compared to 
higher income groups. Thus, improving the quality of education ranks high 
on the agenda. This would require not only augmenting the current budge­
tary allocation to education, but more importantly, guarding against the 
division of the pie into too many parts. 
Science and Technology Policy 
The Philippines industrial strategy has not had a vision of technological 
development. In contrast, the industrialization strategies of successful 
NIEs like Taiwan and Korea were anchored on a technology agenda. All 
public policies contributed to goals for technological development. This is 
clearly not the case for the Philippines. 
Technology policy has two important functions in industrializing econ­
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omies. One, obviously, is to encourage investment in technological activity. 
This may involve subsidies for specific innovation activities, tax allowances 
for R&D, protection of intellectual property rights and regulation to 
promote use of innovative products. The other function is to foster institu­
tions to support firms in technological activities. This involves strengthen­
ing the academic and research infrastructure and forging links between 
institutions and industrial firms. Technology policy is critical to industrial­
ization to the extent that the capacity of firms to absorb, adapt and harness 
foreign technologies and to upgrade its industrial activities is a function of 
society's technology milieu. 
A cogent set of technology policies only appeared in the Philippines in 
the late 1980s. In 1988, a Presidential Task Force on Science and Tech­
nology assessed the state of science and technology. It identified three 
factors inhibiting technology development: low investments in S&T, both 
by the public and private sectors; underutilization of available S&T infra­
structure; and weak linkages between technology generation, adaptation 
and utilization. It found that Philippine R&D as a percentage of GNP had 
been declining, from 0.26 per cent in 1979 to 0.12 per cent in 1984. This 
expenditure was not only below UNESCO's prescribed spending of I per 
cent of GNP for developing economies, but also less than the spending by 
neighbours such as Thailand (0.36 per cent) and Indonesia (0.23 per cent). 
Four-fifths of the expenditures came from the public sector, with the private 
sector doing very little R&D. The task force also noted the falling supply 
of S&T manpower, partly due to the brain drain of S&T personnel, but also 
(and mainly) because of the low turnout by the education system. The 
report emphasized the need for a comprehensive strategy to invigorate 
domestic S&T. Subsequently, a IO-year Science and Technology Master 
Plan was formulated. 3o This plan, covering the decade 1990-2000, called 
for: (0 modernization of the production sectors through technology trans­
fers from foreign and local sources and through industry-university link­
ages; (ii) upgrading of research and development capabilities; and (iii) 
development of S&T infrastructure and raising national S&T conscious­
ness. The vision was for the Philippines to attain NIE status at the turn of 
the century. 
The plan spelled out measures to attain its objectives. A timetable was set 
for the commercialization of some 50 technologies, mostly agro-based; pro­
motion of business incubators and science parks; upgrading of S&T ser­
vices by public agencies such as testing, standardization and quality 
control; and the strengthening of engineering and science education. The 
core strategy was to focus public S&T support on IS 'leading edge sectors' 
supposedly selected for their growth potential. The list was, however, an 
odd mix of industries, processes and technologies. 31 The targets were too 
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broad and priorities were unclear. The action plans were incoherent. The 
S&T plan lacked a clear framework, organization and workable strategy. 
In 1993, at the instigation of the Export Development Council (a private 
sector~government consultation body for export promotion), the targets 
were expanded to 24, to include 'export winners' and even broader areas 
such as housing, environment, defence and disaster relief. However, no new 
programmes were added to the Plan. Nonetheless it was renamed 'Science 
and Technology Agenda for National Development' (STAND). The 
changes showed that S&T policymaking, like industrial policymaking, was 
subject to lobbying from interest groups. As there were too many targets 
without matching programmes, the plan had to be redrawn once again. In 
late 1994, a narrower list of nine 'vanguard projects' emerged. But the 
targets still remained too diverse, from coconuts to information technology, 
spreading government efforts thinly in addressing the myriad concerns of 
these sectors. 
STAND lacked a patron to marshal the resources needed to consummate 
the plan. DOST (the Department of Science and Technology), the desig­
nated standard bearer of STAND, had neither the resources nor the clout 
to launch massive programmes and pursue wide-ranging institutional 
reforms. DOST was set up in 1986 to provide central direction for govern­
ment S&T efforts. It has nearly 5000 employees, deployed over two scien­
tific advisory bodies, five planning councils, seven R&D institutes and 15 
regional offices. The areas of concern of the research councils and institutes 
are broad and diverse: advanced science and technology, agriculture and 
natural resources, health, energy, industrial technology, food and nutrition, 
metals and metalworking industries, textiles and forest products. But these 
agencies are underfunded. The array of activities stipulated in STAND 
require an increasing allocation of government budget to S&T activities. 
DOSTs budget was expected to rise from 0.3 per cent of GNP in 1990 to 
1.5 per cent of GNP by 1996 (DOST, 1990). Instead, DOSTs budget until 
1997 was a mere 0.118 per cent of GNP (Padolina, 1998). 
A shortage of high level S&T personnel in the agency further diminished 
the chances of the plan taking off. Only 2 per cent of DOSTs personnel 
have doctorates and another 10 per cent master's degrees. Attracting scien­
tists to public service is severely constrained by the size of the agency's 
budget and the low pay offered in line with government scales. To address 
this problem, DOST launched in 1993 the 'Balik-Scientist Programme', 
patterned after Taiwan's, to attract foreign-based Filipino scientists to 
return and work in their country. DOST instituted a science career system 
for its employees that allows those conferred the rank of 'scientist' to 
receive extra compensation.32 Yet the compensation package offered is still 
too paltry to entice sufficient qualified recruits. 
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A criticism often made of DOST is weak linkage with the industry. Most 
of the technologies that DOST supports through its technology transfer 
and commercialization programmes are said to be far removed from the 
needs of the market. While claiming to adhere to the principle of 'demand­
led' intervention, DOST's resources for commercialization have been used 
mainly to support research by its institutes, which are often initiated 
without a specific target client. 33 
Reflecting funding and the availability of S&T personnel, R&D activities 
have focused on biotechnology rather than other new technologies. From 
1992 to 1998, biotechnology R&D grew six-fold. However, research focused 
mainly in agriculture, specifically on disease and pest resistance of crops, 
rather than on applied industrial research (Padolina, 1998). Notwithstanding 
the locus of R&D resources in agriculture, the Philippines agricultural 
research intensity is still lower than its neighbours. The research intensity 
ratios reported by Inocencio and David (2000) reveal 0.41 per cent for the 
Philippines versus 1.06 per cent for Malaysia, 1.4 per cent for Thailand and 
4.65 per cent for Taiwan.34 
Some incentives have been put in place to stimulate R&D in the indus­
trial sector, but with meagre results. For example, tax incentives for R&D 
provided by the Board of Investments were used by only 11 companies (for 
13 projects) over a span of six years, that is, 1991~97 (Nolasco, 1998). In 
1992, legislation was passed to provide generous incentives to inventors, 
including financial assistance for commercial application of inventions. Yet 
a survey by Halos (1998) reveals that most respondents balked at availing 
of the incentives as they found the procedures too cumbersome (Cororaton 
1998). 
A more serious problem than the deficiencies in the DOST system is the 
structure of governance. STAND is a comprehensive plan that requires 
the collaboration of various agencies. The crucial task of DOST is to rally 
the support of other agencies for the plan. But the other agencies have their 
own priorities and budgetary constraints. Take the build-up of S&T man­
power. The task of raising the supply and quality of engineering and 
science graduates is vested in the Commission on Higher Education 
(CHED). CHED's responsibility, however, is to the Department of 
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Moreover, CHED has been preoc­
cupied in levelling the quality of education offered by public and private 
institutes, and spreads its resources thinly over numerous mediocre institu­
tions. The funds that remain to support premier institutions with the poten­
tial to turn out better-quality engineering and science graduates are very 
limited. 
CHED also maintains a laissez-faire approach towards educational insti­
tutions. It has not imbibed the thinking behind STAND, that government 
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may have to subsidize the production of scientific, engineering and techni­
cal skills when an unfettered educational system fails to deliver. Enrolment 
has traditionally been highest in liberal arts, commerce, law and education 
degrees (57 per cent of enrolment in 1996--97); engineering and technical 
courses are less favoured, making up only 14 per cent. As one may expect, 
private educational institutions are inclined to focus their offerings on 
courses that are heavily demanded. CHED has not exercized its clout to 
influence the choices of profit-seeking private educational institutions. Nor 
has it been aggressive in supporting public educational institutions to align 
their course offerings with the skills requirements of the industries.35 
Consequently, the education system has not been responsive to market 
demand. 
DOST's coordination with the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), the agency that has the sole mandate to grant fiscal incentives to 
investment projects, is as loose as its linkage with CHED. DTI's incentives 
are granted to industries under the Investment Priorities Plan (IPP), which 
is drawn up independently of the S&T plan. The first set of S&T targets 
had to be revised as no incentives can be given to industries that are not 
included in the IPP. DOST has to ensure that the subsequent list of S&T 
targets were aligned with DTI's priorities. Indeed, it is a case of S&T 
agenda tailgating the industrial strategy.36 
The danger with this kind of S&T intervention is that it diverts attention 
from the more crucial task of technological catch-up. Consider that DOST 
is made to support DTI's 'export champions.' These are electronics, gar­
ments, computer software, fashion accessories, gifts, toys and houseware, 
fresh and processed fruits, marine products, furniture, metal products, 
marble products, ornamental flowers, professional services and construc­
tion industry. With the exception of electronics, metal industry and some 
aspects of services, opportunities for technological learning in this set of 
industries are limited. Moreover, from the viewpoint of technological 
development, S&T support must be directed to sectors with wide-ranging 
linkages with the rest of the economy. And the appropriate measure of the 
benefits from intervention is not the direct gains obtained by the targeted 
sectors but the spillovers to the non-targeted. Since most of those targeted 
have limited linkages, one can only anticipate that spillovers will be tiny. 
The seemingly low status of DOST in the bureaucracy is a reflection of 
the belief among technocrats that technological capacity building is a 
natural outcome of market liberalization. This is only partially true. 
Liberalization does provide the incentives for improving capabilities, but by 
itself, it cannot resolve the structural and institutional problems that plague 
capability development, for example the shortage of S&T skills.37 
Early in 1998, DOST conceded that STAND had failed in its mission. Its 
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place was taken by a six-year programme labelled 'Comprehensive 
Programme to Enhance Technology Enterprises' (COMPETE). The goal 
of COMPETE is to boost R&D in government research institutes, univer­
sities and industry by setting up technology parks, innovation centres and 
R&D institutes. COMPETE avoids too many targets and unfocused pro­
grammes: its focus is information and communications technology. The 
targets are to build local capability in microelectronics design and manu­
facture of more intricate and complete electronic product design; and to 
train and certify some 10000 IT professionals by 2004. To accomplish these 
tasks, universities and local electronic companies have been drawn into the 
programme. 
Many pundits are, however, sceptical about COMPETE. First, the 
current capability of local electronics engineers is limited to discrete 
element design; moving into higher value-added design services will need a 
bigger push than the currently allocated resources can achieve. 38 Second, 
the main strategy is to exploit the synergies of universities, research institu­
tions and private sector. But where is the knowledge? Universities would 
need sizeable resources (for upgrading faculty, curriculum, training and 
research facilities) to engage in frontier research. Local companies have a 
long way to go beyond their current capabilities in labour-intensive, back­
end assembly. The private sector's enthusiasm over the programme is damp­
ened by the slow progress on the few projects that have started, while many 
are still on the drawing board. Past experience with government pro­
grammes suggests that their chances of success are good as long as the hype 
lasts sustaining the momentum is the most difficult part. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Few countries have been as bold as the Philippines in instituting market 
reforms. Recent trade and industrial policies have significantly contributed 
to improving market efficiency. Many local firms seem to have imbibed an 
outward orientation, as opposed to the inward-looking perspective that 
they acquired during the past decades of protection. 
With outward orientation comes greater openness to various sources of 
technology. Market liberalization revives investment, including foreign 
investment, which is regarded as the principal bearer of technological 
change. The opportunities for technological learning and upgrading are 
however squandered by weak capacity for absorption and assimilation of 
the economy. And the weaknesses in technological capacity can only be 
traced to policy neglect. 
Why has not enough attention been given to improving national techno­
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logical capability? The answer must lie in the thinking of policymakers that 
creating a competitive environment is sufficient to call forth technological 
upgrading, Certainly the pressure of competition incites interest for tech­
nologicallearning and innovation. Yet the capacity for learning and inno­
vation must exist; it does not come automatically but is developed through 
time with sufficient investments. 
The lessons from the Philippine experience are palpable. In the past, the 
government coddled local firms without pushing them to harness their 
technological capabilities. When it was time to shift paradigm, firms were 
left to grow on their own intrinsic efforts. To be sure, market liberalization 
sets the grounds for technological learning to the extent that technological 
flows are unhampered and competitive pressure awakens the lethargic spirit 
bred by long years of protection. Yet even under a liberal environment, 
local firms must be supported by institutional infrastructure for absorbing, 
adapting, diffusing and, later, improving on technologies culled from diver­
sified sources, 
Can the Philippines extricate itself from the constraints of narrow 
export specialization, import dependence and shallow knowledge base? 
As it completes the process of market liberalization, the urgent task now 
is to leverage its liberal posture to obtain maximum access to technolo-
Setting a national technology agenda and marshalling resources to 
meet these goals will help define the technological path that the economy 
is treading. Based on this agenda, investments must now flow into build­
ing technological infrastructure. An example of such infrastructure is a 
core of institutions, possibly formed out of public-private sector part­
nerships, that have the capacity to acquire, absorb and diffuse technolo­
gies. Another is an efficient educational system that can turn out high 
quality graduates that would not only meet the skills required by indus­
tries, but also produce a critical mass of scientists and engineers who 
would engage in R&D. Equally critical is creating a regulatory environ­
ment that will ensure the provision of state-of-the-art communication 
and transportation infrastructure, Finally, a stable macroeconomic envi­
ronment will enhance the workings of the market and attract different 
technology sources to use the country as a production base, and over 
time, a knowledge-creation centre. 
NOTES 
To put things in perspective, the Philippines. up until the 1960s, had been regarded 
among Asian economies, as second only to Japan in economic development. Several 
decades later, the Philippines has earned the title of the 'basket case' economy in 
Southeast Asia. 
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2. 	 The Philippines spent most of the 1990s instituting market reforms. Among the critical 
reforms were the unilateral reduction in tariffs and elimination of non-tariff barriers 
during 1992-96; deregulation of strategic industries such as telecommunications and 
banking; liberalization of foreign equity rules in 1991; privatization of state-owned cor­
porations; removal of foreign exchange controls in 1992; and opening of infrastructure 
projects to private investors. Recently, the groundwork for restructuring the power sector 
has been laid, but other reforms that can be expected to deliver large efficiency gains are 
still in the pipeline, such as those in the transport sector and government bureaucracy. 
3. 	 Balassa's (1965) revealed comparative advantage index (more popularly known by its ini­
tials RCA) measures the share of commodity group i in countryIs (manufactured) exports 
relative to the share of commodity group i in the world's total (manufactured) exports. 
4. 	 Ditto medium-high technology exports where 66 per cent is due to motor vehicles. 
5. 	 According to the global definition of the American Electronics Association, the eight 
sectors comprising the electronics industry are: components, electronic data processing 
(EDP), office equipment, medical and industrial, control and instrumentation, commu­
nication and radar, telecommunication and consumer electronics. The six allied indus­
try groups are: tool and die, metal casting/stamping, machinery, services, chemicals and 
packaging. 
6. 	 A rough indication of the high import content of technology exports is the proportion 
of net exports to total exports. In 1998, net export of components was a mere 3 I per cent 
of its export value. 
7. 	 It can be added that enrolment rates as measures of human capital formation are mis­
leading when drop-out rates are ignored. While Philippine participation rates are high, 
cohort survival rates in 1998 are low: 68 per cent for primary and 70 per cent for secon­
dary education (ADB and WB 1999). 
8. 	 To illustrate, Thailand's GNP in 1997 was 81 per cent higher than the Philippines. Since 
Thailand's participation rates are lower, but the proportion of its spending to GNP is 
almost twice that of the Philippines, then clearly, its budget per pupil is significantly more 
than the Philippines. 
9. 	 See HDN (2000) for an assessment of basic education. 
10. 	 The most recent official data on R&D, which are shown in Table 10.3, are for 1992. There 
were surveys conducted in 1998 to obtain data on R&D activity, but the results of such 
surveys remain unofllcial. 
II. 	 In a regression analysis of the determinants of FDI in the Philippines, Mercado-Aldaba 
(1999) finds the fiscal incentive system an insignificant explanatory variable. 
12. 	 See Patalinghug (1996,2000) for a comprehensive review of TFP studies in the Philippines. 
13. 	 The investments have been traced to the privatization of the state-owned enterprise, the 
Philippine National Oil Company, one of the three big players in the industry, 
14. 	 In the semiconductor industry, Raneses (2001) notes the use of advanced manufactur­
ing methods in both MNCs and local firms. These include just-in-time, world-class man­
ufacturing (WCM), total quality management (TQM), total productivity maintenance 
(TPM), agile manufacturing, automation, computer-aided/integrated manufacturing 
(CAM/elM), statistical process control and design of experiments (for example, six 
sigma). 
15. 	 The non-ferrous metals industry is an exception to the general trend that subcontract­
ing declines with size: the ratio to total industry output of work done for others was 
16.07 per cent for firms of 200 or more workers as against 7.15 percent for those employ­
ing 1-9 workers. 
16. 	 The apparel industry even shows a higher ratio to industry output of work done by 
others, that is, 18.96 per cent in 1988, and this is most intense in the larger firms: 24.02 
per cent and 20.39 per cent in firms employing 100-199 and 200 and more workers. This 
may be due to international subcontracting done by large (export-oriented) lirms. 
17. 	 There was no explanation given as to why the two variables have different effects on TFP 
when most of FDr firms are producing for exports. 
18. 	 In the late 19805. some large local businesses tried to set up a venture capital group to 
support local inventors. But the undertaking failed for a number of reasons, among them 
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the apparent lack of trust between the fund providers and the inventors. The former were 
reluctant to invest without well-developed business plans, while the latter were suspicious 
of the commercial interests of their sponsors. 
19. 	 A third element that distinguishes Philippine industrialization experience is the 'de­
industrialization' that started in the 1990s. perhaps accelerated by rapid import liberal­
ization. 
20. 	 The Philippines is maintaining a 40 per cent local content ratio in the automotive indus­
try until the year 2005 in contravention to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs). 
21. 	 This does not, however, preclude the fact that in some areas, the country's ecozone 
regime is less competitive than those in say Thailand or Malaysia. Such areas include: 
the lack of clarity of the ecozone concept, especially as it applies to non-manufacturing 
activities; the uncompetitive impact of the gross income taxation approach; unclear pol­
icies governing sales to the local market and excessively generous packages of fiscal 
incentives in certain instances (World Bank, 1997, p. 79). 
22. 	 Based on Philippine Labour Force Statistics lor 1999, 
23. 	 Data were obtained from [LO (2000), 
24. 	 Based on the October 2000 Labour Force Survey by the National Statistical Office. Even 
during economic boom, for example when the economy was growing by 5,6 per cent in 
1996. unemployment rate was stubbornly high at 7.4 per cent. 
25, 	 Both population growth and labour force participation rates are increasing. 
26. 	 Labour productivity is measured in terms of gross domestic product per employed 
person, The figures are based on data culled from the Philippine Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics 1999 and Yearbook of P/tilippine Stutistirs 2000 both published by the National 
Statistical Oilice, 
27, 	 The decentralization of wage-setting at the regional level began in 1989. Regional 
Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards were formed to determine minimum wage 
levels and wage adjustments. The Congressional Commission on Labour (2001) reported 
that there are 300 minimum wage levels across the country reflecting differences in 
market conditions within and across regions. 
28, 	 Based on Philippine Labour Force StatislicsFJr 1998, National Statistical Office. 
29. 	 The main authoritative studies on Philippine education are the 1995 Philippine Task 
Force on Higher Education Report, published in Manilla by the University of Education, 
the 1998 ADB-WB Philippine Education Sector Study and the 2000 Presidential 
Commission Fir Education Reforms Report. published in Manila by the University of 
Education (Tan 2000), 
30, 	 Previous to this, the only policies relevant to S&T development were concerned with the 
establishment of a number of sector-focused research agencies. The utilization rate for 
research outputs of these agencies was next to nothing in the absence of well-defined and 
coordinated research direction, 
31. 	 These selected sectors were agriculture, aquaculture and marine fisheries, forestry and 
natural resources, metals and engineering, textile industry, mining and minerals, process 
industry, food and feed industry, energy, transportation, construction industry, informa­
tion technology, electronics, instrumentation and control, emerging technologies. and 
pharmaceutical. 
32. 	 From 1984. when the Scientific Career System was established. until 1997. only 79 per­
sonnel have been conferred scientist rank. 
33. 	 The research priorities of the various councils and institutes within DOST are set in con­
sultation with representatives from industry and academe. Notwithstanding this prac­
tice, the very low number of technologies that DOST commercializes is an indication of 
lack of market demand for the research outputs of these institutes. 
34. 	 Several studies justify this focus on agriculture, Libero (1997) and Cororaton (1998) 
found very high returns to R&D investment in agriculture, For some crops, such as 
sugarcane and mango, the returns range from 51 to 71 per cent. and 85 to 107 per cent, 
respectively. By contrast, the estimated returns to industrial R&D hover around 10 per 
cent (Pack, 1987; and Cororaton 1998), 
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35. 	 From the perspective of educational institutions, offering new courses involves fixed 
costs on accumulating new skills, setting up laboratories, and so on. This represents 
market failure for which public intervention is required. 
36. 	 Curiously, agencies such as the Intellectual Property Office and the Bureau of Product 
Standards whose functions are more aligned with the mandate of DOST, are under the 
umbrella of DTI. 
37. 	 A case illustrating this point is the unsuccessful effort of the government in courting 
wafer fabricators to set up Philippine operations. Wafer fabrication is highly capital- and 
skill-intensive, both resources the Philippines sorely lack. 
38. 	 For year 2000, DOST has allotted US$5.8 million, equivalent to \0 percent of its annual 
budget, to ICT initiatives. This amount is to be spread among numerous projects includ­
ing infrastructure development, advocacy, and software and human resource develop­
ment. 
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11. Industrial technology transition in 
Malaysia 

Rajah Rasiah1 

1. INTRODUCTION 
The economic development literature has conceptualized technical change 
in different ways. While the issues involved are too complex to treat here in 
any detail, it is important to note that there are two opposing views. One is 
the traditional neoclassical view that treats technology as largely exoge­
nous. Its advocates see a passive role for governments, with economies 
achieving the 'natural' rate of growth and structural change under free 
markets or, at most, with market-friendly interventions. The other view is 
that of evolutionary institutionalists, who emphasize the building of 
national capabilities as central to rapid growth and structural change. The 
proponents see a proactive, and in some cases selective, role for government 
interventions. 
List's (1885) industrial policy argument to create dynamic comparative 
advantage was perhaps the earliest institutionalist effort to conceptualize 
the development of national innovation capabilities. Dynamic national 
innovation systems have helped nations transform comparative and com­
petitive advantages (Gerschenkron, 1962; Kaldor, 1979; Lall, 1996). 
Given the qualitative attributes of the term 'technology', pioneering 
works in this field have deliberately left the national innovation system 
(NIS) open, with several agents (including organizations) playing impor­
tant interactive and mutually supportive roles to develop nations' produc­
tive capacities (Lundvall, 1985; Freeman, 1987; Nelson, 1985; Dosi, 
1984). Technical change covers innovations, broadly defined, to include 
both the path-breaking inventions and the more mundane (but equally 
important) efforts by which firms introduce new manufacturing designs 
and processes, including minor improvements that are not entirely new to 
the universe. Firms typically move from acquiring existing technologies 
(often from abroad) through various stages of adaptation and develop­
ment to the creation of new processes and designs. Large-scale research 
and development (R&D) thus comes at the end of sequential learning and 
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technological development processes (Pavitt, 1984). The capacity of an 
NIS to stimulate innovations depends on the development of supporting 
organizations and effective coordination between them and firms, The 
unprecedented success of Northeast Asian firms in reaching technology 
frontiers, with active assistance by governments, has raised questions 
about the role of selective interventions in building competitiveness in 
industrial latecomers. 
While firms in mature industrial countries also go through the processes 
of acquisition, adaptation, improvement and innovation, their competitive 
status depends primarily on their ability to innovate. In developing coun­
tries, by contrast, competitiveness rests mainly on capabilities to acquire, 
master and adapt (imported) technologies. The Northeast Asian econo­
mies were exceptional in their ability both to master technologies and then 
to raise domestic innovative capabilities (see Johnson, 1982: Kim, 1997; 
Wade, 1990). Malaysian industrialization is different. It has been driven 
strongly by foreign direct investment (FOI), with much greater reliance on 
MNC affiliates to deploy imported technologies generated by parent com­
panies. Deeper technological capabilities have therefore been slower to 
develop. Given the structural significance of technical change, this paper 
attempts to examine the dynamics of industrial technology transition in 
Malaysia with specific focus on capability building, 
This chapter takes the institutionalist perspective. It assumes that poli­
cies are critical for long-term growth and structural change, and that econ­
omies evolve with a cumulative sequence of structural change powered by 
technological transformation. Initial conditions and structures are impor­
tant in selecting the particular framework of economic growth. Being 
small, Malaysia could not have relied extensively on import-substitution 
(IS) policies. It inherited the basic infrastructure for primary commodity 
exports, and then entered a long period of rapid growth and structural 
change by diversifying such exports while attracting FOI into export­
oriented manufacturing. Commodity diversification helped Malaysia avoid 
the pitfalls of falling terms of trade typical of African economies, while 
export-oriented manufacturing helped raise incomes and exports, stimulate 
structural change and generate employment until the late 1990s. 
However, rising factor costs and the emergence of cheaper sites in China, 
Indonesia and elsewhere now threaten Malaysia's economic prospects. It 
does not seem feasible to rely on primary commodities to drive further rapid 
growth. Further diversification is likely to be difficult, flexibility is declining, 
costs are rising and several markets are becoming overcrowded. In manufac­
turing, sustained growth will require moving into more complex activities 
that can sustain high wages: design, development and innovation. That this 
can happen with FOI is not in doubt. Ireland and Singapore have raised 
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R&D by stimulating MNCs to undertake R&D locally and by offering other 
incentives to local institutions. However, this has been based on strenuous 
efforts to raise human capital - and this is where Malaysia is lagging. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2 deals with industrial 
transition. Section 3 deals with FDI, and Section 4 with domestic support­
ing institutions. Section 5 draws the main conclusions and implications. 
2. INDUSTRIAL TRANSITION 
The institutional base for economic growth in Malaysia was laid under 
colonialism. Revenues from the primary sectors funded the infrastructure 
for manufacturing: railways, roads, wage labour, health and education, 
effective demand, administrative structure, and law and order. Primary pro­
cessing, consumer and support manufacturing industries emerged before 
independence (Rasiah, 1995b: chapter 3). However, the government's pur­
suance of a generally laissez-faire approach to industrialization, and its 
concern with the extraction of primary resources, limited the large-scale 
development of modern manufacturing. 
The institutional capacities built during colonial rule were sustained in 
independent Malaysia. Oil, timber and palm oil overtook rubber and tin as 
the most significant primary commodities from the I 980s. Tin fell into insig­
nificance following the Malaysian Mining Corporation debacle in the early 
1980s (see Jomo, 1990). R&D grew in the oil palm and petroleum industries. 
In-firm and research institutes such as the Palm Oil Research Institute of 
Malaysia (PORIM) were at the technological frontier in their activities, and 
oil palm research generated spin-offs as downstream processing developed 
(Chantasmary, 1994; Jaya Gopal. 1996). However, the slack demand in 
developed economies and the expansion of production in other economies 
in the late I 990s seriously undermined oil palm value-added. R&D in petro­
leum activities is still confined to process technology activities, generated 
largely from spin-offs from the foreign ventures of Shell and Exxon.2 
The significance of primary sectors in the Malaysian economy shrank 
steadily from the 1970s, and accelerated in the late 1980s. Only petroleum 
and palm oil remain major primary exports in the 1990s. The engine of 
growth was manufacturing, which overtook primary commodities as the 
major export earner from the late 1980s and reached 77.5 per cent of total 
exports by 1997 (see Table 11.1). Its share in GOP, which had stagnated in 
1960 and 1965 at 9.0 per cent (World Bank, 1985), grew rapidly from 13.9 
per cent in 1970 to 35.4 per cent in 1998. Manufacturing overtook agricul­
ture in employment generation, contributing 27.1 per cent to the national 
total compared to 17.0 per cent by the latter in 1997. 
Table 11.1 Sectoral employment, output and export, selected sector,\; 1970-98 
Employment GDP Export 
'"" c;:, 00 Agriculture 
Mining & quarry 
Manufacturing 
1970 1980 
39.7 
1.7 
15.6 
1990 
19.9 
0.5 
24.6 
1997 
17.() 
0.4 
27.1 
1970 
29.0 
13.7 
13.9 
1980 
22.9 
10.1 
19.6 
1990 
14.6 
7.5 
31.6 
1997 
11.8 
7.0 
35.4 
1970 
63 
30 
7 
1980 
nla 
nla 
nla 
1990 
21 
14 
65 
1997 
19.0 
3.4 
77.5 
Source: Malaysia (1991; 1995; 1999): World Bank (1995: 191). 
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Table 11.2 Manufacturing export structure, Malaysia, 1968-97 
As share of total exports 
1968 1973 1979 1985 1990 1997 
Food 0.175 0.196 0.123 0.127 0.081 0.023 
Beverage and tobacco 0.009 0.029 0.D25 0.002 0.002 0.005 
Textile and garment 0.014 0.061 0.072 0.1 0.105 0.048 
Wood 0.034 0.097 0.043 0.D28 0.031 0.041 
Chemical 0.03 0.052 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.051 
Rubber 0.009 0.017 0.016 0.009 0.012 0.025 
Non-metal mineral 0.008 O.oIl 0.01 0.01/ 0.018 0.011 
Iron and steel 0.005 0.019 0.015 0.01 0.014 O.OlD 
Metals 0.658 0.433 0.307 0.14 0.042 0.036 
Machinery 0.025 0.038 0.037 0.051 0.086 0.042 
Electrical machinery 0.007 0.021 0.284 0.446 0.534 0.710 
Transport equipment 0.026 0.027 0.033 0.043 0.045 0.031 
Source: Computed from Malaysia, External Trade Statistics, 1969; 1974; 1980; 1986; 1991; 
1998. 
Manufacturing has, over time, undergone significant structural change, 
albeit in low value-added activities. The share of capital goods in manufac­
tured exports (machinery, electrical machinery, transport equipment) rose 
from 5.8 per cent in 1968 to 8.6 per cent in 1973, 35,4 per cent in 1979, 54.0 
per cent in 1985, 66.5 per cent in 1990 and 78.3 per cent in 1997 (see Table 
11.2). Electrical and electronic products saw the fastest expansion, their 
share in manufactured exports rising from 0.7 per cent in 1968 to 71.0 per 
cent in 1997. Their share in employment and output rose from 2.0 and 8.0 
per cent respectively in 1968 to 30.2 and 25,4 per cent respectively in 1990, 
and 29.7 and 30.0 per cent respectively in 1997. Electronics has been 
Malaysia's largest export since 1987, and Malaysia holds significant world 
market shares in several products. Consumer electronics, industrial electri­
cal apparatus and semiconductors from Malaysia accounted for 17.9, 10.6 
and 9.7 per cent respectively of world exports in 1995 (see Table 11.3). 
However, increased export orientation has been accompanied by rising 
import dependency. The import dependency rati03 of the manufacturing 
sector has remained high. Imports as a share of domestic demand of the 
export-oriented (EO) industries of electrical machinery and textile and 
garment fell from 87.3 per cent and 78.9 percent respectively in 1968 to 64.7 
per cent and 41.6 per cent respectively in 1973. They then rose to 98.7 per 
cent and 63.5 percent respectively in 1985 (see Table 11,4). The dependency 
ratio for textiles and garments rose further to 81.3 per cent in 1990. Higher 
310 Competitiveness, FDI and technological activity in East Asia 
Table 11.3 	 Malaysia's share of world electrical and electronic exports, 
1995 
Category Malaysia's World market 
exports (RM m.) share (%) 
Electrical appliances 2820 6.4 
Electrical industrial apparatus 3477 10.6 
Semiconductors 32844 9.7 
Consumer electronics 21407 17.9 
Telecommunications equipment 9445 2.5 
Computers & peripherals 6099 1.9 
Source: Malaysia (1999). 
domestic sourcing marginally reversed these ratios for electrical machinery 
in 1990, while falling imports caused by the financial crisis helped improve 
the dependency ratio of both industries in 1997. However, the share of 
imports in domestic demand of both industries remained high in 1997. 
Both industries are now threatened, electronics by rising factor costs and 
textiles and garments by the impending removal of multi-fibre quotas that 
protected Malaysian exporters against cheaper competitors. 
Rising incomes from commodity production and EO manufacturing 
stimulated the growth of domestic-oriented (DO) industries. Transport 
equipmcnt, iron and steel, non-metal mineral products, chemicals, plastics, 
pottery and glass grew strongly as a result. Among these, highly protected 
industries (such as automobiles, iron and steel, cement and chemicals) 
enjoyed the highest expansion. The share of manufacturing value-added 
contributed by DO industries fell initially from 35.8 per cent in 1971 to 32.6 
per cent in 1979, but rose sharply to 49.7 per cent in 1990 following strong 
state support. Their share fell slightly to 46.7 per cent in 1997 following 
rising factor costs and the financial crisis (see Rasiah, 2001: table 6). 
Growth in final demand durables such as automobiles did not much affect 
the efficiency levels of other industries directly as sales went more to final 
consumers. However, intermediate industries such as iron and steel and 
ccment had substantial knock-on effects on user industries. Despite expan­
sion, the limited evidence available does not suggest that these industries 
achieved significant efficiency improvements.4 However, while DO indus­
tries grew strongly, the heavily protected heavy industries of iron and steel 
and transport equipment remained strongly import-dependent. The import 
dependency ratio of iron and steel, and transport equipment exceeded 50 
per cent in 1997. 
Domestic-oriented industries with declining protection (like glass, 
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Table 11.4 Jvlanufacturing trade ratios. Malaysia, 1968-97 
(xi - mi)/(xi +mi) 

1968 1973 1979 1985 1990 1997 

Food -0.562 -0.358 -0.274 -0.308 -0.163 -0.454 
Beverage and tobacco -0.752 -0.106 0.15 -0.8 -0.509 0.061 
Textile and garment -0.897 -0.482 -0.058 0.106 0.159 0.233 
Wood 0.778 0.935 0.913 0.874 0.932 0.848 
Chemical -0.736 --0.628 -0.71 -0.721 -0.672 -0.040 
Rubber -0.149 0.23 0.47 0.113 0.342 0.754 
Non-metal mineral -0.665 -0.507 -0.335 -0.518 -0.038 -0.213 
Iron and steel -0.91 -0.78 -0.759 -0.826 -0.738 -0.709 
Metals 0.707 0.627 0.57 0.252 -0.307 -0.147 
Machinery -0.824 -0.778 -0.706 -0.746 -0.573 0.023 
Electrical machinery -0.877 -0.723 -0.031 -0.037 0.1 -0.026 
-0.808 -0.813 -0.652 -0.624 -0.595 -0.561 
mi/(yH mi- xi) 
1968 1973 1979 1985 1990 1997 
Food 0.623 0.51 0.227 0.234 0.277 0.220 
Beverage and tobacco 0.221 0.188 0.17 0.12 0.141 0.177 
Textile and garment 0.789 0.416 0.41 0.635 0.813 0.608 
Wood 0.025 0.011 0.01 0.014 0.012 0.081 
Chemical 0.03 0.023 0.017 0.006 0.009 0.052 
Rubber 0.429 0.225 0.491 0.586 0.457 0.087 
Non-metal mineral 0.129 0.094 0.068 0.052 0.093 0.280 
Iron and steel 0.616 0.259 0.306 0.251 0.198 0.532 
Metals 0.569 0.357 0.802 0.669 0.89 0.728 
Machinery 0.82 0.64 0.685 0.948 0.806 0.729 
Electrical machinery 0.873 0.647 0.669 0.987 0.902 0.827 
0.869 0.822 0.8\ 0.839 0.834 0.594 
xi/yi 
1968 1973 1979 1985 1990 1997 
Food 0.316 0.329 0.143 0.139 0.216 0.096 
Beverage and tobacco 0.039 0.157 0.217 0.015 0.051 0.196 
Textile and garment 0.17 0.199 0.382 0.683 0.857 0.714 
Wood 0.17 0.257 0.176 0.17 0.254 0.516 
Chemical 0.179 0.275 0.235 0.098 0.196 0.048 
Rubber 0.017 0.032 0.055 0.041 0.094 0.406 
Non-metal mineral 0.088 0.096 0.114 0.084 0.246 0.201 
Iron and steel 0.167 0.167 0.24 0.084 0.15 0.162 
Metals 0.889 0.612 0.919 0.73 0.604 0.419 
Machinery 0.506 0.408 0.488 0.917 0.819 0.373 
Electrical machinery 0.16 0.11 0.728 0.99 0.94 0.819 
Transport equipment 0.393 0.287 0.398 0.394 0.419 0.292 
Source Computed from Malaysia. External Trade Statistics, 1969; 1974; 1980; 1986; 1991; 
1998; Malaysia, Industrial Sumys, 1969; 1974; 1980; 1986; 1991; 1998. 
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pottery, non-metal mineral products) improved their performance, but 
their share in manufacturing production is very smalL The capacity of the 
main automobile manufacturers (Proton and Perodua) to face interna­
tional competition is still in doubt, following the government's decision to 
defer related AFTA (Asian Free Trade Agreement) deregulation for 
2003~2005. The government still maintains domestic content provisions for 
the industry. Thus, the automobile industry is likely to face serious pres­
sures once the liberalizing currents of the WTO force the removal of tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers and local content rules. 
The trade balance coefficient ([xi - miJ/[xi +miD of the highly import­
dependent DO industries has improved since 1990. However, transport 
equipment, chemicals, machinery and iron and steel, with protected markets, 
remain strongly dependent on domestic demand. Chemical exports had the 
smallest share of output, while the transport equipment and iron and steel 
sectors, despite extensive subsidies, exported only 29.2 and 16.2 per cent of 
output in 1997 (see Table 11.4). The export ratio for transport equipment fell 
sharply between 1990 and 1997 following a decline in car exports to the 
United Kingdom. The trade balance for electrical machinery improved till 
1990, but deteriorated by 1997. 
Despite rapid growth (or perhaps because of it) EO industries have not 
expanded domestic linkages greatly. The legacy of the enclave nature of 
early export-oriented production persists, despite government efforts to 
raise local content. The reasons lie in rapid technological change, weak 
institutional support within Malaysia and inappropriate technology devel­
opment strategies. Imports of inputs for the manufacturing sector rose at 
an average annual rate of 41.2 per cent in the period 1987-91, accounting 
for 50 per cent of total investment goods in 1991, compared to 43 per cent 
in 1986 and 36.4 per cent in 1980. Subsequently, imported inputs grew at 
around 15 per cent during 1991-95, accelerating towards the end of the 
period (32.7 per cent in 1994 and 31.0 per cent in 1995). Almost 66 per cent 
of exported manufactured goods had import content ratios exceeding 50 
per cent. 
While Malaysia has achieved rapid growth, structural change in products 
has not been matched by a similar upgrading injunctions. It remains spe­
cialized in low value-added functions within high-tech activities, but this 
appears to be reaching its limits as wages and other costs rise. Growing defi­
cits in skill and innovation are weakening the foundations of long-term 
growth. The inability to move into higher value-added activities has forced 
the government to allow the use of cheap foreign labour, which now forms 
about 15-25 per cent of the labour force. 
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3. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
Developing countries have long feared that FDI saps domestic savings, 
crowds out local enterprises and stunts domestic technological capabilities 
(Rasiah, I 995b: chapter 2). Japan, Korea and Taiwan are often cited as suc­
cessful examples of countries that restricted FDI (Hamilton, 1983; 
Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990) to build strong domestic capabilities, Brazil 
and Mexico as examples of underdevelopment caused inter alia by heavy 
reliance on FDI (Frank, 1972). This section draws the lessons of thc 
Malaysian experience. 
FDI has been the engine of manufacturing growth in Malaysia. Table 
11.5 shows the shares of fixed assets held by foreign investors by industry. 
These shares have risen continuously in key industries like electrical 
machinery (the slight rise in local shares in 1998 is a result of a decline in 
FDI participation rather than a rise in local investment).5 Technology 
spillovers from FDI - through work experience, employee turnover and 
rising domestic capabilities have helped the growth of locally dominated 
Table 11.5 	 Foreignfixed assets ownership, Malaysian manufacturing, 
1970--98 (%) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1998 
Food 71 55 32 25 30 33 27 
Beverages and tobacco 89 79 76 67 62 58 69 
Textiles 39 63 54 48 61 64 76 
Leather 56 48 48 54 59 57 61 
Wood II 8 13 9 19 36 27 
Furniture and fixtures 71 61 31 19 45 45 25 
Paper, printing, publishing nla 16 10 20 14 13 10 
Chemicals 61 63 53 16 24 25 46 
Petroleum and coal 77 79 78 37 44 50 34 
Rubber 14 42 46 42 55 51 50 
Plastic nla nla 12 13 27 46 38 
Non-metal mineral 60 52 19 32 33 39 34 
Basic metal 45 42 35 32 17 33 30 
Fabricated metal 69 59 26 23 30 56 36 
Machinery 58 51 42 35 53 65 66 
Electric/electronics 67 84 80 73 89 91 83 
Transport equipment 58 51 32 15 25 35 29 
Miscellaneous 67 69 57 53 69 81 56 
Manufacturing 59 52 39 33 42 50 47 
Source: Rasiah (1995b); data for 1993 and 1998 based on unpublished MIDA data. 
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industries like food processing, furniture and fixtures, petroleum and coal 
products, non-metal minerals, fabricated metals and transport equipment. 
In some domestic-oriented industries, like pottery, glass and non-metallic 
mineral products, there has also been a rise in local technological capabil­
ities, although these are largely limited to production rather than innova­
tion. Wood-based products had a rise in foreign ownership primarily 
following entry by Taiwanese and Japanese firms selling to their home 
countries. 
Foreign firms continue to dominate the electrical machinery, scientific 
instruments, beverages and tobacco and textile and garment industries. 
They have also increased their share of the rubber products industry (from 
14 per cent in 1970 to 50 per cent in 1998), primarily through investments 
in glove manufacturing. All foreign dominated industries except for bever­
ages and tobacco are export-oriented, with the prime market destinations 
being the developed economies. Foreign ownership in these sectors is likely 
to rise further after policy liberalization following the financial crisis of 
1997 (with the government trying to revive FDI) and compliance with 
WTO requirements. 
FDI has played a critical role in Malaysia in terms of generating employ­
ment, investment and exports and in raising the skills of the labour force. 
It has also led to many spin-offs in sophisticated activities, especially in 
Penang. Rasiah (1994; 1995b), and Lai and Narayanan (1998) document 
the synergies generated by MNCs that transformed local clusters. For 
instance, the integration of Toyota's multi-product single flow line with 
'lean production' and just-in-time delivery had significant spillover effects, 
especially in the western corridor of Peninsular Malaysia. Where strong 
integrated business networks emerged, as in Penang, MNC activity led to 
considerable local sourcing (see Rasiah, 1996; 2000). The number of firms 
supplying metal and plastic tooling and components to the electronics 
industry rose from around 150 firms in 1989 to around 455 in 1993.6 
However, in other states, weak business networks restricted the creation of 
new firms and backward linkages by MNCs. 
MNCs were also training grounds for entrepreneurship and other skills. 
A whole range of enterprises was started by individuals who had worked in 
MNCs. Examples include Poly tool, Prodelcon, Rapid Engineering and 
Metfab whose founders came from Micro Machining, and Shinca, Shintel, 
Globetronics and Sanmatech whose managing directors came from Intel 
(Rasiah, 1994; 1996). In addition, the Penang Development Corporation 
(PDC) played an important role in bringing MNCs and local firms 
together. It also supported the Penang Skills Development Centre (PSDC), 
which brought firms together to provide specialized industrial training 
geared to specific needs, particularly those of the electronics industry. 
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4. DOMESTIC SUPPORT INSTITUTIONS 
Malaysia was successful in establishing the institutional base of political 
stability, basic infrastructure and an investment climate to stimulate labour­
intensive FDI. The Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA) 
and to a lesser extent the Penang Development Corporation (PDC) played 
exemplary roles in attracting large FDI inflows into EO manufacturing. As 
noted, however, institutional and capability development could not keep up 
with the need to move the industrial structure from low value-added to high 
value-added functions. MNC-Ied structural change has slowed down as 
cheaper sites like China, the Philippines and Indonesia have emerged as 
serious competitors. 
Institutional support is essential to allow firms to shift to higher value­
added processes it is not economic for firms to invest in improving factor 
markets beyond their immediate production needs. Moving into design and 
innovation requires an ample supply of technical and engineering man­
power. It also caBs for effective state-business relations to facilitate invest­
ment in activities with longer pay-off periods. 
Human Capital 
Human capital development in Malaysia has evolved unevenly. While 
general schooling facilities have grown, they lag behind other rapidly indus­
trializing countries in tertiary and technical fields. This weakness has 
restricted firms' efforts to shift to more skill-intensive stages of production. 
}<or example, drawing on a survey of 2200 firms, Rasiah and Osman (1995: 
table 1) report labour supply and workers' quality as the prime deficiencies 
confronting manufacturing firms in Malaysia. The high wage premium 
enjoyed by skilled occupational categories reflects serious skill shortages 
(World Bank, 1995). The sector also faces serious shortages in science and 
engineering employees, critical to drive innovations. All 231 firms inter­
viewed in 1996 considered the shortage of skilled workers as their biggest 
problem.7 
The critical nature of this problem becomes clearer when comparisons 
are made across economies. Malaysia's participation rates in education fall 
short of Korea and the developed economies, especially at the tertiary level 
(see Table 11.6). It had only 2 per cent secondary students enrolled in tech­
nical fields compared to 19 per cent in Korea (see Table 11.7). Even 
Indonesia _. which is far less developed than Malaysia - had a 12 per cent 
share of secondary students in technical education. Systematic governmen­
tal promotion of technical education in Taiwan led to the transformation 
of the ratio of vocational high school (VHS) graduates to academic high 
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Table 11.6 Educational enrolment, selected economie!'; 1970-92 
% of age group enrolled in educational institutions 

Primary Secondary Tertiary 

1970 1992 1970 1992 1970 1992 

Japan 99 102 86 nla 31 32 
United States nla 104 nla nla 56 76 
Sweden 94 101 86 91 31 34 
Germany nla 107 nla nla 27 36 
France 117 106 74 101 26 46 
Canada 101 107 65 ]04 42 99 
United Kingdom 104 104 73 86 20 28 
Korea 103 105 42 90 16 42 
Turkey 110 112 27 60 6 15 
Brazil 82 106 26 39 12 12 
Malaysia 87 93 34 58 4 7 
Thailand 83 97 17 33 13 19 
Indonesia 80 115 16 38 4 10 
Jamaica 119 106 46 62 7 9 
Kenya 58 95 9 29 I 2 
Bangladesh 54 77 nla 19 3 4 
Source: World Bank (1995: 216--17}. 
school (AHS) graduates from 1:1.7 in 1950 to \:\ in 1975 and 2:1 in 1988 
(Lee, 1994: 56). 
The government has launched several efforts to raise the supply of skills. 
It introduced the Double Deductions on Training Incentive (DDT!) in 1988 
to encourage in-house training in firms. The Human Resource Development 
Fund (HRDF) replaced the DDT! in 1993. The DDT!, which applied to 
manufacturing firms with over 50 employees, was generally utilized by 
MNCs that would have trained their workers even in its absence (Rasiah and 
Osman, 1995). The HRDF imposed a levy of I per cent of enterprise pay­
rolls, which firms could reclaim for approved training expenses, and penal­
ized firms that did not train in line with specified conditions. The main 
problem now is the absence in several locations of training institutions; 
firms in Sabah and Sarawak are particularly disadvantaged. 
The government introduced special directives and incentives in the mid­
1990s to expand the supply of science and technology graduates. Training 
suppliers at all levels were expanded and modernized. The Private 
Universities Bill of 1995 helped open the way for new universities, espe­
cially in engineering. It is too early to judge these new initiatives. 
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Table 11.7 Public education and technical orientation, selected economies 

Public education Secondary Tertiary Science 
(% of GNP) technical natural and graduates 
enrolment applied ('X, of 
('Yo of all sciences total 
levels) enrolment graduates) 
(% of total 
tertiary) 
1960 1990 1988-91 1990-91 1988-90 
Japan (4.9) 3.7(5.0) 28 26 26 
United States (5.3) 5.5(7.0) nla 14 15 
Sweden 5.9 6.5(6.5) 73 43 26 
Germany (2.4) 4.0(5.4) 80 42 32 
France (3.6) 5.4(6.0) 54 31 27 
Canada (4.6) (7.4) nla 14 16 
United Kingdom 3.4 5.3 20 39 26 
Korea 2.0 3.6 19 42 29 
Turkey 2.6 nfa 25 33 36 
Brazil 1.9 4.6 nla 31 19 
Malaysia 2.9 6.9 2 30 28 
Thailand 2.3 3.8 19 22 18 
Indonesia 2.5 nla 12 nla 11 
Jamaica 2.3 6.1 4 35 19 
Kenya 4.6 6.8 2 32 24 
Bangladesh 0.6 2.0 1 27 16 
Note: Figures in parentheses to total educational investment as a percentage of GNP. 
Source: U;-.JDP (1995: 158-9, 192-3). 
Private initiatives to boost training followed the incentives offered by the 
government. The PSDC, founded in 1989 and coordinated by MNCs, local 
firms and the Penang Development Corporation, created skills tailored to 
cutting-edge production operations and subsequently became a model for 
training institutions in the western corridor states. The political structure 
of Penang, with strong relations between businesses and the government, 
has ensured effective state-business coordination to minimize both govern­
ment and market failures (Rasiah, 1997). However, not many other states 
have this political structure. 
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Table 11.8 High-technology exports and patent application filed 
1996 1995 (A) 1995 
High-tech export in Residents Non-residents Total of (A) as 
manufactured 'j';, of Japan 
export ('lu) 
Malaysia 67 141 3911 1.0 
South Korea 39 59249 37308 24.8 
Singapore 71 10 1I871 3.1 
Thailand 36 nla nla nla 
Indonesia 18 nla nla nJa 
China 21 10066 31707 10.7 
India 10 1545 5021 1.7 
USA 44 127476 107964 60.5 
Japan 39 335061 53896 100.0 
United Kingdom 40 25355 90399 29.8 
Germany 25 51948 84667 35.1 
France 31 16140 73626 23.1 
Spain 17 2329 68922 18.3 
Sweden 31 6396 64165 18.1 
Jamaica 67 7 54 0.0 
Note: n/a - not available. 
Source: Calculated from World Bank (1999: Table 19). 
Patents and Participation in R&D Activities 
Malaysia has an extremely low level of domestic patent filing: only 4052 
compared to 11881 in Singapore, 96557 in South Korea, 388957 in Japan 
and 235440 in the USA in 1995 (Table 11.8). The number of patents filed 
in Malaysia came to 1 per cent of the number in Japan in 1995, Korea's 
figure was 24.8 per cent. A significant number of technologies patented in 
Malaysia by non-residents are not developed in Malaysia. 8 The patent sta­
tistics reflect the low investment by private enterprises in R&D. Private 
sector expenditure on R&D only came to 0.17 per cent of GNP in 1992 
(MASTIC, 1994). 
While MNCs do not invest heavily in R&D in overseas affiliates, partic­
ularly in developing countries, the Malaysian data do not suggest that local 
firms spend much on R&D either. Table 11.9 shows that the foreign­
dominated electrical machinery industry had the highest investment in 
R&D. However, MNC R&D consisted mainly of redesigning mature prod­
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Table 11.9 R&D in selected industrie:;; Malaysia, 1992 (RM million) 

Industry Locala Foreignh Total 
Electrical/electronics 9.7 102.7 112A 
Transport equipment 82.0 0.0 82.0 
Food 14.8 1.3 16.1 
Rubber 1.2 IA 2.7 
Textiles OA OA 0.9 
Chemicals 1.9 II.7 13.5 
Total 123.7 122.6 246.3 
Notes: 
a local ownership exceeding 50 per cent. 
b foreign ownership exceeding 50 per cent. 
Source: MASTIC (1994). 
ucts and minor process improvement. Only a handful of electronics firms 
undertook product (largely incremental) R&D, all of which were locally 
owned (for example, OYL Electronics and Sapura). Despite extensive 
investment in R&D, Proton's capabilities are stiIllargely limited to body 
design and parts. Its latest car, the Proton Waja still uses a Mitsubishi 
engine for the 1.6cc model, and will use a Renault engine for the 1.8cc 
model. 
A survey by Rasiah (1996) of 82 electronics firms in 1993 (29.3 per cent 
of firms in the industry) showed that only 9 undertook formal R&D. The 
one local firm that reported new product development in 1993 noted that 
its electronics business had declined in 1999. Most firms were engaged in 
product enhancement, extension, customization or redesign. Twenty-one 
firms undertook process R&D, of which 18 firms were foreign controlled. 
A higher share of firms, 73 out of 82, reported incremental engineering 
improvements without significant formal R&D. Foreign controlled firms 
accounted for 64 of the firms reporting minor innovation. 
There are two major reasons for these findings. First, the reason for incre­
mental rather than innovative R&D lies in the nature of electronics 
markets. Rapid product innovation in developed countries means that affil­
iates in developing countries cannot undertake significant product innova­
tion. Nor do they need to adapt products to local market needs, since 
products are highly standardized. At the same time, there is a need for tech­
nological effort to adapt production processes as new technologies appear. 
Second, Malaysian affiliates are now able to undertake process develop­
ment. The labour force has undergone considerable learning over the past 
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20-25 years, and has a cadre of engineers and technicians able to do applied 
R&D. 
However, no electronics firm ~-local or foreign has undertaken frontier 
'blue-sky' research in Malaysia. Even the most sophisticated design activ­
ities in foreign firms have generally been limited to second or third genera­
tion technologies, to improve performance and expand uses for maturing 
products. Intel, AMD and Alterra are examples of MNCs engaged in the 
redesigning of mature products. 
Technology Transfer Agreements 
Technology transfer agreements (TTAs) have been a major source of tech­
nology acquisition in all developing countries. In Malaysia, the official pro­
motion of technology transfer can be traced to the Industrial Coordination 
Act (lCA) of 1975. The ICA acted, inter alia, as the legal framework for 
registering formal technology imports. The electrical and electronics indus­
try was the biggest importer of technology through TTAs (see Table 11.10); 
Japan was the largest supplier. 
While industrial activity in Malaysia became more technology-intensive 
from the end of the I980s (Rasiah and Anuwar Ali, 1995), the government 
did not undertake policies to build local innovative capabilities. In this, it 
differed greatly from Korea and Taiwan, where there was a deliberate and 
widespread effort to transfer and build such capabilities. The only regula­
tory activity in Malaysia was vetting of TTAs ex ante, and even this was 
poorly performed because of the absence of suitable skills (Anuwar Ali, 
1992). There was no preference for technology transfers to local firms; 
around 90 per cent of TTAs in manufacturing involved intra-MNC trans­
fers.9 Only a few industries such as passenger cars had strong local--foreign 
TTAs. 
There was virtually no monitoring and appraisal of technology transfers 
ex post. Institutions governing technology transfer agreements, especially 
MITI, showed little appreciation of technology development issues, and 
did not bargain over the terms of transfer. Unlike Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan, therefore, FDI continues to dominate TTAs in Malaysia without 
significant levels of local absorption or deepening. Hence, the relative fall 
in FDI inflows from the late I 990s led to a visible fall in TTAs (Table 11.10). 
R&D Support 
The sustainability of rapid growth in Malaysia will depend considerably on 
firms' capacity to deepen their technological capabilities and conduct more 
R&D. As noted above, Malaysia lacks the critical mass of human capital 
Table 11.10 Technology transfer agreements by industry, Malaysia, 1975-2000 
Industry 1975-77 1978-80 1981-83 198486 1987-89 1990-92 1993·-95 1996-98 1999-2000 
Electrical machinery 31 55 50 53 106 124 143 132 91 
Chemical 7 38 41 48 74 64 54 35 43 
Transport equipment 9 22 34 52 20 62 56 48 30 
Fabricated metal 16 29 43 34 45 33 20 12 10 
Food 13 24 40 24 45 12 15 6 6 
,..., 
'''''..... 
Rubber 
Non-metallic mineral 
7 
8 
15 
13 
23 
29 
22 
31 
48 
26 
26 
26 
16 
17 
13 
7 
8 
7 
Basic metal 8 15 28 7 8 13 9 5 8 
Textile and garment 15 12 12 14 12 20 7 2 4 
Plastic 3 8 9 11 8 17 22 7 18 
Wood 11 9 5 10 1 II 4 0 0 
Paper 0 0 0 7 4 10 8 2 1 
Others 16 43 42 25 61 42 45 40 31 
Total 144 283 356 338 458 460 416 309 257 
Source: MIDA (unpublished data). 
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required to support extensive R&D activity. The share of graduates and 
students enrolled in science and technical fields is well below figures in the 
industrialized economies and the Asian NIEs (Table 11.11). Malaysia only 
had 4 R&D scientists and technologists per 10000 people compared to 22 
in Korea in 1988-90 (Table 11.12). R&D spending in 1992 was only 0.4 per 
cent of GNP compared to 2.1 per cent in Korea. 
Table 11.11 Scientists and engineers/population 
Country Year Per 10000 pop. 24-year-olds with 
National Seience and 
Engineering degree (%) 
Japan 1993 43 6.4 
United States 1991 38 5.4 
Norway 1992 32 4.4 
West Germany 1989 28 5.8 
Taiwan 1993 26 6.4 
Singapore 1992 23 7.6 
Denmark 1991 23 6.5 
France 1991 23 5.0 
United Kingdom 1992 22 nla 
South Korea 1993 22 7.6 
Italy 1991 13 2.5 
Mexico 1990 7 nla 
China 1993 3 1.3 
Malaysia 1994 2.3 0.8 
Sources: National Science Board (1996: pp. 3-25; 1998: Appendix table 2.1); MASTIC 
(1994: table 3-\9). 
The depth and width of R&D is generally a function of the structure and 
level of development of an economy (Rasiah, 1997). Malaysia's industrial 
structure especially in terms of the dominance of electronics assembly 
activIties appears more knowledge-intensive than that of Taiwan and 
Korea, but lags in terms of technological effort. Most firms are engaged in 
simple manufacturing and do not have serious plans to move up the tech­
nologicalladder; most do not seek R&D support or employ R&D scien­
tists and technologists (Selvaratnam et aI., 1996). 
High-technology MNCs in Malaysia rely on parent company innovation 
for their basic technologies. Most retain their key innovation in the USA, 
Western Europe and Japan. This reliance helped Malaysia greatly in early 
stages of industrial development, but the stage has now come for it to 
launch and attract - more innovative activity. 
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Table 11.12 Research and development statistics 
Scientists and R&D scientists R&D expenditure 
technologists and technologists as (X, of GNP 
per I 000 people per 10000 1987-92 
1986-90 people 1986-89 
Japan 110 60 2.8 
United States 55 nla 2.9 
Sweden 262 62 2.8 
Germany 86 47 2.9 
France 83 51 2.3 
Canada 174 34 1.4 
United Kingdom 90 nla 2.3 
Korea 46 22 2.1 
Turkey 26 4 ilIa 
Brazil 30 nla 0.6 
Malaysia nla 4 0.4 
Thailand I 2 0.2 
Indonesia 12 nla nla 
Jamaica 6 0 n/a 
Kenya nla nla 
Bangladesh n/a ilIa 
Sources: UNDP (1995): MASTIC (1994). 
R&D Funding 
The Malaysian government has set up a number of special programmes to 
fund R&D activities. The Intensification of Research in Priority Areas 
(IRPA) and Industrial Technical Assistance Fund (ITA F) offer funding for 
innovation. The Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (MTDC) 
has been introduced to fund promising firms to expand their technological 
capacities; by the end of 1993 it had invested RM 16 million in 12 firms 
(Malaysia, I994a: 300, 303). The Credit Guarantee Scheme - operated by the 
Bank Negara allows small and medium enterprises to access loans at sub­
sidized rates without commensurate collateral. Much of the internally gen­
erated savings from wage income, including employee provident fund 
contributions, have been directed to government funding. A proportion of 
household investments have been absorbed into Bumiputera trusts Amanah 
Saham Nasional and Amanah Saham Bumiputera - through Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad. Some of these funds are targeted to innovative activities. 
However, the allocation of funds has not been coordinated and directed 
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effectively to innovative activities. A major drawback is the lack of funding 
for innovators lacking collateral. Venture capital is poorly developed in 
Malaysia because of the continued reliance on pecuniary collateral. As 
Timmons and Bygrave (1986) note for Silicon Valley, identifying and estab­
lishing contacts with entrepreneurs rather than access to capital is the most 
important factor in the successful allocation of venture capital. Business 
networks linking capital to prospective innovators remain underdeveloped 
in Malaysia. The most advanced form of network cohesion has emerged in 
Penang, but it is confined to inter-firm and firm-institution links. 
Complementary Business and Technical Support 
The Malaysian government has set up sectoral institutions to promote inno­
vation. These include the Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics Systems 
(MIMOS),IO the National Productivity Corporation, technology parks and 
the Small and Medium Industry Development Corporation (SMIDEC). 
Complementary institutions such as the Standards and Industrial Research 
Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM) were established earlier to provide quality 
assurance and testing and later took on the task of improving productivity. 
From the late 19805 SIRIM has attempted to propagate quality establish­
ment and improvement in firms. Hundreds of Malaysian firms have been 
accredited with ISO 9000 standards to enhance their export potential. 
SIRIM has played a particular role in upgrading quality in locally con­
trolled firms that do not face external competition. 
'Malaysia Incorporated' was launched in 1983 to improve govern­
ment~business coordination. Government officials were sent to Japan and 
Korea to understand better their collaborative mechanisms. Consultative 
committees were formed between the public and private sectors, A broad 
collaborative umbrella, the Malaysia Industry-Government Group for 
High Technology (MIGHT), was launched in 1993 to promote technology 
prospecting and help identify new markets, businesses and investment 
opportunities for R&D and technology development. These efforts suffer 
from some flaws, First, insufficient effort has been made to involve the 
private sector. Officials representing the private sector in consultative com­
mittees have been appointed following their retirement from public service. 
Second, there is little effective participation of governmental officials in the 
private sector, as their role is not clearly defined. Third, most public sector 
officials seconded to the private sector have generally been appointed to 
parastatals. Even here, not many have been involved in the business and 
technical aspects of production. 
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Small and Medium Enterprise Support Programmes 
Three programmes have been introduced to stimulate the growth of 
SMEs. The Umhrella Concept of Marketing (UCM) was launched in 
1984; Besta Distribution, Guthrie Furniture and Guthrie Malaysia 
Exchange Programme were the pioneers, acting as marketing support 
organizations for Bumiputera SMEs. The remaining two programmes, the 
subcontract exchange (SEP) and anchor company (ACP) programmes 
were introduced in 1986 and 1992. Bumiputera equity has been strongly 
emphasized in ACPs involving state-sponsored firms such as Proton, 
which were supposed to provide special help to linked SMEs. The SEP 
acted as a platform for matching MNCs with local SMEs. SMEs were also 
encouraged to access the ITAF, launched in 1990 to facilitate feasibility 
studies, product development and design, productivity and market devel­
opment (Malaysia, 1994b). SMIDEC was formed in 1995 to coordinate 
and facilitate the development of SMEs in the country. 
Despite such support, SMEs have yet to develop effective capabilities 
outside Penang (Anuwar Ali, 1992; Rasiah and Anuwar Ali, 1995). 
Production linkages have been strongest in state-sponsored anchor firms, 
but even here linkages have been rather superficial. For example, Proton 
was reported to have sourced 80 per cent of its components locally in 
1995~2001; this figure could dip below 30 per cent if imports by local sup­
plier firms are taken into accounL 11 
There are a number of reasons for the weakness of SME support 
mechanisms. First, a significant number of SMEs were jump-started to 
boost Bumiputera participation in industry. Their lack of entrepreneurial 
experience has often led to poor management. Second, captive rents 
offered to state-sponsored anchor firms were not tied to performance 
standards. Hence, there was little pressure or competition to improve effi­
ciency and poor performers continued to be supported by anchor firms 
at the expense of their own competitiveness. Third, the 30 per cent 
domestic content condition for firms applying for pioneer status and 
investment tax allowance was not applied to strategic industries. Fourth, 
the 30 per cent sourcing condition also applied to foreign firms, and 
several MNCs met the requirement by purchasing from their subsidiar­
ies in Malaysia. Fifth, government participation in spin-offs to match the 
SMEs with transnationals was not strong, with the exception of Penang. 
Many such linkages have generally emerged in the electronics, machine 
tools and plastics industries where, as noted, the need for flexibility 
strengthened production linkages between foreign and local firms 
(Rasiah, 1994; 1996). From 45 firms in 1989, the number of such suppli­
ers rose to 250 in 1993 and 455 in 1996. 12 As with PSDC, the Penang 
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Development Corporation was an important intermediary in stimulating 
such developments. 
Industrial Master Plan 
The government launched the second Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) in 
1996, basing it on cluster-based development (Malaysia, I 996b). The 
earlier Industrial Master Plan, launched in 1986, was sector-based. While 
IMP2 was a refreshing effort to use production and network interrelation­
ships, the strategy lacks the effective technology management seen in 
Silicon Valley (see Rasiah and Best, 2000). The plan relies essentially on 
network synergies. strengthening component firms and assisting in restruc­
turing of existing firms and the creation of new firms. Its logic can be traced 
to Young's (1928) work re-emphasizing Adam Smith's (1776) dictum that 
the division of labour is determined by the size of the market. Young 
argued that the division of labour in turn determined the size of the market: 
increased differentiation, division of labour and specialization generated 
synergies that expanded markets. It is here that the IMP2 lacks a realistic 
strategy to stimulate the production capabilities necessary to intensify diffe­
rentiation, division of labour. specialization and horizontal integration. If 
clustering requires cross-industry links. the IMP2 retains much of the sec­
toral strategies associated with IMP I. 
Technology Parks and the Multimedia Super Corridor 
Technology parks have sprung up in Malaysia since the late 1980s, but they 
show little evidence of dynamism. Aggressive promotion by the govern­
ment, including direct approaches to selected MNCs, has helped attract 
firms into the Technology Park at Bukit Jalil and the High-Tech Park at 
Kulim. However, the majority of these firms have yet to invest in technol­
ogy development. Unlike the Hsinchu Science Park in Taiwan, where effec­
tive coordination has led to intense technological activity, the rush to fill 
space in Malaysia seems to have attracted firms only interested in minor 
process improvements. On present trends, most innovation in the country 
will be undertaken outside technology parks. Local firms - especially those 
backed by the government are likely to operate there but without signifi­
cant movement towards the technology frontier. 
MIMOS' attempt in 1999 to build Malaysia's first wafer fabrication plant 
was stalled by the financial crisis. Nevertheless, the movement towards 
fabless manufacturing has inspired the Sarawak state government to 
finance the building of I st Silicon. Its success will depend to a large extent 
on its ability to attract the requisite technical manpower and R&D technol­
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ogists and its ability to coordinate effectively with firms and other support­
ing institutions. 
A major effort to enhance technological deepening in the information 
technology (IT) sector has been the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC). 
This was envisioned as a cluster of information technology development 
institutions and firms located in the corridor between Kuala Lumpur and 
a new administrative centre in Putra Jaya. This community was to be served 
by a world-class telecommunications and information technology infra­
structure, with liberal investment incentives for approved projects and 
streamlined procedures for foreign technical experts and the training of 
local personnel. The government revised the legal and administrative bar­
riers viewed as impediments to new applications of technology and to 
foreign investment in technology development. 
Substantial efforts have been made in selling the MSC concept to 
leading IT firms in North America. Europe and Japan. There has been 
some initial interest. The technologies identified for encouragement within 
MSC include very focused projects such as telemedicine applications. 
smart-card technologies and multimedia development that have vast com­
mercial potential. The government also launched the National 
Information Technology Agenda (NITA) in 1997 to focus the energies of 
private individuals, the corporate sector and the public sector on the tasks 
ahead. 
However, interviews suggest that little R&D is being undertaken in the 
MSC because of the lack of human capital and innovation synergies. 
Malaysia would have to conduct another major restructuring if the MSC 
is to catalyse the nation's technology base. The entire resources of the 
nation, with particular emphasis on education, would have to be deployed 
efficiently to make the MSC the engine of Malaysia's development. 
In sum, Malaysia has set up a wide array of institutions to stimulate 
industrial upgrading and technology development. MIDA and PDC have 
stimulated rapid manufacturing growth, but mainly in low value-added 
activities. The rise in factor costs has not engendered a corresponding 
growth in innovation capabilities. The government, acutely conscious of 
the problem, has launched several initiatives to facilitate upgrading and 
deepen technological activity. However, the new initiatives and institutions 
have still to bear fruit. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Export-oriented manufacturing in Malaysia, while highly successful for 
several decades, is running out of momentum. Cheaper sites are emerging 
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and rising costs are not being sufficiently offset by a move into higher 
value-added functions. Access to external technology by FDI continues to 
drive export-oriented activities. especially in the high technology but low 
value-added activities, The expansion of resource-based palm oil, where 
Malaysian companies operate at the technology frontier, was successful 
until a glut in the world market caused by competing producers. In any 
case, stagnating demand in developed economies limits further growth of 
such exports. 
The experience of import-substitution in Malaysia has been different 
from that in other economies. High protection in some industries like auto­
mobiles has not had serious effects on other industries because they serve 
final consumers, EO manufacturing has been allowed to operate in a sep­
arate trade regime that has not undermined its efficiency. However, other 
heavy IS industries have not been very successful, and many firms have been 
unable to reach world levels of technical efficiency. Even in automobiles, 
key technologies are controlled by foreign companies and the licensing 
costs involved have kept tariffs very high. The industry will come under 
severe competitive pressure under WTO rules, and may not be able to 
survive in the long term. 
What lessons do Malaysian industrial growth and competitive success 
offer? First, political stability and a pro-private business environment are 
necessary to ensure that production and trade can grow (and attract FDI). 
Second, resource-based exports should be diversified. Unlike many 
resource-rich countries (in Africa or Latin America), Malaysia resolved 
problems of declining terms of trade and current aceount deficits by diver­
sifying commodity exports. These then provided the foreign exchange and 
savings needed for infrastructure development and industrialization. 
Third, financial incentives can be useful to attract FDI. In Malaysia, they 
were used to offset some of the risks associated with instability - Malaysia 
had just come out of bloody ethnic riots in 1969 when the first wave of EO 
manufacturing FDI arrived in the early I 970s. Finally, countries that are 
successful in attracting labour-intensive FDI must ensure that over time, as 
wages rise, they provide the skills and capabilities needed to take on more 
value-added functions and activities. Malaysia has so far not been able to 
move into high value-added innovation-driven operations rapidly enough 
to overcome emerging competitive threats. 
Thus, good physical infrastructure, a sound framework for orderly busi­
ness transactions (including protection for foreign investors) and political 
stability helped attract EO FDI, which then led manufacturing expansion 
in Malaysia. Growing incomes from resource exports and EO manufactur­
ing raised domestic demand for IS industries like steel, cement and cars. 
Since domestic savings levels were high, FDI contributed more in terms of 
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employment generation, skill formation and export expansion. These 
lessons are stilI relevant to most developing countries. However, the situa­
tion regarding the spread of electronics MNCs looking for cheap assembly 
sites has changed. Such sites are relatively well established now, and it is 
unlikely that many other countries (China excepted) will be able to capital­
ize on them in the way Malaysia did. In addition, rapid technological 
progress has made several formerly labour-intensive industries knowledge­
intensive, making it more difficult for less-developed economies to find an 
export niche. Hence, Vietnam and Indonesia are unlikely to attract much 
activity in electronics industries, despite rising wages in Malaysia. 
A number of the instruments used by Malaysia and other East Asian 
countries will no longer be permissible in the new global environment. 
Domestic linkages can no longer be stimulated by local content require­
ments. Infant industries can no longer be offered protection. Export subsi­
dies and requirements will not be permissible. In Malaysia, the share of 
foreign equity ownership was made contingent on exports; such discrimina­
tory treatment of foreign firms will no longer be permissible. Technological 
arrangements under the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
have similar provisions, restricting the ability of developing countries to 
imitate or reverse-engineer foreign technologies. This will close an avenue 
for technology development that proved invaluable to NIEs like Korea and 
Taiwan (and several rich countries at critical stages of their industrialization 
processes). 
The liberalization of world markets and the ending of the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement (MFA) quotas will open up new markets to developing country 
producers. However, the benefits are likely to be very unequally distributed. 
Only countries with strong capabilities and cluster potential are likely to 
benefit. In thc high-technology arca, such a structure is emerging in Penang 
but it lacks innovation and systems integration tendencies. Developing 
economies have to launch strategies to create duster dynamics if they are 
to attract FDI and benefit from the resulting agglomeration and learning 
economies. 
The Malaysian experience suggests that it is critical for policymakers to 
focus on the creation and sustenance of human capital coordinated with 
firms' capability building. There are two issues here. The first concerns skill 
formation and the second the development of new entrepreneurs. The first 
involves institutional development on a national scale, so that the educa­
tion and training system can create the requisite human capital. The second 
involves creating an enabling framework for entrepreneurs to start new 
firms. The open system framework of Penang resembles Silicon Valley 
except that it has not absorbed the product innovation capabilities pio­
neered by Canon and Intel's systems integration business model. The open 
330 Competitiveness, PDf and technological activitv in East Asia 
systems framework of Penang has led to professionals entering firms and 
leaving them to open new businesses. An integrated business network 
linking MNCs, local firms, chambers of commerce, political institutions 
and the community has stimulated the continuous creation of new firms. 
This is generally missing in other locations in Malaysia. 
The Malaysian experience also shows that MNCs are unlikely to invest 
in building local capabilities and institutions when they cannot appropriate 
the returns fully and when they do not have effective control over their coor­
dination. There is thus a need for significant government intervention to 
overcome market failures and to resolve collective action problems. The 
Penang government played an exemplary role in subsidizing and promoting 
the PSDC to resolve collective action problems on the supply of training. 
MNCs participated but only after the Penang Development Corporation 
took the lead by subsidizing PSDC operations. 
Finally, developing economies, even though they do not seek to push 
back frontiers of knowledge, must invest in R&D activity. Expanding the 
base of high-level technical skills is criticaL It is also important for R&D 
institutions (including universities) to establish closer coordination with 
firms. At the enterprise level, firms must be encouraged to engage in 
product and process development and research. A comprehensive strategy 
to address all these needs is essential if growth is to be launched and sus­
tained. 
NOTES 
I. 	 Professor and Senior Research Fellow, UNU-INTECH, Maastricht. Comments from 
Sanjaya Lall in particular were very useful in the revision of this paper. I am also grate­
ful to Farukh Iqbal, Migara De Silva, Sujiro Urata, Linsu Kim, Peter Brimble and 
Frederich Sjoberg for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2. 	 Interviews conducted in 1995. 
3. 	 The import dependency ratio is measured as (mi/(yH mi- xi), where mi, xi and yi refer 
to import, export and gross output of the ith industry. 
4. 	 Most studies on effective rates of protection, and profits adjusted to account for protec­
tion involving state supported industries are still classified as confidential. 
5. 	 Drawn from figures supplied by MIDA officials. 
6. 	 Fieldwork by Rasiah (1994). 
7. 	 This un weighted sample had firms from all industries at the 3 digit standard industrial 
classification (SIC) level, located in all states except for Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis and 
the federal territory of Labuan. 
8. 	 Interviews with 15 managing directors from the electronics industry. 
9. 	 Interview conducted by the author in 1994, 
10. 	 Placed initially under the Prime Minister's department, MIMOS was subsequently 
moved to the Science, Technology and Environment Ministry until its recent corporat­
ization. 
11. 	 Interviews by the author in 1994. 
12. 	 Traced by the author in the respective years. The actual number can only be more. 
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12. 	 Foreign direct investment, 
technology and competitiveness in 
Thailand 
Peter Brimble1 
1. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT 
1.1 Background 
Foreign direct investment has long played an important role in Thailand's 
economic development. Several researchers have examined the impact of 
FDI on investment, long-term capital inflows, exports, and employment 
generation, but few have looked at the broader impact on human resource 
development and technology transfer.2 Given the growing importance of 
industrial competitiveness and the potential significance of the relationship 
between inward FDI and technological upgrading, this chapter explores 
the links between competitiveness and FDI and domestic technological 
effort. 
Thai policymakers must address two important questions. First, what 
are the most effective ways in which technology transfer can take place 
through FDI, and how can such transfers be accelerated and enhanced? 
Second, what are the policies needed to stimulate alternative (non-FDI) 
modes of technology development within the country? 
1.2 Framework for Analysis 
[n the Ninth Economic and Soeial Development Plan, which will run from 
2002 to 2006, one of the main pillars of Thailand's development strategy is 
improving competitiveness. The framework proposed for this chapter 
(Figure 12.1) goes further, defining the level of technological development 
at the firm-level including MNCs, large local firms, and small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs largely local in Thailand) as the criti­
cal determinant of competitiveness. Technological progress is taken to 
require a continuous upgrading of technology, information and skills. The 
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Figure 12.1 FDI. technology and competitiveness, framework for analysis 
process becomes more complex in an environment where both export com­
petition and technical changes take place simultaneously and at very high 
levels. The two critical sources that determine the level of technological 
development -. FOI and domestic technological effort are shown to feed 
through the environment to the firms in the economy. The environment 
includes three elements: (i) the framework conditions the state of the 
macro-economy and overall policy environment, (ii) the science and engi­
neering base, and (iii) the 'transfer factors' that affect how the technologi­
cal assets of the economy are transformed into firm-level capabilities. These 
include spillovers, training, subcontracting, public-private interaction, 
institutions, facilitators and so on. 
Section 2 presents the macroeconomic backdrop in Thailand and an 
overview of its industrial development process and present levels of com­
petitiveness. Section 3 considers Thailand's approach to FOI and recent 
FOI trends in Thailand. The role of FOI in human resource development 
and technological development is also discussed and evaluated. Section 4 
analyses the policy approach to, and present status of, science and technol­
ogy and human resource development issues, and evaluates technological 
development at the firm level. Section 5 presents conclusions and recom­
mendations. 
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2. 	 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: LEADING TO A 
CROSSROADS 
2.1 	 The Macroeconomic Backdrop and Challenges 
Thailand's economy grew at double-digit rates for several years following 
the world recession of the mid-l 980s and by over 8 per cent per year from 
1991~95. Over the period 1985-94, Thailand recorded the highest growth 
of GNP per capita in the world - 8.2 per cent.) This rapid growth, driven 
largely by growing FOI inflows and exports, was accompanied by a shift 
towards manufacturing, with the manufacturing share of total GOP reach­
ing 29.6 per cent by 1995. Over this period (l988~96). per capita incomes 
rose steadily and the percentage of people in poverty fell from 32.6 to 11.4 
per cent.4 However, the rapid growth placed pressures on infrastructure, 
manpower and the environment and was accompanied by increasing costs 
of production across the board. This began to force Thai manufacturers to 
move into higher value-added, more sophisticated products. 
The key challenge to Thai-based producers, domestic and foreign, by the 
mid-1990s was to enhance production capabilities and move up the value­
added ladder as competition from lower wage countries such as China, 
India, Indonesia and Indochina intensified. Then came the financial crisis. 
On 2 July 1997, the Thai government floated the baht, triggering a collapse 
of the financial sector and a devastating economic recession. GOP declined 
by 1.7 per cent in 1997 and by a further 10.4 per cent in 1998. This com­
pares to expected 1998 growth rates of over 7 per cent as recently as 1996. 
Inflation was estimated to have reached around 8 per cent in 1998, after 
levels of around 5~6 per cent for many years. The value of the baht fell from 
25 to the dollar to around 36-38 in early 2000 (though this was better than 
the rate of 55 seen in early 1998). Table 12.1 shows Thailand's key macro­
economic indicators. 
While the financial collapse was primarily a short-to-medium term phe­
nomenon caused by inadequate financial regulations and weak public and 
private sector governance, the situation was exacerbated by deteriorating 
industrial competitiveness. Export performance worsened dramatically in 
1996, falling by 1.3 per cent after many years of 10 to 20 per cent growth 
rates.5 The stock exchange went through a 'meltdown' in the same year. 
While GOP grew by 5.9 per cent in 1996, the storm clouds were already 
100ming.6 
While the effects of the crisis have yet to run their course, the economy 
returned to 4 per cent growth in 1999. albeit with continuing low capacity 
utilization and significant disruptions in the real sector. Thailand's eco­
nomic recovery sustained most of its momentum in 2000 with real GDP 
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Table 12.1 Thailand's key macroeconomic indicators, J995~2000 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000p 
GDP at current prices (US$ billion) 168.1 181.8 150.7 112.2 123.7 135.0 
Real GDP growth rate (0/.,) 
· 
Overall 8.7 5.9 1.7 -10.4 4.1 4.2 
· 
Agriculture 2.5 3.6 -0.7 -0.3 1.9 0.8 
· 
Manufacturing 11.2 6.9 0.2 11.6 10.5 5.8 
· 
Construction 7.4 7.2 -26.6 -36.8 8.9 1.0 
· 
Services and Others 9.0 5.7 -0.1 -9.0 1.5 3.6 
Sectoral shares of GDP (%) 
· 
Agriculture 9.6 9.6 9.8 11.7 10.0 nla 
· 
Manufact uring 29.6 29.6 29.6 30.7 33.0 nla 
· 
Construction 7.3 7.4 5.7 4.1 3.5 nla 
· 
Services and Others 53.5 53.4 54.9 53.5 54.4 nla 
Inflation (OA. change) 
· 
Consumer Prices 5.8 5.9 5.6 8.1 0.3 1.6 
· 
Wholesale Prices 8.3 4.6 4.0 13.8 -11.6 1.8 
Exports: 
· 
Value (US$ billion) 56.7 55.9 58.3 54.5 58.5 69.9 
·
Growth (%) 25.1 -1.3 4.3 -6.6 7.3 19.5 
Total debt service ratio (%) 11.4 12.3 15.7 21.4 19.4 15.4 
· 
Public (%) 2.8 2.5 2.7 3.3 4.0 4.2 
· 
Private (%) 8.6 9.8 13.0 18.1 15.4 11.2 
Fiscal expenditures (FY) 
· 
Level (US$ billion) 25.8 29.6 32.4 20.2 21.9 21.8 
· 
Fiscal Balance ('X, of GDP) 2.8 2.7 -0.9 -2.6 -2.4 -2.0 
Stock exchange index (end-period) 1281 832 373 356 482 269 
Note: 2000p column is provisional data. 
Source: Bank of Thailand, June 2001 
growth of 4.2 per cent, despite slower industrial expansion. Exports were 
the main engine of growth, rising by almost 20 per cent, as domestic 
demand remained weak and the level of bank credit contracted. 
In 2001 GOP growth is projected to slow (to 1.0-~2.0 per cent or lower) 
due to weak export demand caused by the global slowdown, especially for 
electronics products. This increases the eeonomic risks facing the govern­
ment elected in early 200 I, making a fiscal stimulus package necessary to 
reinvigorate the economy, spur domestic demand and offset the slowdown 
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in exports. This will place pressures on the fiscal balance that was recover­
ing from the negative levels caused by the economic crisis. As economic 
growth slows, the economy will become more vulnerable to weak perfor­
mance in the USA and Japan. Reducing the level of non-performing loans 
and restructuring the corporate sector becomes even more critical to con­
tinued economic improvement and investor confidence. Even if the global 
picture improves and the government continues to reform the finance and 
real sectors, Thailand will still require significant increases in competitive­
ness in the major export sectors. 
In this context of recession and slow recovery, the role of FDI, impor­
tant in the past, becomes even more criticaL FDI is needed to help recapi­
talize failing industries, bring in new technologies, generate or save jobs, 
assist with policy reforms and playa role in addressing the challenges in the 
areas of poverty and social unrest. 7 Two particularly important areas in the 
Thai economic reform process are massive industrial restructuring and 
improvements in corporate governance. FDI may play critical roles both in 
providing the resources to support industrial restructuring and bringing in 
'best practice' in the area of corporate governance. 
2.2 Structural Changes in Industry and the Policy Response 
Industrialization began in Thailand in the late 1950s when the government, 
under the advice of the World Bank, adopted the policy of promoting 
private investment. Since the early 1960s, when the first development plan 
was implemented, the government has supported private enterprise and 
limited government involvement in the economy to the key utility and infra­
structure sectors and to maintaining an incentive structure to encourage 
the private sector. 
In the 1960s, the government followed a traditional import -substitution 
strategy, imposing tariffs on imports, particularly on finished products. The 
role of state enterprises was greatly reduced from the I 950s and investment 
in infrastructure raised. Attention was given to nurturing the institutional 
system necessary for industrial development, and several new organizations 
were established. These included the Board of Investment (BOl), to promote 
domestic and foreign investment through the provision of tax and non-tax 
incentives; the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (IFCT), to 
provide finance to industrial investments; the Small Industry Finance Office, 
to provide finance to SMEs; the Thailand Institute of Scientific and 
Technological Research (TISTR), to enhance research and development and 
testing facilities; and several other agencies to promote SMEs. 
By the late 19608 and early 1970s, the import-substitution policy had led 
to balance of payments problems since most components, raw materials, 
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and machinery to support finished product production had to be imported. 
A major policy shift towards export promotion took place. The govern­
ment implemented numerous policies to facilitate exports, including import 
duty rebates on inputs into export production, incentives for export indus­
tries and concessionary packing credit. However, high protective barriers 
on many products remained, and policymakers resorted to quantitative 
controls on imports and industrial activities in conjunction with tariff pro­
tection. Import bans on automobiles and local content requirements on 
refrigerators and cars are some examples. 
The late 19708 and early 1980s saw continued interest in export indus­
tries, small-scale industries and the promotion of regional industries. In 
1977 a new Investment Promotion Law was passed which provided the BOI 
with more power to provide incentives to priority areas and remove obsta­
cles faced by private investors. The government started to place more 
emphasis on hard and soft infrastructure development, with private sector 
financing becoming increasingly important. 8 Regional inequalities also 
became a key concern and the BOI steadily shifted its emphasis from pro­
moting export activities to promoting regional areas. 
By the early 1980s, policy makers had become aware of the inefficiencies 
fostered by high protection. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, therefore, 
they started to promote openness and competitiveness. However, the strat­
egy of opening up was not well thought through; the selection of sectors 
was carried out in a rather ad hoc manner, based on short-term assessments 
of industrial weaknesses rather than on long-term strategy, The financial 
crisis, in particular, forced the government to focus on the short-run finan­
cial restructuring and corporate restructuring of the large distressed com­
panies. It is only in the last year or so that efforts have returned to the 
formulation of longer-run policies to develop the industrial base and stim­
ulate exports. 
In terms of long-term structural change, Thailand's export structure is 
lagging those of the East Asian NIEs (Table 12.2), In the other three coun­
tries, agriculture has fallen almost to negligible levels, industry has gener­
ally increased (with the exception of Taiwan) and services now account for 
around 50~60 per cent. In Thailand, services are a little less important while 
agriculture remains at 10 per cent. 
On the export front, Thailand also appears to lag (Table 12.3). Since 1980 
resource-based and labour-intensive products have fallen in share by some 
20 percentage points and science-based products have increased by around 
25 percentage points. However, it is likely that much of this increase is in 
the labour-intensive end of science-based production. 
Although S&T and R&D indicators will be discussed later, it is instruc­
tive to compare Thailand with Korea at similar levels of industrial 
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Table J2,2 	 Changes in Thailand's distribution of CDP (%) by sector as 
compared to the NIEs 
1960 1970 1980 1990 1999 1960 1970 1980 1990 1999 
Sector Korea Singapore 
Agriculture 36.9 28.9 14.9 8.5 5.0 5.8 2.3 1.3 0.4 0.2 
Industry 14.7 24.4 41.3 43.1 43.5 10.4 29.8 38.1 34.4 35.8 
Services 48.4 46.7 43.7 48.4 51.5 83.8 67.9 60.6 65.3 64.1 
Taiwan Thailand 
Agriculture nla 17.7 7.7 4.2 2.6 37.1 30.2 23.2 12.5 10.4 
Industry nla 40.9 45.7 41.2 33.1 14.1 25.8 28.7 37.2 40.1 
Services nla 41.4 46.6 54.6 64.3 48.8 44.0 48.1 50.3 49.5 
Source: ADB (2000). 
deve)opment.9 In terms of average GDP per capita and manufacturing 
value-added per head, Thailand in the mid-1990s was lagging Korea by 
around 10-15 years; however, Thailand's R&D indicators lagged some 
additional JO-J5 years behind Korean levels. 
The issue of competitiveness has resonated throughout Southeast Asia 
following the financial crisis. Countries like Thailand have re-examined 
their approach to growth and development. As noted, growing competi­
tion, particularly from lower wage nations such as China, India, Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Vietnam has eroded Thailand's edge in labour-intensive 
exports, and the country failed to undertake the necessary measures to con­
tinue moving up the value-added chain. A recent analysis of the Thai 
response to the economic crisis (Flatters, 1999) concludes: 
While overall productivity growth was moderate, most of it was in agriculture or 
arose from inter-industry shifts. There was little indication of growth of techno­
logical capabilities, or movements 'up the ladder of comparative advantage'. 
Among the widely recognized barriers to growth in competitiveness were very 
low levels and quality of education, serious deficiencies in infrastructure devel­
opment, and a policy regime at the microeconomic level which was much too 
geared to creating and preserving rents than fostering market competition. 
The critical challenge for Thailand now is to build the capacity to absorb 
very complex and fast-moving technologies and to develop and commer­
cialize new products. The Thai government must therefore strengthen the 
technological and skill base of the economy. 
Innovation derives from many factors, many of which fall outside the 
field narrowly defined by science and technology. The crisis has highlighted 
Table 12.3 Distribution of manufactured exports by technological categories 
Korea Singapore Taiwan Thailand 
Sector 1980 1990 1999 1980 1990 1999 1980 1990 1999 1980 1990 1999 
Resource-based 9.0 6.8 11.6 44.4 26.9 13.2 9.8 8.2 9.2 21.7 13.8 10.7 
"" ""­ Labour-intensive 49.2 40.8 23.2 10.6 10.3 7.6 54.3 41.2 31.0 47.0 45.5 35.8 
"­ Scale-intensive 23.6 19.3 21.0 9.3 5.9 5.5 9.1 10.3 10.6 7.8 6.3 7.7 
Differentiated 11.3 15.6 18.7 20.5 22.3 21.2 12.4 20.6 20.4 22.2 14.1 19.5 
Science-based 6.9 17.4 25.5 15.1 34.6 52.5 14.5 19.8 28.9 1.2 20.2 26.4 
Source: Calculated from UN Com trade database. 
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Thailand's glaring deficiencies in R&D, science and technology and its edu­
cation system. The investments in human resources and R&D that are 
required to build the foundations for innovation involve a significant public 
good element, are relatively bulky (or indivisible), and require a long time 
for the results to become evident. This provides clear economic rationale 
for a strong government policy to develop higher quality S&T manpower 
and raise R&D both in the public and private sectors. 
3. FDI POLICIES AND TRENDS 
3.1 The Evolving Policy Approach 
Foreign investment policies The Thai government has generally adopted 
very favourable policies towards FDI. Although there have been laws and 
regulations which limit foreign ownership in certain activities, they have 
been progressively liberalized over the past decade, with an acceleration of 
this trend in the period since the crisis. In particular, the Alien Business Law 
was relaxed in 1999. However, the relaxation on retail business has caused 
public outcry about the impact of large foreign discount stores on local 
retail outlets, and the present government has been under pressure to review 
the law. 10 The Board of Investment (BOI) has also gradually relaxed foreign 
ownership conditions over the past decade, and abolished foreign owner­
ship restrictions for new manufacturing projects in Zones 1 and 2 since 
August 2000 under a new incentive package. The BOI has recently been 
active in undertaking other policy and service measures to stimulate expan­
sion projects from existing investors and new greenfield projects, and also 
to encourage new foreign investment. 
In the service arena, the BOI has enhanced its role in matchmaking by 
introducing a Vendors Meet Customers programme (VMC) into the BOI 
Unit for Industrial Linkage Development (BUILD) programme, which 
involves regular supplier tours to selected automotive and electronics 
assemblers and aims to encourage subcontracting businesses in Thailand. 
BUILD has also launched the ASEAN Supporting Industry Database 
(ASID) in order to encourage sourcing of local parts and components. 
Financial sector liberalization Thailand's weak financial sector played a 
major role in triggering the economic crisis in 1997. The banking and finan­
cial sector had been lending to unsound clients, with inadequate or no col­
lateral and low bank capital requirements. The result was widespread 
misallocation of funds. The result was the near collapse of the financial 
sector in Thailand. Fifty-six finance firms closed by the end of 1997, and 
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six banks were nationalized in 1998. The remaining banks were in frail con­
dition, saddled by 2.73 trillion baht in non-performing loans (NPLs), equal 
to nearly half of all lending. Faced with tremendous recapitalization needs 
of the Thai financial sector, the authorities removed foreign ownership con­
trols for financial institutions, announcing in October 1997 that it would 
allow foreign firms to hold a majority or 100 per cent stake in operating 
financial institutions for up to 10 years. The government also embarked on 
a privatization programme for state-owned banks, the sale of billions of 
baht worth of assets from the closed financial institutions, and more 
recently, drafted legislation to establish the Thailand Asset Management 
Corporation, which will consolidate the remaining NPLs in the banking 
sector. 
Legal infrastructure The legal framework for foreign involvement in 
industrial restructuring and M&A (mergers and acquisitions) activities 
remains weak but has recently been considerably revamped. In particular, 
the Bankruptcy Law was significantly amended by parliament in March 
1999 to provide improved security for new lenders among other measures 
designed to facilitate corporate rehabilitation and debt restructuring. 
Overall, these reforms are expected by most observers to create an environ­
ment of certainty over ownership that will encourage much greater foreign 
involvement in the disposition of the assets from the defunct finance com­
panies as well as working out the non-performing loan problems of the 
financial sector. 
Although the general policy framework for foreign investment in the past 
few years has become more liberal, it must be admitted that relatively little 
attention has been placed on the technological features of FDI; it has been 
sought mainly to generate employment or exports, or to playa role in the 
massive restructuring process. 
3.2 Recent Trends in FDI 
FDI inflows into Thailand increased substantially in the second half of the 
1980s after the Plaza Accord, which resulted in currency appreciation in 
Japan and NlEs such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea. In addition, rising 
labour costs and the loss of GSP status in these countries encouraged 
MNCs to relocate their production base to Thailand. From 1986 to 1989 
Thailand attracted on average US$I.2 billion per annum of net FDI flows, 
accounting for around 7 per cent of private business investment. 
From 1990 to 1996, FDI hovered around a plateau of over US$2 billion 
per year, with a slight drop to US$I. 7 billion in 1993 and US$I.3 billion in 
1994 as the effects of the political unres t in the early 19908 affected foreign 
Table 12.5 Net flows offoreign direct investment in Thailand by sector" 
Million US$ 

Sector 1991-1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 

I. Industry 2836 709 1818 2207 1269 1900 
l.l Food & sugar 233 45 226 73 94 161 
1.2 Textiles 166 49 41 124 21 33 
1.3 Metal & non metallic 387 113 216 342 262 III 
1.4 Electrical appliances 1022 241 602 264 425 276 
1.5 Machinery & transport equipment 352 109 396 661 393 543 
1.6 Chemicals 544 183 164 226 8 503 
...... 
"" 0> 
1.7 Petroleum products 
1.8 Construction materials 
-226 
55 
-250 
4 
10 
10 
329 
23 
9 
38 
36 
58 
1.9 Others 304 216 173 164 20 180 
2. Financial institutionsh 664 72 112 842 247 107 
3. Trade 1591 545 1035 1052 1042 75 
4. Construction 964 70 164 192 152 -19 
5. Mining & quarrying 439 19 20 22 -42 -309 
6. Agriculture 34 2 I I 2 I 
7. Services 312 125 292 276 485 726 
8. Investment 59 -22 26 364 571 273 
9. Real estate 2547 753 112 28 149 75 
10. Others -202 -3 47 161 -9 -383 
Total 9245 2271 3627 5142 3562 2447 
Shares in total (%) 

Sector 19911995 1996 1997 1998 1999 

I. Industry 30.7 31.2 50.1 42.9 35.6 77.6 
1.1 Food & sugar 2.5 2.0 6.2 1.4 2.6 6.6 
1.2 Textiles 1.8 2.2 l.l 2.4 0.6 1.4 
.3 Metal & non metallic 4.2 5.0 6.0 6.6 7.4 4.5 
1.4 Electrical appliances 11.0 10.6 16.6 5.1 11.9 11.3 
.5 Machinery & transport equipment 3.8 4.8 10.9 12.9 11.0 22.2 
1.6 Chemicals 5.9 8.1 4.5 4.4 0.2 20.5 
1.7 Petroleum products -2.4 11.0 0.3 6.4 0.2 1.5 
1.8 Construction materials 0.6 0.2 -0.3 0.5 l.l 2.4 
1.9 Others 3.3 9.5 4.8 3.2 0.6 7.4 
..... 
~ 
2. Financial institutions/; 
3. Trade 
7.2 
17.2 
3.2 
24.0 
3.1 
28.5 
16.4 
20.4 
6.9 
29.3 
4.4 
3.1 
'4 
4. Construction 10.4 3.1 4.5 3.7 -4.3 -0.8 
5. Mining & quarrying 4.8 0.9 0.6 0.4 -1.2 -12.6 
6. Agriculture 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
7. Services 3.4 5.5 8.1 5.4 13.6 29.7 
8. Investment 0.6 -0.9 0.7 7.1 16.0 11.2 
9. Real estate 27.6 33.2 3.1 0.5 4.2 3. 
10. Others -2.2 -0.1 1.3 3.1 -0.2 -15.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: 
a The flgures cover investment in non-bank sector only. 

b Direct investment =equity investment plus loans from related companies. 

Source: Bank of Thailand. by Economic Research Department. 
2000 
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of FDI. Once the banking sector essentially reached its limits for foreign 
participation, FDI dropped to 6 and 4 per cent in 1999 and 2000, respec­
tively. One of the favourite sectors for FDI in the early to mid-1990s was 
rea) estate, which peaked at 33 per cent of FDI in 1996, but since the prop­
erty bubble burst in 1996 and 1997, the sector has struggled to aUract 
investment. 
Within the manufacturing sector, the electronics industry used to attract 
the largest share of FDI but was overtaken by machinery and transport 
equipment in 1998 and 2000. The surge in machinery and transport equip­
ment derived mainly from the automotive industry, as many Japanese auto­
motive parent companies injected capital to assist thcir subsidiaries and 
suppliers in Thailand. The chemical industry is also challenging electronics 
for FDI following its large increase in 2000, taking in over 20 per cent of FDI. 
Sources of FDI in Thailand have traditionally been quite diversified, 
including Japan, the USA, Europe, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore as 
shown in Table 12.6. Japan had been the largest source of FDI since the late 
1980s until being overtaken by the USA in 1999 and 2000. Japanese FDI 
dropped sharply in 1999 and 2000 as a result of the weak economic condi­
tion in the home economy. In 1998, Singapore ranked third behind the USA 
due to its major investments in Bangkok Bank and Thai Danu Bank. There 
was a significant increase in FDI from Europe in 1998 and 1999, especially 
from Dutch investors that have taken control of the Bank of Asia and 
invested in several power plants. It should be noted that FDI from the UK 
and Hong Kong rose significantly in 2000 as they respectively ranked third 
and fourth after the USA and Japan. Closer to home, Thailand's ASEAN 
neighbours remain an important source of FDI despite the regional eco­
nomic difficulties. 
Table 12.7 shows that there has been a decline in investment interest in 
Thailand as the total planned investment of foreign projects approved by 
the BO I dropped by 58 per cent from 326 billion baht in 1996 to 136 billion 
baht in 1999. :However, the number of approved projects increased slightly 
from 490 to 517 projects, reflecting the fact that foreign projects have 
become smaller. This was because since the economic crisis, domestic 
demand has shrunk resulting in oversupply in many industries. However, 
foreign approved projects increased suddenly in 2000 by 48 per cent over 
the previous year, with investment rising by 56 per cent. This was partly due 
to expansion investments of export-oriented projects which performed very 
well after the baht devaluation and partly to a change in the BOI incentive 
package in August 2000 which prompted many investors to apply for pro­
motion status before tax incentives were reduced. 
The number and investment capital of Japanese approved projects 
dropped in 1998 and 1999 as their parent companies were busy injecting 
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capital to help existing subsidiaries rather than investing in new projects. 
However, Japanese investment significantly increased in 2000 especially in 
automotive and electronic sectors. 
Total planned investment from other sources, such as Singapore and 
Taiwan, also fell in 1998 and 1999, while 1998 was the peak year for Europe. 
Investment from the USA and Canada also increased remarkably in 1999. 
It should be noted that investment from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Malaysia, India, the UK and Germany also expanded in 2000. As domes­
tic demand continued to shrink, most new investment projects tended to be 
export-oriented, especially in electronics and light industries. 
The role of FDI in exports has increased quite significantly over the 
years. Sibunruang (1986) estimated that foreign firms accounted for at least 
25 per cent of Thailand's total manufactured exports by the end of the 
1970s, and that the export propensity of foreign firms rose over time from 
10 percent to 33 per cent in 1984. In a later study, based on BOI survey data 
covering 777 companies, Sibunruang and Brimble (1992) found that foreign 
firms accounted for 24 per cent of Thailand's total manufactured exports. 
However, this figure understated the true contribution of FDI, because 777 
firms accounted for only 40 per cent of BOI promoted manufacturing firms 
and the sample excluded non-promoted exporters. Therefore, it was esti­
mated that the real contribution lay between 30-40 per cent. The 983 
foreign promoted firms surveyed by the BOI in 1996 accounted for 35 per 
cent of Thailand's total manufactured exports. Total FDI exports could 
have amounted to as much as 50 per cent of the totaL Export shares of 
foreign firms were relatively large in high-tech industries such as fabricated 
metal products, machine tools, electronic products, chemicals and petro­
leum products. Indeed, by 2000, the electronic and automotive sectors, 
which were dominated by foreign firms, already accounted for 43 per cent 
of Thailand's total manufactured exports. Therefore, the current export 
share of foreign firms could be as high as 60 per cent. 
3.3 FDI Impact on Skill Formation and Technology Development 
A recent study found that foreign firms on average utilized labour and 
capital 50 per cent more efficiently than Thai firms, although a group of 
highly productive Thai firms also performed as well as their foreign 
counterparts. 13 This indicates strongly the critical role that FDI can play in 
contributing to overall productivity (Dollar et. aL, 1998). It has also been 
found that foreign enterprises in Thailand are becoming more involved in 
innovative programmes in training and in undertaking technological act iv­
ities. 14 While not yet constituting a statistically significant quantitative 
trend, there are a number of interesting stories of such activities. 
Table 12.6 Netflows o.fforeign direct investment in Thailand by region/country 
Million US$ 

Region/country 1991~1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 

Japan 1942 524 1348 1485 488 582 
USA 1401 429 781 1283 641 844 
European Union (EU) 998 168 360 912 1368 404 
UK 399 57 124 102 186 425 
Germany 150 42 60 100 288 67 
..... 
v, France 304 30 3 279 240 6 COl 
Netherlands 149 -41 155 332 643 110 
Newly industrialized countries 3250 653 877 1115 899 768 
South Korea 62 25 30 73 6 -4 
Taiwan 424 138 134 106 122 192 
Hong Kong 1832 215 442 394 234 325 
Singapore 932 275 271 542 538 254 
ASEAN (less Singapore) 56 33 27 28 32 20 
Other countries 1597 464 234 320 134 170 
Total 9245 2271 3627 5142 3562 2447 
Shares in total 
Regionlcountry 1991-1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Japan 21.0 23.1 37.2 28.9 13.7 23.8 
USA 15.2 18.9 21.5 25.0 18.0 34.5 
European Union 10.8 7.4 9.9 17.7 38.4 16.5 
UK 4.3 2.5 3.4 2.0 5.2 17.4 
Germany 1.6 1.8 1.6 2.0 8.1 2.7 
Francc 3.3 1.3 0.1 5.4 6.7 0.2 
Netherlands 1.6 -1.8 4.3 6.5 18.1 -4.5 
w Newly industrialized countries 35.2 28.8 24.2 21.7 25.2 31.4 
v. 
....... South Korea 0.7 1.1 0.8 1.4 0.2 -0.2 
Taiwan 4.6 6.1 3.7 2.1 3.4 7.8 
Hong Kong 19.8 9.5 12.2 7.7 6.6 13.3 
Singapore 10.1 12.1 7.5 10.5 15.1 10.4 
ASEAN (less Singapore) 0.6 1.5 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.8 
Other countries 17.3 20.4 6.5 6.2 3.7 -7.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: The ligures cover investment in non-bank sector only. Direct investment equity investment plus loans from related companies. 
Source: Bank of Thailand, by Economic Research Department. 
Table 12.7 Foreign investor interest in Thailand: EOl approvals (million baht) 
Country 
1995 
No. Total 
Invest. 
1996 
No. Total 
Invest. 
1997 
No. Total 
Invest. 
1998 
No. Total 
Invest. 
1999 
No. Total 
Invest. 
2000 
No. Total 
Invest. 
Total foreign invest. 561 397168 490 326335 516 301596 485 255070 517 136060 763 212866 
100% foreign invest. 136 36856 142 75109 188 36846 204 79977 264 77226 380 123231 
Asia 
Japan 267 190569 233 143693 220 147619 158 54113 188 27042 282 107382 
Asian NIEs 
'""-' v, 
""' 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
91 
12 
39945 
2032 
61 
8 
69135 
1675 
56 
9 
11931 
1389 
69 
16 
10029 
5064 
86 
25 
7910 
1899 
120 
31 
17632 
6241 
Korea 14 42247 19 22189 20 3965 13 1836 19 981 17 1394 
Singapore 36 32033 41 41798 43 59028 49 10647 52 7003 84 19910 
PRC 5 196 4 889 I 45 2 69 7 560 8 367 
Malaysia 23 5121 23 1730 33 4713 21 4129 27 3418 43 6096 
Indonesia 3 712 3 634 3 559 2 480 5 1149 4 1300 
Philippines 2 220 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 72 0 0 
India 9 8658 II 8307 5 180 10 10157 6 1374 II 10166 
North America 
USA 45 62613 46 64780 4 88366 62 18646 53 46351 73 37916 
Canada 4 542 2 56 6 310 9 2631 3 26002 6 1089 
Australia 
Australia 7 14775 6 1026 16 4733 13 2756 10 1177 21 2705 
All Europe 72 53592 87 58021 95 88813 123 134326 83 34007 144 31175 
UK 18 6067 22 9952 24 28460 33 31380 17 3919 38 5815 
Germany 12 4352 19 7775 19 9425 22 8606 12 1868 39 6394 
Switzerland 7 1980 9 2630 to 898 11 1548 10 3170 10 2283 
"'" 
France 5 558 8 4389 9 1698 12 181 11 2829 13 1097 
i.:Z Belgium 5 927 7 3498 3 1720 8 948 7 858 2 316 
Italy to 1235 2 38 7 935 4 783 3 106 9 425 
Netherlands 9 1749 15 17476 12 4258 22 88066 18 22481 22 6381 
Note: Firms with investment from more than one country are double counted. Foreign projects are those with a foreign component of 10'% or 
more, 
Source: Board of Investment. 
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build surface ships for the Royal Thai Navy in 1994, has been transferring 
advanced technology developed in Australia to Thailand. Local welders and 
metal workers have been continually trained in new methods of metalwork­
ing that enable them to meet the strict specifications required by the produc­
tion needs. ACS has also assisted with training local subcontractors by 
sponsoring off-site programmes and through the provision of Australian 
engineers and skilled technicians. 
Phoenix Pulp and Paper in northeast Thailand has been very proactive 
in subcontracting. In order to supply the two production lines, the 
company has utilized local villagers to produce individual plantations 
of eucalyptus, bamboo and kenaf plants. These villages raise enough 
wood and are paid nearly one billion baht a year. The company estimated 
that over 1000 villagers gain employment either directly or through sub­
contracting. 
Many MNCs have recently participated in the BOI's VMC programme 
(as a part of the BUILD initiative) by allowing potential suppliers to visit 
their plants and explore the possibility of supplying parts and components 
to them. Foreign companies have also been very active with the matchmak­
ing activities of the BUILD programme since its inception in the early 
I 990s. This resurgence of interest and initiative in BUILD is a very positive 
indication of greater technology transfer from foreign firms in the future. 
The benefits of foreign firms go beyond training and technology devel­
opment. One additional impact they have had in Thailand is to promote 
higher standards of employment practices such as safety and sexual dis­
crimination. Foreign firms have also played an instrumental role in address­
ing issues such as AIDS in the workplace. 17 
3.4 A Summing Up 
FDI has played a significant role in Thailand's economic development, 
especially since the late 1980s as the country liberalized and sought 
expanded markets overseas. The onset of the economic crisis actually gen­
erated record levels of FDI in Thailand, with M&A being the preferred 
mechanism for investment. The current patterns of FDI show a continuing 
strong interest in the manufacturing sector, and it does not appear that this 
will change in the near future as long as Thailand's economy remains based 
heavily on exporting manufactured, labour-intensive goods. The surge of 
FDI in the financial sector in 1998 probably represents an anomaly in 
response to the change in regulations for foreign participation, and other 
sectors such as trade and services have failed to show consistent gains over 
the past few years. 
FDI has made important contributions to the Thai economy beyond 
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generating employment. It has also saved countless jobs during the crisis by 
helping to capitalize failing local industries. Other less evident benefits 
include bringing in new technology and industries to spur competitiveness, 
improving corporate governance and standards for working conditions, 
strengthening local capabilities through linkages, and assisting with policy 
rcforms and industrial restructuring. 
4. 	 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT: 
POLICIES AND TRENDS 
4.1 	 The Policy Approach 
Attention to science was paid in Thailand more than 100 years ago when 
the Department of Science Service was established. But it was not until 
1956 that the government established the National Research Council of 
Thailand (NRCT) to encourage R&D to systematically upgrade the 
country's scientific and technological capabilities. NRCT sets research 
policy and provides research funding, albeit limited, to a wide range of dis­
ciplines including science, engineering, social science and humanities. To 
conduct and support research, the Applied Scientific Research Cor­
poration of Thailand, now known as the Thailand Institute of Scientific 
and Technological Research (TISTR), was created in 1963. Its broad 
objectives are to implement research in applied sciences and to promote 
the utilization of natural resources for industrial and national develop­
ment. 
An important milestone in the development of science and technology 
policies was the establishment of the Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Energy (MOSTE) in 1979 to play the central role of coordinating science 
and technology policy and planning at the national level by bringing six key 
departments belonging to the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry 
of Industry under its wing. They are NRCT, TISTR, the National Energy 
Board, the National Environment Board, the Office of Atomic Energy for 
Peace and the Department of Science Service. In 1992, MOSTE was 
renamed the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment with the 
restructuring of the National Energy Board and the National Environment 
Board, and the addition of two new departments on environment issues. 
The Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1982~86) 
was the first plan with a chapter exclusively devoted to science and tech­
nology. The key policies were to screen and adapt imported technology to 
local conditions and to develop Thailand's own technology. The country's 
scientific and technological base was to be strengthened by emphasizing 
Table 12.8 Rankings 0/ selected technology indicators, 2000 
Indicator Unit Thailand Singapore Malaysia Philippines 
1. Technological sophistication Bus. Per. 3.4 5.9 4.2 2.9 
2. Average years of schooling No. of years 6.10 8.09 7.88 7.62 
3. Secondary school net enrolment Percentage 56 90 59 77 
4. Maths and science education Bus. Per. 3.9 6.5 4.6 3.9 
5. Approach to human resources Bus. Per. 3.5 5.5 4.5 4.0 
6. Management education Bus. Per. 4.6 5.8 4.9 5.9 
7. Research institutions Bus. Per. 2.7 5.1 3.5 3.0 
8. R&D spending °AlofGDP 0.13 1.13 0.24 0.22 
9. Private sector spending on R&D Bus. Per. 2.5 4.1 2.8 2.6 
10. Research collaboration Bus. Per. 3.6 4.2 2.5 2.8 
t..,; 
C\ 
c 
11. Technology development 
12. Licensing of technology 
Bus. Per. 
Bus. Per. 
2.8 
5.2 
4.2 
5.5 
3.2 
5.2 
2.9 
5.2 
Notes: 
Bus. Per.: Business perceptions on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree with the lollowing statements). 
J. Your country'S position in technology ranks among the world leaders. 
2. Average years of schooling by population age 25 and up. 

:I. Secondary education enrolment indicator, 1997. 

4. The school system excels in maths and basic science education. 
5. Companies invest heavily to attract, develop. motivate, and retain staff. 
6. Management education is locally available in first-class business schools. 
7. Scientific research institutions are truly world-class 
8. Research and development spending in percent of GNP, latest available year. 
9. Companies invest heavily in research and development relative to their international peers. 
10. Companies collaborate c1ose1y with loca1 universities in their research and development activities. 
11. Companies obtain technology pioneering their own new products or processes. 
12. Licensing of foreign technology a common means to acquire new 
Source: WEF, The Global Competitiveness Report 2000. 
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Unsurprisingly, Singapore is well ahead of Thailand in every category. 
However, Thailand is also ranked behind Malaysia in nearly every category, 
and in several items fails to keep pace with the Philippines. Both have much 
smaller economies than Thailand. Some interesting features of Table 12.8 
are: 
• 	 Thailand comes well behind Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines 
in most areas of basic education. Particularly worrying is the net sec­
ondary school enrolment rate indicating that nearly half of 
Thailand's children are not enrolled in secondary school. 
• 	 The perceived emphasis on staff training in Thailand falls one full 
point below that of Malaysia and two points behind Singapore. 
• 	 The stronger overall scores of the Philippines in these key HRD areas 
likely explain why it has been able to maintain its competitiveness 
position, despite other problems. 
• 	 Private sector spending on R&D is the lowest of the four countries. 
Thailand also lags far behind its neighbours in key information technology 
indicators, as shown in Table 12.9. 
Some of the shortcomings of Thailand here are dearly a result of the 
language barrier. Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia have a distinct 
advantage over Thailand because of the extensive use of English, with the 
former two countries using it as the national language of business and 
administration. 
Thailand spends, according to Table 12.8, a mere 0.13 per cent of its 
GDP on R&D. A recent study on Thailand's innovation and R&D suggests 
a higher figure, 0.29 per cent.20 According to the latter survey, of the total 
of US$358 million spent on R&D in 1999, the manufacturing sector 
accounted for US$147 million, non-manufacturing firms and SMEs for 
US$26 million and the public sector for US$185 million. Even this more 
optimistic estimate, however, falls far short of the target of 0.75 per cent of 
GDP of the Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan. 
A detailed comparison of R&D in Asia (Table 12.10) shows that Thailand's 
R&D spending per capita of US$5.8 is only ahead of India, Indonesia and 
the Philippines, but is less than half that of Malaysia. While Thailand's total 
R&D exceeds Malaysia's, the amount spent by the private sector on R&D is 
well below. The gap is even more pronounced between Thailand and Malaysia 
in terms of private sector R&D per capita: Thailand's US$2.8 is approxi­
mately one-third of Malaysia's US$8.57. Thailand also fares poorly in its 
ratio of business R&D in total R&D. Its ratio of 48.3 per cent is higher than 
only the Philippines and India. 
In terms of R&D personnel, despite Thailand's population of 62 million 
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and Malaysia's 22.7 million, the former has only 5300 R&D workers in 
manufacturing business enterprises for a per capita ratio of 0.086 (full time 
equivalent per I 000 people).21 Malaysia by comparison employs 3500 R&D 
workers in the private sector for a ratio of 0.16 (full time equivalent per 
I000 people). 
4.3 Human Resource Development 
Thailand lags behind many of its regional competitors in human resource 
development, raising serious concerns about its ability to sustain competi­
tive growth in the future. The English language issue is a structural handi­
cap, but this could have been compensated by investments in education 
(after alL Korea and Taiwan also suffered this handicap). In early stages of 
economic development, Thailand concentrated on developing lower levels 
of education and relied on foreign expertise for higher education and 
research. Before the economic crisis, the education and skill levels of the 
population lagged behind many neighbouring countries. In the mid-1990s, 
only 40 per cent of workers had completed secondary or post-secondary 
education. 
A major factor in Thailand's lagging human resources is the insufficient 
number and quality of S&T students, particularly at the postgraduate level. 
Thailand has a paucity of scientists and engineers who can perform high­
quality R&D. It had only 119 engineers and scientists per million popula­
tion before the economic crisis, compared to more than 2500 each in Korea 
and Singapore and 350 in China (UNESCO, 1997). Private firms in 
Thailand are forced to rely heavily on foreign skilled labour, managers, sci­
entists, and engineers. Thailand's higher education system is partly to 
blame. Thai universities, like those of most other East Asian nations, were 
established primarily as teaching institutions and research was considered 
secondary. In addition, the archaic university system and the government's 
meagre funding for R&D dissuade academics from conducting R&D. This 
makes it very difficult for students to acquire the skills and attitudes needed 
for R&D. 
Thai universities also suffer from staffing problems. In 1997, around 55 
per cent of academic staff in public universities had a masters degree, while 
27 per cent held doctorates. Breakdowns of staff qualifications for science 
and engineering were not available, but there are strong indications that 
staff-student ratios in S&T university faculties have been deteriorating as 
academic staff leave for the private sector while student enrolments con­
tinue to rise. This trend may well be exacerbated by the recent moves to 
support early retirement of public university lecturers. A major problem is 
the wide disparity between academic salaries and salaries in the private 
If! I IIIi£ a 
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sector. In areas like telecommunications the gap can be as wide as five times 
or more. The disparity in basic wages is too wide to be covered by the addi­
tional income academics might earn from private consulting. The univer­
sity wage structure is very inflexible. High-level S&T skills can be acquired 
abroad, but very heavy reliance on foreign training is undesirable. It is more 
expensive, may have less direct application to Thai industry and raises the 
risk of a brain drain. 
One of the major initiatives to improve the quality and quantity of S&T 
in Thai universities is the Higher Education Development Project financed 
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). This project intends to raise S&T 
human resources by funding Thai university training at the postgraduate 
level. Various consortia have been formed among Thai universities and in 
partnership with industry to develop postgraduate S&T projects in seven 
fields: chemistry; environmental science, technology, and management; 
environmental and hazardous waste management; energy and environmen­
tal technology; petroleum and petrochemical technology; agricultural 
biotechnology; and post harvest technology. The project is expected to 
produce S&T postgraduates to meet the public and private sectors' labour 
demands, stimulate research and technological development, and facilitate 
Thailand's structural shift up the technology ladder in manufacturing and 
services. 
4.4 Technological Development at the Firm Level 
Thai companies have focused on acquiring strong manufacturing capabil­
ities through imports of foreign technology, with little attention being paid 
to engineering, design, development and research. Yet, as noted, these 
capabilities will be essential for Thailand's future growth as lower-cost com­
petitors emerge and the world market becomes more competitive. Most 
studies of the technological capabilities in Thai firms indicate that growth 
has been based on low-technology activities with little attention paid to 
strengthening long-run technological capacities and technological learning 
(Intarakumnerd et aI., 2002). A recent study of technology development 
supported by the World Bank (Arnold et aI., 2000) uses the framework pre­
sented in Figure 12.2 to analyse technological activity among different 
types of Thai firms. 
Most large MNC subsidiaries, some large domestic firms and a few 
SMEs are generally able to acquire and assimilate technologies reasonably 
well, and are therefore on the threshold of technology upgrading and 
reverse engineering. Relatively few such firms have actually gone further 
into research and technology development.22 The situation for the remain­
ing large firms and SMEs is more worrying. In many of these firms, even 
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5. 	 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 	 Main Conclusions 
(a) 	 Thai policymakers have generally not been aware of the importance 
of technology and the need to devise policies supportive of R&D and 
S&T. Government expenditures in these areas have been insufficient, 
as have policies to encourage private R&D. The coordination of tech­
nology support policies has been weak, especially in linking such pol­
icies to broader economic policies and institutions. 
(b) 	 Thai industrial firms have not recognized the importance of investing 
in R&D and human resources. Many have diversified into peripheral 
businesses rather than consolidate their position in regional or global 
markets. They generally lack a strategic vision of moving up the value 
chain, and do not engage in collective action (through business asso­
ciations and groupings) to undertake technological activity. 
(c) 	 The education and training system is not geared to providing the 
human resources needed for technology upgrading and innovation. 
Despite rising enrolment rates, Thailand's educational system, partic­
ularly the higher education system, remains weak. The resources pro­
vided are inadequate, curricula are outdated and teachers poorly paid 
and under-trained. Technical subjects receive little emphasis. At the 
firm level, employee training is low, partly because of employers' atti­
tudes but also because of the lack of suitable institutions to provide 
the necessary training. 
(d) 	 The full potential of FDI has not been realized. Despite the billions of 
dollars of inflows, little attention has been given to raising linkages 
between foreign and domestic firms, inducing affiliates to deepen tech­
nological activity and parents to transfer innovative activities and skills. 
5.2 	 How to Kill some Demons among Policymakers 
There are some features of Thai science and technology policymaking that 
have to be addressed: 
• 	 There is insufficient realization that industrial firms are not only users 
of S&T services but also the major generators of technology firms 
are in fact at the centre of the national innovation system. Evidence 
from developed countries shows that up to 80 per cent of technolog­
ical effort is expended by firms. The perception in Thailand remains 
that the government's role is to support technological activities 
through public sector research institutions. This leads the govern-
l!!" 111f * ; 	 Ii' 
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ment to neglect the role of measures to stimulate firm-level techno­
logical effort. 
• 	 Policymakers must understand that the main challenge today is to 
build knowledge, not just buildings and machines. Most incentives in 
place are aimed at capital investments of one kind or another. While 
there has been much talk of the 'knowledge economy' and the value 
of information, policies to support the acquisition, utilization and 
development of such assets have yet to be developed and imple­
mented. 
• 	 The prevailing perception is that MNC strategies are completely 
determined by the head office, and that there is little is to be gained 
by closer collaboration with local affiliates. In fact, MNCs often give 
autonomy to their affiliates to devote resources to a range of techno­
logical activities and increasingly regard this as crucial to their global 
competitiveness. This trend is also evident in Thailand and needs to 
be exploited. 
• 	 A common perception in Thailand is that large or foreign firms do 
not require assistance from the government. International evidence 
suggests that the government can use incentives to encourage large 
and progressive firms to raise their technological activity and link up 
more closely to domestic suppliers and institutions. 
• 	 There is insufficient appreciation of the significance of clusters, net­
works, partnerships and the like in enhancing competitiveness. 
5.3 An Agenda for .'DI Policies 
Promoting linkages and spillovers Efforts to enhance spillover benefits 
from FDI should be an intrinsic part of government strategies to enhance 
competitiveness and restructure industry. There is a strong case for govern­
ment interventions because of the widespread externalities and informa­
tion problems involved in building local linkages (UNCTAD World 
Investment Report, 2001). Such programmes are weak or absent in 
Thailand. It is recommended that: 
• 	 The government set up mechanisms to interact with MNCs in formu­
lating policies and getting feedback on the impact and implementa­
tion of policies. The recent activities of the foreign business 
community to meet regularly with key government agencies have 
been fruitful and should be intensified.26 
• 	 The government should support local firms through vendor develop­
ment programmes and other activities such as cluster and supply 
chain development. UNCTAD's World Investment Report, 2001 
372 Competitiveness, FDI and technological activily in East Asia 
NOTES 

1. 	 This paper was prepared by Peter Brimble of The Brooker Group pic, as an input into 
a World Bank project on Competitiveness, FDI and Technological Activity in East Asia. 
Substantive inputs were received from A tchaka Sibunruang on Section 3 and from David 
Oldfield on parts of Section 2 and 4. The research in this paper is based mainly on sec­
ondary sources, with a few selected interviews and industry meetings. 
2. 	 Brimble et al. (1999) present a comprehensive overview of these issues. 
3. As documented in the World Bank Atlas of 1996. 

4, See Development Evaluation Division (1998). 

5. 	 A constellation of factors led to the rapid decline in exports in addition to declining com­
petitiveness, including a slowdown in world trade, the emergence of China in global 
markets, EU restraints on certain Thai exports, and fluctuations in global electronic 
markets. 
6. 	 See Siamwalla (1997). 
7, 	 In this context, the increasing anti-foreign feelings that have characterized the policy 
approach in the first half of 2001 are a cause for concern, especially if they eventually 
extend beyond simple rhetoric to actual measures to roll back the critical reforms and to 
introduce anti-foreign regulations into the business environment. 
8. 	 See Brimble et al. (1993) for an analysis of the role of the private sector in the infrastruc­
ture sector. Annex I-E summarizes the private sector initiatives of the Seventh Plan, 
9. 	 This comparison is developed in more depth in Arnold et at. (2000). 
10. 	 Indeed, a committee has been established to review the law, and preliminary indications 
are that a more restrictive definition of foreign ownership will be recommended as an 
amendment to the law. The time frame for the consideration and possible implementa­
tion of this are uncertain. 
) 1. It should be noted that the Bank of Thailand did not include foreign capital inflows for 
banking capitalization in FDI statistics. The figure was about US$2 billion in 1998, 
which is when most of the capital injections into the banking sector occurred. 
12. 	 See the World Investment Report 1992, published by UNCTAD, for a more detailed anal­
ysis of the productivity of foreign firms versus that of domestic firms in developing coun­
tries. 
13. 	 These results were calculated from firm-level data of more than 1000 tirms from which 
a simple production function was estimated. More details are provided in Dollar et al. 
(1998). 
14. 	 See Brimble et aL (1999) for additional examples, More such case studies are presently 
being compiled by The Brooker Group for a number of research projects related to com­
petitiveness. 
15. 	 Storage Technology essentially includes all elements of the technology that is embodied 
in the products of the HDD industry. 
16. 	 See UNCTAD World Investment Report (2001) for a detailed profile of the TMT sup­
plier initiative. 
17. 	 An innovative position paper presented in Joint Foreign Chambers of Commerce in 
Thailand (1FCCT) (2001) contains additional examples of the beneficial impacts of 
MNCs and identifies. from the perspective of the MNCs themselves, ways and means of 
enhancing these impacts. 
18. 	 Arnold et al. (2000) consider these issues in some depth. 
19, 	 It deserves to be emphasized that the figures in Table 12.8 that are derived from business 
perceptions must be treated with caution, However, they are included here as they rep­
resent the perceptions of business and are often used by foreign investors when making 
investment decisions, 
20. 	 See the draft final report of the NSTDA R&D/Innovation Survey in Brooker Group (200 I), 
21 	 See the draft final report of the NSTDA R&D/Innovation Survey in Brooker Group 
(2001). Since the survey only covered the manufacturing sector, no results are available 
for the entire business sector. 
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22. 	 A recent survey of R&D in Thailand confirms this, finding that only around IS per cent 
of medium to large manufacturing firms carried out some form of R&D (Brooker 
Group, 2001). 
23. 	 '. . given Thailand's present level of economic development and its desire to continue 
rapid growth based on greater internationalization and competitiveness ... The country 
needs to strengthen considerably its technological capability in industry. While most 
firms in the modern sector have reasonably adequate capability to operate their existing 
technology, they are weak in searching for, acquiring and adapting foreign technology. 
They are even weaker in developing their own technology. Local R&D e/l'orts are 
minimal in the private sector .. .' (Dahlman and Brimble, 1990, p. 41). 
24. 	 Brooker Group interviews with private firms. 
25. 	 Arnold et al. (2000). 
26. 	 See Joint Foreign Chambers of Commerce in Thailand (JFCCT) (2001) for more details 
on the content and nature of these meetings and rclatcd activities of the foreign business 
community. 
27. 	 See Brooker Group (2001). The proposal has been widely accepted, yet not acted on to 
date. 
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development and the policies that supported this. Section 4 discusses the 
lessons from Indonesia's technological development. 
2. 	 INDICATORS OF INDONESIAN 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Technological development cannot be captured in a single measure; it is 
necessary to use several complementary indicators to get a clear picture 
(Hill and Wie, 1998: 13). It can be evaluated from 'inputs' ~ R&D, educa­
tion or 'outputs' export competitiveness or productivity.2 Let us start 
with one output indicator: exports. Figure 13.1 shows total and manufac­
tured exports in Indonesia for 1980~98. Total exports grew very rapidly, at 
around 12 per cent per year; the performance of manufactured exports, at 
23 per cent per year, was even more impressive. As a result, the share of 
manufactured products in total exports increased from 4 per cent in 1980 
to 56 per cent by 1997. 
At the sectoral leveL most industries enjoyed high export growth (Table 
13.1); with the exception of wood and steel, other industries had annual 
growth rates of over 20 per cent in dollar terms. Moreover. although 
resource-based and labour-intensive industries (such as food, garments, 
footwear, and toys) still account for over half of total manufactured 
exports, Indonesia did diversify its export base significantly. For instance, 
exports of textiles and electronics increased rapidly, their shares in manu­
factured exports rising from 10.8 and 3.2 per cent, respectively, in 1990 to 
14.5 and 11.2 per cent by 1996. 
However, despite this strong performance, Indonesian exports remain 
dominated by resource-based and labour-intensive products. In compari­
son to other countries in the region, its export structure is relatively unso­
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Figure 13.1 Total and manufactured exports in Indonesia, I 980~98 
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phisticated (Table 13.2), even relative to other industrial latecomers like 
Malaysia and Thailand. For instance, about 50 per cent of Thailand's 
export is categorized as being technologically complex, whereas the corre­
sponding figure for Indonesia is around 23 per cent. 
It should be stressed that export figures are an imperfect measure of tech­
nology. For instance, classifying industries at different levels of technolog­
ical intensity may be misleading: some low-technology products may use 
relatively sophisticated technological processes; and conversely, apparently 
high-technology activity may consist of simple assembly of imported com­
ponents. In Indonesia, the latter is illustrated by electronics. The share of 
high-technology electronics products in manufactured exports was above 
II per cent in 1996, while its share of manufacturing value-added is below 
4 per cent. This suggests that the industry consists largely of assembling 
imported inputs rather than making complex components. Of course, it 
should be expected that a country like Indonesia, with abundant labour and 
plentiful natural resources, would specialize in products that intensively use 
these factors rather than in high-technology products. At the same time, 
maintaining dynamic export growth does require a steady move up the 
technology ladder, and other resource-rich countries, such as Malaysia, 
have supplemented healthy growth of resource based products with far 
more dynamic high-technology ones. 
Other measures of technological performance seem to confirm 
Indonesia's technological lags. Take some 'input' measures. Table 13.3 
shows R&D expenditure as a percentage of GNP in some Asian countries. 
Indonesia allocated only 0.07 per cent of GNP to R&D in 1994, substan­
tially less than any other country in the region, even those with a similar or 
lower GNP per capita (Philippines and India). Similarly, Indonesia has 
very low patent applications between 1981 and 1990: 12 compared to 
Korea's 6629. Malaysia's 406, the Philippines' 141, Singapore's 812, and 
Thailand's 144.3 
The stock of skilled professionals shows, indirectly, the ability of a 
country to undertake technological effort. Indonesia possesses one of the 
smallest pools of skilled workers in the region, attributable to the low pro­
portion of Indonesians enrolled in, or graduating from, science and tech­
nology courses at tertiary level (Hill, 1995: 94). 
International comparisons of measures such as R&D and education 
may, however, underestimate technological efforts in Indonesia. They do 
not capture the kinds of informal technological activity that predominate 
in early stages of development, when most new technology is likely to be 
imported rather than created locally (Evenson and Westphal, 1995: 2249). 
The following discussion offers a more complete picture of technology 
development in Indonesia. 
Table 13.1 Average annual growth rates ofmanufactured exports 1990-96 and sectors' shares of total manufacturing 
export (%) 
Sector International Export growth Sector's share of total export 
Standard 
Industrial 
Classification 
1990 1996 
w 
0; 
Resource-intensive Food, beverage, tobacco 
Wood and furniture 
Coal and oil refineries 
Rubber 
Non-metallic minerals 
31 
33 
353,354 
355 
36 
26.6 
18.4 
nla 
20.9 
21.6 
11.5 
31.3 
0.0 
1l.9 
2.0 
11.7 
19.3 
0.0 
8.5 
1.5 
Labour-intensive Garment 
Leather and footwear 
Toys, etc. 
322 
323,324 
39 
25.0 
40.8 
43.0 
7.7 
3.2 
0.4 
7.1 
7.6 
1.2 
Scale-intensive Textile 
Paper and printing 
Chemicalsa 
Steel and non-ferrous met. 
Transport 
321 
34 
351,352 
37 
384 
31.3 
27.0 
21.8 
9.2 
57.9 
10.8 
2.3 
4.7 
7.1 
0.5 
14.5 
2.4 
3.6 
2.5 
3.6 
Differentiated 	 Metal products 381 29.3 1.7 2.1 
Machinery 382 56.3 0.1 0.6 
Science-based 	 Pharmaceuticals" 33.1 0.2 0.3 
Plastics 356 32.6 1.2 1.7 
Electronics 383 47.4 3.2 11.2 
Precision 385 68.6 0.0 0.5 
....... 

~ Total 26.4 100 ]00 

Notes: 
Exports calculated in US dollar terms. 
a except 35221, 35222, 35223. 35224. 
b = 35221,35222.35223 and 35224. 
Source: Calculation based on data from the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics. 
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Table 13.2 	 Distribution ofmanufactured exports by technological 
categories, 1995 
Country Technologically complex High-technology 
Korea 65,2 44.1 
Taiwan 59.9 49.3 
Singapore 79.2 73.7 
Indonesia 23.1 14.8 
Malaysia 78.7 72.8 
Thailand 53.6 45.9 
Notes: 
'Technologically complex' includes three categories: scale-intensive, differentiated, and 

science-based products. 

'High-technology' includes two categories: differentiated and science-based products, 

Source, LaB (1998: 142-3), 
Table 13.3 	 R&D expenditures as percentage of GNP in Indonesia and 
other selected Asian countries 
Country Year R&D expenditure as % of GNP 
Indonesiaa 1994 
India 1994 
Korea 1994 
Malaysia 1994 
Philippines 1992 
Singaporeh 1995 
Thailand 1995 
0.1 
0.7 
2.6 
0.4 
0.2 
1.1 
0.1 
Notes: 
a Figures refer to the prod uctive sector only, 
h Not including R&D in social sciences and humanities. 
Source: UNESCO (1999). 
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3. 	 SOURCES OF TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
AND POLICY ISSUES 
3.1 	 Sources of Technological Capability 
There are two (complementary) ways for a country to improve its techno­
logical capability. The first is to undertake domestic innovation, by build­
ing a strong R&D capability. The second is to import technology from 
other countries by inward FDI, licensing, subcontracting and original 
equipment manufacturing (OEM) arrangements. Both have been used in 
Indonesia. 
Domestic R&D 
R&D is, as noted, relatively low in Indonesia throughout the manufactur­
ing sector (Table 13.4). Even highly R&D-intensive industries internation­
ally spend little on R&D in Indonesia (R&D is only 0.24 per cent of sales 
in pharmaceuticals). However, some Indonesian firms have started to 
conduct R&D, with the share of establishments engaged in R&D higher in 
scale-intensive, differentiated and high-technology industries. Over time, 
this should increase as industry moves into more complex technologies 
where local R&D is essential even to absorb and adapt new technologies. 
The public infrastructure supporting industrial R&D is weak (Hill and 
Wie, 1998; Lall, 1998; Thee, 1998). There are 12 national public R&D insti­
tutes and several regional R&D centres. According to Hill and Wie (1998: 
50), most institutes face two problems. The first is a weak funding base, as 
a result of which they have difficulties in hiring qualified staff. The second 
is the lack of ties with the private sector: R&D programmes tend to be 
supply rather than demand driven, carrying out programmes devised by 
their managers and politicians rather than in response to industrial needs. 
ror example, linkages between public R&D institutes and the successful 
export-oriented textile, garment and electronics firms have been very weak 
(Thee, 1998: 125). Many public R&D institutions have been involved in 
projects like aircraft manufacturing in Bandung, a strategic initiative of the 
government rather than a commercial venture. 
:Foreign direct investment 
Indonesia has traditionally relied on capital inflows through external borrow­
ing rather than FDI. One reason has been the widespread suspicion in 
Indonesia of foreign involvement in general and of FDI in particular. 
However, falling oil prices in the early 1980s led to a liberalization of the FDI 
regime, and this continued throughout the 1980s and 90s. These policy 
changes led to a large influx of FDI and the number of foreign establishments 
Table 13.4 R&D intensity hy industry, 1995 
Group Sector International R&D as a share Share of establishments 
Standard of output ('Yo) engaged in R&D (%) 
Industrial Classification 
Resource-intensive 
Labour-intensive 
'-'.; 
~ 
Scale-intensive 
Differentiated 
Science-based 
Food, beverage, tobacco 
Wood and furniture 
Coal and oil refineries 
Rubber 
Non-metallic minerals 
Garment 
Leather and footwear 
Toys, etc. 
Textile 
Paper and printing 
Chemicals" 
Steel and non-ferrous met. 
Transport 
Metal products 
Machinery 
Pharmaceuticalsb 
Plastics 
Electronics 
Precision 
31 
33 
353, 354 
355 
36 
322 
323, 324 
39 
321 
34 
351,352 
37 
384 
381 
382 
356 
383 
385 
0.02 
0.03 
0.15 
0.05 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.04 
0.02 
O.OS 
0.08 
0.02 
0.05 
0.04 
0.05 
0.24 
0.0 I 
0.09 
0.02 
6.8 
5.4 
13.5 
14.4 
6. 
3.0 
9.6 
7.4 
5.5 
7.0 
17.4 
13.3 
12.4 
7.7 
12.5 
31.1 
4.6 
13.8 
8.1 
Notes: 

" except 35221, 35222,35223,35224. 

h 35221, 35222, 35223 and 35224. 

Source: See Table 13.1. 
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increased by 80 per cent between 1980 and 1990 (Table 13.5). However, the 
foreign share of value-added and employment decreased for some time 
because of the rapid expansion of domestic enterprises, perhaps because they 
were more aware than foreign investors of policy changes and better able to 
take advantage of them. After 1990, however, FOJ rose even faster, with the 
number of foreign-owned establishments increasing by more than 120 per 
cent between 1990 and 1996. The share of foreign enterprises in manufactur­
ing employment rose from to to 16 per cent and in manufacturing value­
added from 22 to 30 per cent over 1990-96. 
Table 13.5 shows that the foreign share of value-added exceeds the 
foreign share of employment: value-added per employee is higher in foreign 
than in domestic establishments. Part of this higher labour productivity can 
be explained by the larger size and greater capital-intensity of foreign affil­
iates. Part is likely to be explained by the use of more advanced technolo­
gies by foreign-owned firms. Okamoto and Sj6holm (2000a) find that the 
pace of technological change, as measured by TFP growth, is relatively high 
in foreign establishments. In fact, foreign establishments, despite account­
ing for relatively small shares of sector output (Table 13.5), generate the 
bulk of TFP growth in many sectors. One plausible explanation for this is 
that foreign affiliates have access to superior technology from parent firms. 
Foreign firms have played a vital role in Indonesia's recent manufactured 
export growth. Exporting is a difficult process, requiring detailed knowl­
edge of foreign markets, distribution systems, regulations and other char­
acteristics; multinationals have a clear advantage in collecting such 
information. It also needs specialized skills, technologies and capabilities 
that MNCs generally possess to a greater extent than local firms. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that foreign firms in Indonesia export more in relation 
to output than domestic firms (Ramstetter, 1999). Moreover, even the 
foreign firms that start by producing only for the Indonesian market tend 
to be relatively flexible and seek out foreign markets when this is profitable 
(Sj6holm, 1999a). Figure 13.2 shows the correlation between inward FOI 
flows and manufactured exports. 
While MNCs have certainly introduced new technologies and manufac­
turing capabilities to Indonesia, their impact on domestic firms is more 
ambiguous. There are likely to be both positive and negative effects on 
domestic firms from the entry of FDL Some domestic firms face decreases 
in their market shares and may even be forced out of business; in contrast, 
firms supplying foreign affiliates may enjoy larger markets. Some firms may 
gain access to the new technologies brought in by MNCs and so raise their 
productivity and competitiveness. Others may respond to increased compe­
tition by investing in new technologies. There may be other spillover bene­
fits from MNCs from labour turnover or demonstration effects. 
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the wider dissemination of technology. Hence, FOI attraction should be 
complemented by policies to increase the degree of competition and raise 
the level of local skills and capabilities. 
Other external private sources: the case of local textile companies 
Formal technology transfers through FOI and licensing agreements are 
clearly important in acquiring and mastering new technology. However, a 
case study of some local Indonesian firms reveals that these mechanisms 
are only part of technology inflows from abroad. Table 13.6 shows various 
sources of technology in seven major Indonesian textile firms.4 All these 
firms are successful exporters. Two have licensing agreements with Japanese 
textile companies, buying proprietary technologies from Japanese compa­
nies in return for royalty fees. However. this formal channel is only one 
source of technological acquisition. 
Another source is imported capital equipment. All companies surveyed 
purchased capital equipment from abroad, mainly from Japan. As Evenson 
and Westphal (1995: 2264) note, imports of capital goods played an impor­
tant role in the industrial development of many successful export-led 
economies. Indonesian trade statistics show that eq uipment imports are 
rising in importance. As Figure 13.3 shows, the total value of Indonesian 
imported capital equipment has increased sharply since the mid-l 980s. 
Japanese trading companies often played an important role in facilitating 
such imports, for instance by providing loans. In many cases, trading com­
panies also provided valuable marketing know-how and information on 
foreign markets. 
Foreign technical experts have also been an important source of techno­
logical upgrading. All the surveyed companies used foreign, mainly 
Japanese, experts. Many of these experts were financed by Japanese aid. It 
is important to note, however, that tied aid was not the main reason for 
hiring Japanese experts; these experts already have long-standing and 
extensive contacts with Indonesian firms, and employment contracts have 
been generally made through private contacts. Korean and Taiwanese 
experts may be more important in the future, as the number of Japanese 
experts is falling with the decline of Japan's textile industry. 
Japanese and Korean affiliates in Indonesia provide technical assistance 
in the textile industry through inter-company linkages. Almost all the sur­
veyed textile exporters purchase synthetic fibres mainly from foreign affili­
ates, which provide technical assistance as part of the business arrangement. 
This case study shows the importance of various sources of technologi­
cal capability in addition to explicit channels such as FOI and licensing. 
The importance of such sources cannot often be inferred from conven­
tional data on technology purchases or innovation. Our findings are 
(<$.W /i1 ., $. 
". J 
Table 13.6 Sources of technological capability in seven Indonesian textilefirms 
Company Founded No. of Ellport markets Licensing Imported capital Foreign trading Foreign Technical assistance 
employees agreements equipment companies and technical through inter-
buyers experts company linkages 
A nla 1200 	 Japan None Made in Japan JTC Japanese Japanese and Korean 
Indian merchants Korean 	 affiliates in Indonesia 
Non-pribumi firms 
(Indian) 
B 1968 1552 	 Malaysia, Brunei, Yes nla nla Japanese Mainly a 
Canada, Australia, From 1985-prescnt affiliate in 
Others (Japan) 
C 1976 2400 	 Middle East (55'%) None Made in Japan, Indian merchants Japancse Japanese and Korean 
Europe (20r:!o) purchased in 1989 affiliates in Indonesia 
Others through JTC Non-pribumi firms 
(Indian)
v., 
Q:) D 1962 	 1600 Europe None Made in Japan, Chinese buycrs Japanese Japanese and Korean 
'..j Middle East purchased between affiliates in Indonesia 
1986-96 through 
JTC 
E 1976 1500 Europe (60%) None Made in Japan JTC Taiwanese Mainly a Japanese 
Middle East (10%) Japanese affiliate in Indonesia 
USA (5 
Others 
F 1969 1230 Middle East None Made in Japan nla Japanese Japanese affiliates 
Europe Made in Korea in Indonesia 
G 1970 2500 Asia (30°ltl) Yes Yes JTC Japanese Mainly a Japanese 
Europe (30')!o) ( 1994-present) KTC Taiwanese atliliate in Indonesia 
Middle East (20'Vo) (Japan) TTC Korean 
Others 
Note: JTC Japanese trading company; KTC = Korean trading company; TIC ~ Taiwanese trading company. 
Source' Based on research material providt.'d by Mr Abc, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan. 
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Figure 13.3 Machinery imports in Indonesia, 1981-97 
consistent with another study on Indonesian textiles (Pangestu, 1997), 
according to which the main sources of technological capability are 
imports. Imports of equipment and provision of support services by 
foreign firms are some of the observed channels of technology transfer. 
Other external private sources: the case of local SMEs in three industries 
What about technology development in small enterprises? We draw upon a 
survey of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by Berry and Levy 
(1994), who studied successful Indonesian exporters in the garment, rattan 
furniture and carved wooden furniture industries. The findings are similar 
to those for large textile companies, with private external channels being 
pivotal in acquiring technology. Foreign buyers played a dominant role in 
establishing and sustaining export market linkages for SMEs. Local firms 
and foreign buyers had a strong mutual interest in improving the quality of 
the product; the buyers consequently provided designs and technical assis­
tance to producers. In addition, expatriate employees were critical to 
acquiring new technical know-how. In particular, experts from Hong Kong 
and Korea facilitated the introduction of advanced technical know-how. 
SMEs have also been supported in technology development by industry 
association and public agencies. This is particularly the case for pribumi 
(indigenous Indonesian) firms, which lack access to international networks. 
In general, however, private channels tend to be the most important sources 
of technology in all industries surveyed. 
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3.2 Public policy issues 
Studies on technology development stress the importance of incentives, 
education and training, well-developed technical infrastructure and science 
and technology (S&T) policies.5 This subsection evaluates policy and insti­
tutional arrangements in Indonesia in these four areas. 
Incentives 
Most channels of technology transfer, formal or informal, are related to 
trade and FDI. Thus, the adoption of more outward-oriented economic 
policies in the mid-1980s led to a rise in technology inflows into Indonesia. 
Export-oriented investments were stimulated by the duty exemptions and 
drawback scheme introduced in 1986, which allowed exporters to buy 
inputs and capital equipment at international prices (Pangestu, 1997:45). 
Several other measures to reduce the earlier anti-export bias were also 
introduced. Effective rates of protection for manufacturing feU signifi­
cantly, from 59 per cent in 1987 to 16 per cent in 1995 (Fane and Condon, 
1996: 40). Economic reforms were extended in 1994, with further liberal­
ization of FDI and international trade (Pangestu, 1998: 5). 
It may be argued that Indonesia's economic reforms in the 1980s and 
early 1990s did more to promote technology development than any explicit 
technology policy (Hill, 1995: 110, Hill and Wie, 1998:40). Indonesia's 
stable and growing economy, together with policies to promote interna­
tional trade and FDI, facilitated technology inflows and induced indige­
nous firms to upgrade existing technologies and adopt new ones. 
Education and training 
Education and training provide most of the skills needed for technology 
development (Thee, 1998: 119; Lall, 1996). Educational requirements 
change over time: basic literacy and numeracy may be sufficient for the first 
phase of industrialization, but more advanced and specialized skills become 
necessary as the industrial structure becomes more complex and diverse. 
Indonesia expanded basic education rapidly in the 1970s. Over 60000 
new schools were built; real expenditures spent on education more than 
doubled; primary education was made compulsory; and school fees were 
abolished (Duflo, 2000). As a result, a near 100 per cent enrolment ratio was 
achieved in primary education by the 1980s. Secondary school enrolments 
increased from 35 to 48 per cent for male students and from 23 to 39 per 
cent for female students between 1980 and 1993 (Thee, 1998: 121). The 
expansion of primary education received widespread international recog­
nition and it is likely to have facilitated Indonesia's first stage of industrial 
development. 
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However, despite the expansion, the Indonesian education system 
remains weak. Government education expenditures comprise only 2 per 
cent of GDP, substantially lower than most neighbouring countries 
(Booth, J999). Though junior secondary school was made compulsory in 
1994, enrolment rates are still only about 70 per cent (Booth, 2000: 154). 
The quality of education at all levels remains poor.6 Indonesian 9-10 year 
olds perform below the international average in comparative tests (World 
Bank, 1997: 120) and most university graduates are said to require months 
of extensive on-the-job training (Booth, 1999: 30 I). The poor quality of 
education is attributable to large classes, poorly trained teachers and a lack 
of proper school materials. 
There are additional problems at the tertiary level. The system seems to 
emphasize cheap education rather than the provision of the science and 
engineering skills needed by the economy. This has resulted not only in a 
weak skill base but also in high rates of unemployment among university 
graduates. The 44 state universities, 24 state polytechnics and 5 state fine 
arts academies have not been able to meet the demand for higher education 
(Mukhopadhaya, 2000). As a result, more than a thousand private insti­
tutes have been established to meet this demand, but inadequate monitor­
ing has led to widespread quality problems. The government has recently 
abolished university subsidies, which may exacerbate skill shortages. 
Although poor education could be partly offset by extensive on-the-job 
training, Indonesian firms spend relatively little on human resource devel­
opment (HRD). Table 13.7 shows HRD expenditures as a percentage of 
sales and the proportion of establishments with HRD programmes in 1995. 
Expenditures on employee training are low. similar in size to R&D.7 The 
proportion of establishments with HRD is small apart from a few indus­
tries like rubber, steel, pharmaceuticals and electronics. 
A weak skill base may not be a significant problem in the early stage of 
industrial development when low wages and natural resources provide the 
basis for exports and investment. However, more sophisticated production 
technologies require a higher quality of education and training. The weak 
industrial skill base is perhaps the single most important deterrent to tech­
nology development in Indonesia. 
Technological infrastructure 
The technological infrastructure is another important determinant of tech­
nology development. Many forms of technical information and support, 
with public good characteristics, cannot be provided by the market and 
have to be provided by the government (Lall, 1996: 44). The government's 
role includes the setting of industrial standards, the promotion of quality 
awareness, the provision of metrology services, testing or information 
Table 13.7 Human resource develofJment (HRD) in the Indonesian manufacturing sector, 1995 
Group Sector International Standard 
Industrial Classification 
HRD expenditures as a 
share of output (%) 
Share of establishments 
inHRD 
Resource-intensive rood, beverage, tobacco 
Wood and furniture 
Coal and oil refineries 
Rubber 
Non-metallic minerals 
31 
33 
353,354 
355 
36 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.10 
0.02 
9.5 
11.9 
10.8 
23.2 
7.7 
Labour-intensive Garment 
Leather and footwear 
Toys, etc. 
322 
323, 324 
39 
0.01 
0.04 
0.02 
5.6 
12.9 
11.6 
w 
\0 
..... 
Scale-intensive Textile 
Paper and printing 
Chemicalsa 
Steel and non-ferrous metals 
321 
34 
351,352 
37 
384 
0.02 
0.06 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
9.2 
14.7 
19.6 
22.1 
18.9 
Differentiated Metal oroducts 381 
382 
0.03 
0.04 
14.3 
15.1 
Science-based Pharmaceuticalsh 
Plastics 
Electronics 
Precision 
356 
383 
385 
0.26 
0.01 
0.06 
0.03 
35.1 
8.4 
27.4 
14.9 
NOles: 
1/ except 35221,35222,35223,35224. 
h = 35221, 35222. 35223 and 35224. 
Source: See Table 13.1. 
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search for firms that lack the facilities or skills, undertaking contract 
research, and extension services for SMEs, 
The public provision of information and support is particular important 
for SMEs. In a study of SMEs in Japan, Korea, Indonesia and Colombia, 
Levy (1994) concluded that although the leading sources of marketing and 
technical support were private, public initiatives in this area were also 
important. More precisely, public provision of technical information, tech­
nological training and assistance, and joint and contract technology devel­
opment were of significant help to SMEs. Moreover, the need for public 
support tends to be high when technological requirements are complex or 
when private technology networks are weak (Levy, 1994: 30). This suggests 
that as Indonesia moves up the quality ladder, the role of government will 
tend to increase. 
Indonesia has not yet developed an effective technological infrastructure. 
There are numerous examples of institutions failing to address the tasks for 
which they were set up (Thee, 1998: 127). Metrology, standards, testing, and 
quality assurance services are inadequate. This is partly because the impor­
tance of such services is not fully understood, and partly because compre­
hensive industrial standards are lacking (Lall, 1998: 154). Indonesia lacks 
an effective productivity centre to provide industry-wide technical training 
and assistance, especially for SMEs. Organizations such as the Institute for 
Machine Tools, Automation and Production Technology, established to 
provide such services, tend to meet the demands of only a few 'strategic' 
industries (Lall, 1998: 155). 
To sum up, a technical infrastructure is needed to adopt, disseminate, 
and upgrade technology, but presently such an infrastructure is poorly 
developed in Indonesia. 
Specific S&T policies 

One of the most notable, and controversial, of all government interven­

tions in Indonesia since the late I 970s, has been the aggressive high­

technology programme. The government targeted and tried to promote 

indigenous technological capability in ten high-technology industries, 

including aircraft, shipbuilding, railroads, telecommunications, electronics, 

steel and machine goods. The best known part of the program is the devel­

opment of an aircraft industry (IPTN), which has been the government's 

largest and most ambitious programme of technology development (LalI 

1998: 158). 

Despite the accumulation of some engineering and production knowl­
edge, IPTN has never been financially viable. According to McKendrick 
(1992: 64), managerial weakness, the absence of an independent aviation 
agency and Indonesia's weak scientific and engineering infrastructure 
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account for its poor performance. The industry has few linkages with other 
sectors of the economy, and there are few noticeable spillovers (Lall, 1998: 
158). 
Indonesian S&T policy since the late 1970s illustrates that high­
technology projects do not always lead to a broad-based and efficient tech­
nology development, particularly when the underlying research, education 
and technical infrastructure is weak (Hill, 1995: 118). 
3.3 Technology Policy after the Crisis 
No country in Southeast Asia was more severely hurt by the financial crisis 
than Indonesia. GDP fell by about 15 per cent, unemployment and poverty 
increased, many businesses closed down and there were dramatic social and 
political changes. As a result, the scope and potential for technology policy 
is different from the pre-crisis period. Technology seems to be of less imme­
diate concern than raising employment and revitalizing firms forced out of 
business; thus, efforts are likely to focus on labour-intensive rather than 
technology-intensive industries. 8 The government's ability to fund technol­
ogy policy is seriously constrained, as there are many other pressing eco­
nomic needs. The crisis in the financial sector is estimated to cost the 
government somewhere between 60 and 100 per cent of GDP (spread over 
several years). 
Considering the limited benefits of previous public technology projects, 
perhaps it does not matter very much that the government cannot continue 
with these projects. It seems more important that the government concen­
trate its efforts on maintaining high enrolment rates in primary and secon­
dary education. Rising rates of school dropout in poor urban areas 
following the crisis alarmed the government, which responded by abolish­
ing school fees (Booth, 2000: 151-4). The situation seems to have improved, 
but new problems lie ahead. Most importantly, the new decentralized struc­
ture of Indonesia may affect the education system. Two new laws on polit­
ical and fiscal decentralization were introduced in 2001. As a consequence, 
the districts and regions were allowed to keep a larger share of taxes and 
revenues from oil and gas, which had previously been transferred to 
Jakarta. On the other hand, they will also receive fewer transfers from 
Jakarta and will be responsible for certain expenditures, including educa­
tion. The new system will benefit a few resource rich provinces as well as 
West Java and Jakarta, but other parts of Indonesia will suffer substantial 
reductions in resources. There is an obvious risk that these regions will find 
it increasingly difficult to obtain the resources adequately to educate their 
citizens. 
Liberalization of the FDI regime will probably continue since Indonesia 
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is likely to be more dependent on FOI in the future. The financial crisis has 
wiped out large parts of domestic capital and foreign banks are reluctant 
to offer further loans. Financing current account deficits by external bor­
rowing has been found to be much riskier than by relying on FOI. 
Unfortunately, FOI inflows have declined in the last few years, falling from 
a peak of US$6 billion in 1996 to minus US$3 billion in 1999 (Ramstetter, 
2000). To attract new FOI and cope with intensified competition in the 
region, a robust investment regime is needed. If Indonesia can attract more 
FDI, there is the potential for increasing technology diffusion by improv­
ing the skill base and increasing competition in the economy. 
4. 	 SUMMARY AND LESSONS FOR OTHER 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
In Indonesia's present economic predicament, it is easy to forget its remark­
able economic performance during previous decades. Indonesia achieved 
not only high growth rates and improved living standards for the popula­
tion, it also underwent substantial structural transformation. 
At least four lessons can be learned from Indonesia's technology devel­
opment. First, several external sources of technology are important in the 
early stages of industrial development when technological requirements are 
relatively low. Foreign buyers, trading companies, and foreign experts are 
channels through which new technology and know-how are acquired. This 
implies that openness to trade, investment and skilled labour will enhance 
industrial technology development. 
Second, the public sector has to make greater efforts to acquire, upgrade, 
and disseminate technology and know-how as a country moves up the tech­
nology ladder. This is particularly the case when private industrial linkages 
and networks are weak. Hence, government intervention in technology 
development may increase over time. 
Third, FDI can play an important role in introducing new technology, 
generating employment and expanding production and exports. FDI is 
crucial to technology development when there are constraints on domestic 
efforts, notably insufficient government funding. However, FOI does not 
automatically generate substantial spillovers and linkage effects, nor does 
it necessarily lead to technological upgrading. Complementary efforts to 
maximize benefits from FDI are important in enhancing technological 
development. 
Finally, policies targeting high-technology industries tend to fail when 
the technological, managerial and institutional infrastructure is underde­
veloped. Hence, a micro-level intervention to promote technological devel­
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opment might be useful, but only when sufficient skills are available and the 
technical infrastructure is in place. 
NOTES 
I. 	 Asian Development Bank (1999). 
2. 	 For instance, Lall (1998: 138) uses the technological structure of manufactured exports 
(divided between low. medium and high-technology products) as an indicator of techno­
logical sophistication. 
3. 	 See table 1 of Hill (1995: 92). 
4. 	 More specillcally, they are producers and exporters of woven fabric of polyester filament 
yarn or polyester filament fabric. We are grateful to Mr Makolo Abe, Institute of 
Developing Economies in Tokyo, for providing the information in Table 13.6. 
5. 	 Lall (1996, 1998), Thee (1998), Nelson (1993), and Evenson and Westphal (1995). 
6. 	 See, for instance. Hill (1995). Hill and Wie (1998), Lall (19981. Thee (1998), and Booth (1999). 
7. 	 See Table 13.4 for figures on R&D. 
8. 	 However, technology, in the sense of market knOWledge, will continue to be important. In 
fact, exports will be crucial in any expansion of production since domestic demand is con­
strained by the recession. Trade contacts, foreign trading houses, FDI and other channels 
will have to be utilized to achieve the necessary knowledge for this export expansion. 
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